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Rorschach Thesis

I. Introduction

"A test and a tester without adequate psychology are far more dangerous than a psychology and a psychologist without test."

Leopold Szondi (quoted in Mélon 1975b, p. 145).

This Thesis is the product of at least 15 years of direct work on and careful polishing of its concepts. Having participated for the first time in an International Rorschach Congress in 1990 (Paris, the XIIIth of the series), a very stimulating experience, we left the meeting with -among others- the lasting double impression of the exciting work being done by researchers all over the world together with the firm conviction of a general lack of effective communication or knowledge of each other's work between the experts, either because of language or school barriers or even perhaps due to other additional causes not clear to us at the time. Our commitment to put our Rorschach ideas into a visible, communicable form and to give regular reports on their development every 3 years come from that one experience. *Integration* has been from the beginning a paramount ideal for us, either in the diachronical-historical, geographical, or idiomatic Rorschach sense.

Having been an "outsider" as it were of the main centers of Rorschach research, we had nevertheless the good fortune of having been initiated in the method by a convinced advocate of the Classical Swiss tradition, the late L. Jaime Rijo, and of having been able to get in touch with living legends of this school like Fritz Salomon but most specially Roland Kuhn. If one lesson is to be drawn from the work of this whole group of experts it is the way how, without premeditation, their individual contributions perfectly fit with one another perhaps to a degree never seen anywhere else. Having willfully followed their example, the present work must be considered in the end as a late offspring of this scientific tradition in an attempt to demonstrate how all contemporary Rorschach branches organically connect with the same firm classical trunk, and so through this link should remain in principle essentially compatible with each other. Another key word in this whole endeavor, and which sharply differentiates our contribution from others with similarly ambitious aims, is '*theory*': that often misunderstood and neglected aspect of contemporary science -by contrast again to our common Rorschach forefathers- due to a frequently exaggerated opposing emphasis on "pure empiricism", but which is in fact the only dynamic factor able to hold together cohesively all of the Rorschach method's intrinsic elements or resulting scientific 'data' otherwise running the risk of dispersion.

After $\frac{3}{4}$ of a century and in spite of the example constituted by the undying preoccupation of H. Rorschach in this sense, there hasn't still been any real breakthrough in the theoretical foundation of his "experiment" as a whole; if it is true that there have been some, even capital contributions to the psychological

understanding of isolated elements or of essential but still partial dimensions of the instrument, it's also true however that there is still lacking an accomplished explanatory view aiming at the whole of the original formal system of H. Rorschach in its integrity, synthesizing at the same time in a coherent way all of these previous contributions. On the contrary and in contrast to earlier times, the empirical approach to the instrument largely predominant all over the world today leaves aside precisely that kind of preoccupation. Our contention is then to contribute a fresh, structural and definitive view over the way the Rorschach practice -at least in its classical version or so compatible- grounds itself on the firm columns of respectable concepts acquired through our common psychological science, concepts which give a cohesive sense to the interpretive values that the most renowned experts of our discipline who have preceded us have always contended to be revealed through this marvelous test: our contribution thus, primordially theoretical, takes nevertheless firm ground on numerous empirical researches offering them an original and revealing sense regrouping them in a successful synthesis; practical applications that derive from this labor will also be sketched in the last chapter. We have made a very strong and earnest effort to make a contribution as much original as decisive, of which the following achievements and novelties are a proof: review as exhaustive as possible, in the geographical and historical senses, of the pertinent literature in more than 5 main languages; unveiling of the perfect theoretical-formal system of H. Rorschach, central reference schema organizer of all of his ideas and observations but remained largely implicit in his writing; recovery of a dozen of never published original protocols of the Master, one of which is presented and analyzed in chap. IV; in-depth analysis of the always disputed Adolf Eichmann case, with largely unknown and even unpublished material never reassembled since his testing in 1961; etc. Let us examine these rather ambitious goals in still some more detail.

A) Theoretical introduction

A few chosen quotations from certain accomplished Rorschach theorists, precisely what we aspire to become at the end of this work, should allow us to introduce our argument by locating our research in the historical context of Rorschach investigation. To start by the very beginning, here are the words with which Hermann Rorschach himself introduced his master work "Psychodiagnostics" (1921/1942):

The following pages describe the technic of and the results thus far achieved in a *psycho-logical experiment* which, despite its simplicity, has proved to be of value in research and in general testing. *At the outset it must be pointed out that all of the results are predominantly empirical.* The questions which gave rise to the original experiments of this sort (1911) were of a different type from those which slowly developed as the work progressed. *The conclusions drawn, therefore, are to be regarded more as observations than as theoretical deductions. The theoretical foundation for the experiment is, for the most part, still quite incomplete.* (p. 13, italics added)

Just a few months after the release of this publication the author passes away leaving in this unfinished state his important contribution to our psychological science, the inkblot test which with the passing of decades has become one of the most used and

respected ones all over the world. But, despite his insistence in his writings and with his direct disciples (Zulliger 1949a, pp. 294-5: "...he complained always anew about the fact that he had not yet been able to sufficiently ground his work in a theoretical-scientific way") on the absolute necessity of this theoretical foundation of his experiment, the overwhelming majority of his indirect followers -those who knew him only through his book- has concentrated onesidedly on the amplification and sophistication of those empirical data. Let us pay attention to the words of the author of one of the very rare and simultaneously the most recent book on the theory of the test:

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN RORSCHACH THEORY. Over the last seventy years, the Rorschach test has been the subject of a massive body of literature. A variety of systems for administering, scoring, and interpreting the test have been put forward...; a multitude of studies have examined the significance of particular test signs and patterns of test performance; and innumerable books and papers have described clinical applications of the instrument... Yet what is most striking about this literature is not what it includes, but what it lacks. In these tens of thousands of pages, there is remarkably little discussion of the most significant question that can be asked about the test: What is the [psychological] nature of the Rorschach task itself? [At this point he also refers regarding this issue to the Introduction to "Psychodiagnostics", to conclude:] ...Certainly, the basic problem posed by Rorschach is no less with us. Now, as then, the fundamental question remains... (Leichtman 1996b, pp. 1-3)

We have the most immediate proof of this assertion in the impressive work - attempt at unification of the very diverse practice traditions- of John Exner, creator since the '70s of the Rorschach "Comprehensive System" which contemporarily exerts without doubt the widest influence on the world practice of the method. However, this author insists persistently since his first volume (1974) on the primordially empirical nature of his own contribution, leaving as so many others before him the concern for the definitive theoretical foundation to his continuators:

...The work presented here [is] based largely on empirical data... The goal of this work is to present, in a single format, the "best of the Rorschach." This system draws from each of the systems, incorporating those features which, under careful scrutiny, offer the greatest yield, and adds to them other components based on more recent work with the test... It is not based on any particular theoretical position... (pp. x-xi; italics added)

We convinced ourselves that it was more than time to undertake in a privileged way this largely neglected side of Rorschach research, and have dedicated ourselves to the task of redacting this **primordially theoretical** Thesis on the essential -psychological- nature of this method and on the meaning -psychological again- to give to that quantity of empirical data collected with the test during very long years without sufficient connection with established psychological theory. Schachtel, one of our main precursors and models, in the Introduction to his book

(1966) has described better than anybody else this particular aim of our chosen scientific task so we must quote him *in extenso*:

Despite the wealth of stimulating thoughts and implications contained in his book, Rorschach felt that the results of his “experiment” were predominantly empirical observations and that its theoretical foundations were, “for the most part, still quite incomplete.” Of the extensive literature on the test, by far the greatest part has been devoted to adding to these empirical observations and to refinements of technique; relatively few attempts have been made to inquire into the rationale of the test and to contribute to its theoretical foundations... Thus the gap between empirical observations and theoretical understanding, though somewhat narrower than in 1921, when Rorschach’s book was published, is quite large.

The attempt to increase our understanding of the foundations of the test seems important to me for several reasons. For the psychologist interested in theory, the phenomena occurring during a Rorschach test raise a wealth of questions... Any improvement of our understanding of the rationale of the test is likely to contribute to the relevant formulation of these questions and to their eventual solution. It is likely to contribute even more to the *clinician’s* use of the test. One can achieve some competence in the use of the test with the mere knowledge of the empirical findings that certain scores or combinations of scores tend to indicate certain types of pathology, certain tendencies, and certain assets and limitations in the personality of the testee. But such competence and such use of the test remain blind in the sense that they do not derive from an understanding of *why* the scores mean or indicate what they are supposed to indicate. This situation resembles a diagnosis on the basis of symptoms without understanding the nature of the connection between the symptom and the condition it usually indicates. The word “usually” is important here; without understanding the connection between symptom and the condition empirically found with it, one cannot know when what seems on the surface to be the same symptom does *not* indicate the same condition.

The empirical “validation” of the symptomatic significance of certain Rorschach scores does not differ in principle from some of the validation on which much folk wisdom rests, namely, on recurrent experience of a relation between two factors, a score and a trait or tendency... The main difference is that we now have statistical methods that tell us when to accept such a relationship as valid but that do not exclude the possibility that in any particular case it may not be valid. *No amount of [empirical] validation of Rorschach-test-score meanings can substitute for the [theoretical] understanding of what goes on in the test and in its interpretation.* [italics added]

... To use the test without the serious attempt to understand as much as possible of its rationale is tempting as well as dangerous.

It is tempting especially to the beginner, but also to the expert, insofar as it may give one a spurious feeling of security to rely on a fixed meaning of a particular score or a particular symbol (as is done in much of content

interpretation) he has learned from an authority - a teacher or a book. It is more difficult if one has always to examine anew whether such meaning really applies to the concrete response before him. This does not mean, of course, that a statistically valid relation between a particular score and a particular meaning is without value. It only means that it still requires judgment to decide whether the usual meaning applies in a particular case.

If blind dependence on learned meanings of scores and the like is one danger, the development of an esoteric Rorschach language and Rorschach psychology, not or insufficiently connected and integrated with our general knowledge of the normal and abnormal psychology of personality and interpersonal relations, is another. The use of such an esoteric language and of a special Rorschach psychology entails the danger that it does not communicate meaningfully to other people, and not even to other psychologists and psychiatrists. Sometimes it does not even communicate to the person who uses it because his sense of understanding the meaning of this esoteric language is spurious even though it may be comforting and reassuring. Similarly, excessive refinements of "technique," if not *founded on advances in theory and validated by empirical data and concrete understanding* [italics and boldface added], may foster a tendency to confuse the matter to be studied with the method used for the study and to mistake complicated and impressive scores and tabulations for better and more subtle understanding. (pp. 1-3)

B) Scientific methodology

In agreement with the status of things above defined, in this Thesis it isn't about still another personal experimental research but in contrast about a primordially theoretical reflection with the intention of finding and giving a cohesive and integrating sense (1st hypothesis) to this quantity of primordially empirical findings of our predecessors that in general have lacked precisely of a satisfactory theoretical systematization.

Before developing our own view of things, and hand in hand with our day-by-day personally accumulated experience with the test in our clinical and general testing practice for already 25 years, we have made (chap. II) a critical and as exhaustive as possible review of the literature on Rorschach theory since 1921; although this is a task materially feasible for a researcher due to the earlier mentioned relative lack of publications on the subject, one should not mistake oneself about its enormity due to the explosion of the Rorschach movement into a multitude of schools, languages, countries, during more than 80 years. As a result of this review we have been impressed by some significant and illuminating contributions to the understanding of the nature of the instrument by a small group of authors, usually those with direct access to or truly identified with the classical ideas of the creator of the method, but above all we have been struck in general by the unnecessary disagreements and the global lack of integration even when the different authors have proposed to our eyes valid and compatible/complementary theorizations (2nd hypothesis) with those of others. To give but one example, that's the case of

authors from the pheno-menological tradition to be followed attentively like Minkowska or even Kuhn, always reticent to the equally respectable psychoanalytic theorizations despite the key and unquestionable influence that the work of Freud has had on Rorschach's creation (3rd hypothesis).

With the aid of this per(retro)spective we have then turned ourselves (chap. III) precisely towards the source itself, that is Rorschach's work, to attempt to make explicit the concept the author had of his own creation to be thus able from that point on to develop a psychological understanding or theorization of the instrument in agreement with its originary essence. Al-though he has evidently had a globally valid intuition and has even proposed some concrete ideas on his conception of the test (as a perceptual-diagnostic, or 'perceptanalytic' experiment: Pio-trowski), the fact remains that he has not explicated everything in writing and that one must make an inductive or reconstructive work from the details at hand. Let us add that we have not remain-ed content with the recourse to his sole book but that we have also referred ourselves to every other source able to illuminate us about what Rorschach had in mind, including his minor works, his unpublished protocols, his letters, his inkblots, and the testimonies given by those who had interacted with him in person or who have had access to the still zealously garded part of these sources themselves (Morgenthaler, Oberholzer, Römer, Zulliger, Ellenberger, Kuhn, Bash, Exner).

Two things particularly struck us: first the already mentioned obvious presence of Psychoanalysis as the main theoretical reference for him; and -which was far less evident- the everywhere present but implicit triadic formalization of his ideas, visible for example in the closed enumeration of his response scoring categories (locations: whole = G, usual detail = D, and rare detail = Dd; determinants: movement = B, form = F, and color = Fb¹) and meaningfully comparable to similar theoretical schemas (compare for example the last series with the triad of his teacher Bleuler: thinking, will, affect), and which testifies on the existence of an *a priori* structural intuition in him (4th hypothesis) against the opinion of those *a posteriori* atheoretical "systematizers" (Exner) who have always supposed -by projection, since never demonstrated- an unsystematic method in our author. An equally expressive example is that of the standard sequence of his 10 -originally 15- inkblots: the author decided in this way but saying very little, the followers have supposed a symbolic psychogenetic sequence, experimentation has not confir-med it at all (Dworetzki 1939), leaving for us to find the more than plausible explanation in the same principle of spatial structuralization of the determinants through the division of the plates in three subgroups (left-center-right; B-F-Fb; I-III, IV-VII, VIII-X). Those and other similar findings have entirely convinced us of having discovered and set up, for the first time explicitly, Rorschach's original thinking system organizer of all his ideas and observations, but since he never described it himself black-on-white -at least in his documents at our disposal- was left open to us for establishing it only the way of the

¹ Due to a concern for conceptual coherence but also to insist on this 'return to the source' spirit, we have chosen to use -here as everywhere else- the scoring symbols of the Classical Swiss Tradition (abbrev. from German): Rorschach 1921/1948 "Zusammenstellung der Signa und Abkürzungen", Bohm 1951/1972 Appendix.

inductive method (he had the initial, diffuse global intuition and on this basis has subsequently collected detailed experimental data, leaving to us the concern for the superior, empirico-theoretical synthesis that unites those two domains) and for demonstrating it the validation through the hermeneutical reconstruction (Freud 1937/ 1975). About the scientificity of this method (cf. also Ricoeur, Gadamer) and its relationship to experimentation, it seems useful to us to quote here the relevant arguments of the eminent psychiatrist-phenomenologist Ludwig Binswanger (1926/1970):

...Cela ne change rien au fait historique que la psychanalyse de Freud a, pour la première fois systématiquement, *fondé* l' "étude intrinsèque de l'humanité" sur l'expérience. Ce fait est en règle générale négligé aussi par les "critiques" sérieux de la psychologie de Freud, ou n'est pas situé sous son vrai jour. Conformément à la nouveauté de sa procédure à l'intérieur de la science *médicale*, on s'est principalement attaché à ce que Freud appelait interpréter (Deuten), sans se douter, ou en oubliant que cet interpréter, précisément comme "interpréter", avait déjà un nom et s'était déjà acquis un droit de cité dans les sciences les plus différentes. Sous le nom d'*herméneutique*, ou de procédure hermé-neutique dans le sens d'un "art de l'interprétation", et de la présentation, des règles de cet art... Dans la mesure où le contenu particulier et la fin particulière d'une procédure scientifique n'ont rien à voir avec cette procédure en tant que telle, il serait facile de présenter la procédure freudienne d'interprétation comme un cas particulier de l'herméneutique des sciences de l'esprit (philologie, théologie, histoire dans toutes ses branches), et cela dans le sens d'une structuration et d'un approfondissement particuliers, empiriques, de cette herméneutique sous son aspect psychologique ou individuel (Böckh). Et cette proposition est donc également valable... que Freud a, pour la première fois, fondé l'herméneutique sur l'expérience (au sens de la science expérimentale). (p. 157)

In the same sense of the experimental side of our research (defined as "primordially -not exclusively- theoretical"), since it really does exist as long as it is true that it is materially impossible to do pure theory (just as pure empiricism for the rest, no matter what so-called extreme empiricists may say), let us make a recapitulation of the most important researches in this domain that have been our key scientific supporting and inspiration material (cf. the first two paragraphs of this section):

[For each contribution we present, in this order: year of publication, author(s), title, type of research (primordially Experimental or Theoretical), and size of the sample]

1921 405	Rorschach	A Perceptual-diagnostic Experiment	E	
1932	Binder	Light-dark Interpretations	E-T	271
1939 210	Dworetzki	Development of perception	E	

1945-1946	Rapaport et al.	Diagnostic Psychological Testing	T-E	
271				
1948-1954	Zulliger	Z-Test	E	8,000
1949?	Kuhn	Rorschach Introductory Lesson	T	-
1951	Bohm	Textbook of Psychodiagnostics	T-E	>>32
1954	Ellenberger	Life and Work of H. Rorschach	T	-
1957	Piotrowski	Perceptanalysis	E	>200
1962	Salomon	Ego-Diagnostics (genetic-structural)	T	
-				
1966	Schachtel	Experiential Foundations	T	-
1976	Mélon	Ego Figures	T-E	462

Although this is just a narrow selection of the more pertinent works that have made possible for us to reach our essential conclusions, it is enough to show *grosso modo* the balanced proportion between theorization and experimentation and how much experience there is behind our own contribution, inextricably tied to that of our cited predecessors. Personally we have used no formal sample of our own in the usual sense of the experimental method (just as it was the case for the researches of the Rorschach theoreticians Kuhn, Salomon and Schachtel above), but conversely we have followed-through the concern of testing our results in practice with the protocol analysis of some cases according to the idiographic method (chap. IV; cf. references-quotations above of Schachtel and Binswanger on this issue); the more detailed one and in a better position to demonstrate what we can scientifically expect as net profit from our new views and discoveries is that of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, with no equal in projective literature.

Notwithstanding the fact that, on the model of H. Rorschach himself, our theoretical commitment is consciously and predominantly psychoanalytical, our results clearly suggest -and in fact also include some concrete proofs of- the possibility of being integrated without difficulty in other depth-psychological, genetic-psychological, Gestaltic and, last but not least, phenomenological contexts: Psychoanalysis has certainly no exclusivity of valid exploitation of Rorschach theory, but in opposition to so-called "atheoretical" researchers we sustain that in science there must be at least *one* (some) theory guiding our practice. From a still narrower point of view our fundamental theoretical debts are with Jacques Schotte on the one hand, by reference to whom we strive to imitate what he has accomplished for the theorization of the test and, beyond, of the thinking system of his Master L. Szondi, and with Hans Zulliger on the other who without being aware by contrast but in an entirely symmetrical way succeeded in reading under a structural form the contribution of his Master H. Rorschach adding on his side, just as the 'circuits theory' of the former did, "une dimension temporelle à une représentation des choses jusqu'ici purement spatiale" (Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989, p. 21) with his Z-Test, cornerstone of our research.

Since our main data are ideas (intuitions, opinions, rationales, theoretical conclusions) reached by many of our predecessors, we will make much resort to the

tool of the quotation - making things at the same time much easier for the inquisitive reader. In a way, we will make all these colleagues -alive or dead, from far away or nearby, speaking one or another language- meet and participate in an in-depth, lively, mutually respectable, open group discussion - thing that never happened in reality. Let us hope that Rorschach science will only draw benefit from it.

II. A critical review of the works on the theory of the Rorschach

A) Empiricism?

"...Before I appear in front of a congress [on the test, meeting suggested by Roemer]... I'd still like to have given first some theoretical foundation to my test. I cannot finally answer like a quack doctor to all questions about theory only with the stereotyped maxim: in practice it has proven itself, but the theory is dull. I'd like now to start looking myself a little into today's psychological currents. I'd also like to let the material deploy itself still somewhat... But I am now fairly often questioned about theoretical foundations and I see that I must begin with this, that for a great many people something is really true only when a beautiful theory is woven around it."

Hermann Rorschach (2004, p. 397; our translation).

"Une 'théorie', ne l'oublions pas, n'est finalement rien autre chose que ce qui permet de voir (du grec 'théoria'), en le mettant en forme(s), un certain champ de recherche et de pratique scientifiques. Peut-on penser qu'existe dans la psychiatrie d'aujourd'hui et la psychologie clinique qui en est corrélatrice, une telle théorie, entendons quelque chose qui transcende l'empirisme (si cher aux 'cliniciens')?"

Jacques Schotte (1981, p. 1).

As paradoxical as it may seem we must begin our review of the diverse theoretical approaches applied to the Rorschach with a consideration of the numerically important "atheo-retical" or empirical view of it, tradition present in fact from the very beginnings of the method and all along its history to the point of playing still today a very important role. More than probably this tradition stems directly from some ideas of Rorschach himself, as expressed in the Introduction to his book "Psychodiagnostics" (1921/1942)²:

The following pages describe the technic of and the results thus far achieved in a psychological experiment which, despite its simplicity, has proved to be of value in research and in general testing. At the outset it must be pointed out that *all of the results are predominantly empirical*. The questions which gave rise to the original experiments of this sort (1911)^[3] were of a different type from those which slowly developed as the work progressed. *The conclusions*

² To make easier for the reader to identify them we are going to underline each reference to every reviewed work in this entire chapter, always making an effort to follow a chronological order within each section.

³ Rorschach is referring here to the isolated experiments he made with his friend Gehring's schoolers mainly on the expression of intelligence in inkblot imagination –a concept he later abandoned– during his Münsterlingen period (cf. Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 38-9, 57-9).

drawn, therefore, are to be regarded more as obser-vations than as theoretical deductions. The theoretical foundation for the experiment is, for the most part, still quite incomplete. (p. 13, italics added)

Even more paradoxical is the fact that while Rorschach was fully aware of the absolute scientific need for this theoretical foundation (cf. heading quotation above and pp. 207-8 below), he may have contributed in no insignificant way to the development of this counteracting empirical tradition with his above unfortunate choice of words. What we mean is that (in the very clever reasoning of Kuhn, 1944 p. 39) "...*Rorschach's* presumption, namely that his results proceed almost exclusively from experience, is not correct. The most diligent collection of experience material, like for ex. *Hens* also has pursued, does not lead to make a *R o r s c h a c h's* *T e s t* out of the experiment with inkblots... It must be attempted to demonstrate rather *Rorschach's* method, the [formal] method according to which he has elaborated his experience material... Decisive is moreover his concept of man, that served him as foundation. This has probably arisen in part under the influence of his work, but in part it already was largely constituted beforehand, as precisely a look at his earlier works has shown...". Despite our profound conviction (shared with some others besides Kuhn: Ellenberger, 1951b pp. 329-30, 1954/1995; Salomon, 1959b pp. 235-6, 1962 pp. 11-2; Schachtel 1966, pp. 1, 12-3; Silberstein 1987, pp. 33-4) of this Rorschach's way of presentation of his work to be essentially incorrect, this due to his being widely unaware of the far-reaching implications of his own *a priori* definite theoretical choices -as we will develop at length in the next chapter-, the fact is that following his example the Rorschach test began to be presented by many as a "purely empirical" instrument and his failure to give theo-retical foundation to it as an expected consequence of that fact, as a useless and even confound-ing attempt on his part to complicate an already perfectly "objective" procedure⁴.

Far from it, this initial lack of explicit theoretical foundation or guide is what explains in our opinion an all-important practical and eventually historical issue such as the early and almost irreconcilable division between opposing Rorschach schools - particularly in the U.S.A.- after his premature death, epitomized by the specific Beck-Klopfer prototypical controversy (so well recalled by Exner: 1969a pp. 7-9, 12-28). One of the best early experts, Vernon (1935), who was able to understand and foresee many aspects of this controversy still being sustained today, clearly stated the issue in the following way:

In the last two or three years there has been a marked increase of interest in the Ror-schach ink-blot test [*sic*], both among medical psychologists and

⁴ Just to give a superficial introductory example of this ulterior misunderstanding and biased reinterpretation of the creator's original views, consider the meaningful choices in different languages ("*traduttore-traditore!*") of a routine title to describe his method: the non-committal, each time purely descriptive terms of "inkblot test" in English (a non-essential aspect for Rorschach: Exner 1974/2003, p. 8), "psicodiagnóstico" in Spanish (actually, a term insistently suggested by Morgenthaler and reluctantly accepted by Rorschach: 1965/1967 Pt. 2 chap. I.27 p. 245, 1999 pp. 25-9, 2004 pp. 239-43; Exner op. cit. pp. 5-6), and simply "le Rorschach" in French, do not do justice at all to Rorschach's own choice for the routine German term "Formdeutversuch" (form-interpretation test) which clearly implies his specific theoretical representation of the procedure (1921/1967 chap. I.3, 2004 p. 287; cf. the Minkowskis in section C below pp. 79-85, Husain 1997 pp. 14-5, and next chap. III.B.2).

psychometrists... Although the majority of recent investigations have tended to confirm and amplify Rorschach's original claims, and to show that his method is worthy of serious attention from all who are interested in psychodiagnosis, *yet many misconceptions have arisen as to the true nature of the test*. The time seems ripe [1935!], therefore, for a discussion of the status of the method, and of the uses to which it may legitimately be put. *In particular I hope to controvert the view that the Rorschach method is, or even can be, an empirical, objective test*. Such a view is sedulously fostered by German writers who often state that the test is 'rein empirisch', because they have so little conception of what objective testing entails. *But Beck, the chief American authority, has made similar claims*. Hence psychometrists insist on treating it as an empirical test, like a test of intelligence or of special aptitudes; they try to mechanize its application and scoring, and to validate it by correlating the scores on the various categories of response with independent criteria of the 'traits' which they assume that the test aims to measure... Perhaps the issue can best be clarified by examining the proposition that *the Rorschach test is not a test at all, but is a psycho-diagnostic instrument of the play-technique type...*

The psychometric test, whether a test of general intelligence or of special aptitudes or of personality traits, invariably implies the existence of some distinctive psychological function or entity which varies in amount among the different subjects who are tested... The psychometrist's ideal would be to record sufficient samples of objective behaviour in controlled situations to enable him to present a complete cross-section of his subject's personality in terms of scores on all the aptitudes and traits. This static, cross-sectional view of personality... is not the only possible view of personality, and it is not a view which is of much practical value to the medical psychologist, who prefers what might be called the genetic-dynamic or longitudinal view. It should be realized that this dichotomy between psychometrist and clinician, cross-sectional and longitudinal views, scientific observation and intuitive interpretation, is an abstraction... But for the moment the dichotomy must be exaggerated so as to show that the Rorschach test belongs to the latter pole rather than to the former.

The essence of the alternative, clinical, viewpoint is that every psychological event, mental or behavioural, which occurs in an individual now is the direct outcome or causal resultant of his past history, *i.e.* of his presumed constitutional needs as overlaid by interaction with environmental influences; and that if the clinician was sufficiently skilled in tracing out the interplay of all the factors which have entered into this history, he would be able to explain the event completely. Since, however, the interaction and the tracing are so complicated (unlike the simple interrelations which scientists discover in the physical world), he has had to erect certain short cuts or general principles which represent to him frequently occurring species of interaction and of psychological development. *These 'general principles', which include the*

psychopathologist's conceptions of mechanisms and the German characterologist's types, should be regarded as modes of interpreting personality, or intuitive generalizations crystallized out of the experience of the analyst or typologist. Being constructs or mental 'fictions' they stand or fall by their fruitfulness rather than by their objective truth or falsity; hence the lack of agreement among different schools as to which are the most fundamental... Such mechanisms are not, of course, 'things' that can be measured; being reached by a process of interpretation they are not objectively definable like the aptitudes and unitary traits of the psychometrist, and they can certainly not be thought of as varying in quantity without changes in quality. The traits and sentiments, which are the only affective components of personality that the psychometrist seems able to handle, are, to the clinician, useful and necessary for descriptive purposes, but are regarded as rather superficial end-products behind which lie the mechanisms or types that he finds more fruitful...

Now Rorschach himself was a psychiatrist, trained in the atmosphere of pre-[1st world] war psycho-analysis. There can be little doubt that his search for a diagnostic method was inspired mainly by Freud's *Traumdeutung* and Jung's *Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien*, not by the psychometry of Binet, Cattell and Spearman [cf. Kuhn 1944 pp. 29-34, and p. 67 below]. Influenced by the affective biotypes of Jung and the perceptual types of Messmer, Kulpe and others, he expected the ink-blot responses to reveal the fundamental emotional and cognitive organizations of a patient's mental life. *Hence his method is misconceived if it is not studied in the light of his particular 'terminology of personality', i.e. of his own general interpretative principles. And the main problem nowadays is not to prove that the test does or does not measure certain [isolated, objective] traits and abilities, but to translate his 'terminology' into more up-to-date conceptions of [whole, intuitive] personality organization.* (pp. 199-202, italics added; further supporting arguments can be found in Binswanger 1923/1967 -last two sections- & 1926/1970, and in Kadinsky 1970)

This timely assessment by Vernon of Beck's "empirical" position may not hold for the latter's whole life-long Rorschach practice since he understandably went through some changes in scientific make-up discovering rather early (1942) and insisting from then on -against opposition- on the psychoanalytic nature of the method and on the necessary psychoanalytic formation of the Rorschacher (cf. 1939), but as late as 1972 -and still explicitly marking the sharp contrast with Klopfer's approach- he himself explained and insisted on how "...I can remain an unreconstructed empiricist" (p. 107) in Rorschach matters; so by his own avowal this fundamental atheoretical tenet seems to have remained essentially unaffected by the theoretical overcoating. But surprisingly enough -"extremes meet"-, despite Klopfer's sharp criticism of Beck and on his side contrasting, farther-reaching concentration on 'personality' and for that purpose second-thought Jungian-analytical Rorschach developments (1954, 1955), him too seems to have fostered this a- or least-theoretical view with his initial explicit position for the fewest and simplest theoretical commitments in Rorschach practice so as to evade unneeded -according to his understanding- scientific confrontation, a

weak position undisputably refuted in a way valid for any "empirical" partisan by Schachtel (1942) in his critique of the former's first book:

Since the publication of Hermann Rorschach's *Psychodiagnostik* in 1921 quite a few manuals, text books, and introductions to his method have been published in various countries. Although varying in scope and thoroughness they all refrain from examining the psychological foundations of the Rorschach method. Klopfer's book is no exception to this rule and it is for this reason chiefly that... it nowhere approaches the level of Rorschach's own presentation... [p. 604]

It is obvious that the concept of personality in the mind of any student of human nature and personality will be of considerable importance for his insight into people, regardless of whether such a concept be articulate and explicit or vague and even unconscious. When dealing with a diagnostic tool for the exploration of the individual mind and personality it is impossible to make even a single statement without explicit or implicit reference to personality concepts, of which the person making such a statement may be aware or unaware. Klopfer thinks it unnecessary, for purposes of the Rorschach test, to have any theory of personality except the assumption that people are prompted "from without and from within"-page 221-and that the "susceptibility to be stimulated from within, or to be stimulated from without is distributed in mankind according to a normal curve"-page 222. But he constantly uses such concepts as spontaneity, inhibition, control, pseudo-control, repression, sublimation, some of which seem to stem from the psychoanalytic theory of personality which has influenced Rorschach's personality concept. Especially the term *control* is used freely throughout the book, a term which makes little sense unless at least two agencies are assumed within the human personality one of which controls the other, as they are assumed in Freud's theory of the ego and the id. Klopfer, then, makes many more assumptions concerning the human personality that he seems to be aware of-as most people do. But unfortunately in addition to that, he abrogates in one place even those concepts and assumptions which he uses quite explicitly in many other places... [p. 605]

Klopfer succumbs to the same danger to which so many Rorschach workers before him have succumbed, namely of constructing a kind of immanent "Rorschach psychology" which uses the categories of scoring implicitly as categories of human behavior and human psychology, without obtaining at first the necessary insight into their relation to the basic concepts of psychiatric and psychological theory and to the totality of human experience⁵. It was the merit of Rorschach never to lose sight of these relations. (p. 606)

Anyway, under the guidance of these two great, overtly opposing but covertly agreeing early leaders (or "systematizers", in Exner's 1969a term) the initial Rorschach practice in the U.S.A. could not but develop marked by a significant

⁵ In perfect symmetry, also in Beck (1933b) we have precisely another instructive example of the same way of thinking.

empirical-"atheoretical" -or at least insufficiently-theoretical- stamp remaining on this issue basically at the same level where Rorschach himself left it. From their teachings subsequently emerged the very influential figures of Piotrowski and Exner (both analyzed in detail in the next chapter, section A.1) who became the purest exponents of this tradition, a non-insignificant fact since the latter's approach clearly dominates the Rorschach scene today and which we are forced to contradict for the reasons already stated above; on the other hand an "original" leader within the group of "systematizers", David Rapaport (Exner 1969a, pp. 12, 24-5, 27, and chap. 8), insisted in contrast from the get-go on the absolute necessity of making the Rorschach method theoretically rational and understandable so as to maximize its usefulness for psychiatric-diagnostic and general psychological purposes: his important contribution will be analyzed in the next section.

But the opposite, conceptually-oriented reaction was soon to come forward and following the examples of Schachtel (1941, 1943, 1945, 1950) and Rapaport et al. (1945-46/1968), *the first Rorschach authors to attempt a systematic reflection on the theoretical foundation and merits of the main formal superstructure of the method*, gradually there appeared from time to time more questionings about the advisability of hastily adopting the naïve "empirical" approach: just to mention the instances which appear historically most important there were the warnings -much in the spirit of Schachtel's quotation above- of Rickers-Ovsiankina (1943, cf. 1960/1977), Thurstone (1948) and Holt (1954) in the U.S.A., and of Heiss (1954) in Europe, and the sym-posia "Implications for Projective Methods in Recent Developments in Personality Theory" in Connecticut in 1953 (cf. Holzberg 1954, featuring contributions by Auld, Eriksen, Deutch, Schafer) and "Does the Rorschach Technique Need a Theory?" in Japan in 1969 (cf. Kataguchi 1970, with papers by Sorai, Okonogi, Tanaka, Huzioka).

Holt's is certainly the best of this series of papers and the one we feel most close to, not only due to the thorough way in which he analyzes the "empirical" issue but also because of the different theoretical approaches he reviews in their possible application to the Rorschach which we followed-through in expanded form in the subsequent parts of this chapter. Let us reproduce here some of his argument:

Perhaps it would be worth-while to ask some naïve questions: Why do Rorschach work-ers need to bother about theory? Hasn't there been enough empirical clinical research with the test to show that most of the clinical tradition of its interpretation is valid? ...There are four main points to be made in answer to these questions... First, just from the practical viewpoint, a theoretical understanding of the psychological processes that are involved in the Rorschach performance can give much greater *flexibility* to our efforts to analyze and diagnose personalities, at the same time *checking wild speculation*. If we restrict ourselves to looking for and interpreting patterns the significance of which has been demonstrated in empirical research and in our clinical experience, we will be helpless when faced with a new problem or an atypical case-as most of them seem to be! ...It follows directly that theory can have a great value in *teaching* the use of the Rorschach. A skilled and intuitive

clinician [practically all similar descriptions of these times referred implicitly to Klopfer] will have great difficulty in communicating to his students anything of his interpretative ability unless he is able to reflect on his experience and draw from it general principles-which is exactly one stage in the process of theory-formation. In teaching, if we do not emphasize the memorization of arbitrary-seeming equivalences (to caricature: color = affect, shading = anxiety) but rather give the student an understanding of what is going on in the patient as he responds to the blots, through emphasis on systematic rationale, we can get away from the all-too-prevalent "cook-book method" of Rorschach interpretation. No amount of preaching that the test is a Gestalt and that no factor can be interpreted without considering its context can be effective in counteracting this rigid, mechanical attempt to categorize patients... A third practical value of a systematic theoretical understanding of our tests... is in *facilitating communication* between colleagues. The logical positivists have taught us what a large part of theoretical science consists of putting ideas into systematically clear language... And it must be admitted that even old friends and colleagues in clinical testing have difficulty sharing their insights about the Rorschach in the present relatively atheoretical babel of jargons ...Finally [we will turn back to this 4th point later on, cf. p. 18 below]... only with the aid of the logical order given by theory is it possible to *prove* or *disprove* empirical propositions. All of this means that the Rorschach method can become a part of the great body of scientific advance only when research with it is planned and executed with the aid of clearly formulated theory... (pp. 502-4)

Based on these sound arguments and on others we will present in full detail in the next chapter (III.B.1) we reject completely Kataguchi's ones in his introductory remarks to the 1969 Japanese symposium, to refer to an author on the opposite sidewalk. This expert not only refuses the fact that Rorschach developed his method deductively from a specific theory (by contrast, according to him, to Murray's 'wish-pressure' one with the TAT or Rosenzweig's 'frustration-aggression' with the P-F Study) but also denies any influence of Psychoanalysis on this process, on 5 specific grounds: weak reference to Freud in his book, disregard of content symbolism, more influence of Mourly Vold and Fankhauser -non-analysts- than of Jung on the Experience Type, exclusive reference to Bleuler's associationist psychology in his presentation of the response process, and contrast with his own previous widely analytical publications. He adds that while he does not accept a simple 'no' as an answer to the question posed by the symposium's title, he recognizes quite rightly that the issue in question has marked significantly the history of Rorschach research. Sorai (1970) in the same session -as we do on our side- tries to refer to the source itself ("*Psychodiagnostik*") to throw light on the issue but without much success in attaining definite clarifications; we sincerely hope to be able to do better.

Naturally this mainly critical trend provoked the corresponding counterreaction of the Rorschach "systematizers" on their initial empirical positions, who then published papers explaining in more detail their respective (and differing) attitudes

toward theory - with a particular reference to psychopathology⁶. Klopfers (1954) for one made *a posteriori* a correcting, explicit and far-reaching Jungian commitment (section F below), and similarly Beck (1955) provided a more careful consideration of the eventual convergences between his experimental results and whole-personality, organized-complex -in Weaver's sense, i.e. truly *systematic*- psychoanalytic theory, in fact in some of its implications rather close to our own analysis and conclusions (comp. next chap. III.D.2) and in sharp distinction from his previous exceedingly atomistic viewpoints (pp. 219-20 below). But the next generation(s) of following U.S.A. "systematizers" took in contrast a more subtle and simultaneously more extreme "empirical" position based more or less on the following reasoning: they accepted that every Rorschachist may identify with one or another theory of personality as an integral part of their scientific work, but as a way of still remaining personally theory-independent -i.e. non-committal- and despite the solid arguments of Schachtel and others (cf. Szondi p. 1 above) they artificially separated the Rorschach method supposedly as a self-contained, concrete instrument from abstract personality-theory development. Piotrowski (1966) in particular was the first to accentuate, persistently, this senseless separation between *Rorschach theory* on the one hand (which in his writing turned out to be sort of an still "immanent", half-baked, actually no real theory yet: cf. 1970) and *personality theory* on the other. But the contemporary exponents made the final step and discarded Rorschach theory altogether: Exner (cf. 1981) on his side still insisted audaciously and anachronistically on the "atheoretical" nature of the Rorschach so his -exclusively technical, i.e. scoring and tabulating- "system" could remain equally appealing, as he put it, "to both the behaviorist [like Beck] and the phenomenologist [like Klopfers]" (1974 p. xi, comp. 1969a p. 8); but we will center our critical analysis on the position of his associate Weiner who dedicated a whole series of papers to the issue. Although the latter (1981) criticized -with full reason- the exclusively "atheoretical" approach to the Rorschach research of psychopathology on the basis of the need of abandoning the "esoteric" (Schachtel) closed-system attitude and listing the respective benefits in a way similar to Holt, he also strongly defended the "empirical" viewpoint on the following arguments (1986):

The necessity of an [also] empirical perspective for adequate Rorschach assessment of psychopathology derives from some current conceptualizations of the nature of psychological disorder and of the task of delivering Rorschach responses... Two propositions concerning the nature of psychopathology are especially germane to the clinical application of psychodiagnostic instruments. The first of these holds that psychopathology exists on a continuum ranging from normal to abnormal on various dimensions of personality functioning. Known as the *continuity theory of psychopathology*, this proposition stresses quantitative distinctions between psychological normality and abnormality... The second proposition holds that psychopathology can be understood in terms of maladaptive personality functioning, as reflected in unrealistic, ineffective, and self-defeating ways of thinking, feeling, and acting... Note that this

⁶ This is the product of no coincidence but has its intrinsic importance: see Schotte on 'pathoanalysis' below.

proposition is pantheoretical: It embraces and can be translated into the language of the major theoretical approaches to formulating models of human behavior and experience...

The Rorschach Test, by the nature of the processes it involves, is likewise a pan-theoretical instrument... The perceptual-cognitive processes that subjects invoke in formulating and articulating their responses provide clues to their current and characteristic ways of dealing with life experiences - their psychological states and traits, if you will, including how they perceive their environment, how they process information, and how they prefer to cope with problem-solving situations (see Exner, 1986, chap. 2). This way of conceptualizing the Rorschach cuts across various theoretical perspectives on the nature of the human condition and does not depend on any particular theory for guidance in generating fruitful hypotheses and formulating descriptions of psychological disorder... The necessity for an empirical foundation in the Rorschach assessment of psycho-pathology becomes clear: (a) If psychopathology is formulated in quantitative terms, as the presence of more or less than an optimum amount of certain characteristics; (b) if the crucial characteristics in this regard comprise unrealistic, ineffective, and self-defeating ways of thinking, feeling, and acting; and (c) if the Rorschach provides clues to state and trait characteristics of how people think, feel, and act. Adequate assessment requires quantitative data concerning the normative distribution and other psychometric properties of Rorschach response patterns that reflect dimensions of personality along which psychologically normal and abnormal individuals are most likely to differ. Without such data at hand, clinicians are ill-prepared to draw distinctions from the Rorschach concerning what is psychopathological and what is not, and they are especially ill-prepared to convey their impressions to persons who have sought their consultative services. (pp. 475-7)

We are thankful to Weiner for this detailed spelling-out of the grounds for his ultimately "pantheoretical" position while defending the empirical approach, this explicit presentation of arguments can only promote communication and understanding between colleagues, but the least we can say is that it is *overly optimistic*. It is so first when assuming that the "continuity theory of psychopathology" and its intrinsic quantitative proposition can be translated or included into all major theoretical approaches: actually, from a 'pathoanalytic' -Schotte's term- perspective this is an essentially faulty and unacceptable theory in sharp disagreement with Freud's thought, even if some lesser psychoanalysts have endorsed it; in Schotte's (1990) own words...

On peut penser que la psychanalyse s'avance sous un triple étendard de choc, plus ou moins polémique. Résumons-le en trois notions: les deux premières sont bien connues, la troisième est celle à laquelle je voudrais réserver un sort qui resitue aussi les autres. Les deux premières sont, d'une part, l'inconscient..., et d'autre part la sexualité... La troisième idée-choc de Freud, à laquelle je

voudrais faire un sort, parce que cela me semble de plus en plus nécessaire à mesure que la psychanalyse et son héritage se perdent aussi bien dans les théories et les pratiques sexologiques que dans toute une littérature sur un Inconscient désormais gratifié d'une majuscule, - la troisième idée-choc de Freud est que nous avons à *repenser*, et non pas seulement en clinique car cela vaut pour chacun de nous en tant qu'humains comme tels, *les rapports entre ce qu'on appelle le normal et le patho-logique...* Nous posons que Freud nous donne donc à penser la pathologie psychiatrique, tous les problèmes de la névrose, de la psychose, etc., de la folie, si vous voulez, comme un vaste révélateur de notre condition humaine, puisqu'il fait constamment ce rapport. C'est ce que j'appellerai l'*option nosologique* de notre auteur... Or, selon l'option traditionnelle du psychiatre, médecin moderne, le pathologique, c'est d'abord ce qui est *extérieur* au normal. Pour Freud, au contraire, il faut dire qu'existe réellement un *rapport*, au sein duquel en quelque sorte le "normal" et le pathologique se définissent réciproquement dans et par le mouvement de la vie, spécialement de la vie humaine...

Il a même été plus loin, et il a fini par avancer, dans certains énoncés qui passent au fil de ses textes sans qu'ils aient fait l'objet thématique d'une investigation, il a fini par avancer l'idée de ce que j'appelle personnellement - et c'est un néologisme que j'essaie de lancer parmi vous comme ailleurs - une espèce d'option *pathoanalytique*. Qu'est-ce à dire? Les différentes formes de morbidité psychiatrique nous montrent en quelque sorte à l'état éclaté ce qui reste invisible comme articulation structurale de différents moments dans la vie dite saine de l'esprit. Freud utilise à ce propos une image qui illustre ce que j'appelle le *principe du cristal* [see chap. III.C.2 below; cf. Carrau et al. 1990 pp. 23-4]. Freud nous dit: si vous jetez par terre un cristal, il se brise selon certaines lignes de fracture bien déterminées; or vous ne les distinguez pas avant que le cristal ne fût brisé; il en va ainsi des malades mentaux... En ce sens, la pathologie révèle la structure cachée du normal, et si nous étendons ce principe à l'ensemble de la nosographie, nous pouvons dire que ce n'est pas seulement vrai d'un individu atteint d'une forme de pathologie, mais que l'ensemble de toutes les formes morbides révèle les différentes façons dont peut se fracturer, se fissurer, dont peut sauter cette normalité qui recèle des possibilités de morbidité. Au moment où cela saute en morceaux, nous obtenons un ensemble qui est [patho]analysé par le processus même du "devenir malade". Dans l'ensemble analysé, nous avons les morceaux éclatés, sautés, de ce qui est, quand tout marche bien, un fonctionnement dit harmonique... Cette idée conduit la pathoanalyse dans sa tentative d'éclairer la structure cachée, la structure secrète de l'existence "normale" de chacun, du moins de celle que chacun espère plus ou moins réaliser. La pathoanalyse s'efforce de mettre en évidence l'ensemble articulé, dans cette structure normale, des diverses possibilités de morbidité qui la constituent en interagissant de manière plus ou moins harmonieuse. J'évoque, sans la commenter ici, la formule à laquelle nous reviendrons peut-être plus loin: dans un texte auquel on n'a pas fait le sort qu'il mérite, Freud [1924/1961] aboutit à déterminer, à définir, la normalité comme une *composition réussie* de plusieurs

possibilités de pathologie, en disant que le comportement que nous appelons "sain" ou "normal" est celui qui réussit à réunir en lui à la fois des traits névrotiques et des traits psychotiques... La combinaison harmonieuse de deux possibilités de morbidité contradictoires appelées à s'équilibrer, névrose et psychose, définit la normalité. La normalité n'est donc pas extérieure au pathologique: elle réalise la mise en forme plus ou moins harmonieuse de possibilités morbides qui déterminent l'apparition, dès lors qu'elles passent à un mode de fonctionnement dysharmonique, de la morbidité avérée comme telle. Freud explique, en faisant usage du terme de réalité comme concept opératoire, que le névrosé s'adapte et s'incline en quelque sorte devant la réalité, pour autant qu'il s'agisse d'un compromis névrotique, tandis que le psychotique transforme la réalité. Mais si vous transformez sans adaptation, vous transformez en l'air, tandis que si vous vous adaptez sans transformation, vous vivez une existence que Freud appellerait plutôt animale qu'humaine. Contrairement à ce qu'ont dit tels critiques de la psychiatrie, Freud ne prétend pas du tout que l'adaptation, au sens du compromis névrotique, soit l'exemple même du paradigme de la normalité; au contraire. C'est là la clé de voûte de la perspective systématique de Freud sur la pathoanalyse...

...Selon ma conception, le problème de la psychose, contrairement à ce qu'on dit, n'est pas du tout celui d'une régression à ce qu'il y a de plus primitif dans l'homme (cela, c'est la psychopathie). La *psychose, c'est le problème le plus complexe*, c'est l'incarnation souffrante et impuissante d'un problème auquel doit s'affronter tout homme, problème de l'ouverture et de la fermeture, de l'ipséité et de l'altérité, problème dont nous pouvons dire, au terme de ce parcours, qu'il est déjà en jeu dans les étapes préalables du développement mais sous des formes qui le structurent et le complexifient progressivement... Cette conception que je défends s'oppose tout à fait à ce qui est traditionnellement dit en psychanalyse, où la psychose est située au départ d'une échelle de progression. Celle-ci commence par la psychose, passe par la névrose et aboutit à la "normalité" [Weiner's *continuity theory of psychopathology*]. Pour moi, il n'y a pas une telle normalité; et c'est la seule position cohérente avec la pensée de Freud. Il y a bien un certain sens à parler d'une échelle, parce qu'il y a aussi un certain sens à dire que le développement suit une série d'étapes génétiques. Mais s'il y a un certain sens à établir une sériation du pathologique, ce qui est au départ, c'est la psychopathie; puis viennent les perversions suivies des névroses qui, disait Freud, en sont le négatif; enfin viennent les psychoses. Et le normal n'est évidemment nulle part. A mesure qu'on progresse, il s'agit de résoudre des problèmes de plus en plus compliqués, sans jamais arriver à une normalité qui serait promise comme les lendemains qui chantent et dont chacun sait ce qu'il en est. (pp. 144-9, 166; for another similar, Weiner's-contradicting view of "normality" now from a Rorschach author, see Schachtel 1966 pp. 64-7)

Moreover and more to the point, Weiner's "pantheoretical"-quantitative position is also overoptimistic when contending that it also applies without qualification particularly to the Rorschach test response process in a non-contradicting and

coherent way no matter the Rorschach's specific theoretical convictions: not only Vernon (cf. above) would totally disagree with his timely 'psychometric vs. clinical' arguments but, as it turns out, Rorschach (1921/1942) himself would too...

The test is primarily a qualitative examination. The quality of symptoms can be determined from it, *but the quantitative* degree in which these appear remains *uncertain*... It is important to note that the test often indicates the presence of *latent schizophrenia*, neuroses which are barely perceptible clinically, and constitutional mood trends. The inadequacy of the test in estimating the quantitative importance of findings can be so great that it cannot be said whether a symptom is manifest or latent. It is impossible to determine from the record of the test, in some cases, whether a schizophrenic reaction is manifest, latent, or dormant for the time being. Catatonics who have almost completely recovered may appear more obviously ill in their records than cases who are clinically obviously still quite active. Sometimes the test findings indicated as schizophrenic people who had never shown the slightest indication of the disease but who had schizophrenic parents or siblings. (chap. V.1 pp. 120-1; italics added according to the original German text)

We even see these Rorschach's words as entirely compatible with the 'pathoanalytic' point of view (cf. Binswanger 1923/1967, p. 239), while declaring the impossibility of disentangling psychopathology and normality in the test from a strict quantitative point of view. In the next chapter (section D.2) we will also enter in detail into the issue of how, despite Exner's hopes, neither a convinced phenomenologist would necessarily be more in agreement with Exner's "systematic" Rorschach formal views than with ours. Weiner further develops his views particularly on Rorschach theory in a number of subsequent articles (1994, 1995ab) from where we extract his main points as follows:

...Simply put, the Rorschach is not a test because it does not test anything. A test is intended to measure whether something is present or not and in what quantity... Accordingly, we should break our long-standing custom of calling the Rorschach a test and instead refer to it as the *Rorschach Inkblot Method* (RIM)... The central theoretical implication of identifying the Rorschach as a method and not a test is that there is not and will never be any single, overarching theory of the Rorschach. Like other human behaviors, the data generated by the Rorschach method can be interpreted from a variety of theoretical perspectives; like other methods of generating data, moreover, the Rorschach does not require any theory to explain its utility... (p. 499)

When the Rorschach is rightly viewed as a method that transcends theoretical points of view, rather than as a test held captive by some particular theory, the door is open for the data that are generated to be interpreted along any theoretical lines with which the examiner is conversant-and even, in multimodal fashion, for some features of the data to be interpreted within one

theoretical framework and other features within a different frame-work... The point is therefore not that theory is unimportant to the Rorschach. To the contrary, conceptual formulations of why Rorschach data mean what they mean are critical for guiding informed interpretation, and theoretical perspectives on human behavior enhance the interpretive significance that can be attached to *individual bits* [italics added] of Rorschach data (Weiner, 1986). Taking the Rorschach *as a whole* [italics added], however, there is no one theory that accounts for its utility-because the Rorschach in its totality is not a test, but a method... (1994, pp. 501-2)

As we saw above this early proposition against conceptualizing the Rorschach as a - psycho-metric- test in fact proceeds originally from Vernon rather than from Krugman as Weiner assumes, and the latter's alternative designation is a perfect example of the subtly biased, "aseptic" reinterpretation of Rorschach's seminal ideas we talked about in footnote #4 above: no doubt for the creator what he put together was a test (1921/1967 chap. I.1, 1965/1967 Pt. 2 chap. I.27 p. 242, 1999 p. 10, 2004 p. 193), but more specifically *a form-interpretation test* of a brand-new kind that must be first understood and then judged according to its own nature (see next chap. III.B.2). But anyway, where we most strongly disagree with Weiner is in the last quoted phrase - with the added italics- where he regresses from Rorschach's revolutionary to an expired atomistic-psychological point of view, just as Beck did earlier (see pp. 220-1 below) although due in both cases to the intrinsic limitations of their own respective "empirical" positions and not to Rorschach's or his creation's fault. In his 1995a paper Weiner begins by an interesting review of the successive complaints of prestigious experts, beginning with Rorschach himself, about the unsatisfactory theoretical situation of the method and after $\frac{3}{4}$ of a century he essentially concludes it is time to give up: personally we haven't and in the next chapter we present our most important argument, a truly overarching Rorschach theory with which we believe to have proved him entirely wrong on this point (and also Flores & Pereyra González, 1993 p. 91); and as it is supposed to be with a comprehensive theory, in it we account for all of the components of the method in true *Gestalt* fashion, not just for isolated bits of its data. In other words and to use in a slightly different sense a metaphor suggested by DeCato (1993), it is as if after athe(or)ism Weiner were denouncing in science the adoption of monothe(or)ism to favor panthe(or)ism, but hasn't the history of religion demonstrated a universal development from pantheism to mono-theism? That the Rorschach data are open to interpretation from multiple theoretical perspectives according to the interpreter's choice was recognized by Binswanger (1923/1967, for an author very close to our positions; cf. also Starobinsky 1970, Di Paola 1997) from the very beginning, we don't question that fact, but our point is that the actual *choice* is the crucial part that allows the data to acquire sense, and evading to do so amounts to adopting a position out of scientific comfort and confrontation-sparing reasons (Klopper!): "only with the aid of the logical order given by theory is it possible to *prove* or *disprove* empirical propositions" (Holt above). And although we give preference to the psychoanalytic point of view we do not contend Rorschach's method must be "held captive" by it and we fully respect other theoretical approaches, in fact in the long run we also demonstrate ours in its main features as entirely compatible

with pheno-menology, genetic-psychology, Gestalt, Jung's 'complex' and still other psychologies (chap. III.D.2 below). For a further criticism to Weiner's views and particularly for an excellent response to his questionable "multimodal" approach, refer also to Smith (1994, pp. 64-7; cf. Silberstein 1987, pp. 33-5) where this author also points to a decided *advantage of the analytic framework*.

Let us conclude by going back to the beginning. What was the essence of Rorschach's genius that allowed him to 'see' where others (the prototypical example being Hens: cf. Schotte and Kuhn, pp. 8-9 above; and Ellenberger 1954/1995 pp. 48, 60, 69) couldn't find anything signi-ficant? The answer is to be found in his original *formal-scoring system*, the product of a brand new -literally, *theoretical*- way of *looking* at the empirical inkblot test data so as to make them truly meaningful by organizing them into a handful of distinct but interrelated and immediately senseful categories. There resides the whole key of the issue, and also why we talk about Rorschach's *a priori* theoretical outlook by contrast to the *blind* (Rickers-Ovsiankina 1943, p. 41; Schachtel 1966, p. 2) approach of his subsequent "empirical" followers (cf. below chap. III.A.1). Beck, who despite any criticism we may address to him has a superior feeling for the right metaphor, presented the issue in the following way in one of his earliest articles (1933b, quoting Murphy):

Four psychological activities have now been described: form perception [*F*], organizing energy [*Z*, derived from Rorschach's *G*], affective drive [*Fb*], creativity [*B*]. One of our hypothetical consequents can now be stated. Given a knowledge of the quantity in which each of the above processes obtains in an individual, and a knowledge of a fifth factor, the environment in which the individual has lived, we have a knowledge of all the com-ponents that have gone into the making of the personality in question... The point that needs to be amplified here is the position that all traits-whether one takes for example shyness, originality, pedantry, or any of the considerable number of traits that have been described in the psychological literature-can, if our observations in the Rorschach expe-riments are valid, be shown to be manifestations of the four psychological processes above described and of the environment in which the individual has lived. The four pro-cesses are primary, dynamic, events in nature, psychological functions of certain physical events. The traits are secondary, dependent for their structure upon the quantity of the primary psychological ones within the given individual, and the vicissitudes of the pro-cesses under impact of environmental forces. This individual, the behaving personality, the succession of behavior manifestations which we recognize as this or that identified person, are the resultant interaction of our four series of dynamic events and the envi-ronment. The personality we see is the balance reached between the five stresses.

The notion of a **limited number** of possible forces that can exist in combination in a personality is not altogether new, and it has been formulated by at least one contemporary writer. Gardner Murphy [cf. pp. 111-4 below], in discussing

the contribution of psycho-logy to the study of personality, before the American Orthopsychiatric Association in 1932, said:

"There are a very limited number of habit systems which can actually cohere and work in a pattern in our existing social order. Not every habit can be combined, harmoniously, with every other habit; in fact, a limited number of possible, workable combinations of habits can probably be defined. . . .

"We may have something very close to Mendelyeev's Periodic Table of Elements. Just as there aren't an infinite number of chemical elements, so the laws of the structure of personality resemble the laws governing the number of elements that can exist under the conditions which the astronomer and chemist tell us about." ... [pp. 371-2; comp. Di Paola 1997, p. 17]

In this paper is formulated *some theory as to the personality as a whole, derived from observations in the Rorschach experiment*, checked by clinical data... The experimental observations, together with the clinical material, led to the generalization that human behavior phenomena are ultimately organization of four psychological processes, varying in quantity from individual to individual, and of a fifth force, the environment... While *these terms are derived from Rorschach's formulations*, they are described in language applicable generally. The paper as a whole is devoted to these descriptive aspects of the unitary personality as arrived at by the writer's Rorschach experiments and observations, in the hope that, *considered entirely hypothetical, they may be subjected to further experimental procedure by whatever reliable techniques or methods of observation.* (pp. 374-5; italics and boldface added)

What Beck offers us here is the retrospective reconstruction of the exact, reverse logical course of events in Rorschach's creation: personality theory (implicit, subconscious) - hypothetical or 'fictitious' formal schema (Rorschach's own words: 1921/1967, chap. II.6.a p. 27) isomorphic with the former - development of the inkblots featuring these perceptual factors - empirical validating results using them. And just as he quoted from Murphy, we will reproduce an undisputable additional demonstration that strongly supports our view taken from Schotte (1981) quoting on his side a significant, similar paper by Caillois:

...Déjà cette **limitation** comme telle [cf. Murphy above] mérite qu'on s'y arrête, car l'empirisme usuel dans la pensée du psychiatre n'imagine même pas qu'il soit possible ou légitime et à la fois fécond, d'opérer une telle limitation, à contre courant de l'idée d'une série indéfiniment ouverte de phénomènes. A la limite, l'idéal d'une certaine pratique "scientifique" dans le domaine médical serait que chacun attache son nom à un syndrome [ou à un facteur formel Rorschach] supplémentaire, mis bout à bout avec les autres: Ecoutons, à rebours de cette pente empiriste qui éloigne toujours plus d'une vraie théorie clinique, Roger Caillois, dans un article de "Cases d'un échiquier", faire l'éloge du fini et du dénombrable... Ce sur quoi tout le texte de Caillois débouche, c'est cette "plus sévère ivresse" que réservent au connaisseur le fini et le

dénombrable d'une authentique mise en tableau. Comment mieux l'illustrer que par l'exemple de Mendeléeïev? Son exploit est "plus stupéfiant encore" que celui de Le Verrier, l'astronome français qui a démontré que le mouvement des planètes ne respectait les lois de la gravitation qu'à la condition de postuler l'existence [théorique], en telle position du système solaire, d'une planète qui avait jusqu'alors échappé à toute observation. Et l'observation confirma le calcul. Mendeléeïev a fait plus que de découvrir un élément, puisqu'il a dégagé le système [théorique] même qui allait permettre de découvrir une série d'éléments. Aussi bien les cases laissées vides de son échiquier se sont-elles peu à peu remplies: l'observation et la découverte empirique confirment la valeur heuristique du système [théorique]. *Le monde n'entre plus seulement dans le tableau: il en sort, si l'on peut dire, pour autant que le schéma permet de voir ce qui restait jusqu'alors inconcevable...* (p 81, italics and boldface added)

B) The psychoanalytic approaches

"As already in earlier letters, here it becomes clear how enthusiastic was H[ermann].R[orschach]. about Psychoanalysis, and therefore how he wanted to get also interested in it people to whom he was close like Walter Morgenthau. The years-long occupation of H. Rorschach with Psychoanalysis and his unequivocal stand-taking is until now too rarely presented to its best advantage in the Rorschach literature. In the RA [Rorschach Archives] find themselves numerous documents that speak unequivocally in favor of the fact that Psychoanalysis was for H.R. an important means for the understanding of the mentally ill."

(Rorschach 2004, p. 171 footnote 7; our translation)

During the first 20 years after the publication of "Psychodiagnostics" the few serious post-Rorschach attempts to further the theory of the method in a more or less comprehensive way (by Furrer 1930, Binder 1932, and Dworetzki 1939; all renowned Swiss experts analyzed later on) were characteristically not psychoanalytic; only isolated works (Furrer's 1925 reflections about the *B* response are the central reference here; see also Zulliger: 1933, 1935, 1938a; and some others: Christoffel 1924, Giese 1924, Matskevitch 1932, Bustamante 1934, Brendgen 1938) applied the particular psychoanalytic mode of approach to some isolated element of the system or to some specific clinical application. But in the '40s (Beck's 1939 thoughts seem to have been premonitory) things begin to change, and the plenty of articles written from a psychoanalytic point of view with far-reaching theoretical implications (Schachtel 1941, 1943, 1945, 1950; Lagache 1944/1957, Tosquelles 1945; although not having the same value, Lindner's follow the same trend: 1944, 1946, 1947, 1950) together with the first proposals at systematization (Zulliger 1941/1956, chap. 9; Beck 1942; Apfeldorf 1944; comp. Sherman 1955) became then the rule rather than the exception. Thus, with this same wave, the deservedly famous broad chapter on the test by Rapaport et al. in their "Diagnostic Psychological Testing" Vol. 2 (1946)

became the first systematic and thorough application of Freud's theory to the Rorschach frame; not long afterwards other comprehensive works followed reediting this approach, a trend that has since continued almost uninterrupted in different countries until today (Baer 1949, Schafer 1954/1982, Salomon 1962, Brückner 1963, Schachtel 1966, Portuondo 1973a, Mélon 1976, Noceti & Sorribas 1982, Chabert 1983, Debieux 1987, Jidouard 1988, Weigle 1988, Portuondo 1989, Carrau et al. 1990, Lerner 1991 & 1998a, Giambelluca et al. 1995, Ruiz & Orcoyen 2000)⁷ ultimately making of this theoretical option the most popular one in Rorschach work.

Maybe this latency period was partially responsible for the most-of-the-time isolated character of the psychoanalytical Rorschach research in each country or language, because whereas the first generation of great Rorschachers was almost always open to several languages that was generally not the case with the later ones. Anyway, the consecutive publication of these general psychoanalytical Rorschach works geographically distant lead to the spontaneous formation of different "schools" which we can identify with five main language-related traditions, presented below following a more or less rational-chronological order of their respective developments and influence upon each other:

1. The German-speaking Swiss tradition

Carefully following and developing Rorschach's thought-provoking insights in this sense (1921, cf. chap. V.5; & Oberholzer 1923/1924; see chap. III.B.1 below) this particular psycho-analytic wing inside the 'Classical' system has as its main figures Zulliger (1949abc, 1950a; 1948-54/1969) and in a finished way his disciple Salomon (1962). The work of these two particular authors gives ground to a great part of the ideas we present in this Thesis and consequently we will be coming back to their contributions with greater detail later on (chap. III.D), so we will just introduce their main features here. A keen observer and consequently a profound connaisseur of child and adolescent normal and abnormal development (cf. pp. 280-6 below), with the vantage techniques -a parallel and a complementary series to the Rorschach- and captive population -he remained a school teacher his whole life- he had at his disposal Hans Zulliger was able to collect an impressive series of facts and to discover intimate relationships between a host of Rorschach factors. His main contributions pertain to the accurate syndrom description of some behavior problems and character conditions (1938b), the development and enriching use of parallel series of plates (1941/1956), the depth-psychological content interpretation of protocols (1949abc, 1950a) of which he still remains an unparalleled master (Bohm, 1951/1972 chap. 16.V.3, 1961/1978 Preface; and Piotrowski 1957, pp. 369-72; both readily acknowledge this aspect of his teaching), and the intuitive meaningful articulation -prompting the eventual solution of the intriguing theoretical questioning about their effectiveness- of the central formal-symbolic features of the stimulus material in a way that corresponds closely to

⁷ Our following critical review will be focused mainly on these nearly 20 psychoanalytic-Rorschach *books* but including besides a selected number of isolated, in-depth articles which are particularly relevant to the theoretical discussion.

the findings of numerous researchers (1948-54/1969) which we will be specifically exploiting in the crucial part of this work. Much like Rorschach he was not at first sight a theoretically-minded scientist, and numbers were alien to his personal way: his style is made of very simple and didactic statements exemplified with case studies from his large practical experience; but his writings are filled with intuitively clever original observations (exs.: the connections between *DG* and lying/stealing, *BHd* and paranoid anxiety, pure *Fb* & *Hd* and suicide, etc.) where his multi-sided knowledge finds appropriate expression, opening up research and validation paths.

His most directly psychoanalytical works were those about the theory and practice of Rorschach content interpretation that appeared on the occasion of the First International Rorschach Meeting (Zürich, August 1949; which converged there, very appropriately, with the XVIth International Psychoanalytic Congress), completing the evaluation in a way already pointed out by Rorschach. However, like the true classic Rorschacher he was, in those papers as everywhere else in his writings he always stressed the need for a primordial consideration of the formal aspect of records, Rorschach's truly original scientific discovery. To be sure, it is upon him that falls the merit of being the first after Rorschach, putting an end to the latency period referred to earlier, to propose a now *systematic* rapprochement between the formal factors of the method and psychoanalytic theory: in a passage in his 1941 book (/ 1956, chap. 9.a p. 98), referring to the different Apperceptive Types, he voices the key observation that *G* types correspond closely to what is psychoanalytically known as oral characters, *D* types to genital, *Dd* types to anal, and *Zw* types to aggressive ones respectively. One can measure at this point how little diffusion his psychoanalytical system has gained -see below- when considering that none of the other ones seems to have taken notice of this well-founded and promising conclusion, even with authorities such as Schachtel (1951 pp. 158-9) and Piotrowski (1957 p. 381) independently arriving afterwards at similar results; there is only a lonely citation by Portuondo (1973a)⁸. And this instance was in fact the beginning of a systematic linkage of psychoanalytic concepts with the individual formal scores and of the latter's natural groupings with specific areas within the theory, taken up by Salomon after him always with his close collaboration: in a word, it became the birth of their 'system'.

Zulliger's psychoanalytic contribution to interpretation was everything but exclusively content-oriented. Not only was it undertaken after -and coherently integrated with- the solid establishing and classical interpretation of the formal psychogram (his 'static' and 'dynamic' stages, respectively: 1949a) but was also based on formal signs: analyzing the *original* tending to *individual* responses, keeping track of their overall meaningful *sequence* and of their eventual *perseverative thematic* reappearance in *retests with parallel series*. This introduction of immediate parallel retesting -with its corresponding 'on-going' psychogram- was one of the essential features of his personal method, attempting to reevaluate the formal data in a more

⁸ Weigle (1988/1998, p. 96) also repeats these results but without mentioning Zulliger's name.

dynamic way⁹; here he joins some of the best representatives of Rorschach interpretation, who each one by himself tried to redynamize the Rorschach schematic data in an original way: Schachtel (1937) by dividing them into a sequence of phases able to reveal the 'curve of reactions', Rapaport et al. (1945-46/1968 chaps. 1 & 11) by relocating them in the context of a coherent battery of tests, Klopfer et al. (1954, chap. 11) and Brückner (1957, 1963) by conceptualizing 'sequence analysis', etc. However, in our opinion Salomon's technique -see below- was the best solution to this problem, much more practical and meaningful than these more or less cumbersome procedures, and thanks to which most of his achievements were arrived at.

Another important representative of this group and personal friend of the former was Ewald Bohm, author of the most important classical Rorschach manual in the German language (1951/1972). He (chap. 2.II) supported Beck's opinion on the necessary psychoanalytical formation of the Rorschacher and contributed in his volume many interesting observations in this sense, for example the following -entirely compatible with Furrer's earlier- explanation of Rorschach's *B* responses and their connection with thinking to be found, unexpectedly, in Freud's book on "Jokes":

I have acquired the idea of a movement of a particular size by carrying the movement out myself or by imitating it, and through this action I have learnt a standard for this movement in my innervatory sensations. When, now, I perceive a movement like this of greater or lesser size in someone else, the surest way to an understanding (an apperception) of it will be for me to carry it out by imitation, and I can then decide from the comparison on which of the movements my expenditure was the greater. An impulsion of this kind to imitation is undoubtedly present in perceptions of movement. But actually I do not carry the imitation through, any more than I still spell words out if I learnt to read by spelling. Instead of imitating the movement with my muscles, I have an idea of it through the medium of my memory-traces of expenditures on similar movements. Ideation or 'think-ing' differs from acting or performing above all in the fact that it displaces far smaller cathectic energies and holds back the main expenditure from discharge. (Bohm chap. 4.A.I.2.b; quoted here directly from Freud, 1905/1960 pp. 191-2, cf. also 1900/1953, 1911)

His main other psychoanalytic indications concern chiefly the shocks and other special phenomena (like reflection responses, which he was the first to identify and to connect with narcissism: chap. 6.70), interpretation -prognosis, Ego strength- (chap. 7, appendix: see Eichmann's case chap. IV.B below), affectivity (chap. 9), neuroses and complex-responses (chap. 11), subjects all of which that should be consulted in the original text. In the last theoretical chapter (16.V.3, comp. also chaps. 7.I & 15.II.

⁹ By the way, this is the feature that the Szondi Test exploits to its extreme implications transforming it into one of its major assets, giving room to an essential aspect (the dynamic one) in the assessment of human personality: see MacFarlane & Tuddenham 1951, footnote 5; Bohm 1953/1963; Mélon, 1975b chaps. 8-9, 1976 p. 47; and Anzieu's views p. 25 below.

1 footnote 17) he adds some very interesting observations which we will be very specifically exploiting in the next chap. III.D.2.

The classical-psychoanalytic Rorschach system attained its maturity thanks to Fritz Salomon. A clinical psychoanalyst, he associated with Zulliger during many years assimilating his contributions and testing them in practice, adding his own original discoveries, and finally explaining them theoretically. Very early (1954), using Zulliger's three-blot series, he introduced a systematic double-administration/consideration of the formal data -in line with Zulliger's on-going psychogram- that proved to be extremely powerful generating psychoanalytical insights. Following Zulliger's -and Rorschach's- intuitions, he developed to a finished result the systematic and orderly bringing-together of formal elements and psychoanalytical concepts, from the topic, economic, genetic and dynamic points of view, to a level attained by no other of the systems¹⁰; the progress of his researches can be traced through his successive communications to the International Rorschach Congresses from the IInd to the VIth (1954, 1959a, 1960, 1963b, 1965), his article in *Rorschachiana VIII* being the best overall abstract of his aims, methods, and conclusions (besides his main book of course: 1962).

Not being here the place to review in detail his contributions to the Rorschach, we will limit ourselves for the time being to a simple listing of them adding some comments in due place, particularly as concerning their comparison with other better-known ones:

a) his detailed elaboration of the response process from the psychoanalytic theory of perception and of metapsychology (Freud 1900/1953) discloses its sequence of specific psycho-analytical mechanisms, significantly enlarging Baer's (1949, 1950) and Schafer's (1954/1982 chap. 3) previous views soon to be discussed;

b) his double-administration demonstrated the existence of an intimate relationship between *Zw* and *Do* responses (complementing Zulliger's observations), and between both and light-dark responses through their interpretation in the context of a shock and transference situation where the management of aggression by Ego and Super-Ego, respectively, plays a pre-dominant role;

c) the psychoanalytic reinterpretation of Binder's light-dark responses¹¹ in the sense of object-relations theory, with their relation to orality, depression, Sex responses, and early stages of the Super-Ego, leads to a consideration of them - divided into two subgroups- in close agreement with the independent ones of Piotrowski (1957 chap. 9) and Schachtel (1966 chap. 10);

d) in a more detailed way than any previous writer (Rorschach 1921/1967, chaps. II.5.c., IV.11 & VII.A.3.b; Schachtel 1943; Rapaport et al. 1945-46/1968, chap. 9 pp. 362-89; Bohm 1951/1972, chaps. 6 & 9; Piotrowski 1957, chap. 8) but with meaningful empirical coincidences, he interprets psychoanalytically the numerous

¹⁰ On the contrary, there are instances of their significant disregard by a "displacement of cathexis" onto the content area, for example in Schafer (1954/1982, pp. 185-6); we cannot but join with Piotrowski's criticism (1957, p. 389) later on expressed almost with the same wording by Salomon (1963b, p. 169). See pp. 29-30 below.

¹¹ Better, by any standards, than any of the subsequent classifications: see pp. 66-7, 220-1, and chap. III.D.2 below.

particular reactions to color in terms of Ego-defenses; above all, he discovered a one-to-one relationship between specific colors and partial drives, and described and interpreted specific-color shocks as libidinal fixations in the subject's personal history;

e) the consideration of the *B* response, following Rorschach, as a product of psycho-analytic introversion widens the understanding of its genetic origin and symptomatic value;

f) turning to the perceptual features of the plates, there is an ingenious interpretation of the different reactions to the symbolic value of symmetry; in particular, his thorough interpretation of mirror responses -following Bohm's lead- and aspects of narcissism vicissitudes precedes and integrates Exner's (1969b, 1970) 'reflections' on the subject;

g) as a practical application of his whole system, his formal-scores based and psycho-analytically founded homosexuality 'syndrom' -instead of discrete "signs"- has proved to be the best there is in the field (Palem 1970, pp. 46, 56¹²).

In our opinion the Zulliger-Salomon system has come closer than any of the subsequent -and not only psychoanalytic- ones to a comprehensive, structural theoretical foundation of the method. Unfortunately, due to the virtually complete retreat of German-speaking practitioners from the international Rorschach scene (cf. Bash 1983a) at present it has almost sunk into total oblivion. It should be recovered nevertheless. In a timely overview Anzieu (1983, introducing Chabert's approach: cf. section B.4 below) has accurately identified chiefly two shortcomings in the current Rorschach method that prevent its becoming a truly psychoanalytic instrument: the static character of the sample of reactions provoked by the test administration 'cutting across' the ongoing back-and-forth dynamic in the psychic apparatus, and the imperfect representation of the genetic perspective of drive and Ego development in the test results. With his already mentioned original technique of a second presentation Salomon -equivalent to the parallel retesting by Zulliger- efficiently remedies the first defect; and their particular stage-related interpretation of Apperceptive Modes, Light-Dark and specific-Color determinants by contrast to Movement, and narcissistic reactions to the inkblots' perceptual features, all meaningfully interrelated with *the original sequence order of Zulliger's three-plate series* (see chap. III.D.2 below) eliminates the second in a significant contribution to the advance of Rorschach theory and practice, proving that Anzieu's earlier extreme views (1970, pp. 5-7) were, at least, partially unwarranted¹³. And as we will see below, none of the remaining psychoanalytic approaches can make the same claim.

¹² Precisely this author, in a very contradictory manner closely resembling the attitude of the group of subjective opponents to a psychoanalytic Rorschach (cf. chap. III.B.1 below), simultaneously and mockingly starts by criticizing Salomon's conclusions (p. 39) but without offering an alternate explanation of why his procedure works anyhow!

¹³ "Un test projectif ne permettra jamais de saisir le fantasme individuel pathogène" (Anzieu p. 6). Zulliger -as well as Salomon- has demonstrated this to be incorrect in many published cases: 1949abc, 1950ab, 1952; comp. Bohm 1951/1972, chap. 16.V.3; Piotrowski 1957, pp. 369-72; Salomon, 1959b pp. 253-4, 1963b. Contrary to some opinions, a form-interpretation test -joined here by the Szondi- can even be an *integral* part of a psychoanalytic therapy (Zulliger 1969/1973, case 5; Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989, pp. 10-2; Deri 1974, pp. 43-8).

Before passing on to them we must still mention a couple more authors. Brückner's valuable but almost completely overlooked book on the interpretation of neurotic records (1963) also finds its place here: following the former authors and centering on the auxiliary dynamic-thematic aspect of records (sequence analysis, shocks, complex-responses according to their content) from the point of view of Ego-psychology (conflict, defenses, etc.) it seems much like a contribution very similar to Schafer's (1954/1982: see below) who also influenced him (p. 14). Finally and contemporarily, despite his being a French-speaking author the Belgian projectivist and psychoanalyst Mélon, an admirer of Salomon's work (1976 pp. 66-7, 86-7, 107-8, 117), has since the '70s (1975a, 1976) connected the latter's 'Ego-diagnostics' with Szondi's 'Ego-analysis' (1956) and in the process has redirected the findings of this school towards new ways leading on the whole to a true theoretical validation and systematization of the method (cf. Peralta 1995a); this has actually been the point of connection with our own research (cf. chap. III.C&D below).

2. The U.S.A. English-speaking movement

Almost simultaneously with Zulliger's suggested connection between the variety of Apprehension Modes and psychosexual development stages, in the U.S.A. Beck (1942) and Apfeldorf (1944) proposed a similar systematic relationship between the original triad of determinants and Freud's second structural model of personality: *F+* being supposed to represent the Ego conscious functions and reality principle, *Fb* the unconscious Id and pleasure principle, and *B* the Super-Ego's also unconsciously motivated idealistic aspirations; however mechanical and superficial these initial theoretical approximations may seem, one must recognize and admire their *a posteriori* proven exactness through empirical validation and adequately deep theoretical reflection by subsequent authors (Sherman 1955; Schachtel 1959 pp. 104-9; Salomon 1962 chap. V, 1963b p. 173; Mélon 1975a pp. 258-9, 1976 p. 56). At the same time Schachtel (1941, 1943, 1945, 1950) began to publish his series of perceptive "Contributions to an Under-standing of Rorschach's Test" where he successively psycho-analyzed the same determinants but now in a much more thorough way - including an original view of the 'test situation' and its transference implications: leaving aside classical or 'detached' -conscious, critical- form perception, he analyzed and interpreted those particular 'dynamic' *F* responses which according to Rorschach (1921/1967 chap. VII.A) could also carry revealing unconscious elements; color determinant was metapsychologically and convincingly equated with Freud's 'affective' expression of drives; and kinesthetic responses were brilliantly explained and interpreted as based in the mechanisms of identification and projection. We will come back to his contributions when we get to the publication of his book (1966).

But the first complete presentation of Rorschach's formal schema in one work from a psychoanalytic point of view was the long chapter on the test in Rapaport et al.'s "Diagnostic Psychological Testing" (Vol. II, 1946): this was in fact a contribution of paramount importance, as subsequent history has demonstrated, since it constituted

the first widely published book¹⁴ including an explicit theoretical *rationale* -a tentative psychological explanation of why each one has the symptomatic value initially ascribed to it by Rorschach- of all of his major formal categories, locations and determinants. Rapaport introduced the subject in the following way:

Projective tests are indirect questions, and the responses to them are indirect answers, pertaining to the psychological structure of the subject, and their use implies a theory of personality which assumes that much of this psychological structure is not consciously experienced by the subject... If taken seriously, these tests therefore refer to unconscious *motivation* of action and behavior, and necessitate a personality theory that assumes the existence of, and accounts for, these motivations. The most extensive and consistent personality theory of this type is the psychoanalytic theory; and the projective tester must lean heavily on it to find relationships and analogies which will help him in his thinking about the material.

Here certain dangers arise... glib analogies and direct transposition of psychoanalytic concepts to projective-test data become a great temptation, and may often replace independent thinking appropriate to the projective-test material [as in Klopfer, cf. Schachtel pp. 11-12 above]. Such independent thinking utilizes modes of thought parallel with the modes of psychoanalytic thinking, but does not borrow concepts from it uncritically... The... danger [of] uncritical use of psychoanalytic concepts demands a scrutiny of the relation of psychoanalytic theory to the processes that occur in the subject during the course of the test... When the subject is asked to respond to a given test item, a thought process is set off; and when a reaction is obtained it represents the end point of a thought process. This process may be... of an intertwined associative and perceptual organizing character, as in the Rorschach test... Personality manifests itself through a thought process or through the product of such a process...

Consistent exploration of projective tests is exploration of thought processes. In these tests the ego, the carrier of conscious thinking, demonstrates its bent and its proclivities. The unconscious makings of the thought process will occasionally become palpable, especially when thinking is disorganized; but in the main, projective tests are concerned with the type of organization of thinking palpable in the course of the spontaneous thought processes, and characteristic of the person and his ego.

The psychology of thought processes is a part of ego psychology. If a breakthrough of unconscious modes of thinking occurs, it should prompt the projective tester to draw on psychoanalytic theory concerning such a breakthrough and the nature of unconscious processes. But the patterns characteristic of conscious thought processes are unexplored by psychoanalysis, and the next of kind to them are defense mechanisms-the subject matter of

¹⁴ By contrast to the previous ones of Beck (1937a, 1944-45) or Klopfer & Kelley (1942) as discussed in the preceding section A; on the other hand the important previous theoretical works of Binder (1932/1979) and Dwo-retzki (1939) were monographs appeared in journals. For an assessment of other ulterior, more or less psycho-analytically inspired books (Beck 1952, Phillips & Smith 1953) refer to Schafer 1954/1982, p. 3 footnote.

psychoanalytic ego psychology. To draw on the theory of the latter with the utmost caution, and to attempt to mold a theory of observed thought patterns so that they and the known patterns of defense mechanisms will elucidate each other and be welded into one common theoretical framework, is the great unsolved task of projective testing.

Here we may state the picture of personality structure implied in the projective-test procedure as it appears to us. The subject has an ego which is the *recipient of outside stimulation*, and which may be inclined to take, to avoid, or incessantly to invoke stimulations. This ego is also the *executor of the intentions of the unconscious strivings*, which in their particular constellation and strength are specific to the person; as executor of these intents, the ego may oppose them, subserve them without delay, or postpone them and by thinking prepare for their optimal realization. The ego has a certain autonomy: autonomous energy (bound cathexes), autonomous behavior (defense mechanisms), and autonomous thought patterns-to govern perception, execution, and thought. The reception of stimulation by the ego is not automatic but selective, and to some extent distorts the stimulation to meet the needs of the subject. The execution of intentions by the ego is likewise not an automatic discharge of internal tensions, but an adaptation to the nature of the objects in reality which these intentions are aimed at or must cope with. (pp. 227-30)

This kind of presentation was of course a great scientific step forward from the typical Rorschach manuals of the time (cf. Schachtel 1942) in the way wished by Rorschach himself in his Introduction to "Psychodiagnostics", to the merit of Rapaport and colleagues and which immediately and deservedly established their long-lasting reputation. Another advantage of their contribution was the high caliber of the psychopathological Rorschach syndromes as well as of the case protocols plus interpretations offered (Schafer 1948), together with comparative material from the other tests of the battery used by them, which retain all of their intrinsic value still today. From his perception-association framework¹⁵ Rapaport practically reached the essential psychoanalytic interpretation of the Movement-Color (*B:Fb*) Experience Balance as representing the presentation-affect or 'thought delaying acting' dialectics (Freud 1900/1953) explicitly suggested by ulterior French-speaking Rorschach authors like Mélon and Chabert, and the other two main determinants as more specific expressions of this same balance, i.e. Form as the particular kind of delay implicit in the development of the objective perceptual (re)presentation in the "conflict-free sphere of the ego", and Shading as an indicator of the specific affect of anxiety respectively: in a way he is proposing an interesting, expanded (*F&B:Fb(&Hd)*) consideration of the Experience Type (follow in the book the order of presentation of

¹⁵ For a more detailed summary of Rapaport et al.'s psychoanalytic contribution than ours, refer to Holt (1954 pp. 537-43).

the four of them¹⁶). If one criticism, in the spirit of Lacan, is to be addressed to the authors' approach -but which is largely a product of their time- is precisely this strong foundation on Hartmann's Ego-psychology of conscious thought processes with its eventual disregard of the essential psychoanalytic factor that constitutes the dynamism of the unconscious fantasy, already visible in Rapaport's introduction above. This is much more evident in their predominantly intellectual treatment of the manner of approach (locations): compare for example their 'rationale of the W [G] score' (pp. 309-12) with the following interpretation of Schachtel (1966)...

The complexity of the test is also one of the reasons... why in interpreting tests a variety of methods is usually used... Thus, a good W response of a high F+% may be viewed as an *achievement* that permits conclusions regarding certain intellectual *abilities* or certain intellectual processes enabling the person to make such an achievement [like Rapaport et al. do]. Rorschach considers the W responses in this way when he uses them as an indicator of the capacities for abstraction and for imagination. But he also uses the W as an indicator of a special kind of *motivation*, of conscious or unconscious *willing*, that is to say, as pointing to dynamic factors in the personality structure. These, in turn, may be related to the way in which the testee experiences and defines the test task and the test situation. (p. 6; cf. a concrete example of interpretation in this sense in 1951 pp. 158-9, which leads us precisely to Zulliger's connection with 'oral' dynamics)

The preceding comment can serve us to put in perspective Schafer's (1954/1982 p. 2, footnote) criticism of Schachtel's psychoanalytic approach as supposedly "narrower" than Rapaport's, but also to introduce the former's own contribution in line with the one of his mentor. Schafer's classical book achieved the "great unsolved task of projective testing" as referred to and as defined by Rapaport above. In it he dedicated subsequent chapters to a detailed analysis of the dynamics of the testing situation (following Schachtel's own example), to the Rorschach response process mainly according to perceptual theory out of Freud's "Interpretation of Dreams" (without deriving however all of the possible benefit: refer to chap. III.B.1 below, and to a specific criticism in the subsequent section B.2 pp. 249-53), to thorough content analysis, and to the diagnosis of specific defense mechanisms. Notwithstanding his in many respects well-deserved reputation, we feel however that with this volume he let his mentor down in more than one respect: he persisted for instance in his sharp rejection of the Szondi test (pp. 10, 15) which for Rapaport was as valuable a tool as the Rorschach (cf. chap. III.C.2 below), but more importantly in the process of supposedly developing psychoanalytic *Rorschach* theory he lost sight of the instrument's nature in too great a measure to the point of ultimately compromising his results. As he asserted himself...

¹⁶ Rapaport comes here close to Mélon's (& Lekeuche 1982/1989, chap. 4) ulterior differentiation, using as his framework Szondi's drive schema (refer to chap. III.D.2 below for more clarification), between a thing-presentation (S) and a word-presentation (Sch) on the one hand, and between a word-affect (P) and a thing-affect (C) on the other, corresponding precisely to these four determinants in that *F-B:Fb-Hd* order respectively.

While attention will be paid in the case stories to scores, test attitudes and imagery, *the scores will often be relatively underemphasized* [italics added]. This is because I hope to show how much we can understand the Rorschach record without referring to scores. This is not for the purpose of a *tour de force*. I believe that the development of Rorschach technique has tended to restrict attention to scores and their sequences to the point where scores often become barriers between the tester and the patient. Theory and interpretation suffer as a result, becoming mechanical and jargonistic...

The score summaries will frequently be touched on only briefly and only after the response-by-response part of each analysis is complete. The scores will be checked then chiefly to see where and to what extent they reflect the already inferred trends [exactly the reverse of Rorschach's suggested, initially 'global' psychogram-departing interpretation technique: 1921/1967 chap. VII.A.1/2 pp. 218-9, quotation reproduced at the beginning of chap. III.A.2 pp. 224-5 below]. This didactic technique is used to demonstrate what is new and not to disparage what is old and well established [i.e. his *new* psycho-analytic interpretation is not so compatible with the *old* formal analysis]. (pp. 185-6)

In other words he gradually gravitated from Rapaport's insistence on the psychoanalytical rationale of the formal scores to a more content-oriented psychoanalytic interpretation (1953), a deviating trend which we will be assessing shortly¹⁷. Here we must join with Piotrowski's (1957) sharp criticism who hit the nail right on the head when remarking:

No one has described the nonspecific use of the content of perceptanalytic responses in such detail and with such an extreme disregard of formal components as did Schafer. There is so little of Rorschach's specific methodology in Schafer's approach that this approach is equally applicable to any other test situation, to dreams, to interviews, to any verbal productions. Resembling the technique of a novelist, this approach is of necessity anecdotal. It results in a great mass of specific and diverse little observations, the relative significance of which remains sheer conjecture. The main conclusions describe neurotic defenses without an evaluation of the strength and nature of the drives against which the defenses have been set up. The approach may be of help to the psychotherapist who will work with the subject but it misses the wealth of conclusions, the orderliness, and the relative simplicity of a complete perceptanalytic methodology which makes use of both content and formal components [as in Zulliger]. However, Schafer's book is representative of a number of similar approaches which demonstrate that the matter of content analysis, the oldest psychological occupation of humanity, is an important and most helpful feature of the interpretation of Rorschach responses, a feature which is being intensively investigated at present. (p. 389; Salomon voices also a very similar criticism: 1963b p. 169)

Piotrowski is also referring in general to a historically important, in a superficial sense psychoanalytically inspired content-oriented trend taking place

¹⁷ For a similar deviation in his approach to theoretical Psychoanalysis, refer to Deri (1984, pp. 79-80, 218-22).

during the '40s and '50s which more often than not went to unwarranted extremes. A typical example is the work of Lindner who, supposedly inspired by Freud's interpretation of dreams (cf. chap. III.B.1 below), through a series of papers ultimately (1950) composed a complete list of 43 responses with specific interpretations of the symbol-dictionary kind (plate I light center *Dd* = "tomahawk" in aggressive psychopaths; plate IV = "suicide" card; plate VIII blue = "banners, flags waving" in hypomanic persons; etc.; see also Brown 1953. For well-deserved criticisms: Schafer 1954/1982 p. 118 foot-note, Holt 1954 p. 545, Schachtel 1966 pp. 260-1). Works like these were the ones that created between Rorschachers the wrong illusion that the psychoanalytic contribution to the Rorschach is limited to content analysis, and motivated Piotrowski to write his 1958 article contrasting both domains to conclude that "the roots of each are different[,] their aims were so dissimilar..." (p. 37): all this will be analyzed in detail in chap. III.B.1 below.

That said, some other authors merit also to be mentioned here as representatives of the U.S.A. psychoanalytic approach. Sherman (1955) for instance wrote an isolated but very important article on the psychoanalytic definition of Rorschach's original triad of determinants, without referencing Apfeldorf (see beginning of this section) but arriving to exactly the same conclusions however after a more thorough theoretical reflection insisting on the needed systematic consideration of the formal categories into one homogeneous and dynamic configuration; more importantly, proposing a *developmental* continuum of *Fb-F-B* (Id-Ego-SuperEgo) he clarifies a series of Rorschach points very much in the spirit of our own contribution (see also p. 34 below, and comp. chap. III.D.2). And to commemorate Sigmund Freud's centenary the Journal of Projective Techniques also dedicated a special number to the subject "Psychoanalytic Theory and Projective Methods" (Forer 1956) with contributions by Bellak, Holt and Schafer. The first one dealt with the historical and early theoretical connections between these techniques -Rorschach and TAT in particular- and Psychoanalysis; Holt, another disciple of Rapaport, dedicated on his side much effort to the development of a scoring manual for the expression of primary and secondary processes in the content of Rorschach responses (cf. 1960/1977) which he introduced there, monumental effort which seems mostly impracticable in retrospect (by comparison to our much more practical and simple approach: comp. pp. 316-23 below) due to having disregarded Rorschach's also psychoanalytically meaningful formal scoring categories (cf. 1954 pp. 543-6); finally Schafer focuses on the concept of transference applied to the Rorschach situation which condenses part of the respective chapter of his already discussed book (1954/1982 chap. 2).

1966 was the year of the publication of Schachtel's important book on "Experiential Foundations", one of the best works ever written about the theory of the Rorschach from a double psychoanalytic and phenomenological point of view (p. v). This author was without doubt -despite Beck's claims- the U.S.A. expert most influenced by and conceptually closer to Rorschach himself, as the title of his work testifies (to relate with '*Erlebnis*': p. 4). Just as for Rapaport, with whom he maintains throughout the book a continued critical and mutually enriching dialogue, his main

concern was to contribute a theoretical rationale of the test as a whole and of the determinants, for him the most important scores: besides reprinting an updated version of his articles from the '40s on the classical determinants, he offers a series of initial chapters on the 'experiential' nature of the test data and adds two final others on shading and content. In these initial ones he reviews the "projective" and the perceptual-associative conceptions of the response process, which he finds too abstract and lifeless and in need of a more experiential complement: much in the spirit of Freud's '*Das Unheimliche*' (1919) he offers an illuminating aesthetic-phenomenological assessment of the 'unfamiliar structure' of Rorschach's inkblots - rejecting their supposedly being "unstructured" and rightly stressing their widely neglected accidental character- and of the existential anxiety (Kierkegaard) they provoke which in turn mobilizes the subject's defenses when he cannot react with full openness (to relate with Szondi's and Schotte's conception of the double function of the Ego: 'diastole-systole' and '*ouvrir-fermer*', respectively; as well as with Rorschach's dilation-coartation dimension: Ellen-berger 1951b p. 330). In particular (pp. 27-30), taking clues from Kuhn (and Binswanger: see section C below) he introduced an important consideration of the symbolism of the plates' symmetry later largely exploited by the French school (see Chabert section B.4 below), and much more meaningful than the Lindner's and others' similar dictionary approach (IV = "father" card, VII = "mother" card, etc.: cf. pp. 260-1): in the plates with more *unitary* blots, symmetry -due to its semblance with vertebrate anatomy- stimulates an unconscious identification with and "projection" of the subject's body image, while in the more *bilaterally* divided ones it stimulates the expression of his view of object relations¹⁸. In chap. 6 -and the following ones- he argues how the concept of 'Experience Type' logically extends to all determinants as representatives each one of a particular mode of subject-world perceptual relatedness and experience, analyzing them both phenomenologically (according to Strauss' "Sense of senses") and psychoanalytically (according to Freud's two 'principles': pleasure and reality), and suggesting a developmental sequence of them (p. 86, cf. 1959 pp. 104-9)¹⁹ which independently coincides with the one of Sherman discussed above. All along this Thesis we will be repeatedly entering in more detail into Schachtel's always illuminating ideas.

Another disciple of Rapaport to be mentioned is Mayman, because of the relevant criticisms and complements he contributed to his mentor's approach particularly in the sense of a more clinically experience-near Rorschach assessment by contrast to the former's "experience-distant" or too abstract metapsychologically oriented Ego-psychology. According to Lerner who wrote an important tribute (2000ab, pp. 33, 42) "of Rapaport's colleagues and students, not one carried forth this

¹⁸ We will also profit from this adequate and fruitful *formal* view of plate symbolism when we expose and apply Peirce's concepts of 'Firstness' and 'Secondness', respectively, in chap. III.D.2 below.

¹⁹ In the context of these arguments, their ontogenetic sequence is clearly implied in the following quotation from Schachtel, the only location we have found in his writings where it is clearly summarized: "To perceive a flower fully, the openness toward the charm of its *color* is as important as the grasp of its *form* and the *kinesthetic* experience of how the stem rises up and is slightly bowed by the weight of the blossom" [*italics added*] (1959 p. 179 *passim*). Compare with our own slightly different view in chap. III.D.2 below.

Rorschach tradition more ably, passionately, innovatively, and nobly than did Marty Mayman. Over time, most others, including Rapaport himself, moved away from psycho-logical assessment and reinvested their time and energy in other professional pursuits but not so with Mayman... [He] extended, refined, and filled in gaps in Rapaport's work". Unfortunately he did not publish much, we just want to mention his clinically useful papers on content approach to self- and object-representations (1967), on a detailed form-level scoring (1970) better reflecting different levels of reality testing, and on movement responses (1977) analyzed from five different dimensions (perception -already in Rapaport's rationale-, fantasy, kinesthesia as self-expression, object representations, and empathy/identification in object relations; the last four his own contribution). For a more detailed assessment of these and of Mayman's several unpublished papers one must refer to Lerner's tribute.

Coming to contemporary psychoanalytical Rorschach writers, two main aspects of Blatt's contributions have to be mentioned: the extension of the pioneering work of Mayman on the assessment of object representations from a content approach (particularly by a detailed analysis based on Werner's developmental theory of the level of differentiation, articulation and integration of the human content: et al. 1976, & Lerner 1983, et al. 1990), and the new consideration of the nature of the Rorschach task as one of 'representation' instead than one of 'perception' (1986, 1990). Concerning the first aspect, sharing Mayman's above mentioned critical view of Rapaport's framework he promotes via content a more 'experiential' (self and interpersonal) Rorschach assessment by contrast to the latter's supposedly more impersonal 'structural' (formal) point of view: we believe this content-formal distinction is not necessarily so and that it is an extension of the deviating trend initiated by Schafer, which however useful tends to perpetuate the restrictive and ultimately false identification of a true psychoanalytic Rorschach with content analysis instead of percept-analysis. Freud's also structural division of personality into the concepts of *Id*, *Ego* and *Super-Ego* is a case in point: how can it be "impersonal" if those are nothing but precisely grammatical *persons* (cf. Schotte 1990 *Avant-propos*, pp. 133-8, 143-72; Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 pp. 181-7; Carrau et al. 1990 pp. 24-5), fact that tends to be overlooked in English due to the use of their artificially objectified latin translations? Similarly, if there was one author preoccupied with an *experiential* Rorschach approach it was Ernest Schachtel -who actually coined the term- who remained nevertheless focused on the *formal* factors for that purpose following the example of Rorschach himself. This Blatt's position is totally opposed to the Zulliger-Salomon tradition (see for ex. the latter's predominantly formal diagnosis of homo-sexual dynamics: 1959b, 1962 chap. XIII), and by applying the same Werner's developmental theory than Blatt but now to the *formal* factors we will show how these can still offer a more sophisticated experiential diagnosis (chap. III.D.2). For a critical assessment of the second aspect of Blatt's contribution see chap. III.B.2 below.

But the true heir of this tradition is Paul Lerner who in 1991 published his celebrated book "Psychoanalytic Theory and the Rorschach", in which he summarizes most of the contributions touched on above within the U.S.A. tradition initiated by

Rapaport that had been scattered for decades in separate publications since the classical manuals of the middle of the century. The volume is divided in two distinct parts, one clinical and the other research-oriented. In the 1st one are treated in 10 successive chapters the 'clinical' (by contrast to the psychometric) test-ing approach, the test report, his psychoanalytic diagnostic nosography (based both on classical character or pathological types and on Kernberg's more recent assessment of level of personality organization), test administration and scoring (mainly Rapaport's plus Mayman's form level scoring), the nature of the subject-tester interaction (following Schafer and Schachtel) but from a more contemporary object relations perspective (Lerner; Arnow & Cooper), the processes underlying the major determinants (Movement according to Mayman, Form according to Schachtel, Form level according to Mayman, Color according to Schachtel, Shading and Blackness according to Rapaport and Schachtel) with -relatively few- updated refinements, the meaning of some other additional formal reactions (subtle shading [Binder's $F(Fb)$], arbitrary color, inanimate movement, reflection, symmetry, and perspective reactions) following newer conceptions of self and narcissism (Kohut, Winnicott, Modell), content analysis in the frame of three of Mayman's dimensions established in his analysis of movement responses (fantasy -related to Holt's primary process assessment-, kinesthesia -rather questionable to extend beyond movement responses-, and object representation), sequence analysis of both formal and content features, and the inference process (relying on Schafer's validity criteria and proposing a personal step-by-step procedure) which finally leads from the test data to the interpretive report. The 2nd part of the book concerned with research applications, of less interest to us here since being more theory- than test-centered, includes 7 chapters which focus on several Rorschach-operationalized -concentrating mainly on the content dimension of responses- psychoanalytic concepts (object representation, defense -traditional and more recent measures-, and developmental object relations) and pathological syndromes (borderline disturbances, primitive mental states, and narcissistic disorders), the concepts largely based on the works of: Mayman, Blatt; Holt, Levine & Spivak; Lerner & Lerner, Cooper et al.; Urist, Kwawer, Coonerty, Ipp, Lerner & Lerner; respectively.

This work of Lerner is definitely a most important contribution within this tradition, which has accomplished sort of an equivalent result to the one of Exner within the empirical or psychometric one: the summarization of the dispersed works of many experts in a single comprehensive presentation. This feat has even more sense in the case of Lerner since in principle all synthesized contributions are supposed to be internally coherent between themselves proceeding as they do from the same (Rapaport's) theoretical tree, a questionable issue in the case of the Comprehensive System (C.S.: see pp. 217-21 below). Many valuable clinical and research wisdom becomes thus conveniently available to the interested psychoanalytical Rorschach expert. But despite our high respect for Lerner's scholarship and sensitivity, from our particular point of view we are not completely satisfied: again because of the relative neglect of Rorschach's formal schema -typical of this tradition since Schafer, *not* since Rapaport-, true backbone of his method. As we saw above Lerner has the merit, in contrast to some of his cited colleagues, of

having picked up again and duly analyzed the scoring factors in his manual: but even him would agree that this is not the most central or original part of his work. In fact, we believe that the same disregard of content analysis he criticizes in the psychometric approach is attributable and criticizable, in an identical but inversed way, to the 'clinical'-psychoanalytic approach of which he is a part concerning formal analysis: let us paraphrase his argument (1991), systematically replacing the word "content" with "form" and viceversa precisely to reverse the idea...

There is no area of Rorschach analysis that has been more misused and more underused [*within this post-Schafer tradition*] than [form]. For too many years [before him] Rorschach interpretation meant the interpretation of [form]... In an attempt to restore respect-ability [rather, dynamic interpretability] to the Rorschach test, many [psychoanalytic] theorists and investigators tended to shy away from assessing [form] of responses. With the Rorschach test viewed as an instrument best suited to assess [content] variables [(themes, representational imagery, etc.)], [form] was either ignored or approached exclusively in terms of categories that could [not be dynamically or symbolically interpreted]. This counterreaction too was unfortunate. The [form] categories are important... To exclude [form] altogether, in the service of [clinical] refinement, is to ignore an immensely rich and valuable source of information. (p. 107)

To confirm the exactness of these paraphrased words one only has to refer to Lerner's case study in his chap. 10 ("The Inference Process") which carries just the same quality than Schafer's ones criticized earlier (cf. the latter's quotation p. 29 above²⁰). We on our side won't get tired of insisting that there is, from a dynamic-symbolic *psychoanalytic* point of view, so much more to get out of the formal structure of the Rorschach (cf. Schachtel 1941, Salomon 1963b, titles; comp. Silberstein 1987 pp. 32-3) than this U.S.A. tradition seems to recognize, formal interpretive wealth which is in contrast precisely the core contribution of the earlier discussed classical Swiss tradition or Zulliger-Salomon system. Just following the above quoted lines Lerner explicitly touches on his group's paradoxically overturning (content-oriented) position in face of Schachtel's predominantly formal-experiential approach, a not insignificant shift of this author's correct stand-taking in direct line with Rorschach's own profound convictions (see chap. III.B.1 below).

Because of this and other, below explained reasons we don't believe Lerner to have yet achieved the expected definitive theoretical foundation or *systematization* - initiated by Rappaport- of Rorschach's formal method, from a psychoanalytic perspective in his case. He doesn't even states this aim for himself, in the sharp way Sherman (1955) did which strictly coincides with our own conception of the issue:

²⁰ Lerner makes a very similar statement: "Several highly sophisticated and richly elaborate Rorschach systems have been developed for quantifying the formal scores. Typically, scores are weighted, then tabulated, and compared with other scores in terms of prescribed ratios. The tabulated scores and the ratios become the basic data from which inferences are drawn. *Because of its atheoretical roots, strong reliance on normative data, and emphasis on descriptive rather than dynamic inferences, I have tended, despite the richness of this approach, to avoid conducting more extensive quantitative [formal] analyses*" (1991 p. 128, italics added; and in total contradiction with Salomon's 1962 and our view: see chap. III.D.2 below). Certainly, there is no Psychogram in his case analysis which was for Rorschach precisely the main interpretive tool.

Most psychologists who have been concerned with the intrinsic meaning of Rorschach determinants... have regarded the test as a composite of separate perceptual categories, i.e., movement, color, form, etc. To each of these categories a distinctive interpretation has been attached, even to the extent where a balancing of opposing forces has been conceptualized... This interpretative trend has in many ways resulted in an implicit psychological system which regards personality as a composite of trait fragments. **Although the claim is frequently made that the Rorschach is adaptable to any school of psychology, it is a fact that no consistent adaptation has been made... the concepts do not tie together in any truly dynamic fashion, and to a large extent this seems due to the piecemeal approach to Rorschach interpretation. In contrast to this fragmented kind of Rorschach interpretation, there have been some formulations which have presented *overall* dimensions of Rorschach productivity [as in Rapaport]... conceptualizations which allow the entire breadth of Rorschach perceptual activity to be fitted upon a single, meaningful continuum [just as Zulliger did with location scores]... The purpose of this article [and of this Thesis too] is to further define and formulate the continuum and to relate it, both as a whole and in terms of its elements to a psychoanalytic frame of reference. This formulation is not intended to question the general accuracy of specific Rorschach interpretations such as the meaning of M, C, F [B, Fb, F], etc., but instead to raise the question of the place of these same interpretations within a dynamically meaningful and clinically consistent system of psychoanalysis. (pp. 68-9; boldface added)**

On the contrary, Lerner's volume certainly cannot free itself from the impression of a composite of many and diverse points of view converging in the Rorschach, decidedly better than the C.S. subsystems do but in still too loose a way, while attacking different extra-test theoretical concepts or practical problems and despite their general sharing of a psychoanalytic inspiration. This is no doubt a direct reflection of his own view of Psychoanalysis as a theory, as articulated by him in this quotation:

It is important to keep in mind that psychoanalysis is not a closed, tightly knit, well-integrated personality theory. Rather, it is a loose-fitting composite of several complementary, internally consistent submodels, each of which furnishes concepts and formulations for observing and understanding important dimensions of personality development and functioning. The submodels I have identified include drive theory, structural theory, object relations theory, self psychology, and developmental theory... (1991, p. ix; comp. Flores & Pereyra González, 1993 p. 91)

These words sound very different from Szondi's ones when attempting to truly '*integrate*' (Schotte 1963/1990, pp. 22-7; Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989, pp. 22 & 24, 27-31) Psychoanalysis as a theory in all of its 'submodels' or 'dimensions', Szondi's system which is our chosen theoretical framework that we struggled to apply to the present work and which has naturally led us to a qualitatively different psychoanalytic systematization of the Rorschach than this one.

Lerner's subsequent (1998a) volume, despite the change of title is nothing else than a second revised and enlarged edition of the former book - so a discussion of its added first and last chapters will conceptually suffice here. From this fact and from his assertion that "the pre-vious structural orientation gives way here to a considerably more experiential one" (p. xiii) one would expect in it an even greater distancing from our own formal-psychoanalytic model and convictions. Nevertheless, some agreeing issues are rather brought into a sharper focus through a more careful comparison and distinction throughout the work between the two main U.S.A. Rorschach traditions, the empirical-psychometric and the psychoanalytic-clinical, and through an analysis of the important and challenging issue of *integration* (cf. above) between the two. For instance in chapter 1 several relevant points are made:

...Recent and significant shifts in psychoanalytic theory are leading Rorschach theorists... away from Rapaport's virtually exclusive structural approach and toward an interest in experiential factors... Although the emphasis here is experiential, this is not intended as a replacement of Rapaport's earlier structural focus [agreed!]. (p. 3)

He passes then to underline the differences between both approaches around five points: (1) emphasis on the role of the examiner, (2) sources of Rorschach data, (3) testing rationale, (4) the test battery, and (5) role of personality theory. Leaving aside #4 which is of secondary importance to us, as discussed earlier we totally agree with Lerner in his criticism of the empirical approach in all points *except* #2 which merits a closer look:

A second difference between the two approaches involves sources of information. In general, those who approach the Rorschach from an empirical perspective tend to rely on one source-the scores and their interrelationships [comp. Salomon 1962, *Vorwort*]. For instance, even though Exner's Comprehensive system admits to three sources-the structural summary [Rorschach's 'psychogram'], the sequence of scores, and the patient's verbalizations-in reviewing illustrative case material, it is clear that the structural summary is the heart and soul of the system [here we couldn't agree more with Exner rather than Lerner, an infrequent occurrence!] and that the other sources serve to refine and extend inferences derived from the summary...

With respect to the empirical and psychoanalytic approaches to sources of information, there are two provisions to be added. First, with the movement toward integration has come a greater appreciation of the other approach's contribution... psychoanalytic examiners are coming to realize that more can be gleaned from a careful appraisal of the formal scores than they had allowed. Second, beginning with Rorschach himself, a distinction has been drawn between the formal and structural features of a record and the substantive or content aspects. Some (Aronow, Reznikoff, and Moreland, 1995) have tended to associate the psychoanalytic approach with a primary if not exclusive concern with content. As I have indicated above, both historically and presently, this is not the case [again, totally agreed on both provisions]. Although several psychoanalytic theorists (P. Lerner...; Mayman...) have suggested approaches to content that are thoughtful and systematic, this has

not been to the exclusion or devaluation of structural features [this is a weak point in Lerner's argument, and contradicted by Schafer's and his own quotations above concerning their respective protocol analyses]. (pp. 6-7)

In his final chapter 26 "Toward an Integrated Rorschach Approach", after briefly reviewing the historical evolution of both the C.S. and psychoanalytic approaches in the U.S.A., Lerner presents some contemporary attempts at integrating the two. The most important for us, due to its closeness with our own theoretical positions, is the brilliant work of Smith (1994, 1997) whose commitments he summarizes as follows:

A third type of integration, one even more weighted to the psychoanalytic side, is presented by Smith (1997). Smith begins by arguing that for assessment to be meaningful, one needs a theoretical framework within which to fit test-based observations and interpretations... For Smith, only psychoanalytic theory in general, and object-relations theory in particular, "contains propositions capable of linking test results with underlying psychological processes, genetic or developmental..., [so that] observable behavior can provide the framework for a comprehensive psychological evaluation" (p. 193). Smith's methodology is clinical, not empirical. He scores the protocol in terms of the Comprehensive System and makes use of the structural summary. He begins interpretation by examining the structural variables, but then adopts a "more fluid interpretive process" in which he "moves back and forth between structural variables and more narrative data" (p. 195). Unlike Exner (1993), who recommends an interpretive strategy based on key variables, Smith first attends to "the most striking findings, especially those that were noteworthy during the administration" (p. 195). He then examines cognitive factors, affects, defenses, self- and object representations, and dynamics. (p. 438)

This is also basically our own way of approaching a protocol (cf. chap. IV below), the only thing one could question from our particular point of view is the theoretical advisability of using the dispersed formal structure of the C.S., based on an entirely different formal logic, for this essentially psychoanalytic undertaking (see chap. III.D. 2 below for more details). Anyway, a crucial point is made by Smith above and by Lerner in the next page of final discussion of the whole book:

Efforts to integrate the empirical and psychoanalytic approaches rekindle basic questions that have concerned and challenged Rorschach practitioners, researchers, and students since Rorschach introduced his method virtually 75 years ago... The tension that exists between the empiricist, with his or her interest in hard and solid data, *numbers* that can be crunched with objectivity, and the clinician, with his or her investment in softer *narrative data*, subjective meanings, and human drama, is not, of course, restricted to our provincial Rorschach realm...; (p. 439, italics added)

this is precisely the same point made by Schotte (1990 pp. 22-30) while discussing the quality of Szondi's psychoanalytic contribution and how the latter was able to maintain integrated in his work both scientific aspects, the *numerical* and the *narrative* ones, as the dual-meaning paradoxical verbs of 'contar' in Spanish, 'Zählen-Erzählen' in German, 'compter-(ra)conter' in French, i.e. both 'to count' and 'to recount or tell' in English, invite us to do.

Lerner's above complaint of Psychoanalysis as an unintegrated "composite" and the effect of this on Rorschach interpretation has also been stated and tackled by two publications. Burke, Friedman & Gurlitz (1988) proposed an integrated "Psychoanalytic Rorschach Profile" composed of 10 -eventually 14- associated scoring scales to assess impulse (oral, anal, etc.), ego structure (boundary, stability, thought), and object relations (differentiation, mutuality, anima-tion). They review and criticize the limitations of earlier psychoanalytic measurement scales for the Rorschach - essentially the same ones included by Lerner in the IInd Part of his 1st manual - before introducing their own. The impression one gets is of a cumbersome interpretive procedure which poses a real challenge to theoretical "integration" by adding rather discrete scale over scale, besides their being purely superficial-quantitative and exclusively content-based despite their arguments to the contrary: for instance, the supposedly *structural* Ego Stability scale includes (1) fragmented or dead ("dead cat"), (2) incipiently fragmented ("man falling"), (3) precariously integrated ("balanced glass"), and (4) enduring and solid ("a hand") *contents*. How diametrically dissimilar this kind of "integration" seems from Zulliger and Salomon's truly systematized (cf. chap. III.D.2 below) psychoanalytic personality assessment and interpretation, strictly based on the meaningful *formal* features of the test plates and individual protocol! (Zulliger 1948-54/1969, Salomon 1959b cases, 1963b; cf. also Schachtel's 1966 instructive chap. 11). Some of Salomon's (1959b) reflections on content are totally in point here:

...c'est seulement lorsque l'interprétation *statistique* et *dynamique* du protocole tout entier a été faite que l'on peut se permettre une interprétation [du contenu] d'une réponse dans le sens de la *psychologie des profondeurs* [italics added: cf. Zulliger 1949a], et sans jamais perdre de vue le caractère formel de cette réponse elle-même. Il va sans dire qu'une telle interprétation n'est valable que si elle provient d'un testeur qui a une connaissance approfondie et une certaine expérience de la psychanalyse...

L'interprétation formelle nous permet d'obtenir des indications sur la façon dont le sujet vit, mais non sur ce qui remplit son existence. Le contenu nous donne parfois des éclair-cissements sur les thèmes de sa pensée et de ses rêveries, sur ses désirs et sa vie imagina-tive en général, et dans des cas exceptionnels sur les événements de son existence. Son comportement extérieur se laisse parfois concevoir plus exactement mais le contenu ne nous donne pas à l'inconscient l'accès direct que permet l'interprétation des rêves. Il est vrai que le contenu est très souvent un dérivé direct de l'inconscient, mais sa mise en forme par le processus secondaire ne se laisse pas facilement interpréter en dehors d'un traitement psychanalytique. Ce que le contenu peut nous offrir comme connaissances sur le sujet appartient donc surtout au *préconscient* et au *conscient*. Ces deux instances seules se laissent explorer par le processus perceptif mis en jeu par les planches, le contenu d'un test est donc beaucoup plus en relation avec le moi qu'avec le ça.

Freud dit dans son ouvrage sur le mot d'esprit: "Une pensée consciente peut être régie pour un instant par les lois de l'inconscient et ce qui en résulte et saisi immédiatement après par la perception consciente." Nous aimerions

prendre en considération aussi cette possibilité pour le problème qui nous occupe ici. L'expérience pratique nous permet, croyons-nous, de prétendre que cela est vrai surtout pour les réponses originales à la fois quant à leur contenu et quant à leurs modes d'appréhension (ce sont également ces réponses qui nous indiquent des possibilités de sublimation); et naturellement aussi les réponses kinesthésiques dont on sait qu'elles ont une étroite relation avec l'inconscient. Cette influence de l'inconscient sur l'élaboration du contenu est, pensons-nous, bien plus fréquente qu'on ne le suppose en général. Mais la signification latente ne se laisse pas si aisément dévoiler à travers le contenu manifeste. C'est cette dernière raison qui fait que le contenu est si rarement dans un protocole de Rorschach une voie d'accès directe vers l'inconscient.

Le contenu peut servir aussi à indiquer des besoins instinctuels qui cherchent leur expression. Ces besoins sont naturellement plus ou moins déformés et ne se laissent que faiblement déceler. Il s'agit alors d'indices de pulsions instinctuelles ressenties comme défendues... Les indices donnés plus haut ne suffisent nullement à donner une interprétation symbolique sexuelle du contenu. Une anamnèse très poussée est la première condition pour y parvenir. Des associations libres à des réponses présumées révélatrices peuvent fournir parfois des renseignements très intéressants. Mais croire que l'interprétation du contenu est aisée et n'est qu'une simple "traduction" peut conduire à de lourdes erreurs et jeter le discrédit sur le test.

Il arrive quelquefois, mais pas toujours, que l'on puisse voir dans les réponses complexes à quelle couche dynamique elles appartiennent et quelles relations elles indiquent avec les phases prégénitales. Mais nous ne pouvons pas être d'accord avec l'opinion de Bohm [equally applicable to our authors' 'Impulse' subgroup of scales] pour qui elles donnent des indications presque infaillibles concernant les points de fixation. Comme nous l'avons déjà indiqué, elles sont plutôt un des signes qui permettent, parmi d'autres, de déceler des régressions. Une telle conclusion n'est toutefois possible qu'à une condition préalable: que le dépouillement formel indique clairement une structure psycho-sexuelle infantile. A cette condition seulement peut-on supposer que des pulsions partielles continuent leur existence sans s'être soumises entièrement à une génitalité d'adulte. Ce n'est que dans la mesure où l'on a une quasi-certitude des points de fixation ou de régression que l'on peut mettre en rapport avec eux le contenu sans trop de risques d'erreur dans l'interprétation. Il faut aussi tenir compte des modes de perception et des déterminants pour l'interprétation d'un contenu significatif.

...La statistique, et ce devrait être là un fait évident, ne peut pas apporter une grande aide pour l'interprétation du contenu. Il est donc d'autant plus surprenant de voir plusieurs spécialistes du Rorschach employer des méthodes statistiques et, à partir d'elles, affecter telle ou telle réponse d'une signification immuable. Cette méthode ne peut se référer qu'à des conceptions pseudo-analytiques. (pp. 258-61)

Without showing exactly the same Rorschach and psychoanalytic theoretical commitments -just as Smith- but basing himself on Piotrowski's clearly structural 'Perceptanalysis', Rosner (1990) makes a similar criticism than ours to Burke & al.'s

approach as well as more generally to the current psychoanalytic approach to the Rorschach in the U.S.A., contradicting Lerner's conception that due attention to more contemporary psychoanalytic 'psychologies' -like object-relations and self psychology- imply a de-emphasis on the formal factors of the method. Of course the lack of an explicit and more general rationale, interfacing Rorschach and Psychoanalysis, as guide to his case analysis decreases conviction to his interesting interpretive proposal.

3. The Spanish/Latin-American current

Shortly following Rapaport et al.'s (1946) groundbreaking publication there appeared in Buenos Aires the interesting monograph of the Brazilian author Alcyon Baer (1949; French translation: 1950) who proposed some original and in part radical modifications of Rorschach's interpretive method inspired to him by Psychoanalysis. He warns nevertheless that his publication is just a *practical* contribution with not all duly required theoretical explanations, and announces a larger, deeper-going one which to our knowledge was never published. Apparently in reaction to Lindner's earlier discussed publications he criticizes both this then contemporary confinement to pure content analysis but on the other hand also the current "inflexibilité mathématique" (1950 p. 503) which tends to "réprimer les aspects dynamiques du test lui-même au bénéfice de ses aspects plus sensoriels" (p. 456), and states his "tentative de rapprocher les faits de la psychologie analytique [contenu] de ceux de la 'gestalt' [forme]" (p. 455) aiming to "diminuer ainsi l'immense abîme qui jusqu'à nos jours a séparé la psychologie 'gestalt' de la psychanalyse" (p. 503). In his opinion Furrer's findings on the *B* responses, Binder's ones on the *Hd*, and Beck's -with whom he strongly identifies, simultaneously criticizing Klopfer- on form organization activity (*Z*), "apparaissent comme un véritable retour de la dynamique, c'est-à-dire une reprise du sens dynamique structurel [duel] du test initié et non terminé par Rorschach" (p. 456). Concretely speaking, he begins by analyzing the response process and assimilating it to an anxiety-arousing traumatic -enriching conceptualization later exploited by Schafer and particularly Salomon- and transferential situation because of the 'loss of objects' (forms) in the almost totally unstructured stimulus material: as discussed earlier and later on we do *not entirely* agree with this last view of the test inkblots, neither with the assertion that the supposedly general resort by the subjects to the regressive mechanism of projection -taking literally and at face value the popular designation "projective test"- proves the existence of the trauma. Anyway, referring to Beck's (1945, chap. II.IV) three basic Gestalt structures that organize the test experience -partially criticized by us, and which simultaneously contradict his "unstructured" hypothesis-, the existence of the most important third one which determines the appearance of Color and eventually corresponding shock reactions - adding Binder's similar observations concerning Light-dark- endorses his traumatic-anxious interpretation of the test task as 'loss of Form' through the confrontation with Color and/or Light-dark regressive pulls. Movement, on the other hand, represents according to Furrer the construction of a dream from the "day residues" which constitute the formless blots, including in its content specific and far-reaching traumatic and transferential implications in the subject's past. So, since defense against anxiety in the test is struggle for maintaining the Form, and since Movement

represents the trauma or better the structured trauma, again following Beck (chap. II.VIII, who by the way later on changed this opinion) he then discards Rorschach's '*Erlebnistypus*' interpretive opposition between Movement : Color for his new Movement : Form (trauma : defense) dialectics: "Cette observation nous conduit directement à la clef qui régit le Test de Rorschach: ...C'est le mouvement (M) qui en tant que *contenu* s'oppose à la *forme* en tant que structure" (p. 462). From this quite original theoretical conception derive all his technical contributions regarding the psychodynamic interpretation of Rorschach protocols, in whose details we do not need to enter here besides this final quotation:

En tenant compte des deux extrêmes que nous venons de signaler (M et F)[B et F], il est facile de capter toutes les nuances de l'activité du Moi dans le Test, dans sa lutte défensive contre l'angoisse... Pour ces raisons, l'ensemble des réponses du Test doit être évalué de deux points de vue différents: du point de vue des *contenus*, et avant tout des contenus de Mouvement, et du point de vue des *défenses*, selon que la forme se présente isolée ou en combinaison avec d'autres déterminants... Nous nous trouvons ainsi devant la nécessité d'analyser aussi bien les contenus que les défenses, et dans l'obligation de comprendre que la clef de base qui commande le Test est constituée par l'antinomie entre le *mouvement et la forme* et non entre le mouvement et la couleur. *Le mouvement et la forme* représentent sous des aspects sensoriels les mêmes pôles extrêmes de l'opposition dynamique qui existe entre la représentation inconsciente et l'attitude caractérologique, c'est-à-dire entre contenu et défense. Pour autant, il n'y a aucun doute qu'une interprétation profonde du test doit poursuivre, d'une part, l'analyse minutieuse des contenus réprimés et, d'autre part, doit faire un examen attentif de la dynamique des défenses, ce qui permettra d'obtenir une vision d'ensemble très ample de l'interaction des forces qui détermine la structure totale du Moi. (pp. 463, 466, 468)

If some of Baer's conceptions are certainly fruitful, particularly his dynamic representation of the response process as traumatic-anxious to begin with and the subsequent possible analysis of the defensive operations at work, but also his sound criticism of the interpretive dangers and limitations of pure content analysis (1949 p. 16, 1950 p. 468); others are entirely wrong, like the assimilation of the same process to free association in a psychoanalytic session (cf. Schachtel 1966 p. 14), or the above already criticized ones concerning the "unstructured" inkblots and projection. But the most questionable one is no other than his central and original Movement : Form dialectics, rejecting Rorschach's absolutely essential Experience Type, based on the too quick equation Movement/dream = trauma (what about 'wish-fulfillment?') besides the fact that the typical human movement response always includes a *formal* element. His theoretical mistakes are condensed in the assertion: "...dans les méthodes d'interprétation habituelles, la 'gestalt' temporelle [de Beck] tend à être sacrifiée à la fausse exactitude des formules du type de réactivité, déformation qui est poussée à l'extrême dans les critères de Klopfer et de ses collaborateurs" (1950 p. 472 footnote); in our opinion on the contrary Klopfer's *spatial* schema (his 'distribution of determinants' bar-graph: & Kelley 1942, chap. VIII & Part Three Appendix; et al.

1954, chap. 9 & p. 640), based on Rorschach's final one in his posthumously published case study (1921/1967 chap. VII.A p. 236), was very close to the real key of the method as entirely demonstrated by us in chap. III.D.2 below against Beck's erroneous *temporal* conception.

For some unknown reason -at least to us- and in contrast to the traditions in other languages, despite the strong both Rorschach and psychoanalytic practice in countries like Spain, Argentina, or even Brazil -considering the idiomatic closeness-, the important works appeared in the Spanish language dedicated to an overall psychoanalytic approach to the Rorschach have not inspired the constitution of 'schools' developing the ideas of the original authors: this holds for the already discussed Baer as well as for our next author, Juan A. Portuondo. Initially practicing psychologist in La Habana this prolific writer later emigrated to Spain where he published his main works. In 1973(a) appeared his book "*El Rorschach Psicoanalítico*" where he proposes an impressive finished and comprehensive synthesis of both sciences, equating Rorschach's de-terminants with orthodox Freudian concepts. Schematically, these are the proposed correlations:

I. Reality principle.

A) external reality:

- 1- *F* as the "thing in itself"
- 2- *V* as social customs

B) internal reality:

- 3- *O* as individual world concept

II. Pleasure principle.

A) Eros:

- 1- *Fb* as uncontrolled instinctive (erotic) impulsivity
- 2- *FbF* as partially controlled egocentric impulses
- 3- *FFb* as realistic altruism (through repression of impulses)

B) sublimation (in both senses, *Eros* or *Thanatos*):

- 1- *B* as sublimating ability (including object, animal, and human movement, in increasing order of sublimating success)
- 2- *B+* plus *O+* as true cultural creativity

C) Thanatos:

- 1- *Hd* as destructive 'death' responses (including black color, chiaroscuro, and texture, in decreasing order of intensity) indicating...
 - a) panic (if self-destructive) or...
 - b) crime (if projected outside)
- 2- *HdF* as... a) fear or b) aggressiveness, respectively
- 3- *FHd* as... a) uneasiness or b) bad humor, respectively.

However convincing some of these correlations may seem (*Fb* = Eros; *B* = sublimation) they all carry a persistent questionable character: in sharp contrast to eminent psychoanalytic authors like Rapaport, Schachtel, or Salomon, Portuondo proposed all of them mechanically and superficially without any effort on a rationale that would make them minimally reasonable, in the way Rapaport called

'uncritical' (pp. 26-8 above). We are supposed to just accept them putting our faith on his persistently mentioned "empirical" confirming data, about which we don't have any details either. Based on this fact it becomes difficult to evade the impression of having to do with a different category of Rorschachist who, without all required qualifications (*F* = Kant's '*Ding an sich*'?!), wants nevertheless to figure side by side with the above mentioned names. On a careful reading of his chapters becomes clearer the one-to-one, out-of-books dictionary type methodology of reaching interpretations, like in his sections on plate symbolism or on content symbols. There is limited scientific use for this kind of contribution, and correspondingly as already said it seems to have attracted little attention. His subsequent 1989 book is essentially a repetition of the same ideas.

Noceti & Sorribas (1982) published a detailed psychoanalytic study on the different degrees of hysteria, dividing their cases into three levels: classical neuroses (I), serious cases (II), and hysterical psychoses (III). The Rorschach -Klopfer's version- was used to confirm psycho-analytic hypotheses on the growing psychodynamic complexity of the respective cases, organizing their data according to the classical determinants (movement, form, color) but from then on paying exclusive attention to the content of responses using each determinant in an effort to identify the differing characteristics of fantasy (Oedipus, castration, primal scene, repression, return of the repressed, object relations, etc.). They advance some seemingly interesting hypotheses but don't follow them through long enough, like the grasping of "*...a certain isomorphism between mental growth, as it was investigated by Freud, and the appearance of the determinants in the Rorschach*" (p. 18 citing Ames, to whom we prefer Salomon or Dworetzki) just as we do but without clearly offering a concrete chronological sequence in Sherman's sense, or "*...the existence of 'homogeneous semantic unities' for the determinants, which differ in their meaning from other semantic unities that appear in other combinatories categorized by the same determinant*" (p. 19, our translation) assertion that sounds contradictory and remains still unclear with the sub-sequent rather short discussion. The orientation of this contribution is incidental to our primordial *formal* orientation but we reviewed it anyway due to its importance and in an effort to identify some theoretical trend in the Spanish-speaking literature: however, even if the authors referenced most of the earlier discussed publications (Beck, Rapaport, Schafer, Baer, Bohm, Schachtel, Anzieu) it is difficult to establish their allegiance to any previous psychoanalytical Rorschach school since their writing is not focused that way.

Silberstein (1987) wrote, as usual for him, a very thoughtful article on the problems of confronting both domains, which seems -at least in part- a criticism of the study just commented²¹. Using a semiotic model he distinguishes two levels in the Rorschach: a syntactic (with rules that determine the relationship of the different signs -i.e. scoring symbols- between them-selves, syntax which is "Rorschach's most original contribution" p. 32) and a semantic one (that studies the relationship

²¹ See p. 32 and endnote 4 p. 38 of the text. Silberstein's paper was originally delivered in 1984, and includes in its bibliography Noceti & Sorribas' 1982 monograph as sole Argentinian psychoanalytic Rorschach contribution.

between the signs and that designated through them: in other words the interpretation of the formal factors in psychological terms -cf. Noceti & Sorribas' last quotation above-). He views the first level as deserving much attention and development from Rorschach authors (Klopfer, Exner) but without an adequate theoretical -semantic- study of the interpretation of the new determinants and formulas by contrast to the old. In this unequal situation many experts attempt to incorporate Psychoanalysis to the test interpretation following the model of Rorschach's posthumous case study, precisely from where the forementioned authors took cues for the introduction of the new determinants. This problematic situation is the one reflected in the title of the paper. He then goes on establishing a difference in between the syntactic or scoring variables: the triad of original determinants (B, F, Fb) he finds as *symbolic* i.e. with an indirect, exclusively *theoretical* relationship with their decodified meaning, by contrast to the location, content, or frequency variables which maintain a similarity or analogic sign-signified relationship with their interpretive value (many G = "ability to relate details or interest in wanting to survey everything", p. 33) and are thus *iconic*. In his opinion this distinction is more relevant than the false form-content opposition. He notes that, following Schafer, psychoanalytic interpretations concentrate on the content to be then embedded into the original ("formal") interpretive hypotheses. This presupposes the original method as atheoretical or at least as theory-independent (see previous section A), but as already discussed Rorschach's supposedly "empirical" establishment of the central triad of determinants derives from and carries in fact definite theoretical hypotheses, in his case Bleuler's conceptions, whose compatibility with the psychoanalytic ones is questionable (here he develops the diverging concept of 'affect' in both as an example). From here the semantic inconsistency in the current practice of the psychoanalytic Rorschach. It is as such already observable in Rorschach's posthumous case study, where "...what is important in the first place for psychoanalysis... is not the color [or the other determinants] but the direct content of the response. The presence of color is used (proposed) as sort of an index of greater depth. Although he makes resistance to abandon this category for the psycho-analytical analysis he does not consider it intrinsically to develop it" (p. 36; just as in the above discussed Noceti & Sorribas' study), i.e. the less important iconic variables take the place of the symbolic ones in search for simple analogies between responses and psychoanalytic assumptions (cf. Salomon's relevant warnings reproduced pp. 37-9 above). The solution he foresees is a psychoanalytic reformulation of the whole procedure:

...we are interested in approaching the semantic problem of the articulation between the test variables and the psychoanalytic interpretations.

...But now, how would be then stated a psychoanalytic Rorschach which at least in this level -from the point of view of the test- would not generate inconsistencies...? From what we have stated it [the solution] is in creating new variables or determinants, obtained by reduction to the test parameters, of enunciations from psychoanalytic theory, which furthermore demonstrate their validity. For that should be taken into consideration the iconic classifications and reviewed the symbolic ones linked through their code to the bleulerian statement. The original test would provide the syntactic system for processing the variables although there would have to be formulated new

syntactic rules due to the juxtaposition of different levels of classification... The definitive formulation of this system should be stated after the examination of the psychoanalytic point of view and its possible pertinence and conditions; although in principle would demand a new foundation absent in this model... The advantage of this procedure would be in the ability to widen the descriptive value of the test, to verify the specific configuration of psychic dynamics studied by psychoanalysis in the test structure itself, and to regulate the mode of psychoanalytic inference over the contents... The disadvantage of this procedure would be in leaving aside and without foundation the system of relations that -beyond Bleuler's theory, overflowing it- Rorschach discovers between the movement, the form and the color and that he left without a good explanation. (pp. 33, 37)

We find ourselves essentially agreeing with most of Silberstein's arguments, particularly his assessment of Klopfer's and Exner's unbalanced or exclusively 'syntactic' contributions, the special *symbolic* place he reserves for the determinants in the test procedure (cf. p. 232 below), and the Bleulerian-theoretical nature of his supposedly "empirical" discovery of the latter (cf. pp. 289-90 below). But we disagree on our assessment of the role of Rorschach's posthumous case study and consequently on the proposed solution to the stated problem: in our opinion in that paper Rorschach establishes a more essential connection between his *formal* procedure and Freud's one in dream interpretation, no wonder since as we know the latter also found the key of dreams in their peculiar *syntax*, and in this way the road is open to a direct psychoanalytic relay of Rorschach's "most original contribution" of his triadic system of determinants (cf. pp. 237-43, 289-92 below) - despite their Bleulerian accent and their subsequent discard by Silberstein.

The Brazilian colleague M. Debieux (1987) in a modest booklet proposed a psycho-analytic reinterpretation of Rorschach's determinants in particular, not satisfied with the original author's basic introversion-extratension conception. Equally grounding herself on quite dissimilar authors (even theoretically opposed as in the case of Schachtel-Klopfer, or Klopfer-Baer: cf. above) like Schachtel, Klopfer, Baer, and Rausch de Traubenberg, she attempts to clarify these scores with the help of concepts such as drive, identification, object, cathexis and fantasm from a mainly Lacanian perspective (criticizing, as could be expected, Rapaport-Schafer's Ego psychology). In condensed terms, *F* is related to reality and defense, *B* to desire and demand, *Fb* to affect and cathexis, and *Hd* to anxiety and narcissism. The treatment of the subject is not altogether original except for some issues like the all-important movement determinant, put in a relevant connection with those key concepts of Lacan. But the above mentioned diversity of points view on the one hand, and the modesty of her contentions on the other, prevent the attainment -despite her being in the right way- of deeper insights entirely at her reach (comp. our treatment of Lacan in chap. III.D.2).

C. Weigle (1988/1998) also offers us an introductory manual to her personal psycho-analytic approach to the test interpretation, which is largely schematic (often simply tabulating the ideas of countless authors) and not free from inaccuracies

(many names for ex.). In the first chapter she presents a hardly original theoretical framework for the method largely supporting herself on the "projective" hypothesis, but simultaneously taking into consideration the plates' specific qualities since they "are not completely unstructured... each plate mobilizes a series of universal fantasies in each subject" (p. 21). This she develops in a separate chapter, proposing to organize them in 3 groups (exactly as we did in p. 6 above): I to III as mobilizing aggression and anxiety, IV to VII Oedipical situation (father & mother figures) and sexuality, and VIII to X aspects of interrelation and affect, respectively; in other words we both agree on the structural global vision of how the material is organized and divided, but not on the explanations proposed. One can recognize in her plate by plate presentation the elaboration of the same old, supposedly symbolic hunches of Lindner and others which still remain unproved (cf. Schachtel 1966, pp. 260-1): I = fantasy of illness: who am I; II = sexual guilt; III = normality in social relation; IV = Oedipical terrifying father - authority; V = reality; VI = heterosexuality; VII = inner, Oedipical mother; VIII = affective adaptation and fantasy of cure; IX = sublimation - the mother as partial object; X = life space and environment.

A quite extensive group of Uruguayan university professors (Carrau et al., 1990) put together an interesting book on "dynamic analysis of the Rorschach" which - despite its not reaching great depths - has the merit of a clear and sound presentation connecting its clinical practice with psychoanalytic theory, in a more rational and successful way than the majority of works in this linguistic current. Leaving aside an introductory section, a second chapter is dedicated to the response process very much in the spirit of Schafer (whom they reference) and Salomon (whom they don't): the drawing from "The Interpretation of Dreams", the double regressive-progressive topic/formal movement; but adding a reference to Freud's expanded, world-shaping ideas of 'projection' and a subsequent connection with Klein's Ego-and-object development concepts. The third and central one focuses on the interpretation of the results, including the general behavior to the testing situation, the formal aspects of the responses proper (adopting Noceti & Sorribas' and Silberstein's 'symbolic' approach to the determinants, complementing it with a formalized reinterpretation of Schafer's 'shifts': 'dreaming' pole = pure other-than-form determinants and F^- , 'daydreaming' = F as secondary determinant, 'purposeful visualizing' = F as primary determinant considered the ideal solution, 'normal perceiving' pole = excessively rigid control or repression), special phenomena (Bohm) and deviant verbalizations (Rapaport), content (rightly insisting on its only partial character in a psychoanalytic interpretation) and sequence analysis, and plate symbolism (a not very original, rather questionable repetition of clichés). A number of case studies and a final chapter on scoring (mainly Klopfer's) close the volume.

The Brazilian expert Latife Yazigi (et al.) dedicated a couple of articles to compare Rorschach performance with the concepts and works of specific, rather neglected psycho-analysts: Abraham and Bion respectively. In 1991 (& Del Porto, Warschauer), using a strong content-oriented approach but without disregarding formal aspects, she tried to identify the psychodynamic phenomena established by the first psychoanalyst in manic-depressive states through the protocols of seven

bipolar mood disorder patients, entirely confirming his found characteristics: aggressiveness, obstinate and defiant attitude (Zw responses, extratensive type, aggressive contents); orality and cannibalistic tendencies ("food", "breasts", "eating", etc.); repetition and adherence (perseveration, condensation, adhesivity between percepts); ambivalent identity (*B* in figures of opposite sex); ambivalence of affect (contents of approaching and separating simultaneously); ambivalence of mechanisms (splitting and fusion simultaneously); lack of Ego control (low $F+\%$); control and possessivity (description of the stimulus, speech as a way of control and domination of the stimulus-object); and disengagement of the libido from the external world (low $F+\%$, high Λ and low $F\%$, high $Anat\%$). In 1994 (& Altimari) she established a detailed but rather common-sense, unexplained comparison between the other analyst's highly original concepts and Rorschach's signs: the type of link (*L*, *H*, or *K*) would be expressed through the attitude towards the test; the Beta-elements through the $F-$, pure determinants without form, and special phenomena indicating thought disturbances; the Alpha-elements through the $F+$ and all determinants secondary to form; dream-thoughts and -myths through the *FM* and the *M* with other-than-human content; logic pre-conceptions through Beck's *Z* and pathologic ones through thought-disorder phenomena; conceptions through superior *G*; the concept through combinatory *G*, good *Z*, $F+$ or other determinant with prevalent and positive form, and *V*; the scientific deductive system through the operations that lead to combinatory wholes; the horizontal axis spectrum would be expressed by the F spectrum from - to +; the capacity for action (6th column) by the relation between $F\%$ and $F+\%$ and by Beck's Λ ; etc. Overall this paper constitutes an interesting initial approximation which requires however further elaboration and research (see next paragraph).

In 1992 took place and were published the proceedings of an important Rorschach congress in Buenos Aires which included a panel focused on the interpretation of an extensive, repeated protocol (the "Silvio" case) from different authors'/theoretical approaches, most of them psychoanalytic: Bion (by Pérez, rather difficult to coordinate with Yazigi's above discussed but shortly after published paper), Freud (by Herrera, partially based on Baer's earlier discussed *M:F* opposition), Klein (by Gavilán, which makes much sense but of course needs more ample confirmation), and Kohut (by Rodríguez Amenábar, which as usual makes much use of content as the U.S.A. school does but without reference to and independently from the latter). We should also mention that the next congress of its kind picked up in a subsequent volume of the same journal (17.1, 1995) was dedicated to the psychoanalytic concepts of sublimation and creativity.

Finally two Argentinian authors, Ruiz & Orcoyen (2000), published another book on the psychoanalytic reading of the Rorschach. As their subtitle suggests ("three Freudian case histories in search of a Rorschach") they chose an original method: by rereading "100 years after" Freud's famous case studies concerning the neurotic structure and symptomatology (the Dora, little Hans, and Rat-Man cases, paradigmatic of hysteria, phobia, and obsessional neuroses respectively) they hoped to find new clues for the clinical understanding of the classical psychogram. In the first part of

the book, of an entirely anecdotal nature, they hypothesize how would have appeared the respective Rorschach protocols of these cases. After a subsequent summary of the Rorschach structure of the three respective neurotic entities, in the third and final part they contribute the new theoretical interpretive style suggested to them by their research procedure, concentrating exclusively on the determinants - and not all of them, just a selection. The study of this part was disappointing for us since the conclusions reached don't seem proportional to the previous effort, i.e. with really new and illuminating psychoanalytic interpretive views or a "theoretical foundation" of Rorschach's formal structure by the way not analyzed systematically, in its entirety (cf. Sherman above). For example, to divide the *B* by a bar separating its Cs-Pcs/Ucs dimensions, and the procedure to reach from the numerator part (the specific verb used, in *G* = fantasy or in *D* = behavior, etc., plus free associations besides the standard test administration) to the denominator or searched unconscious meaning (incestuous wishes, or whatever) is unfortunately not original or specific enough and/or adequately rationalized and demonstrated from the theory to be really convincing.

4. The French school

Still as part of the '40s all around psychoanalytic-Rorschach vogue mentioned earlier, we may date the beginning of this tradition in France and French-speaking Europe with the prestigious psychoanalyst Lagache's²² paper (1944/1957) on the normal response process and its nature largely from this theoretical perspective. Two points of his argument merit full recognition: his brilliant (pp. 402-4) antedating of Blatt, Leichtman, and others' entirely contemporary 'representational' rather than perceptual nature of the Rorschach task (see pp. #III58-64 below), and his assertion that: "On entend parfois opposer deux façons d'utiliser le Rorschach, dont l'une orthodoxe vise la forme et dont l'autre psychanalytique s'attache au contenu. Certes, il arrive que les contenus soient révélateurs... Mais l'aspect formel du Rorschach n'est pas moins psych-analytique..." (p. 410). Aside from that, it is very curious to realize the strong similarity of this paper with closely following one by Tosquelles (1945). A later paper by Béjarano-Pruschy (1952) approaches an issue of the time: the formal vs. the psychoanalytic content interpretation; in a somewhat disorganized way she gives convincing examples of the workings of the unconscious behind the test responses which are witness of her clinical sensitivity, rightly stressing however the transference issue and suggesting careful precautions against "wild analysis".

In 1961 appeared the first edition of Anzieu's projective handbook with the Rorschach as the main instrument, whose influence may be compared with the one of Rapaport et al.'s volumes in the U.S.A. however without such detailed psychoanalytic elaborations (rationales) as the latter work. Nevertheless its endorsement and promotion of the psychoanalytic approach to projectives in general, and to the

²² The following quotation is relevant in this sense: "L'année 1949 marque deux dates importantes. Le 15 août ont eu lieu à Zurich les Premières Rencontres Internationales de Rorschach... A la suite de cette rencontre, un 'Groupement français pour l'étude du Rorschach', affilié à la 'Société internationale de Rorschach', a été constitué sous la présidence de M. LAGACHE. Ce groupement représente les tendances actuelles du Rorschach, psychologique, psych-analytique et clinique" (Minkowska 1956/1978, p. 212).

Rorschach in particular, should not be underestimated and made of him also the head of this school (see Rausch de Traubenberg and Chabert below). Anzieu dedicated the 1st chapter to the concept of projection (adopted from Frank: refer to our criticism in chap. III.C.1 below) and its psychoanalytic roots, explaining in a more clear way than anyone previously the historical influence of Freud's "Psychopathology of Everyday Life" over the development of these methods (& Chabert 1961/1983, pp. 15, 20-1, 48-9; with full reason: refer to our further developments in chap. III.B below). And in the last chapter is delineated for interpretive purposes a theory of personality which draws extensively from Psychoanalysis (projection, pleasure principle, wishes and conflict, Unconscious, defense mechanisms, Id, Ego and Super-Ego, objects and cathexis, etc.). The book was a resounding success and underwent numerous revised and enlarged editions over the years, gradually incorporating new psychoanalytic points of view: a detailed comparison between the projective test and the psychoanalytic 'situations' (adopting Baer's anxiety-motivating 'loss of form = object'), the appeal to the subject's unconscious body image, primary and secondary processes...; here we just want to add a quotation from an ulterior edition in which Anzieu modifies somewhat his previous views on a specific point (cf. Chabert below and compare chap. III.C.1) approaching our own's in the process, important subject that we will be explicitly developing in the next chapter (III.D.2): "On a pendant longtemps un peu vite affirmé que le matériel projectif n'était pas structuré, ou qu'il l'était seulement faiblement. Or on s'est aperçu depuis qu'il recouvre des structures très précises, mais qui sont de nature affective et fantasmatique..." (1961/1983 p. 22).

Taking notice as some others before him of the triadic structure of Rorschach's formal (determinants) scoring schema, and based on parallel clinical dream interpretation material, Foissin (1965) felt authorized to establish the psychoanalytic relationships "missed" by Rorschach between *F* and Ego, *B* and Id, and *Fb* and Super-Ego, with the latter two factors entering however in contradiction with Beck's, Apfeldorf's, and particularly Sherman's previous conclusions in the U.S.A. He felt to have found theoretical foundation for this interpretation of the first two opposing factors (Ego against Id) in Klopfer & Kelley's (1942) concept of Form as "control" over instinctual strivings represented in the Movement responses. For the last Color = Super-Ego identity, he argues that while drives emanate from 'internal life' (*B* i.e. introversion) the core of the Super-Ego always proceeds from introjections of object relations established in external reality (*Fb* i.e. extratensivity). This proves to be a superficial argument: while this is certainly the way the Super-Ego is constituted, the process of introjection makes of it in the long run precisely an *internal* instance; on the other hand, *external* objects can perfectly represent symbolic stimuli and mobilize internal drive demands (Salomon 1959b, 1963b) as commercial advertisement for ex. has amply demonstrated. This difference of opinion between us established (we will come back to Foissin's contribution below), some of his arguments with which we totally agree merit nevertheless to be reproduced:

Cet exposé est le compte rendu d'un travail susceptible de fournir quelques éléments à un éventuel effort de synthèse entre notre conception freudienne de la personnalité d'une part, et son aspect structurel dans le sens où

l'entendait Rorschach d'autre part... j'ai ac-quis peu à peu la conviction que derrière son apparence empirique, l'épreuve de Rorschach cachait un aspect fondamental de la structure du psychisme, et que l'intérêt théorique de ce matériel perceptif débordait largement le cadre pratique d'un test d'investigation... Ce que l'auteur nous dit là [Introduction] est vrai, certes, mais ne l'est que partiellement. Il paraît plus évident que Rorschach n'était pas prêt, ou croyait ne pas l'être suffisamment pour nous livrer sa découverte tout en nous laissant espérer cependant qu'il le ferait un jour. Malheureusement, le destin ne l'a pas voulu ainsi. Rorschach est mort subitement, emportant avec lui ce qui nous intéressait plus encore que la somme de ses expériences, je veux dire l'expression directe de sa pensée. Pourtant Rorschach a tout de même, dans une certaine mesure, exprimé cette pensée. Si la première partie de son ouvrage est bien le compte rendu objectif d'un travail expérimental, on trouve dans la deuxième partie, - celle qui est consacrée à l'étude des résultats, - une somme d'interprétations théoriques cohérentes, souvent exprimées d'une façon prudente sur un mode interrogatif ou hypothétique, mais qui n'en trahit pas moins la présence d'une conception personnelle déjà élaborée de la structure du psychisme... Et dans cette conception nous retrouvons évidemment sous le règne incontesté de *l'intelligence*... nous retrouvons aussi ce recours fréquent à *la volonté*, consciente ou inconsciente, comme entité déterminante de l'économie psychique... Enfin, ...l'entrée en scène franche et inattendue de *l'affectivité*...

Voici en gros ce qu'il y a dans la pensée de Rorschach. Voyons ce qui n'y est pas. Ce qui n'y est pas est important quand on songe que nous sommes en 1921 et que Freud a 65 ans. Il ne peut nous échapper, en effet, que la notion déjà répandue à cette époque d'instances agissant simultanément à l'intérieur de la psyché dans une relation de tension réci-proque^[23] est, sinon tout à fait ignorée, du moins fort éloignée encore de la pensée de Rorschach... Telle est aussi la raison pour laquelle, quelques semaines avant sa mort, dans une conférence faite à la Société suisse de Psychanalyse sur le cas d'un malade traité par son ami Oberholzer, Rorschach, se proposant de faire une synthèse entre les observations psychanalytiques de son confrère et les réponses données à son psychodiagnostic, n'arrive pas à dégager sa pensée de l'exploitation mineure des contenus de réponse, véritable sous-produit de l'élaboration perceptive auquel il n'accordait, à juste titre, qu'un intérêt limité, et termine sa conférence sans avoir une seule fois évoqué ce qui apparaissait à l'époque comme la clé de voûte du freudisme: la structure ternaire de la personnalité... En ce qui concerne le psychodiagnostic, ...nous devons d'abord nous rappeler, comme le souligne Rorschach, qu'il s'agit essentiellement d'une épreuve de PERCEPTION... Le "développement", l' "étalement" du mécanisme de la perception apragmatique [c-à-d devant des taches indéterminées] fait alors apparaître sa structure [aussi] ternaire effective ou latente supportée

²³ We object only to this point due to its being entirely false: Freud's "The Ego and the Id" is dated 1923, one year after Rorschach's death!

par les trois déterminants fondamentaux: La forme, la couleur, ...et le troisième déterminant...: le mouvement, ou kinesthésie...

...nous pensons que la synthèse exhaustive des découvertes de Freud et de Rorschach sur le plan de la structure de la personnalité, est non seulement possible, mais nécessaire et sans doute riche de conclusions inattendues. (pp. 713-7, 724; italics added)

With the above indicated important exception, we identify completely with these sound words and even attempt to produce the finished Rorschach-Psychoanalysis 'synthesis' (cf. chap. III.D.2 below) wished by Foissin with them.

Since 1970 Nina Rausch de Traubenberg began to make her own contributions to this tradition. This her first book, conceived to be of a purely practical nature, does not help us very much in our endeavor but contains nevertheless (Introduction) the germ ideas of a life-long preoccupation for her (1981, 1983, 1993, 1994): the percept-fantasm interaction in the Rorschach response process, in which she avows to have received the influence of Lagache but more largely of the Rapaport school - specially Schafer with his 'dream-percept continuum' (1954/1982 chap. 3). In her subsequent book on children's Rorschachs (& Boizou 1977, cf. subtitle) she explicitly presents this dialectics in the Lacanian terminology "réel-imaginaire" (just as Anzieu did: & Chabert 1961/1983 p. 62) but in a questionable, restricted sense dissimilar from its creator's intention (without including the third and most important *symbolic* record: compare our develop-ments in chap. III.D.2 pp. #137-8), a fact probably related to the known, even personal distan-ciation between this quite original psychoanalyst and his former disciple (cf. Anzieu 1967a). Again without a clear rationale of the formal scores in particular, in the chapter on interpretation she clearly adopts a psychoanalytic schema: first she proposes to establish the child's always somewhat conflictual level of psychosexual development ("la problématique": primary narcis-sistic identity, oral, anal and phallic -incorrectly titled "genital"- stages) but exclusively from the content of responses ("Nous proposons de dégager tout d'abord les thèmes dominants de la *problématique* du sujet, le niveau et l'intensité de son expression. C'est à partir des contenus descriptifs que l'on peut dégager une thématique, en tenant compte largement des adjectifs et des épithètes qui présentent ces contenus", p. 78)²⁴, then it is the turn of the type of anxiety triggered by the test material and of the corresponding defensive mechanisms (introducing an illuminating terminology typical of the French school, implicitly but obviously now more focused on the formal categories: "recours à la réalité [*F*]... à l'affect [*Fb*]... à la fantaisie [*B*]" characteristic of obsessive, hysterical, and pre-psychotic or delirious-psychotic cases respectively), and finally of self-representation by relationship or contrast to the parental images (explicitly referencing her inspiration in Blatt et al.'s human-content-based scale, although she is more flexible in its application from both the formal and content points of view). In general, and despite the sound formal conceptualizations just mentioned, for our purposes we still find her psychoanalytic contributions too

²⁴ Rausch however was another one of the few to recognize the importance of Zulliger's psychosexual-developmental conceptualizations of the Apprehension Type, particularly for the successful *integration* of the formal (perceptual) and thematic (fantasmatic) approaches, but this happened too late (1993 pp. 13-4, 1994 pp. 128-9).

dependent from the U.S.A. post-Rapaport content-promoting tradition criticized earlier. Let us reproduce here a relevant argument by Mélon (1976):

L'introduction de la notion de Symbolique dans la psychanalyse met fin à l'équivoque conceptuelle où s'enlisait la théorie psychanalytique du fait de l'opposition hautement problématique entre imaginaire et réalité (qu'est-ce que la réalité, sinon, comme dit Bachelard, "une norme estampillée au sceau des valeurs sociales?"), opposition inhérente à la formule [de traduction dans le sens Hartmannien de la célèbre maxime Freudienne "*wo Es war, soll Ich werden*"] "Le moi doit déloger le ça". Au nom de quoi? De la réalité, "naturellement", répondent en cœur les hommes de science, les moralistes et les simples d'esprit. Mais il n'y a rien de moins naturel que cette réalité-là. Ce que LACAN a mis en exergue, c'est que le Réel - qui est tout autre chose que la réalité -, comme l'Imaginaire, reçoivent leurs déterminations d'un ordre tiers, le Symbolique, qui ne se soutient que de soi, défini et spécifié qu'il est par ses seules articulations internes. Le sujet ne se constitue dans sa singularité que par son insertion à l'ordre symbolique qui gouverne le monde humain, qu'il s'agisse du langage ou du symbolisme socio-culturel... L'autre découvreur de génie qui a contribué à recentrer l'intérêt du psychanalyste sur l'activité symbolique proprement dite, c'est D.W. WINNICOTT. De même que LACAN a placé le Symbolique à la charnière du Réel et de l'Imaginaire, éclairant d'une lumière vive ces territoires où nous vivons et qui nous sont cependant tellement étrangers - *unheimlich* -, WINNICOTT a situé, exactement au même endroit, son aire transitionnelle, espace intermédiaire entre la réalité interne et la réalité externe, espace de l'illusion, du rêve, du jeu, de la création, de la culture ... et de l'analyse. (p. 27; comp. also Deri's assessment of the importance of Winnicott's concepts for a generic psychoanalytical theory of *symbolization*: 1984 p. #)

As it happened with Salomon inside the Swiss tradition, or with Lerner in the U.S.A., thanks to the importance of her work Chabert (1983) became no doubt the ripest representative of the French psychoanalytic school: respecting due distances, her contribution sort of constitutes the achieving 'third moment' (cf. her insistence on her 'trois termes': pp. 11-6, 29, 65, etc.) of the previous Anzieu's initial-general and Rausch's practical and duality-stressing ones, just as Deese presents his phenomenology in line with the ones of his own two predecessors' (pp. #11139s below). Her book contains several weighty innovations from the point of view of a psychoanalytic theorist. For example, she was the first to make profit of Winnicott's just mentioned enriching concepts of transitional objects and phenomena (chap. 1, pp. 11-6; before Willock 1992 and Handler 1999 in the U.S.A.) in the consideration of the role of the plates and test task in the response process, paradoxically and successfully interconnecting reality and fantasy, perception and projection, outside and inside. In chap. 2, following Rausch's (and mediately Schachtel's, even if she doesn't mention him: p. 31 above; cf. Rausch 1993, 1994) lead, she develops a crucial analysis of plate symbolism (their 'latent content') from their objective features (their 'manifest content': structural -symmetric- features correlated with the sensorial -chromatic- ones) rather than from their sequence order, in its implications

and criticism of earlier attempts very close to our own although we believe to have further explicated and developed -systematized- its theoretical foundations (cf. chap. III.D.2 below). Chap. 3 presents a much needed reconsideration of the plausible context-dependent diverse interpretations of the different apprehension modes from a psychoanalytic point of view (almost completely overlooked since Zulliger, whom she does not mention), again much in the integrated cognitive + affective way suggested by Schachtel (pp. 28-9 above) thus complementing Rapaport's rationale. In the chapters dedicated to the determinants (4-6), besides developing the fundamental presentational/affective interpretation of the Experience Type already gradually reached by the best authors discussed earlier, she explicitly considers the *B* responses as specific speakers for the Ego thus complementing insufficient interpretations of the meaning of this determinant proposed by the earliest authors (Beck, Apfeldorf): Mélon (1976) had made exactly the same point when sustaining...

Le pourcentage de bonnes formes (F+%)

La bonne forme est en rapport avec la capacité de bien voir, de bien percevoir, de bien faire attention, de bien sélectionner les engrammes. Elle caractérise le bon élève.

Il y a toujours un risque de voir le critère de "bonne" forme contaminé par des notions entâchées d'idéologie. Ainsi n'est-il pas étonnant que la psychiatrie traditionnelle accorde un privilège exorbitant au F+%, dans la mesure où il la conforte dans son habitude de classer qualitativement les malades mentaux de haut en bas d'une échelle... Il n'est pas non plus étonnant que le F+% soit habituellement considéré comme l'indice de la force du moi dans la meilleure tradition de l' "Ego psychology". Qu'on lise, pour s'en convaincre, ce qu'écrivit BECK à ce sujet [1952, chap. I.B]. Dans cette perspective, le moi est réduit à ses fonctions d'adaptation en tant que représentant du principe de réalité. Notre conception du moi est moins réductrice. (p. 68)

After paying due attention to response content and respective themes (chap. 7), theoretically related to the functioning of the Preconscious (just as Salomon did: pp. 37-9 above), in the third part of the book she puts together an interpretive procedure focused both on anxiety and on the defense mechanisms to counter the effects of the former directly inspired by the works of Vica Shentoub with the T.A.T. and of Rausch (cf. above, comp. p. 247). On the whole Chabert succeeded in contributing one of the best contemporary psychoanalytic views of the procedure without deemphasizing Rorschach's original *formal* definition of it, in line with the best tradition (Rapaport, Schachtel, Salomon, Mélon) but surprisingly without awareness or reference to any of them!

Maybe for the first time in the history of any of the psychoanalytic Rorschach traditions, Jidouard (1988) published a book contradicting the formal interpretations of a previous one in the same language (pp. 30-1) thus defining an alternate school or "system" - event much more common inside the "empirical" current: precisely the just commented volume of Chabert. Denying any significant psychoanalytical knowledge to Rorschach (and even referencing Freud on p. 28 for that purpose: cf. chap. III.B.1 below), his point of departure (chap. I.1) -besides the clinical-psychoanalytical publications of Bergeret- were the earlier discussed (pp. 39 and 47 above) and mostly

ignored Rorschach works of Baer and Foissin ("En fait, le Rorschach inscrit sur des rails jungiens n'a jamais véritablement rencontré l'optique freudienne avant A. Baer, R. Schafer et surtout H. Foissin", p. 37), even announcing a following more complete work that has not yet appeared just like the former did. It is thus inevitable that defining the issue in this way he would carry on the same theoretical weaknesses and reproduce the same straightforward mis-takes of his predecessors. Furthermore, despite accepting to begin with that each one of Rorschach's blots is "...pliée sur elle-même dans un sens vertical ce qui crée un axe, une médiane haut-bas et ainsi une certaine symétrie, ce qui n'est pas sans renvoyer au corps humain et à l'image de Soi" (p. 49), he criticizes rather perplexingly (chap. I.2) Chabert's and others' efforts for uncovering a symbolism of the plates in the following terms:

L'obstination à vouloir trouver un sens aux planches ne conduit nulle part, du fait qu'on ne tient pas compte, ainsi, du degré du développement libidinal, et aussi du degré du développement du Moi de chacun [manifestement faux comme démontré dans le chap. III.D.2]. Une telle attitude est trop rigide, trop systématique [Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? L'attitude contraire n'est elle pas trop floue ou désordonnée à son tour?]. Le Rorschach est destiné à traduire une tranche de vie et il y a discontinuité des planches comme il y a une succession des événements de la vie [mais celle-là est exactement la position de Chabert, contre Monod par exemple!].... D'ailleurs Rorschach n'a jamais cherché vraiment à trouver une symbolique à ses planches. Il est bon de rappeler, par ailleurs, que ce n'est pas Rorschach lui-même qui a décidé de se limiter à dix planches [faux à nouveau: Rorschach 2004, lettre Nr. 65 pp. 146-7]... (p. 51)

He continues in chap. I.3 by making a hardly original contribution to the assessment of the Rorschach response process, in line with his chosen predecessors', which merits no further comment. Passing to chap. II.1 ("Les représentations inconscientes et la nature des conflits"), rejecting Rorschach's classical scoring-by-columns and following Baer's "determinants graph", he focuses successively on his proposed interpretations of the movement (drive or Id representations), color (Super-Ego or reality representations), and shading determinants (anxiety representations due to "loss of object") by contrast to form (the former 3 more or less structured each time, according to the latter's i.e. Ego prevalence), resorting to a series of rather confusing and unconvincing examples in his effort to demonstrate that "l'étude des réponses mouvement, des réponses forme, des réponses couleur, des réponses clair-obscur nous informe [respectivement] sur le degré du développement libidinal, sur le degré de maturation moïque, sur le degré du développement du Sur-moi ou de l'instance précurative, sur la nature de l'angoisse latente et sur le mode de la relation d'objet. L'ensemble nous indiquera la nature de l'économie structurelle: psychotique, état-limite ou névrotique" (pp. 83-4): even if we share as a general rule that the better visualized the formal element the better the Ego control, as discussed earlier and analyzed in detail in chap. III.D.2 others' and our own conclusions and subsequent theoretical/developmental organization of Rorschach's determinants is (are) quite different. In chap. II.2 Jidouard approaches again unwittingly Chabert while interpreting the different Apprehension Modes in a defensive sense, and finally a case example is analyzed in detail in chap. II.3. We cannot but essentially agree with Rausch's (1990) assessment of this work.

Finally, at the Boston 1996 XVth International Rorschach Congress (no proceedings) two French-speaking authors participated in the symposium relevant for our purposes "Rorschach Comprehensive System and Psychoanalysis: Compatible or incompatible?", and fortunately their papers were published the next year in the journal of the Spanish Rorschach Society. Andro-nikof-Sanglade (1997) made within the issue a practical-clinical (comp. Holt's and Schachtel's views above which contradict her point here), an ideological-political, and a theoretical-epistemo-logical distinction - the one that will concern us here. Comparing then the reconstruction of the Rorschach response process by Exner and by psychoanalytic theorists, although judging the former as comprising limitations in considering affective/unconscious influences as "biases" during the "correct" perception she nevertheless finds its internal coherence and external pertinence as abundantly demonstrated, by contrast to the absence of an equivalent model from Psychoanalysis where "in fact, the majority of models rest on postulates" (p. 11): actually, that is true of *any* model including Exner's so-called "empirical" one (the postulate of what is "bias" and what is "correct" for ex.; cf. section A above and chap. III.A.1&B.2 below). We have found not only equivalent but even clearly better ones in our review of psychoanalytic authors: there are Rapaport's (in which Exner also based himself), Salomon's, and Schachtel's ones, just to mention the more coherent and pertinent as demonstrated both in the theoretical and practical arenas. Quite pertinently she specifically asks: "Is it legitimate the interpretation of the Rorschach responses from a psychoanalytic perspective? In what measure is there correspondence-similarity between the psychic mechanisms triggered in the Rorschach situation and those that produce psychoanalytic forms (parapraxes, lapsus, dreams, transference, neuroses, [or transitional phenomena] etc.)?" (p. 12); in chap. III.B.1&D.2 below is offered ample and pertinent theoretical proof of this, as well as of the additional postulate questioned by her (p. 11) of the objective blot-rooted basis of a clinically useful plate symbolism. Despite our different theoretical-literature references, we find ourselves in better agreement with Husain's (1997) more complex epistemo-logical exposition and choice for the incompatibility answer, warning that the vogue for the "integration" of both models (cf. Lerner above) may be confused with a simple "addition" (typical of the C.S.: p. #III14-6 below) carrying the risk of flattening the conceptual differences, and presenting the issue in a way very similar to us whether focusing on the existence of a double "testology" according to the ideas of Reuchlin and Duruz (and even Schottel!: cf. section A above) or on the specific nature of the 'clinical' perspective following Kaplan, Diesing, and Parnas & Bovet (cf. chap. III.A below).

5. The Italian authors

Recognizing that because of practical limitations our research for literature in this language has not been as thorough as with the other ones discussed above -since Italy has been one of the most active countries in the Rorschach movement-, we were however able to collect some significant psychoanalytic pieces. We begin with Porta (1949: '40s again!) who following Rorschach's example with Oberholzer's patient describes quite convincingly with some clinical examples of his own how unconscious

dynamics reveal themselves through what he calls "con-tent shock" (mostly a sex shock) and sequence analysis in some of Rorschach's plates, particular-ly VI. This and other similar articles of that moment (Carraï 1954; cf. Béjarano-Pruschy above) were more than probably inspired by Zulliger's same-nature series starting with his intervention in the First International Rorschach Meeting, published at the same time precisely in the neigh-boring Switzerland and in Italy itself. This is certainly the case with Missaglia's (1955) who contributes still more examples, reviewing and commenting at the end these and other papers adding some practical advice.

More importantly, in his excellent theoretically-oriented introductory book Chiari (1961); cf. his intention on p. 20: "...a contribution that approaches psychology to the Rorschach and the Rorschach to psychology", comp. Szondi p. 1 above) takes a more critical approach. In a quite thorough chap. VIII he reviews the psychoanalytic contributions of the prominent authors until that time and struggles to separate in his view the real scientific contributions of this psycholo-gical theory to the Rorschach, finding rather few that merit praise. Some of his in general well elaborated arguments must be translated at length here:

Between the psychodynamic orientations the one that has concerned the Rorschach technique already since its birth and that still constitutes the most numerous troop of it is undoubtedly the psychoanalytic one. The reasons are essentially of a historical nature and it is a curious fact that while there are few the psychoanalysts that use themselves the technique and give it credit, there are instead many more the rorschachers, non psycho-analysts, that give a psychoanalytic interpretation of the protocol^[25]...

Saying that the reasons for the close kinship between psychoanalysis and Rorschach are historical we refer there first of all to the fact that Rorschach himself was a psycho-analyst, a psychoanalyst, noticed Morgenthaler, that, specially at the beginning, held more to the formal, quantitative aspects than to the content ones. Certainly there is no constant reference to psychoanalytic concepts in Rorschach's work and the assertions of the creator of the method are, in this regard, rather sporadic and uncertain...

More than in the presentation and justification of his method, Rorschach demonstrates himself as a psychoanalyst in the global evaluation of the protocol, as it can be seen in the blind diagnosis conducted over a case sent by the friend Oberholzer.

²⁵ We are not so sure of the general validity of the first part of this assessment, even at that time, certainly not in countries like –a small one but a leader and a giant in psychodynamic matters– Switzerland (keep in mind that Rorschach presented his method in the psychoanalytic society and directly trained several of his colleagues: Ellenberger 1954/1995 pp. 47-9), the U.S.A. (the example of the prestigious Menninger Clinic and the Rapaport tradition, assessment still valid today), or France (the Lagache-Anzieu school or "university" psychoanalysts: see previous section and p. # below).

Like Rorschach also the other major writers do not make direct references to psycho-analytic theory although register to it after the discussion, either in the psychopatho-logical framing or on certain clinical cases. A typical example of this is the far-reaching and excellent treatise of E. Bohm where the reader is not able to find any approximation between the Rorschach factors and psychoanalytic theory, except the generic advise that the practitioner of the technique should dispose of psychoanalytic knowledge; but afterwards suffice to read the introductory chapters of the various psychopathological syndroms to find a Bohm convinced endorser of psychoanalytic principles. This is, in our view, the only criticism that can be made of the most complete treatise existing today. And the criticism concerns not so much the position assumed by Bohm than the way in which one passes from a precise and documented treatment, within the applied technique, to an interpretative phase that does not seem to have any rapport or logical connection with the former. In summary Bohm has not been concerned with saying how and why is it appropriate that the various factors of the protocol become interpreted according to psychoanalytic principles. In other words it is taken for granted that which is not.

The only noted psychologist and rorschacher who has posed himself the problem and tries to present it is still Rapaport... [pp. 93-5; and after a detailed review of the latter's contribution he goes on...]

Many other works of a psychoanalytic postulate could be recalled (Baer, Schafer, Sher-mann, Zulliger, Holt, etc.) but, besides the single contributions to one or the other of the problems, it seems to us that the investigation made by Rapaport was better decided and did not limit itself to interpretative considerations about the subject's production obtained from the responses to the ten plates; it is rather attempted to give an explanation to everything: theoretical foundations and interpretative problem are one and the same thing and the one justifies the other. In reality, the possibility of a unitary explanation is the best thing to be done because more responding to the effective situation created by the technique: it's global the stimulus-effect that the test exercizes over the subject, it's global the "response" of the latter. But since the main objective of science is to control, document and convalidate the truth that intuition, genius or a certain stream of thought have presented, it seems to us that the interesting, suggestive theoretical formulations of psychoanalysis are not yet in measure to respond to these demands.

We do not want to assume here the attitude of he who does not want to accept the psychoanalytic theory due to "side already taken" and we can not deal on the other side with the merits and defects that could be attributed to psychoanalysis, as personality theory or as therapeutic technique; we only want to consider objectively its contribution to the Rorschach method, from the exclusive point of view of a psychological problem.

On this premise let us say immediately that the attempt to explain almost every phenomenon by referring to psychoanalytic principles seems to us as forced and unilateral. One does not see the search for a conciliation with those of other theories, with what has been said from other points of view, but a monopolization of the general problem, from the elementary phenomenon of a form perception to the content-related one; there has not been a channelization of interests and research in the one sector (the unconscious material which could eventually emerge from the test) where an explanation in terms of depth psychology could become more coherent and justified. In short, the psychoanalysts have become, as the saying goes, "more royalists than the king", going far beyond the position of Rorschach who was also a psychoanalyst and as such interpreted the protocols. One could say that it was natural to go farther and outside the thought of the creator of the method, but we respond that it is not in this direction that one should be walking: it is easy to add theory to theory, but we want to carry the research, the control, the revision precisely there where all seems taken for granted...

Even under the more commonly accepted aspect, since effectively responding to a psychodynamic problem, of the *symbolism* included in some contents, are not lacking perplexity, doubts, reserves.

Loosli-Usteri [1958/1969, p. 95], highly appreciated continuator and head of the classically oriented school (and by classic is meant of psychoanalytic inspiration) gives us, in the very recent revision of her manual, very useful observations. Given that the content symbolism has interested always more the Rorschach users, she recognizes that it constitutes a strong temptation, specially for the beginners which believe to be versed in psychoanalytic theory, and adds: "...Qui dit tentation dit danger; effectivement l'interprétation symbolique du contenu des interprétations n'en est pas exempte. Il en résulte parfois des psychogrammes qui se lisent plutôt comme des romans que comme analyses scientifiques"...

...More generally, those that Bohm indicates as "complex" responses, should all be interpreted in light of a hidden meaning as is done in the analysis between real or manifest content and symbolic or latent content of dreams. Even the apprehension modes don't escape the psychoanalytic point of view: *wholes*, in the measure they would correspond perceptually to the phase of "syncretism", typical of infancy, would be related to regressions or residues of the *oral* stage; *rare details*, due to their analogy to the "analytic" phase, genetically succeeding the syncretic one, would be related to the *anal* phase; *normal details*, finally, by their adherence to reality, would indicate an analogy to the *genital* phase of libidinal development. In other words, psychosexual evolution would reproduce the development of perceptual maturation...

Now, it seems to us that although the psychologist more open to psychoanalytic theory is better disposed not to neglect the contribution that derives from this

formation, the whole should be considered *cum grano salis*, the problem should be posed of the other possible explanations and justifications of that which the production of the subject offers him (there are contents apparently absent of symbolism which become instead justified by the subject himself on the basis of reasons much less deeper than the ones we had supposed; there are more than one motive which could lead to a high production of wholes or of rare details...). Above all it seems indispensable to us that there should be a concurrence of several factors, all indicating in the same sense, so one could attribute value to an element whose support is only hypothetical.

For the rest there are rorschachers of convinced psychoanalytic formation, in disagreement over several points with their own colleagues: it is the case of Holt... who still declares himself little convinced of the distinction made by Schachtel between movement interpretations as primary processes and form interpretations as secondary processes... [pp. 99-103]

[And finally one of his main book conclusions:] It is possible that someone accuses us of eclecticism since in substance we have refused any unilateral [i.e. psychometric, psycho-analytic, or phenomenological] position and, at the same time, we have arrived to the conclusion that all contain something that should be accepted.

This is still, for us, the reality of the matter.

To a unitary interpretation, where the parts are the whole and viceversa, we have not yet arrived. [pp. 115-6]

Let us examine his arguments point by point. Despite his sharp thinking that has opened our eyes more than once above actually we believe Chiari is right about himself in this last conclusion, it clearly seems to us that despite his illuminating criticisms he is nevertheless guilty of being *overly* critical thus being unable to accept the concrete merits of many psychoanalytic contributions which, albeit imperfect, did give adequate response to some questionings. To begin with he is absolutely right when saying he misses in general an explicit psychoanalytic presentation or justification of the novel method of formal analysis -percept-analysis- as a prerequisite for actual protocol-interpretation in the sense of Psychoanalysis in Rorschach (cf. however chap. III.B.1 below) or his subsequent followers until Rapaport, but then he still remains unsatisfied openly contradicting himself in the process: first he recognizes the latter's psychoanalytic 'unitary explanation' (i.e. global, comprehending every aspect, form and content) as 'the best thing to be done', surprisingly qualifying it immediately as 'unilateral' and 'monopolizing'; if Rorschach did the right thing keeping both stages separated to begin with and if we should continue to walk on his footsteps, why criticize Bohm then? Without all wished clarity from his side, at the end it seems to us that with his theoretical criticisms Chiari is reaching the more straightforward but equally questionable position of Piotrowski (1957 pp. xiii-xv, cf. our criticisms chap. III.A.1 & B.1 below) who defended an initial "atheoretical" analysis of the formal aspect to be complemented only afterwards by a

psychoanalytic or other theoretical interpretation. Just mentioning and leaving aside Schachtel's and Salomon's sound demonstration of the also psychodynamic symbolism of *form* (p. 34 above), Chiari then concentrates his criticism on the disputed psychoanalytically oriented content-interpretation siding with Loosli-Usteri's entirely misguided opposition between '*roman*' and '*analyse scientifique*': but this literary character was exactly how Freud preferred and presented the radical originality of his doctrine! (1895, cf. Schotte 1990 p. 22). He then goes back to one of Bohm's (basing himself on Zulliger) full of sense, absolutely paramount theoretical contributions (1951/1972 chaps. 11.B.I.1, 15.II.1 footnote 17, 16.V.3): the libidinal-developmental view of the Apprehension Modes sequence (which precisely contradicts what he said earlier about the missing part in Bohm's rationale) as reproducing both perceptual and general psychological development (as brilliantly established by Dworetzki, 1939), a connection at Bohm's reach but not made explicitly by him so letting Chiari become - so far as we know- the first before us to make this crucial theoretical parallelism between Dworetzki's and Zulliger's conclusions (just missing the reference to the Z-Test: comp. chap. III.D.2 below, axis of this Thesis), but too quickly discarding it again as biased and unilateral!: Chiari totally overlooks here the psychoanalytic principle of conscious-unconscious overdetermination (cf. Schachtel 1966 p. 6 and pp. 28-9 above), besides Peirce's (cf. p. #III122-8 below) clever demonstration of how an otherwise valid *general* law can never be confirmed with the same degree of evidence in every *particular* case. Furthermore, he presents Holt (cf. 1954 p. 547) as contradicting something Schachtel *never* said (1966 Index, comp. p. 31 above and pp. III132-4 below). We from our side feel in the right to say that, without confusing it with Chiari's misguided criticism against the "unitary explanation" of all aspects of the Rorschach method from a single -the psychoanalytic- theory (cf. Smith 1994), we do make a serious effort here to pay due attention to what other theories have to say so considering and integrating alternate explanations ("concurrence of several factors, all indicating in the same sense") finally achieving his last-phrase wish of really arriving "to a unitary interpretation, where the parts are the whole and viceversa" (comp. chap. III.A.2 below).

But the real conclusion of this tradition in Italy is the important contemporary work of Giambelluca, Parisi & Pes (1995), which aims at the formulation of a new-level psychoanalytic Rorschach diagnosis according to Kernberg's object relational model. The treatment of the subject as they present it essentially emphasizes the use of the whole scoring system and does not give priority and limitatory privilege to content symbolism and its evocatory character, as it happens frequently with the studies concerned by the psychoanalytic interpretation of the test. From the coincidental point of view we could say that Giambelluca et al.'s work presents itself (Introduction) as ambitious as ours, visible in the following quotations:

While in the Rorschach Test the other characters are clearly defined, in the measure it concerns instead its explicit reference theory there cannot be recognized the same clarity. To understand the causes the argument requires a series of considerations that not only concern it directly, but that invest above all the psychological disciplines in their specific characteristics and in the stage

of their evolution. Because it is on such considerations that, in the last analysis, can be explained how the choice of a reference theory for the Rorschach has always been a datum of permanent instability, that has accompanied it since its inception and until today, for more than seventy years.

The test was born for the psychodiagnostic inspection, and so remains tied to psychiatry which is the official science. But H. Rorschach, eclectic and imaginative psychiatrist, is also vicepresident of the Swiss psychoanalytic society. An official post which lets sup-pose his unconditional predilection for psychoanalysis. In the search for greater theo-retical certainty, he trusts in the meantime the Test analysis to a phenomenological approach [?], as a way of leaving place to validations more open and suitable to receive eventually new inquiry perspectives. He confirms in this way the tendencies of a historical moment where the theoretical ferments are decisively potencializing around psychoanalytic theory, general and experimental psychology, and where the requests for more satisfying responses are directed above all to the new disciplines. At the same time, the theoretical validation criteria remain provisional although, placed in this dimension, the Test finds itself included in the theoretical disciplines of greater relevance. But neither one of them presents as yet the necessary requirements for asserting itself as explicitly adoptable reference theory. And so, in conclusion, the theoretical references for Rorschach interpretation are proposed as a mixture of psychiatry, of general psychology, and of psychoanalysis.

From certain sides and within certain limits, a positive reading of the phenomenon leads to recognizing that, if the reference theory would have been more clearly established from the beginning, would have been missed all the interpretative experimentations which in a great variety have instead been concentrated around the Rorschach. Widening the investigative capability and rendering the instrument more ductile, there has been the possibility of realizing inquiries about personality according to different views. Research-ers of diverse formation have been able to use it perfectly inserting it within their theo-retical construct.

With time, the contribution of such a long-lasting production has been gradually differen-iating itself, and the various interpretative hypotheses have been settling on different levels of validity and relevance. Only some of them, more than others, have had a more adequate checking thus becoming a definitive acquisition of the Test...

In general terms however, of the many theoretical orientations which have been concern-ed themselves with the Rorschach and that have made anyway their contribution to its development, no one has asserted itself in a decisive way over the others. Above all in relationship to the adoption of a reference theory, which could be recognized as the most suitable for a complete and

unitary interpretation of the Test. The wide literary production faithfully reflects such a situation...

[While] Under the technical aspect and of systematization of the data the Test has achieved a level of exceptional sophistication.

Concerning the psychological theories which have functioned as theoretical support for its interpretation, the detailed definitions of each single datum reflect the most advanced theoretical indications. Consequently, most of the times such definitions are of a psycho-analytic character, precisely because the psychoanalytic theory is the richest in theoretical increments. And above all the most suitable for scanning the complexity of the psycho-diagnostic valences.

But, despite of the prevalent definitions of the data being based on psychoanalytic theory, this is not to be automatically assimilated to the psychoanalytic interpretation of the whole Test according to a unitary model. For such reasons, neither the other psychological disciplines, nor psychoanalytic theory, have offered until today the possibility of a unitary interpretation of the Test. The only unitary interpretation which gives a global view remains the phenomenological interpretation [?], but if there are not theoretical references which could offer a scientific and definitive interest, its value remains circumscribed to the single diagnostic validations.

Some authors have posed themselves the objective of a unitary interpretation of the Test. But it seems to us that the result obtained until today is of a shrilling divergence between the theoretical enunciations, the validation of the significant personality traits which avail themselves of such enunciations, and the diagnostic conclusions which present themselves as a compromise of mixed solutions. And let us retain that such a difficulty in organizing in a coherent manner the whole validation process is attributable in an absolutely primary way to the lack of a completely adopted reference theory.

The specific relationship between the Rorschach Test and psychoanalytic theory is the argument that we intend to treat with the utmost attention. Inside the Rorschach the psychoanalytic theory has always been the privileged referent, either for the understanding of the mental mechanisms presupposed to the formulation of the response or for the subsequent interpretations of the single data. But its character of a discipline open to polyvalent interpretations, its always being in a continued process of theoretical elaboration which renders more difficult the stability of its axioms, besides its historical characteristic of a lack of a unitary psychological model that Freud himself never succeeded in formulating or wanted to formulate definitively, have impeded its becoming for the Test the contextual theoretical container of unique reference. For such reasons, the diagnoses which propose a psychoanalytic validation become reduced in reality to the psychoanalytic analysis of single factors. But being such validational factors fundamental for the diagnosis and perfectly

responding to the theory, they lack the cohesion of a unitary model. And in this way, despite the indications which derive from their accurate analysis remaining limited to single traits that cannot reach definitive relevance, in the measure they lack a systematic and univocal confrontation between all the parts of the Test, they conclude in the global interpretation of the personality.

As proof of that is relevant the scarce psychodiagnostic contribution that, in proportion to its immense bulk of production, can be drawn from the psychoanalytic material that has been and continues to be object of study by means of the Rorschach. Although at different levels of completeness, studies have been made about defenses, about the characteristics of primary and secondary processes, about the psychoanalytic interpretation of the contents of responses. There have been made evident countless data to make relevant the Super-Ego instance and its precursors, the castration anxiety, the libidinal fixations, the pathological regressions, the various depressive levels, the Ego functioning and its force, the adaptive capacity. In summary, all the psychological aspects that have relevance in psychoanalytic theory. But neither all together, nor individually considered, can they substitute a unitary psychoanalytic model which may not have been previously defined. In its absence, it seems difficult to evade the risk which crystallizes in a generic theoretical position, where are carelessly used the contributions of akin, but not super-imposable disciplines. Obstacle in such a way also the work of those who would like instead to achieve more specific definitions, to give course to a theoretical growth which also bases itself on their differentiation. Psychiatry, experimental and general psychology, psychoanalysis, in their common attempt which poses at the center of research the understanding of the human being, don't have only always confronted themselves in their evolution, but often have superimposed and at times have opposed themselves. This close interaction find a reason of being in the process of development of the psychological disciplines. But in a phase of more mature theoretical advance, which takes shape today, they tend to a specificity of competence which cannot justify anymore the indiscriminate use of theoretical definitions that belong to one or the other, above all if the scope is to find a shortcut to overcome with approximations the objective theoretical difficulties. It would not be in fact about a creative confrontation between akin disciplines with common historical matrix, which continue to interact positively under very many aspects. It would be a perpetuation of the shadow zones of their boundaries, which does not facilitate the theoretical growth. (pp. 22-5)

The above reconstructed historical explanation of the persistent unsatisfactory, mixed or incoherent theoretical nature of the Rorschach is of course open to discussion (comp. chap. III.A.1 below), particularly the unexplained phenomenological references, but is also obviously correct in several respects: Rorschach's anyway pre-existing theoretical concerns, the plurality of its foundation (cf. Rorschach's letter footnote # below) and the subsequent 'ductility' of the instrument, Freud's specific unwillingness to achieve a "all-ready" theoretical model (cf. Schotte 1990 p. 26, Mélon

& Lekeuche 1982/1989 p. 27) and their related similar criticism to the previous psychoanalytic-Rorschach proponents (Lerner for ex.: pp. 34-5 above²⁶), and the absolute necessity -entirely shared by us- of this 'unitary' ('systematic', in our terminology) approach either towards the partial aspects of the theoretical (psychoanalytic) model or to the integrality of Rorschach factors. Their critical assessment clearly echoes the previous ones of Chiari and Sherman above. They concretely propose then their own solution to this situation, possible today they say due to the fortunate coexistence at present of three particular previously unexisting conditions (p. 26): 1. a new and more suitable reference epistemology; 2. the availability of a truly unitary psychoanalytic model already constituted; and 3. the very sophisticate technical, data-treatment level achieved by the Rorschach. The first point refers to their adoption of the Complexity epistemology (Piaget, Bateson, Cerruti...) including Systems theory (Bertalanffy) which they consider have allowed human science to surpass more mechanistic previous models, a very similar choice to the one made by us later on (chap. III.A) for the same purposes but with a more accentuated hermeneutical accent on our side (Binswanger, Ricœur, Bogaert, Ellenberger). The second concerns their choice of Kernberg's object-relational psychoanalytic model as specific reference theory, in which they find the above-mentioned important unitary character elsewhere lacking; while the 'unitary' aspiration is the same we have chosen instead Szondi's Fate-analytic drive theory particularly in its pathoanalytic developments by Schotte and the 'Louvain School' (chap. III.C.2). It is on the third and last point that our views most disagree since we are not so enthusiastic about the contemporary technical 'sophistication' of Rorschach formal analysis (comp. pp. # below), and their identification with the complex scoring system of the *Scuola Romana Rorschach* in our opinion merits the same questionings than Exner's Comprehensive System.

The book is composed of five parts: the first frames the diagnostic subject and explains the selection of the dynamic-structural psychoanalytic model in question; the second treats in detail the psychological instances which, according to this object relations theory, concern each developmental level of personality, the intrapsychic dynamics, pathology; the third specifically focuses the Rorschach test in a complete technical presentation; the fourth part refers to the application of the psychodiagnostic model translating the psychoanalytic definitions in Rorschach tables, subdivided in two subgroups: 1) essential tables for differential diagnosis (reality testing, affects, sexuality), 2) synthetic tables of complex psychic functioning with a complete investigation of all the instances and their mutual interaction (relationship between Ego and Id, Super-Ego, defensive modalities); finally the fifth part presents nine complete clinical cases. We must say that our general reaction to the volume was one of disappointment because, despite their strong criticism to the previous similar works already reviewed in this section -some very valuable- from

²⁶ Immediately following the quoted piece by the way, Giambelluca et al. further criticize the 'unidirectional' use of the Rorschach in psychoanalytic theoretically-oriented research, assessment specifically contradicted by Lerner's (based on Rapaport's) insistence on this relationship as a 'two-way street'. Cf. Binswanger's (1923/1967) original observations on already Rorschach's breakthrough in this sense in *Psychodiagnostics*, case #12.

which they don't seem to profit at all at the same time promising something superior, we miss in their book a more satisfactory level of *basic and explicit psychoanalytic rationale* between theory aspects and test factors! For that key task they trust, unexpectedly, the already criticized existing literature. Neither in the 1st part (chap. 4 "Psychoanalytic theory and Rorschach's psychodiagnostics"), nor in the 2nd (chaps. on the Ego, the Id, affects, sexual identity, defense mechanisms, and Super-Ego; in each case including the respective Rorschach section) can we find the expected careful treatment of the issue. Only in the 3rd, technical Rorschach part, can we find an -albeit discouraging- explanation the first time they treat the diagnostic meaning of the formal factors:

Either the psychological area represented by each [formal Rorschach] datum, or the mode of validation of its specific meaning inside each protocol, are established in the literature. The criteria through which a Rorschach index represents the characteristics of a certain psychological area are established according to general principles which find themselves in the foundations of the Test and which are accepted as such from the time it was conceived. The theoretical explanations sometimes are more or less scientifically demonstrable, but are guaranteed by praxis and certainly shared. That, for example, color interpretations refer to the emotional domain and to the affective experiences of the subject, is a datum acquired from the literature and confirmed in practice. The theoretical justifications that have been proposed by researchers don't achieve a definitive scientific explanation, but the couple Affectivity-Color is an undisputable issue of psychodiagnostic interpretation and confirmed by clinical experience. (p. 216, thus becoming subject of Schachtel's criticism pp. 3-4 above; comp. Rapaport above, Holt 1954 pp. 502-3 point 2)

When we reach the 4th, translating part of the new psychoanalytic concepts in Rorschach terms the trick has been already done without our awareness, and we find ourselves facing only two-column, admittedly very detailed technical tables directly transposing from one domain to the other, leaving the reader insufficiently convinced and wanting for more in the sense of specific rationales. They recognize it themselves when saying that "the part dedicated to the translation in Rorschach scores of the psychological instances is relatively consequential and mechanical, from the moment one can avail from clear psychoanalytic definitions and from related Rorschach scores already singled out to represent them. It consists of an organic presentation of all the data whose characteristics converge in representing the Rorschach equivalent of each particular psychological area... organized in tables of diagnostic consultation" (p. 30). Despite the clarifying treatment of many psychoanalytic issues we don't believe Giambelluca et al. have yet achieved their main objective of a superior, unitary psychoanalytic-Rorschach interpretation.

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Due mainly to linguistic barriers, as already mentioned, these -at least- five traditions developed during many years almost independently from one another, Rapaport's one becoming the more widespread today having influenced indirectly some individual specialists in other languages and in a direct way the young French school through Rausch de Traubenberg (1970, Introduction; 1981, pp. 10-9), one of the more conspicuous integrationists in contemporary Rorschach research. There has been other *isolated* instances of a more or less essential inter-school influence (from Rorschach to Schachtel, from Salomon to Mélon, from Baer to Jidouard) but generally speaking it has been as if each tradition anew "started from scratch", sometimes even rediscovering facts, either completely overlooking or just not considering the findings of the other ones *in their full implications* concerning one coherently integrated psychoanalytical Rorschach system. Most conspicuous and surprising of all, and very regrettably, is the to-date practically complete isolation of the Swiss psychoanalytic system, a fact alluded to already from the tribune of the Xth International Rorschach Congress by the late K. W. Bash (1983a); even the publication of important papers other than in the German language (specially in French: Zulliger 1948/1957 1954/1959, Salomon 1959ab, Mélon 1975a; but also in English: Bohm 1951/1958, Zulliger 1948-54/1969; and in Spanish: Zulliger 1948-54/1970) didn't appear to have had any-thing approaching a lasting impact on the development of the foreign traditions. It is our aim in this Thesis to correct that situation demonstrating its enormous possibilities for furthering Rorschach theory in a decisive way.

Diverse explanations could be resorted to in trying to understand why this coherent and self-consistent system of Rorschach interpretation has not met with the respect and consideration it deserves side by side with the other psychoanalytical traditions, very active at present by the way. The first that comes to mind is the already mentioned linguistic difficulty generated by the confounding virtually complete retreat of German-speaking practitioners at least from the inter-national Rorschach scene, during what seems to be one of the best moments in the history of Rorschach research. Others could be also plausibly offered: it is a very well known fact the sort of iconoclastic trend that prevailed during a significant part of the Rorschach history -specially in the U.S.A.- against the Classical system, actually rejecting it behind the confessed aim of "improving" or even of surpassing it (Bohm 1951/1972, Prefaces); and there is also the usual prejudice, by the other wing of more "orthodox" Rorschachers accustomed to a stereotyped practice, against any innovation including capital ones such as the Z-Test.

Turning to more specific reasons, maybe in the particular case of Salomon -in sharp contrast to his teacher Zulliger- we have another instance of an intriguing phenomenon described by Ellenberger (1970 chap. 6 -last section: "Influence"-) in the history of science, concerning the at times completely unjust correspondence between merits and fame; we do not have enough accounts on his personality (we have only had one -very brief- personal contact with him) to judge with certainty. In any case, we remain convinced that, whatever reasons could be implicated here, a central decisive factor is related to the persistent *resistance* that every truly psychoanalytic discovery or interpretation generates in the majority of the public,

including psychoanalysts (Mannoni 1968, pp. 98-9; Schachtel 1947). And the fact remains that, while other systems benefit from popularity and success, Lesmosyne - the goddess of oblivion- has covered Salomon's psychoanalytic developments over Zulliger's ingenious contributions to Rorschach's original method.

C) The phenomenological-existential approaches

"Il serait tentant de spéculer sur ce qui serait arrivé si Rorschach avait survécu à sa maladie... L'évolution de la pensée de Rorschach le conduisait vers la phénoménologie. Il connaissait personnellement Eugène Minkowski et Ludwig Binswanger, dont les premières contributions à la phénoménologie psychiatrique furent délivrées un an après sa mort..."

Henri Ellenberger (1954/1995, p. 78).

It is only fitting that we should begin this section discussing Ludwig Binswanger's contribution since he was not only from the very beginning one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Rorschach and his method, but also throughout his whole professional life (Ellenberger 1954/ 1995, p. 74) maintaining for example regular '*Rorschach Abende*' in his psychiatric clinic and influencing in this sense directly or through his writings most of the authors we will review below, most notably Kuhn and Schachtel. Judging from their short correspondence (Rorschach 2004, letters Nr. 100, 101, 102, 126, 191, 209, 215 and 220) the personal relationship between him and Rorschach was apparently the beginning of a life-long, close, mutually respectful professional and personal friendship that may very well have steered things in the way indicated by Ellenberger above. Even if they had met earlier (Ellenberger p. 39) they seem to have truly broken the ice beginning with their 1919 meetings on behalf of the creation of the new, post-Jung Swiss Psychoanalytic Society, and interestingly enough both made a very good initial impression on E. Jones from Freud's immediate circle or "fellowship of the ring" (Rorschach 2004, p. 152 footnote 1; Jones 1955, chap. 6). The most interesting of these letters is Nr. 209 of 1/5/22 where Binswanger offers some very positive impressions on the reading of "*Psychodiagnostik*", not included in his subsequent review, that we feel need to be reproduced here:

My first item, after this burden I had on my shoulders [i.e. the finishing of the manuscript of his "*Einführung in die Probleme der allgemeinen Psychologie*"], was the reading of your work and the one of Dr. Behn-Eschenburg. I should equally tell you that I have taken the greatest interest for your researches, from the empirico-psychological as well as from the general psychological point of view. *But also, apart from the contents, the form of your work, your whole work and thinking method have also given me the greatest delight.* I have followed with increasing interest how you have systematically elaborated the results of the individual examinations, how methodically and thoughtfully you have always deeper expanded that being elaborated, without ever denying the

scientific prudence and the consistency of your thinking... The utmost joy have given me the quiet and clear execution of the pure natural-scientific method and the recognition of the limitations of this method, like it comes into expression in particular in the concept of the Experience Types and the clear separation between the experience apparatus and the actual life of the individuals [Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. IV.5]... Aside one can precisely see in your case that a good and sensible natural-scientific psychology is only possible in he who besides has a good knowledge of men or is an "understanding" psychologist as well. (p. 392, italics added)

So, from the very beginning Binswanger focused predominantly on this implicit, enriching dual character of Rorschach's work, a natural-science *perception* (in Bleuler's sense) experiment by affiliation but simultaneously carrying as well phenomenological-existential implications (Dilthey's concepts of '*Geisteswissenschaften*' and '*Verstehen*' by contrast to natural science: cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995, pp. 399-400) and capable of a further development in this specific direction. He expands on these ideas, as Ellenberger indicates, in his first work on Phenomenology (1922/1971; see chap. III.A.1 pp. #5-6 and *passim* below) and in his 1923/1967 book-review (see in particular pp. 237-8 on 'psychological types'; cf. also chap. III.A.2 pp. #22-3 below) from both of which we make great profit at the beginning of next chapter and will only mention here.

His concrete development of this new approach to the Rorschach took form gradually over the years together with the development and maturity of his existential-analytical thinking (in the '40s, making a temporal leap). As general principle may be considered the following (which makes us also understand his enthusiasm above facing Rorschach's intuitive and identical method of analysis as his own's, cf. pp. #21-3 chap. III.A.2 below):

...First and foremost it is our task to assure ourselves, over and over again, of what our patients really mean by their verbal expressions. Only then can we dare to approach the scientific task of discerning the "worlds" in which the patients are or, in other words, to understand how all partial links of the existential structure become comprehensible through the total structure, just as the total structure constitutes itself, without incongruity, from the partial links. In this, as in any other scientific investigation, there do occur errors, dead ends, premature interpretations; but, also as in any other, there are ways and means of correcting and rectifying these errors. It is one of the most impressive achievements of existential analysis to have shown that even in the realm of subjectivity "nothing is left to chance," but that a certain organized structure can be recognized from which each word, each idea, drawing, action, or gesture receives its peculiar imprint—an insight of which we make continuous use in existential-analytical interpretations of the Rorschach test and recently also in the Word Association Test. It is always the same world-design which confronts us in a patient's spontaneous verbal manifestations, in the systematic exploration of his Rorschach and Word Association responses, in his drawings,

and also, frequently, in his dreams. And only after having encompassed these worlds... and brought them together can we understand the form of our patient's existence in the sense of what we call "neurosis" or "psychosis." Only then may we dare to attempt to understand single, partial links of those forms of world and existence (clinically evaluated as symptoms) from the modes and ways of the patient's total being-in-the-world. (1946/1958, IIIrd section p. 202; compare with Kuhn below pp. 69-71)

The best and most extensive example of the realization of this possibility in his writing, again according to Ellenberger, is a multi-phobic schizophrenia *Daseins-analytic* case study -including two Rorschach protocols- published under the name of "Jürg Zünd" (1946-47/1957). After a classical formal analysis of the protocols in Rorschach's sense -contributed by his disciple Kuhn- which confirms the diagnosis, concentration on the original aspect of contents (absurd, fragmented, sexual, devaluated or devitalized interpretations), comments (impressions, aesthetic or anti-aesthetic remarks, time-related comments, also accompanying gestures) and special phenomena (self-references, 'motor response', symmetry remarks) opens the way for the existen-tial Rorschach analysis. Binswanger reconstructs above all a global 'tortuously heterogeneous and disharmonious world', loaded with pushing and pressing energy to the point of bursting, its temporality characterized by urgency and its spatiality by crowdedness and uncomfortable closeness, in which "no step could be made without running the danger of being knocked against or knocking against something" (1946/1958, p. 206) that allows the patient to express his enormous spiritual and bodily *sensitivity*, or better *vulnerability* by relationship to it. Countless responses clearly convey this, like in the 1st Rorschach numbers I-1 ("X-ray... spinal cord" which reminds him of his fright when facing a lumbar puncture), I-4 ("piece of furniture, on which one might knock one's shin"), III-4 ("drum with tripod, so it won't strike one's leg"), IV-1 ("fur... one runs the hand over it...", to remember in the 2nd how he suspected a trader wanted to cheat him), VII-3 ("something you would get scratched with"), and in the 2nd I-1 ("bat... so it won't fly into one's face"), III-2 ("waiters... they could earn a slap in the back of the head/neck... like the head-waiters once [did]"), VI-3 ("the biting fangs of an insect"), IX-1 ("testicles, almost already fallen... would be easily castrated"), X-3 ("crabs, one must pay attention not to get pinched"; remembers also bicycle accident, torn pants, his embarrassment, others' making fun of him) or X-4 ("centrifugal balls of a flywheel... which hit me in the face, me of all people, ...although for decades they had stayed fixed with the machine; only when I get there something happens"). As with the world of things (*Umwelt*), so with the *Mitwelt* where danger, mockery, and shame from others constantly menace him, which is an existential-analytic way of understanding a reference or prejudice delusion. Binswanger makes us also remark the way the patient desperately deals with or defends himself from this threatening world: by keeping himself distant from it (phobias) rationalizing this solution by devaluating its positive features (life, love, beauty: in the Rorschach through the fragmented and devitalized or clearly morbid interpreta-tions, the grotesque, unappealing, disappointing, or damaged impressions, etc., without compen-satory achievements like *B* or otherwise animation of the blots, or superior-synthetic *G*), and by an

artificial attempt to mechanically harmonize it and maintain its balance (symmetry); in this last sense the highly *individual* and clearly schizophrenic response IX-1 of the 2nd Rorschach proves itself as particularly revealing...

The red below like testicles, almost already fallen, some appendage, would be easily castrated. With screws one could - - I ask myself, why does that live? Because it is screwed on and not glued on... it still looks dubious, but it is solidly screwed on. Cunning saving of material? That is the question that I have posed myself, the anxious doubt. Question: does it raise or not, like with a post crown, or with a chandelier from which one wants to hang himself. I always strive for order, definitive solution through the production of a last effort in my life, for the rest then the Nirvana which, as [is] the case with all these pictures: as if one should fold them up according to their longitudinal axis to dispose then of them [file them away]. Feeling, it won't develop above oneself. *Always the last effort that I should still make, the last one, I should stress that.* (1946-47/1957, pp. 217-8; it is also an excellent example of what Schachtel calls a 'motor response': 1966 pp. 138-40)

So, the objective interpretation of the picture turns itself too quickly (p. 222) into the experience of his own and pervasive castration anxiety (i.e. total feeling of inadequacy and impotence in dealing with his world). Binswanger's interpretation on this point, condensed in his contemporary article on symmetry -which will subsequently still retain us, and precisely for this reason- should be reproduced in detail:

C'est ainsi que se trouve éclairée d'une lumière nouvelle la compréhension de la symétrie de la forme humaine et, en particulier, du visage. Lorsqu'un malade affligé d'une paralysie faciale, un portrait de Picasso et, surtout, un masque ou une caricature "asymétrique" nous semblent *grotesques*, nous effrayant ou nous inquiétant, ce n'est pas parce qu'ici nous voyons un principe esthétique lésé ou bien, comme chez Picasso, que nous croyons le voir lésé - ce qui ne nous effrayerait pas - mais parce que, bâtis symétriquement comme nous le sommes, nous sentons lésé un principe vital, un principe de création vivante. Il en va de même pour l'impression grotesque que nous donnent les invertébrés asymétriquement construits. Dans la *déformation* réelle ou supposée, donc contraire à la symétrie, nous pensons percevoir quelque chose d'étranger, d'hostile à la vie, de destructeur de la vie, ce qui signifie: la proximité de la mort. D'autre part, lorsque, dans le test de Rorschach, de nombreux malades schizophrènes, névrotiques ou dépressifs se "cramponnent" de façon surprenante à la symétrie, disant: "Je suis tout le temps frappé par la symétrie!" [rép. VII-3 du 1er Rorschach] ils se cramponnent aussi à la vie. Cela exige d'être examiné plus en détail.

La symétrie dans le test de Rorschach joue des rôles très différents... Déjà, les interprétations d' "images en miroir", où la symétrie est un élément de construction expressif "conscient" de l'interprétation, sont quelque peu "en

deçà de la vie", "en reflet", comme nous le disions plus haut, le fait d'insister sur la symétrie est encore plus en retrait de la vie, voire même étranger à la vie. Au moins, dans la schizophrénie, comme nous avons pu le montrer dans le cas Jürg Zünd, la symétrie peut être, en fait, la dernière bouée de sauvetage à laquelle la présence [*Dasein*] se raccroche et grâce à laquelle elle essaye de ne pas sombrer dans le chaos. La symétrie est alors le dernier et unique principe d'ordre du "monde" et, ainsi, l'ultime tentative, le "dernier effort", comme dit Jürg Zünd, de se conserver à *soi-même*. Cette tentative, cependant, représente également, dans une certaine mesure, un éloignement et un appauvrissement de la vie parce qu'elle signifie simplement une géométrisation du monde et, par conséquent, une rationalisation très "abstraite" du monde. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'à partir de là, cette tentative s'accompagne en général d'une matérialisation et d'une mécanisation extensive du monde [cf. the "screwed on" testicles, or the "flywheel" response]. Lorsque Simmel, à qui l'anthropologie doit tant, explique que "la symétrie est la première preuve de force du rationalisme, au moyen de laquelle il nous délivre de l'absurdité des choses et de l'obligation de les accepter telles quelles", cela se trouve justifié dans le sens de la théorie de la construction *a priori* de la *ratio*, mais se change exactement en son contraire quand il s'agit d'un cas de destructuration schizophrénique; car ici, la symétrie n'est pas la première, mais la dernière "preuve de force".

Eu égard à la fondation anthropologique de la symétrie chez Pascal, il est intéressant que notre malade, souffre justement, beaucoup de l'asymétrie de sa forme et de ses mouvements ("asymétrie testiculaire", tenue de guingois, mouvements unilatéraux abrupts) et recherche la symétrie d'autant plus ardemment, non seulement dans le monde extérieur, mais d'abord dans le monde privé, dans la sphère physique et psychique. Il insiste toujours sur "l'axe de la longueur" autour duquel on devrait replier les "images", cet axe de la longueur qui, chez lui, justement, est tellement "de travers". Et il fait entendre des plaintes sempiternelles sur son allure voyante, physiquement et psychiquement grotesque et que nous qualifions habituellement de *gauche*. Ce n'est que sur le terrain de l'argumentation de Pascal qu'il devient compréhensible pourquoi justement la symétrie distordue d'un propre corps, d'une propre âme doit conduire à une surcompensation de la symétrie, à une accentuation prononcée de la symétrie. La symétrie, l'harmonie ou la proportion est si profondément ancrée dans l'organisation et le sentiment vital de l'homme que son altération, soit dans la sphère physique, soit dans la sphère psychique et spirituelle ou dans toutes les sphères à la fois, est ressentie comme une *menace* et, en ce sens, comme une proximité de la mort. (1947/1971, pp. 231-3)

Binswanger concludes then in this way:

...les tests de Rorschach aussi témoignent de la rationalisation artificielle du monde, de sa symétrisation et de sa mécanisation... il [l'étant] ne devient ici accessible que dans un monde réduit à la catégorie de la pression et du heurt.

Et nous ne sommes donc pas étonné lorsque nous voyons que dans cet être-présent et dans son monde ne règne aucune constance, que le courant de vie ne s'écoule pas paisiblement, mais que tout se produit par heurt et par à-coup, des gestes les plus simples et des mouvements les plus simples jusqu'à la formulation des expressions linguistiques, l'exécution de la pensée et des décisions de la volonté. Tout, chez le patient, est anguleux et se produit abruptement. Or entre chaque coup et chaque heurt règne le vide. (Comme vous le voyez, nous ne faisons ici que décrire analytico-existentiellement ce que, cliniquement, nous caractérisons comme schizoïde et autistique.) Extrêmement caractéristique est à nouveau le comportement lors du test de Rorschach. Le patient éprouve le besoin de refermer à chaque fois les planches comme un dossier, avec bruit, et de les "classer", et cela, à chaque fois par un "dernier effort", tout comme il aimerait refermer le monde en général par un dernier "effort" et le "classer". Il ne parvient pas à en devenir maître autrement. Mais ces derniers "efforts" aussi l'épuisent au point qu'il devient toujours plus inactif et abruti. Vous le voyez, ...c'est dans ce cas l'équilibre dynamique de l'être-présent et de son monde qui doit être maintenu à tout prix. Ici aussi, les graves protections phobiques concourent à ce maintien. Là où celles-ci échouent, et que ce soit simplement dans l'imagination, surviennent alors l'accès d'angoisse et le désespoir total. (1946/1970, pp. 74-5)

However interesting, original, meaningful and convincing Binswanger's *Daseins-analytic* Rorschach approach may and actually does seem, one must say it is difficult to derive general practical interpretive principles from a single case study. Here we should turn our attention immediately to Roland Kuhn's contribution directly in line with his mentor's which, to our benefit, concentrated much more specifically on the Rorschach. But before doing that we should go a little back in time and still discuss, however briefly, a very important Rorschach work published in the meantime which influenced both phenomenological authors.

Following a suggestion appearing for the first time in Rorschach's posthumous case study (1921/1967 chap. VII.A), Binder (1932/1979) researched in a very detailed publication the Light-dark interpretations thus giving quite soon its full weight to this fourth determinant (carry-ing it to the same level of movement, form and color), monograph which immediately motivated similar although -because of the lack of an equivalent level of theoretical foundation (cf. pp. 9-12 above)- less original and less valuable reformulations by Beck and Klopfer in the U.S.A. There have been differences of opinion about the true phenomenological nature of Binder's work (Kuhn 1947?, pp. 35-8; comp. Bohm 1959/1977 p. 304, and Salomon 1962 pp. 49-51) but as recognized by Kuhn himself its conclusions fit perfectly in this place. For purposes of understanding these particular responses Binder first offers a general theory of feelings, distinguishing -figuratively- between 'peripheral' reactive discrete feelings and 'central' feeling tones (moods): the former are exogenous (aroused by sensations, perceptions, and ideas) rather momentary specific and directed (object-oriented) reactions so different feelings may coexist simultaneously in the person, while the latter are endogenous 'feeling resonances' in the deeper layers of the personality

(vitality-feelings) of a total all-or-nothing and non-directional (objectless) nature so only one can exist in consciousness at a given (usually long) time; Binder also recognizes the existence of an intermediate kind of central but reactive total-feelings, aroused by peripheral experience of a diffuse global nature and capable of provoking the already mentioned 'resonance' of the deep-seated emotions at the core of personality, thus forming in combination the moods in which an endogenous and a reactive side are to be distinguished. That distinction made, he then advances his main thesis: that in perception "light-dark values affect particularly the total-feelings, produce mood-reactions; the hues of the chromatic colors affect particularly the discrete feelings" (p. 13), which is directly applicable to Rorschach's method. This allows him to reject Rorschach's assumption of Light-dark interpretations as underdeveloped Color responses ("F tending towards Fb"), proposing for them the new Hd symbol and reserving the original F(Fb) one for a particular kind of them where the 'discrete' attitude characteristic for colors is maintained towards the nuances of shading; in perfect coherence with the above rationale, the former usually happen to be G responses or include large portions of the blots while the latter, reflecting the opposite attitude, are mainly rather small D or Dd. In his 271 cases he found Hd-responses most characteristic of psychopaths, secondarily neurotics, in general depressive or otherwise dysphoric (anxious, irritable) individuals. He also found an inner relationship between them and B responses since both proceed from the deeper center-core of personality, the former from the feelings 'static' (passive) sphere and the latter from the strivings 'dynamic' (psychomotor) sphere. As we can see Binder's work is, in line with Rorschach's own, a coherent development which exploits the important inner relationships between all factors of the method and of which we will make extensive use in the next chapter (by contrast to Beck's: III.A.1 pp. #16-7; see also D.2 pp. #109-12 and *passim*). A more extensive English account of the original text can be found in Bohm (1959/1977).

Coming back to Kuhn, in 1944 he initiated his own contribution with an excellent and thoughtful paper on Rorschach's psychology as a beginning answer to the question of the "theoretical" (in his case mostly phenomenological) foundation of the method. He discusses how between Rorschach's precursors the *Klecksographie* shifted from a creative-artistic experiment in the hands of Da Vinci or Kerner, into a materialistic-rationalistic test for researchers like Binet or Hens which just "dismembers life" (p. 30). Superficially it seems as if Rorschach complied with this contemporary trend but, as mentioned by Binswanger in his letter to him and in his sub-sequent book-review, Kuhn shows how Rorschach's smooth transition from a purely quantitative method to a *correlational* one when analyzing the formal factors, which "rather receive sense and meaning first as members of a great, organized whole" (p. 33), proves it is not so. Besides an interesting distinction between Bleuler's and Rorschach's diverging conceptions of intelligence (the former spoke of " 'the' intelligence" as a way of expressing the existence of several types of it, the latter of "the 'intelligence' " implicitly questioning the possibility of isolating this function from the whole of mental life), an unquestionable example constitute the Movement response in which the mind (creativity) and body (kinesthesia) aspects of existence

are hold together. Then Kuhn discusses the rather scant influence of Psychoanalysis on Rorschach's own original psychology, point where we entirely disagree (refer to chap. III.B.1 pp. #37s below), rather suggesting to develop the psychological foundations of the method on *Gestalt*-psychology (for the Apprehension modes) as well as on the phenomenological work of Katz (about color), or the ones of Palagy, Klages, Weizsäcker and Straus (about movement). He finally goes into the issue of developing the complementary and more personally significant (from the point of view of the test subject) phenomenological *content analysis*, a feature that will always characterize his sub-sequent approach. A direct example: in the same year appeared his book dedicated entirely to mask responses (1944/1992). The reasons why Kuhn chose this particular kind of content for his research are not clear to us in his argument, it just seems that following the suggestions of Rorschach's posthumous case study (1921/1967 p. 243) he was in search of a sign for possible "complex" material to study it phenomenologically (discussing at length with his subjects their possible biographic sources and relevance) as an aid to eventual therapeutic intervention. In any case for Ellenberger (1958), while giving an account of Binswanger's Existential Analysis and 'existential modes' (dual, plural, singular...), it appears that "the [remaining] *anonymous mode* was briefly sketched by Binswanger and its description developed after him by Kuhn in his study of the interpretation of masks in the Rorschach test. It is the mode of the individual living and acting in an anonymous collectivity, such as the dancer in a masked ball..." (p. 122). Of much more direct interest for our present purposes is the meaningful way in which Kuhn divided his material²⁷ into three groups of responses so as to reach a uniform interpretation of each type: I- natural-size facing masks as *G*; II- diminute profile masks as *D* or *Dd*; III- bilateral and global masked human figures in movement (as *B*). Let us quote here his most important conclusions that will acquire their full relevance during our discussion in the next chap. III.D.2 (pp. #):

Il nous reste à étudier le rapport du sujet avec ses interprétations. A ce propos, nous rencontrons tout d'abord la discrimination entre la conscience du moi et celle de l'objet dont nous avons parlé en détails dans nos paragraphes I et II. Chez les sujets qui ont four-ni des interprétations de masque du groupe I, il est apparu qu'en face des interprétations il n'existe pas de démarcation entre la conscience du Moi et la conscience de l'objet, le Moi et l'objet se confondent plutôt. C'est l'inverse qui se produit au groupe II; là, le sujet s'ingénie à séparer nettement le Moi et l'objet... (pp. 94-5)

²⁷ In spite of his reticences as expressed in the following quote: "**Considérations générales sur les interprétations de masques dans le test de Rorschach.** Maintenant qu'il s'agit de fournir une somme de résultats de cette enquête longue et souvent détaillée, nous voyons alors sur quels compromis elle repose... Un.. compromis consiste en ce que l'expérience multipliée ne permet pas d'intégrer, par force, les problèmes traités dans le système limité d'une psychologie définie. Il en résulte un antagonisme perpétuel entre le schème qui vise à la simplification et la multiplicité de l'aspect vivant. Bien des faits restent en suspens et il est difficile de se faire une idée d'ensemble. Nous nous sommes efforcés de ne pas suggérer que les problèmes sont résolus, alors qu'il n'en est rien; pourtant nous pouvons dire que nous sommes allés plus loin que nous ne l'avions espéré au début devant le chaos qui nous était apparu à un premier examen du matériel" (Kuhn 1944/1992, p. 177).

...Au contraire de ce qui se produit dans le groupe I, où le sujet et la personne étrangère se superposent d'une façon particulière dans l'interprétation, et à l'inverse du groupe II, où seul autrui est objectivé, nous voyons s'affronter le sujet et autrui dans les réponses de mouvement... Comme on l'a fait pour les groupes I et II, on peut étudier le côté formel des rapports interhumains qui sont liés à l'existence en tant que forme masquée. Précédemment, nous avons constaté dans un cas une identité et dans l'autre une de ces différenciations concrètement objectivées entre le monde et le Moi. Ici [groupe III], nous trouvons juxtaposées dans les interprétations l'objectivation de soi-même et la conservation de la personne distincte d'autrui. Le rapport avec l'objet proposé par le monde, c'est-à-dire la personne d'autrui, ne se définit ni comme superposition (groupe I) ni comme éloignement (groupe II), mais plutôt comme un rapport nouveau qui correspond pour une part à une position intermédiaire. (pp. 107-8)

Concerning the specific phenomenological approach Kuhn also offers some short but interesting reflections about space and time experience of his subjects (chaps. 3.A and 7.A.a) which we will encounter again later on, and the expanded analysis of 2 protocols (chap. 5) which -probably due to this predominant focus on masks- we found a little unclear by comparison to Binswanger's case discussed above (but actually published a couple of years later).

In a subsequent but unpublished, mimeographed text for introductory courses apparently written around 1947(?); cf. Minkowska 1950/1978 p. 211), Kuhn reviews meticulously the "*Psy-chodiagnostik*" and attempts to offer a deeper phenomenological view of the method (pp. 13, 57, 74) particularly of the determinants: just to give some highlights, he suggests for instance while talking about the Form responses (pp. 20-2) to apply Bachelard's ideas about the use of the four primary elements by imagination and subdivide them accordingly for interpretive purposes (ani-mal resp. for ex.: worm = Earth, fish = Water, bird = Air), which offers immediate relationships with the subject's dreams; then, basing himself on Goethe he derives later on (pp. 27-9) an experiential spatial relationship between color and horizontality (colors that 'advance', or that 'widen' our existential space) on the one hand, and between light-dark and verticality (the night that 'falls' for ex.) on the other (cf. p. #III141 footnote #80 below); discussing inner factor correlations from his own statistical researches he also asserts (p. 42), in agreement with Binder (for whose work he expresses the highest praise), that "...there are these extraordinarily important findings which indicate that *B* and *Hd* interpretations are closely akin to each other and that both have common relationships to the *G+*, while this does not apply to the *Fb*"; and finally, that *B*-responses stand in an inner relationship with time and historicity of existence (he speaks for instance of "quick" and "slow" movements: p. 64) by difference to *Fb*. These all-important views, which amount to a first attempt at a phenomenological systematization of the determinants and of which we will make significant use at the end of next chapter, will be further completed by him in another similar text seemingly put together towards the end of this decade (1949?) where we can find more precise phenomenologically-based statements now about the

location scores. In a 1st chapter Kuhn begins by developing the historical ideas with which he also introduced his 1944 article, mentioning how inkblot-experiment precursors made a creative-artistic use of this or similar pareidolic media (Botticelli, Da Vinci, Kant, Goethe, Kerner, J. Müller, V. Hugo, *a posteriori* still Bachelard) which were also more popularly used for magical or divinatory purposes, until this transformed into a psychological experiment - facts that suggest to pay more attention to the creative personality of Rorschach. Chap. II contains a careful assessment of Rorschach's sources for his book (his very thorough analysis of this text is a persistent characteristic all along his work) and of the artistic nature of his test material. In chap. III he attempts to describe Binswanger's -and Rorschach's- general interpretive principle (see pp. 62-3 above), whose first step is the need to grasp a global structure of the protocol which will give sense to the partial elements²⁸, with the following words quoted at length since nowhere else to be found:

When we have presented our 10 blot plates, which are printed according to Rorschach's originals, to a test subject in the right situation and position, and when all of his statements on them have been written down, then are we able at first to look at the result as a whole, and we will be very inclined to do that without any particular previous theoretical knowledge. On this matter, considering a great quantity of similar material we have been lead to the following results:

The test protocol as a whole

This whole is a wide superordinated configuration [*Gestalt*] comparable perhaps to a discourse, whose subject would be the blots and whose task consisted in distinctly describing them. This whole contains an abundance of contents and statements often difficult to overview, but is often attuned in a more or less distinctly recognizable way. It prevails as it were an atmosphere, for ex. illumination or darkness, cheerfulness or sadness, rigidity or mobility, uniformity or variability, the dreamlike or the matter-of-fact, the obvious or the elaborate etc. This mood is obtained partially by means of the content, partially by means of the style of the verbal expression. One traces often in a not easily to characterize way the entire protocol to see if it was interpreted joyfully or with aversion, even when it doesn't contain any direct statement about it; one notices if the test subject has spoken about himself and his world or if he tried rather to hide himself. It is to be distinguished from this general attunement of a protocol the share of feelings and the share of concrete objects; it lies again in another plain if we establish protocols with certain, clearly outlined forms, from those with uncertain or deteriorated forms, those with open, clear articulation with those with unclear, overlapping articulation;

²⁸ Its first clear, complete and detailed description was to be found shortly after in Bohm (1951/1972 chap. 7.I, and 15.II.1 footnote 17) who took his cue from Dworetzki's (1939) results in accordance with Renan's law (see below chap. III.A.2 pp. #23-4 and III.D.2 p. #107 & footnote #57). Kuhn immediately endorsed it in his 1954 *Nachwort* to the 2nd edition of his masks book (1944/1992 p. 210).

yes, following W ö l f f l i n one is occasionally tempted to speak of a linear or painting style of a protocol. There are protocols which in their entirety show a trait for the small or the picturesque, then again those which have an inclination for the great or even the oversized; there are miserable and rich findings, those with space organization and those which do not show any consideration for space articulation. Certain findings let recognize tender-protective tendencies, others are decidedly aggressive-destructive.

Such a phenomenological description of the general findings could become still more extended and should be verified with examples. It requires some experience with the test to notice the whole comprehensive characteristic of it. In addition there are findings which have a marked tendency to appear as a whole, and others that do not show this. However once one has collected oneself some experience in it, then this review of the findings as a whole is extremely valuable.

Notice is also to be taken of the fact that there are masculine and feminine protocols, in some are only interpreted female persons and animals; and [in others] tools from the hand of the man. When for instance at the 1st. plate in reversed position an anvil is seen, then this interpretation is possibly a constitutive component of a masculine protocol, while instead in a feminine protocol finds itself interpreted for instance a soup bowl.

Precisely in this example shows itself now what meaning do have such structures actuating through the whole protocol. Naturally it is not so that male test subjects only have masculine protocols, and in reverse, female persons only feminine ones. However such a protocol shows that in a test person, whose interpretations choose only of one or the other sex, the sexual differentiation between male and female plays a role in the organization of his/her optical perceptual world and seemingly also in the relationship to him/herself. The sexual differentiation is a structural element of his/her individual world organization. This general remark can have now in the individual case very different effects. A person with nothing but masculine interpretations can possibly be a really very masculine personality, with enterprising spirit, daring, a daredevil, with joy for competition and struggle. It is however just as thinkable that the opposite is precisely the case and that the Rorschach Test, like also the rest of the perceptual reality, conjures wishful dreams. It also is here in such a way as R o r s c h a c h himself has explained in another connection, that a test does not show w h a t is lived, however it does allow to state very much about h o w is lived. What becomes in each individual case of certain fundamental structures of existence, which often let themselves be discovered in the mentioned way from the general findings of a Rorschach protocol, is different from person to person, occasionally lets itself be discovered from all sorts of aside circumstances and also from the findings, but often not.

However we must also still point to the fact that there are likewise protocols in which first of all don't let themselves be recognized such fundamental structures of the whole.

With these considerations we have been steered into a certain way of looking at the results of the form-interpretation test, which does not belong to the generalizing natural-scientific but to the individualizing cultural-scientific thinking method.

Such a way of looking stands distant from R o r s c h a c h... R o r s c h a c h confronts one another here c o n t e n t and f o r m a l aspects of the form-interpretation test. In this way the cues are given for an extensive problem of all psychology, that even has its long history, into which we naturally cannot enter here. But it is important to understand what R o r s c h a c h has understood under these opposite ways of looking.

The original conception of Psychodiagnostics is distinguished by a marked incli-nation towards the f o r m a l and shares this trait with all leveling, generalizing natural-scientific knowledge. The multiplicity of phenomena is lead back to relatively few and simple "basic forms" [*Grundformen*] and with these is then further worked on. The unencompassable wealth of possibilities that offer them-selves in the interpretation of R o r s c h a c h plates is reduced and made surveyable while one makes evident their common formal aspects bringing them to the fore-ground. (pp. 12-4; boldface added)

We don't completely agree with this assessment by Kuhn in which he somehow opposes the phenomenological and the formal approaches (cf. footnote #26 above), however formally speaking Binswanger (1942) himself starts by individualizing certain existential '*Grundformen*' precisely to grasp and not to thwart individuality! Let us pay attention to Ellenberger's (1958) contrasting assessment of the issue:

...the phenomenologist may submit the raw material furnished by the *epoche* to structural or categorical analysis... (p. 96)

Phenomenological observation does not merely provide the observer with a wealth of data. It may also lead to the recognition of connections and interrelations between these data. It may even happen that in the total content of consciousness a general structure or gestalt shows itself spontaneously to the observer, who will subsequently try to describe and define it. Thus doing, he is performing what Minkowski called "structural analysis"... (pp. 99-100; already recognized by Kuhn himself about Rorschach's formal schema!: 1944 p. 33, cf. p. 68 above)

...phenomenology can also use a "categorical" frame of reference. This means that the phenomenologist attempts to reconstruct the inner world of his patients through an analysis of their manner of experiencing time, space,

causality, materiality, and other "categories" (in the philosophical sense of the word). The two basic categories of inner experiences are considered to be time ("temporality") and space ("spatiality"), which we must examine in some detail because of their great importance. (p. 101)

And Kuhn too, while phenomenologically studying mask (a particular *content*) responses, was drawn to formal conclusions almost identical to ours (cf. chap. III.D.2 pp. #111-2 below) which demonstrates this supposed opposition as spurious (cf. also Schotte chap. III.A.1 pp. #17-9). Continuing with our review of this text, then a series of truly introductory chapters focus on formal factors' scoring technique: in chap. IV few really new is said about the apprehension modes, perhaps only the important distinction later on also made by Piotrowski between 'simple' and 'composed' (combinatory) *G*s, and the recognition of the important intimate relationship between the latter and *B*-responses (pp. 20-1); chap. V, in which he further develops these *spatial* (location) considerations, contains a technical description of his topographical 'focusing-coefficient' (already applied in his research on masks: 1944/1992 pp. 75-6) which expresses the mutual proportion between the number of center and lateral details interpreted, approaching 0 when the former and 2 when the latter prevail; in chap. VI it is the determinants turn (which were more largely treated in the previous monograph), with a phenomenological explanation of how to score *F+* or *F-* according to the subject's individuality (in contrast to Beck) as well as *FFb* or *FbF* according to Katz's distinction between 'surface' and 'film' colors respectively; both *Hd-* and *B*-responses are approached in chap. VII, whose detailed identification is explained closely following Binder's (mood-related feelings) and Rorschach's (own body experience) texts respectively; in chap. VIII are described the content categories. Then in chap. IX, with the examples of Rorschach's "intelligence" (*Psychodiagnostik* chap. IV.1, obviously departing from Bleuler's conception) and Apprehension Type concepts, Kuhn contributes still some interesting and new phenomenologically-inspired ideas: he quotes Rorschach's first paragraph from that chapter and makes notice how the latter attempted to use a natural-scientific statistical averages method to clarify "*what distinguishes the perception and comprehension of the normal intelligent persons*", at the same time aiming at an 'etiologial' (*causal*, in a medical sense) confirmation of the statistically established 'symptom values' of the test factors; Bleuler too considered that "...it would be important for intelligent persons 'to understand what one perceives' " (Kuhn p. 59, boldface added), but characteristically Rorschach left out from his presentation this cultural-scientific *understanding* concept (Rickert, Dilthey) which aims at the individual instead of at the group. For example (which was also one of Beck's starting points by the way), with this method it becomes difficult to understand why the number of *G*-responses rises together with intelligence in any given person. Analyzing then Rorschach's reflections on the diverse apprehension modes he reaches the following important conclusion:

When we compare now R o r s c h a c h ' s explanation about the "symptom values" of the different apprehension modes with one another, we will see that they are defined in a totally different than a unitary system way [comp. Mélon

& Lekeuche 1982/1989, Avant-propos]. While for the understanding of the explanations about the G-interpretations we must make great detours and B l e u l e r ' s theoretical discussions take part there, and indeed in a considerable measure, in the discussion on the D, Dd and Do-interpretations we confront a wholly different situation. Here we find living, immediate, from-the-everyday-seized determinations that appeal to us without theory. But it is now extraordinarily difficult to bring under a global formula such disparate, partly very special, partly very general, partly much more theoretically association- and affect-psychological, partly seized immediately out of life designations, like R o r s c h a c h did with his A p -p r e h e n s i o n T y p e. One cannot totally put aside certain concerns that this must turn out slope... And nevertheless we are left with... the impression, as if R o r s c h a c h had seen in his Apprehension Type something extremely subtle, dynamic, living, like it never lets itself be properly captured in mechanical pictures. From there braid themselves then the diverse relationships to other test factors, that we should learn to know first before we could understand such an artistically rich object, like the analysis in R o r s c h a c h ' s lecture added in "Psychodiagnostics" contains precisely with reference to the Apprehension Type. (pp. 63-4)

He also refers in this sense to Furrer's (1930) criticisms and his relevant differentiation of two groups (primitive and normal) of whole responses, and to the convenience of combining then the statistical with the development-psychological method: just here comes into consideration Dworetzki's (1939) work about which he rather hastily concludes that this author "...obviously has been deluded in essential points due to too small material and that the whole question must be wrapped anew and [that] also from the developmental-psychology side we obtain until today no further clarification about the meaning of R o r s c h a c h ' s apprehension modes" (p. 68). One of our self-assigned tasks has been precisely to demonstrate, in total opposition to Kuhn above, the truly *systematic* character of Rorschach's formal schema (including the apprehension scores) and for this purpose Dworetzki's results in particular have been of no less than paramount relevance (cf. chap. III.D.2), which on the other hand totally coincide also with Kuhn's own while researching masks above (comp. loc. cit. pp. #)! We do not see at all why he insisted on criticizing them²⁹. In chap. X he goes on trying to derive an understanding of the apprehension type now from *Gestalt* psychology with its discussion on the relationship between the whole and its parts (see chap. # below), but since this theory has been more interested on general perception laws from the point of view of the external stimulus and not of the individual perceiver and his internal conditionings, we must not expect too much however. Since relevant for this discussion, he then clarifies Rorschach's term of

²⁹ Comp. Minkowski 1950 pp. 149-50: "Il est évident qu'entre les deux méthodes: méthode statistique et méthode phénoménologique, un écart existe. Des heurts peuvent se produire. Le tout est de discerner la portée de chacune d'elles et de ne pas les mélanger... De sorte que si M. Kuhn, dans une analyse publiée dans la *Revue suisse de psychologie*, croit en quelques traits de plume, en s'appuyant sur ses nombreux, presque trop nombreux dossiers et sur ses diagnostics, pouvoir rabaisser la valeur des recherches d'un autre auteur, on ne peut qu'en être péniblement surpris".

"abstract *G*" as *not* concerning at all an abstract concept in its content by contrast to detail responses supposedly referring to concrete things: one and the same concrete object like 'butterfly' can be seen equally as a *G*, *D*, *Dd*, or *Zw* response, so what is expressed through the apprehension mode must have to do with *the specific way of givenness [Gegebenheit] of this object in perception*, which is precisely what *Gestalt* psychology has studied. Here Kuhn refers to his research on mask responses as a confirmation (see above): the two relevant types of responses found were masks as *G* or as *D*, and while in the former group the interpretation had an undeniable relationship with the subject's own face seen in an identity relationship with the one(s) of other(s), in the latter it was treated more distantly and dis-passionately as an object independent from the self even if some (usually repressed) affect could be associated with this specific interpretation as with an external object (face) in the subject's past. This does not apply however to every content or *G* response: the mask/face interpretation obviously, or any symmetric animal being probably (by identification with our own, symmetric body: cf. Binswanger p. 64 above), allows for such an identification, but not when unformed responses like "lava", "slag" or similar ones are offered. This touches on an ancient and venerable philosophical problem already discussed by Plato and Aristotle, of the distinction to be made between two forms of wholes represented by the face on the one hand, and a slag heap on the other: if one divides the latter in two portions and discards one of them, there is no essential way of knowing if we are dealing with a separated part or with an original whole, unthinkable situation in the case of a face (eyes, nose, mouth, all form part of and are defined by a superordinated whole); in Husserl's theory these are named 'independent' and 'interdependent' parts respectively, the latter being defined by the 'essence law' of the whole. A final phenomenological observation is contributed: the intimate relationship existing between the perception of *Dd* responses (to differentiate them from the *D*) and the experiences characteristic of the sense of touch, which was already recognized by Dworetzki (1939 pp. 296-7) we must add! After a chap. XI dedicated exclusively to *Zw* interpretations (a subject close to his heart and which we will encounter again from a subsequent paper: chap. III.D.2 pp. #125-7), in chap. XII Kuhn returns to the issue of the Apprehension Type as a unitary system (a whole). After having identified a more -not exclusively- affective component above all in the *G* and the *Zw* (which also share other characteristics) in contrast to a more intellectual one in the *D* and the *Dd*, he expresses some important conclusions:

The whole responses in their entirety point out that the test subject tries to understand his perceptual world according to unitary points of view, to explore it in conformity to [natural] laws and to offer these himself. Under the disregard of concrete particularities he seeks an abstract sense-coherence. For all that, apart from intellectual, representational files are also available most of all (emotional and mood-like) interests that preserve a unity between Ego and world and so enable an emotional participation in all that surrounds us. The whole responses always stand in a definite immediate closeness to the Ego of the interpreter. For the person that gives whole responses is

characteristic the tendency to proceed himself in a form-giving, "legislating" way, whether now being a religious person, an artist, an organizer, a politician or, which allows to understand particularly beautifully the essence of him who interprets whole responses, a law-fanatic^[30] or inventor in any form. We can always find wholeness only in ourselves, and to invent is also a possibility to stamp into things our own spirit.

The will for this achievement included in the whole response is tied however to a material that first decides about how the respective achievement comes out: on the lowest stage (in children for instance) we find gullibility and influenciability as expression of a need to obtain a total context in the absence of the respective abilities. In just the same way, without letting the demand of reality prevail, are encountered generalizations that can go from bare arbitrariness to adaptation. The course of development leads then further in the sense that the primary usual whole responses stand in relationship to understanding- and sense-connections generally performed, regulating our life in the community; the latter are naturally relatively primitive! Farther appear then the individual interpretations, picking-up and incorporating the parts in the whole with understanding of the world, such as that one can then conceive them as explanation-connections in the full sense of the word, what naturally is performed by each person again and again in a peculiar way! The precipitation of such abilities finds itself in the well-configured secondary G. (p. 87; underlining and boldface added)

With these non purely theoretical, life-related arguments concerning the G Kuhn attempted to complete (systematize) in a phenomenological way Rorschach's statements about the Apprehension modes mentioned in his previous quotation from chap. IX. Zw responses, he adds, by their concentration on the space that encloses both me and the objects, share with G the trait connecting Ego and world. To these two, globally-enclosing apprehension modes are then opposed the concrete, individualizing D and Dd location types. Referencing Binswanger's 1922 book, he concludes by warning that the counting of the responses (10 G+ as twice as much as 5 G+) using all these different apprehension types -as *Gestalt-qualities*- does not establish the valid existence of a purely quantitative "psychometrics": what is really calculated or counted is the intraindividual number of times it is repeated or changed the same apprehension attitude by relation to the other possible ones when interpreting concrete responses (=contents), and is thus a correlational figure; and people who prefer one attitude over another can then be compared to others differing in or with a similar qualitative preference. With chap. XIII we pass on to the important subjects of locations *sequence* (a concept obviously implying a *temporal* succession) and of '*spatial structures*' (symmetry and proportion, in the aesthetic sense of Ruskin he quotes on p. 99: "in the human face [= Rorschach blot], its balance of opposite sides is symmetry; its division upwards proportion"). Following Rorschach's

³⁰ About the Peircean sense in which to understand this 'law' concept, refer to chap. III.D.2 footnote #66 p. #126 below.

posthumous case study, according to Kuhn the former subject is to be understood directly as a 'programmatics of thinking' (i.e. if this is rigid, confused, etc.) that must be analyzed -in a temporal-spatial unity- in connection with a simultaneous topographical attention (cf. earlier his 'focusing-coefficient') to the relative and successive interpretation of central or lateral details, a technique that since Rorschach -to his knowledge- has only been used by Zulliger³¹: in his experience attention to central details corresponds to a proportional concentration on oneself, and attention to lateral ones to concentration on the external world (to relate with the Experience Type). For the latter subject he bases himself largely on Binswanger's key article on symmetry (1947/1971, comp. above), quoting or suggesting paramount ideas for the understanding of the creation of Rorschach's test like the following ones clearly convey:

...La symétrie, l'harmonie ou la proportion est si profondément ancrée dans l'organisation et le sentiment vital de l'homme que son altération, soit dans la sphère physique, soit dans la sphère psychique et spirituelle ou dans toutes les sphères à la fois, est ressentie comme une *menace* et, en ce sens, comme une proximité de la mort. [Dans une note en bas:] Hermann Rorschach a fait à ce propos la démonstration de son génie visionnaire en choisissant pour ses "formes fortuites" des images symétriques et cela en prenant en considération la réalisation de certaines conditions de la rythmique spatiale et l'expérience que des images asymétriques sont souvent *refusées*... Pour Simmel, "tout comme le rythme dans les arts de l'oreille, ainsi la symétrie dans ceux de l'œil c'est le commencement du façonnement de la matière. Afin de porter dans les choses idée, sens et harmonie, il faut avant tout les façonner de façon symétrique, égaliser entre elles les parties du tout, les ordonner symétriquement autour d'un centre médian. Ainsi la puissance créatrice de l'homme est matérialisée, face au hasard et au chaos de la simple création de la nature, de la façon la plus rapide, visible et directe. Répétons-le: la symétrie est la preuve première de la force du rationalisme, grâce à laquelle il nous libère de l'absurdité des choses et de leur simple acceptation" [en d'autres mots, les planches de Rorschach sont une rare combinaison réussie de *Vorhanden-*, *Zuhanden-*, et *Da-sein!*: cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995, pp. 399-400, 402-7]. (Binswanger pp. 233-4, Kuhn p. 102)

And finally this last quotation, which will further prove the existence of an entirely shared aesthetic thinking between Simmel and Rorschach and is very close to an original contribution we will make in chap. III.D.2 about the meaning of the latter's test material:

Dès que nous avons compris que la symétrie spatiale n'est qu'une forme de la symétrie en général, le champ de sa valeur devient infini. Simmel, déjà, a décrit "la symétrie comme le rythme dans l'espace [le *Raumrhythmik* de

³¹ This particular reference to Zulliger in this key spatial-temporal connection is far from incidental, as will be demonstrated later on in chap. III.D. Compare also Bolzinger pp. 96-9 below.

Rorschach!: 1921/1967 chap. I.1] et le rythme, comme la symétrie transférée dans le temps". (loc. cit.)

In the XIVth and last chapter Kuhn further develops these same ideas, insisting on how for both Simmel and Rorschach there is a connection to be made between the spatial and temporal aspects of the matter:

We have already encountered the term "spatial rhythm" in S i m m e l... We don't know if R o r s c h a c h had read the term somewhere or if he has been lead himself to this word construction. For sure it is a question of a meaningful concept, which will also be used at other times and which connects space and time in a peculiar way... B i n s w a n g e r also widens the symmetry concept temporally in his essay, while he indicates on this that sym_umetry "<<can>> even 'have an effect' on the sequence of interpretations as principle of order, in the measure in which particularly intelligent test subjects for ex. i n v o l o n t a -r i l y avoid giving an interpretation which would not 'correspond' with the previous one in the sphere of objects or of senses" (page 23). We find also here space and time closely tied and indeed time in the form of sequence, since each succession is properly a tempo-ral phenomenon. It is necessary to go still a little more precisely into R o r s c h a c h's spatial rhythm, even if we cannot make the claim to have clarified this exceedingly diffi-cult and involved field. First should be differentiated between the spatial rhythm of the blot and that of the interpretations. By the latter should be distinguished on the other hand between the space and time problem of each individual interpretation and that of the succession of interpretations to a plate as well as to all 10 plates. (p. 104)

All that said about -horizontal- symmetry, he devotes himself then to the development of a re-ference system for the complementary and unexplored spatial-structural aspect of *proportion* (Ruskin) now in the vertical sense of the blots *and* interpretations just as in the human face/body: examples of this are the respective meaning to be ascribed to interpretations of creatures with "too big" or "too little" head/feet, to position-responses, and to interpretations with similar or different than their natural size by reference to the interpreting subject and his body (cf. his masks groups and their respective relationship to the Ego). After making the relevant observation that this proportion systems naturally change with development together with the child's gradual growth in size, he concludes this enormously rich and suggestive work with the following words:

Anyway let us turn now to the counterpart, after Gulliver's trip to the giants, his walk in the kingdom of the dwarfs. Most of all we must first become aware here of the fact that it is a quite fundamental step to tear apart the "coherence between perceiving Ego and per-ceived object", to talk like

v. W e i z s ä c k e r, to take one's leave as it were of the objects, to let them withdraw in the distance, to let them become small and with it to let them escape from the hand as it were. There is a naive belief in our environment, in which we are one with it and which must be destroyed, as soon as we see

ourselves forced to recognize that the other has his own law and disappears for us. (The oversized also withdraws from us!) In child development there is a moment at which this step is carried out, it is the moment at which the third dimension appears in child drawing and it is in certain cases, if always I don't know, the same moment at which the child encounters death, i.e. it experiences that things do not last and exactly that we must separate ourselves from them, that we can be separated from them. - However with it is also made a step in the spiritual domain; with it the person becomes then referred to himself in a particular mode and way, he becomes, whether he wants it or not, independent of the objects of the world through the separation from holding others, he becomes free from the tie to the world, he learns to think for himself! -

It is certainly immediately evident that with these considerations we have been led not only to an important moment of individual development, but also as it were to a decisive moment of human becoming. Even though with our sentences we offered nothing else than an "aperçu" and not dare to hope even to recognize, not to mention exhaust, the whole content of this problem, anyway we still want to point to a train of thought that seems important to us, that diverges here and which, like everything else that has been communicated until now, is based also on multiple observations through the form-interpretation test...

We are of course now scarcely able to represent life to ourselves dynamically enough in the different size-reference systems, as we have described them. The naive, immediate unity between Ego and World, the primitive exaggeration and the mental distancing alternate in mixed succession during the course of a Rorschach Test, condition themselves, or exclude themselves, and organize the experience in time in the form of a succession like the Apprehension Modes or the symmetry.

We have arrived imperceptibly from the static and concrete domains of size and proportion to the dynamic one (in L. Binswanger's sense) (comp. above), where it is a question of proximity and distance, and so into the spiritual one. We still miss dimensions, like the width and narrowness, the height and depth. We are still going to run into them in the course of our analysis of the Rorschach form-interpretation test. But we are still going to run into also other temporal aspects. Space and time will always be what will concern us, and in the measure in which this happens we will see more and more fulfilled our promise of the first hour, to obtain from the Rorschach form-interpretation test an anthropology in the sense of a picture of man. (pp. 111-2)

After this key contribution by Kuhn, we just want to mention a final article (1953/1977, based on a lecture delivered at the 11th International Rorschach Congress the same year) which is a tight synthesis of this previous, unpublished work (see about chaps. I, IV, IX, X, XII and XIV above). In it he begins by explaining how the Rorschacher's method of interpretation, historically -in reference to the pre-scientific era- and in its own essence, does not differentiate itself so much from the one of a

fortune-teller: concentration on certain unclear (fortuitous) signs, exploitation of the ambiguities of language with the usually general statements made, serious recourse to his own occurrences if not fantasizing, and inevitable combined use of the subreptitious knowledge about the life of the subject. Statistics provide an initial assistance for a more scientific result, particularly with reference to the validity of the signs, but on the other hand it "allows us no insight at all into the inner connections out of which emerge the reason why a certain sign has a certain meaning. Psychological insight will not be obtained through statistics" (p. 324). This requires the application of psychological methods, which he demonstrates with the example of *G* responses: Rorschach offered a host of complex and possible interpretations of them, so in a particular case (he offers as ex. the one of a simultaneous inventor and swindler with no less than 23 *G*!) it is hard to decide even statistically which one applies and which other does not; in true Klopferian fashion (cf. chap. III.A.1 p. #8 below) he initially suggests a thorough subdivision of them following particularly Furrer's suggestions, but for theoretically clarifying purposes he concentrates on the philosophical distinction between only two types, the *G*s with either 'independent' or with 'interdependent' parts (cf. p. 74 above about chap. X of the previous Kuhn text: the classical "slag" vs. "face" exs.). While the former are obviously primitive and which he found related with Binder's *Hd* and generalized moods, the latter combinatory ones are rather developed performances and are closely related statistically as well as psychologically with *B* responses: since movement is a sequence including the preceding and following interdependent ones in a *temporal* totality, just as a combinatory whole includes all blot parts interdependently in a *spatial* totality. "...The question arises as to the how and why of man's capacity for structuring perceptions in space and time. It appears that a cue to the problem may be found in man's experience of the temporal totality of human existence including death itself [Heidegger's '*Sein-zum-Tode*': cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995 p. 404]. Consistent with this reasoning is the increase of *W M+ H* [*G B+ M*] responses during adolescence, a period when thoughts concerned with death seem to be quite common. Furthermore, there is some evidence that immediately following an encounter with death, children tend to produce many *W M+ H*" (p. 506; comp. above about chap. XIV of the previous Kuhn text). These illuminating reflections will be taken up again in chap. III.D.2 below.

Summarizing the weight of the (German-speaking) phenomenological Rorschach contribution of both Binswanger and Kuhn, in our opinion two things must be regretted. First the fact that they fall short of an optimum from the publication point of view: after his excellent initial book-review Binswanger's published papers have been scarce and scattered with the Rorschach mostly as an incidental subject, and Kuhn on his side has left two of his best monographs unpublished! It is true that we count with the latter's fine book on masks (which unfortunately *seems* like a much too narrow research for the eventual Rorschach reader³²) and even a previous, clinical

³² We cannot at all agree with Mélon's following criticism of this text: "On connaît l'étude phénoménologique très fouillée que Roland KUHN a consacrée à cette question [de masques]. Pour KUHN, il y a lieu de distinguer trois types de réponses masques... Nous pensons que les distinctions subtiles qu'il opère ne se justifient pas. A notre avis, toutes les réponses masques ont la même signification, elles indiquent une tendance dissimulatrice qui concourt à la préservation de ce que le sujet estime avoir de plus précieux, sa vie et son sexe" (1976 pp. 120-1).

one (1940); but he could have become a leader of a much more extensive phenomeno-logical group had he published a much needed detailed manual like the one of Barison & Passi T. (1982) that we will be reviewing later on. This masks book leads us to our second regret: this unfortunate insistence on the *content* aspect of the Rorschach while simultaneously devaluating the merits of the *formal* approach; note that every time Kuhn cites the contributions of his disciples (comp. 1944/1992 p. 220, where he also mentions still another unpublished Rorschach works of his!) the content focus clearly prevails. It is a pity that this extraordinarily important Rorschach author openly expresses his abrogation of the *systematic* aspect of the method (cf. footnote #27 above) while there are so much instructive lessons to be derived from a detailed comparison between what Ellenberger calls 'categorical phenomenology' (1958 p. 101) and Rorschach's system of formal *categories* (comp. chap. III.D.2 below)! And in spite of this, this tandem has unwittingly made one of the most fundamental, illuminating contributions to the formal systematization of the method as we will expose in detail at the end of next chapter. Any-way, the subreptitious influence of this current as represented by these two authors in contemporary Rorschach practice should not be underestimated, as can be confirmed in particular in the present-day deserved importance recognized to symmetry reactions and reflection responses, as represented in the works of widely followed contemporary experts like Exner, Chabert, and Lerner. To our knowledge Binswanger's 1947 article was the first one dedicated to the significance of this subject, before Bohm included them in his widely used list of 'special phenomena'. We will come back to this point below while discussing Schachtel. But another, more general and demonstrative example of this subreptitious influence is represented by the way projective techniques are classically defined as opening the door to the subject's "private world" (*Um-, Mit- or Eigen-welt*: cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995 pp. 403, 405-6; comp. for instance Frank's 1948 obviously phenomenologically inspired popular monograph, without the least explicit reference to this school).

One of the few published endorsements of this tradition is Brambilla's 1949 article, which constituted the first of the many Italian contributions to this school but was just a summary of the above minutely exposed concepts. Correctly comparing the Rorschach interpretation process with the practice of art criticism aiming at identifying the artist's singular style, this author merely enumerates certain of the phenomenological concepts that could be an aid to Rorschach practice: self-awareness or not of the interpretation process, experienced spatiality and temporality, stressed material qualities, etc.

A tradition similar in more than one respect to the above reviewed one (Minkowski 1956/1978, pp. 12-3, 33-4) is represented by the contributions of the renowned psychiatric couple of Eugène Minkowski - Françoise Minkowska, ultimately of Paris. Even earlier than Binswanger they were friends of the Rorschach couple, having followed together part of their medical studies in Switzerland to the point of having traveled at the same time -1909, Rorschach's 2nd trip- to Kazan-Russia for their state examinations (Ellenberger 1954/1995, p. 35; M. Minkowski 1955, pp. 272-3; E. Minkowski, 1955 p. 283, also 1970 pp. 986-7) with the project of exercising there. If

Minkowski -just as early as Binswanger- published his first Rorschach paper in 1923, their relevant written contributions began to appear towards the end of the '40s decade and have their right place here. The best starting point should be an article by Minkowski (1950) centered precisely on "the problem of content and form" in which, in an entirely shared way than above, he begins by diminishing the systematic character of Rorschach's work at the same time criticizing the supposed psychoanalytic focus on content instead of on the more relevant 'form world': let us hear him present his own argument...

...De nos jours, après la seconde guerre mondiale qui en horreur a de beaucoup dépassé la première, nous nous penchons à nouveau, avec plus d'angoisse mais aussi avec plus d'ardeur qu'avant, sur l'éternelle question: Qu'est donc l'être humain, quels sont les côtés de cet être que jusque-là nous avons peut-être trop négligés? Des décombres une nouvelle sève semble vouloir monter. Notre science s'est enrichie de mainte nouvelle conception. Le monde des contenus usé jusqu'à la corde si l'on peut dire, doit, ramené à ses justes limites, laisser la place à un autre monde, tout aussi vivant que lui, celui *des formes*. Et là, le regard se tourne vers l'œuvre de Rorschach... pour qui sa méthode était une expérience d'interprétation des *formes* (Formdeutversuch). [pp. 132-3]

...Toute orthodoxie est sujette à caution. Le "clos", pour parler avec Bergson, se substitue là à "l'ouvert", fondement de toute recherche et de la vie en général. L'élève trop zélé est ce qui menace le plus la pensée du maître. Il immobilise ce qui est appelé à rester mou-vant. Nous savons à quelle impasse peut mener l'orthodoxie freudienne, à l'instar de toute autre orthodoxie du reste... [p. 132]

La première question est de savoir *de quoi est faite la psychologie de Rorschach*... A maint égard, elle se place au même niveau que la psychologie de Bleuler... Il eût été pour-tant une erreur que de caractériser aussi sommairement la psychologie rorschachienne. A chaque pas presque, elle fait éclater les cadres de l'associationnisme. C'est une psy-chologie riche et "peu systématique", ce dernier qualificatif, loin d'être un reproche, ne témoignant que du besoin de déborder un schéma toujours trop rigide lorsqu'il s'agit de la vie humaine. Ainsi, cette psychologie se trouve émaillée d'expressions pittoresques em-pruntées au langage courant et qui la rendent particulièrement vivante... [p. 134; comp. Kuhn's quotations above p. 68 footnote #27 and p. 73]

...Si à l'avènement de la psychopathologie affective contemporaine, inaugurée par les tout premiers travaux de Freud en collaboration avec Breuer, par réaction contre la période précédente caractérisée par un intellectualisme excessif, on réunissait sous le même voca-ble "affectivité" tout ce qui n'était pas sensation, perception, représentation, pensée ou idée, par la suite il devenait indispensable de différencier les divers phénomènes groupés ainsi... A côté de l'affectivité-sentiment ou mieux, de l'affectivité-conflit venait se ranger l'affectivité-contact... La richesse d'une vie ne se mesure point au nombre de conflits, ni même à leur intensité, mais bien davantage à cette faculté innée d'établir un contact intime avec ses semblables, avec la vie et probablement avec soi-même... C'est du reste, comme nous le croyons,

l'affectivité-contact qui constitue la quintessence de l'affectivité en nous en révélant l'aspect le plus humain et le plus profond. La psychanalyse se trouve centrée sur le contenu (contenu manifeste et contenu latent du rêve, "contenu" de la psychose, etc...). Elle trouve là ses limites. Par opposition à ce contenu, nous pouvons dire que l'affectivité-contact ressortit au cadre, à la "forme" de la vie. Cette "forme" nous fait pressentir ce que le "monde des formes" en psychologie peut vouloir dire, où son étude doit nous conduire. Trop négligé jusque-là, il demande à être "découvert" à nouveau. Dans cette voie, Rorschach, avec son épreuve d'interprétation des formes, a été un précurseur. [pp. 135-6]

Là, pourtant, un commentaire devient indispensable. Nous avons pris l'habitude de considérer la forme comme ce qui reste lorsque nous avons vidé le tout de son contenu. Par là-même, la forme apparaît comme vide, rigide, immobile, c'est-à-dire comme non-vivante. Il n'en va pas de même pourtant lorsqu'il s'agit de vie mentale. Là, elle peut être plus ou moins riche, plus ou moins mobile et vivante (affectivité-contact, rationalisme morbide) et forme ainsi le cadre général, le style de la vie, sur lequel, par la suite, la destinée viendra brocher les événements, les contenus, les conflits, ceux-ci, dans la façon même dont ils viennent marquer, se montrant dépendants, en grande partie, de ce cadre, de ce style... C'est ce qui est mis en avant dans les récentes analyses existentielles des schizophrènes, présentées par un chercheur avisé comme l'est L. Binswanger... et nous-même [aussi]... Par la suite, comme nous le verrons encore, la mise en évidence de l'importance capitale de ce "monde des formes" devait prendre encore bien plus d'ampleur. Cela par réaction contre les tendances psychanalytiques qui réservent une place presque exclusive aux contenus, position plus que compréhensible au début, née par réaction contre l'intellectualisme excessif de la période précédente, mais position, comme du reste toute autre position, ayant eu son temps et appelée, de ce fait, si elle ne veut pas se refermer sur elle-même et devenir uniquement du "clos" doctrinal, à ouvrir largement ses portes à des données primordiales acquises depuis...

Ici, dès 1920, prennent rang la pensée, l'effort, l'intuition, l'œuvre de Rorschach. Il n'a jamais nié la possibilité de voir les complexes venir déterminer certaines réponses au cours du test, mais il s'est toujours défendu, malgré la pression exercée sur lui par ses amis psychanalystes, contre l'idée de considérer les interprétations de cet ordre comme but principal de sa méthode. Son test était et devait rester avant tout, pour ne pas dire uniquement, une exploration de *l'interprétation des formes* (Formdeutversuch), cette interprétation, loin de concerner des formes vides, étant appelée, au contraire, à fournir des renseignements précieux, ayant trait à la personnalité tout entière, dépassant de beaucoup les facultés formelles au sens courant du terme et se référant à ce qu'il y a de plus essentiel en elle. [pp. 154-5]

If the general critical tone of the above argument is recognizable from the previous Binswanger & -particularly- Kuhn tradition, there is however a fundamental difference not to be overlooked: while Kuhn defended a sort of incompatibility between the phenomenological and the formal approaches (cf. pp. 70-2 above), the

Minkowski's on their side will always defend -with full reason- the original and true nature of the method as a *Formdeutversuch* otherwise fully compatible with Phenomenology (cf. chaps. III.B.2&D.2 below); where we entirely disagree with the latter however is on their pejorative view and subsequent refusal of the both "closed" and "systematic" character of the method (*Gestalt* psychology, on the contrary, has taught us precisely that 'good' forms or systems are necessarily closed ones: cf. pp. #III14-9 below, comp. Minkowski 1970 p. 988), and most particularly on their narrow and erroneous assessment of Psychoanalysis in relationship to the form/content issue (cf. chap. III.B.1). As indicated, our position on all of these questions will be fully developed and justified in the next chapter.

Minkowska contributed also a simultaneous article (1950/1978) which is not only the continuation and "sidekick" of her husband's one, but also the most representative of all aspects of her whole work - which happened also to be her final one (E. Minkowski 1955, p. 283). In it she treats in succession a number of subjects that we will be reviewing with some detail: the early history and -in her opinion- not always adequate ramification of the Rorschach movement (using as her model the diverse interventions at the Zürich 1949 Rorschach Meeting), her criticism of the psychoanalytic approach, a comparison of the careers of Bleuler and Rorschach, her original typology in its relationship to Rorschach's schema, and some short case studies. To begin with she finds that, while the Rorschach started as a psychiatric tool and clinical aid, unfortunately psychologists like Loosli-Usteri and Zulliger have loosened this use and, worse, have introduced a psychoanalytic view of the procedure; her particular contempt for the latter's contribution (considering the key importance we assign to this author: cf. section B.1 above and chap. III.D.1 below) merits some quotations...

Nous venons de toucher aux interprétations psychanalytiques. Ici M. ZULLIGER peut servir d'exemple... Lors de la "[1re] rencontre internationale de Rorschach", [il] a parlé de l'interprétation en profondeur (tiefenpsychologische Interpretation) du Rorschach... Chez M. ZULLIGER la "psychologie en profondeur" est synonyme de psychanalyse. Dans ce travail M. ZULLIGER nous donne deux protocoles... suivis d'un dépouillement quanti-tatif et qualitatif habituel... Au début, l'interprétation des résultats se situe sur le plan formel, mais progressivement pénètrent, jusqu'à effacer entièrement ces premiers résultats, les interprétations psychanalytiques qui, par ailleurs, peuvent être justifiées mais qui trouvent difficilement leur place dans le cadre du test de Rorschach... Au cadre formel du test qui, comme l'a dit RORSCHACH lui-même, fait appel à la fonction du réel et non à la "psychologie en profondeur", qui s'adresse à la valeur directe et métaphorique du langage, se trouve substituée une interprétation exclusivement symbolique... Si nous nous sommes étendue sur cet article, c'est qu'y apparaissent nettement des tendances qui se rencontrent aussi bien en France qu'à l'étranger: les résumés d'interprétation de protocoles reflètent dans bien des cas des considérations qui appartiennent tantôt à l'observation directe, tantôt à la psychanalyse. Ces considérations se trouvent ainsi mélangées indûment. Pourtant Rorschach possède son langage

bien déterminé: ce sont les F, les K[B], les C[Fb], les Clob[Hd], les Dbl[Zw], les D, etc... (pp. 214-5)

We just wonder if her husband's opinion concerning Kuhn's hypercritical attitude (comp. foot-note #29 above, and Morgenthaler's words cited by E. Minkowski 1955 p. 285) does not apply in the exact same way here: she finds unwanted deviations in almost everybody else's contribution! As already said we will give full attention to her misguided criticism of a psychoanalytic Ror-schach later on.

According to Minkowska, the fact of Rorschach's premature death has prevented himself from differentiating this initial confusion of issues traceable in his text itself. Having been his disciple, here she compares him with his teacher E. Bleuler (that was also her's) who thanks to a long life could accomplish himself this ulterior clarification and delimitation: "Ainsi les notions révolutionnaires d'ordre structural, ayant trait au monde des formes, comme la 'Spaltung' et l'autisme, côtoient au début le contenu de la psychose (données psychanalytiques de FREUD [dont il s'est ensuite distancié]) et l'associationnisme, survivance du passé..." (p. 216). She then passes on to enumerate what she considers these insufficiently distinguished confusions in the "Psychodiagnostic":

RORSCHACH est psychiatre et élève de BLEULER, et son œuvre témoigne de l'importance qu'il accorde à la schizophrénie; il suit son maître. Mais en même temps il entreprend une œuvre absolument originale pour laquelle on ne lui connaît pas de précurseur: la recherche du monde des formes ("Formdeutungsversuch")... Pour intégrer les données recueillies au monde des formes, il établit le triage des réponses à caractère *qualitatif* avant tout: les G, les D, les Dd, les Dbl, les K, les F, et les C, en spécifiant que "ce test de recherche qui est devenu un test d'examen indique les qualités des symptômes et n'indique que problématiquement leur degré *quantitatif*". Pourtant le psychogramme est bâti sur le facteur quantitatif. C'est là une *première* contradiction et la source d'une première confusion [et pourquoi elle a complètement abandonné son calcul: voir plus loin]...

Dans la phase suivante, il veut utiliser ses résultats pour déterminer des types. Cette typologie a d'emblée un caractère très personnel. Le terme même "Erlebnistypen" met l'accent sur le *vécu* et témoigne de cette orientation. Mais cette recherche du vécu manquait encore entièrement à cette époque de notions appropriées ou, ce qui revient au même, de moyens d'expression. De là, en partie, l'origine d'une *deuxième* contradiction et d'une *deuxième* confusion. RORSCHACH abandonne le terrain de la psychiatrie clinique. En s'appuyant sur les C[Fb] et les K[B] (et en négligeant en même temps à ce point de vue les F) il interprète les types C et K conformément aux conceptions en cours de son temps, c'est-à-dire en adoptant les notions d'extra- et d'introversion... se référant ainsi aux types de JUNG, mais en soulignant en même temps qu'ils ne leur sont pas super-posables... Par la suite, il devenait de plus en plus clair que la simple opposition de l'extra- et de l'introversion, située en surface, prêtait à maintes critiques... Ainsi cette typologie provisoire, comme l'appelle RORSCHACH lui-même, en s'écartant d'une part de la clinique, n'ayant pas, d'autre part, trouvé son langage propre, reste comme suspen-due

en l'air, et c'est là, comme nous l'avons dit, l'origine de la *deuxième* confusion [et pourquoi elle l'a remplacée par une autre typologie: voir ensuite]...

Tout en délimitant la notion de *forme* en face de celle du contenu, tout en défendant la valeur du "comment" à côté de celle du "quoi", par la mise en évidence, si importante et si juste, du choc-couleur qu'il subordonne pourtant au complexe, au refoulement, au subconscient, en laissant de côté toute la gamme des autres réactions possibles, comme l'ont prouvé les recherches contemporaines, RORSCHACH a ouvert la porte à une *troisième* confusion: une interprétation imprégnée exclusivement de facteurs psychanalytiques. Cette troisième confusion reste à notre sens la moins justifiée de toutes. C'est que RORSCHACH avait vu cet écueil et s'est prononcé à son sujet avec une telle précision qu'aucun de ses continuateurs ne devrait le méconnaître. Dans le chapitre "Application du test d'interprétation des formes à la pratique du diagnostic" [V.4&5]... il passe au contenu des interprétations (p. 132), puis aux rapports entre le test et la psychanalyse (p. 133). Là, nous lisons: "...Il n'est donc pas question de prendre ce test comme méthode de pénétration dans l'inconscient..." [Minkowska, pp. 218-20³³]

Then Minkowska enters into the modifications which she has introduced in Rorschach's types (by discarding the Jungian terms), partly following Bleuler: just as the latter discovered in schizophrenics the *Spaltung* as the prototypical mechanism traceable even in normal psychology as characteristic of the 'rational' type, thanks to her genealogical as well as clinical researches with epileptics she introduced at the other pole the *lien* as the characteristic procedure of the normal 'sensorial' type; a third intermediate type is represented by the 'syntonic' as the normal expression of the other great psychosis, manic-depression³⁴. In Rorschach terms and inspiring herself on Monnier's conclusions (and reminding us in some way of Baer's amended formal dialectics: cf. section B.3 above):

Le psychogramme, par contre, basé sur une proportion quantitative des K[B] et des C[Fb] au détriment des F [pas nécessairement: voir Schachtel plus loin], aboutit à une typologie (introversion et extratension), que RORSCHACH cherchait à rattacher à cette notion nouvelle qu'est la psychologie des formes, mais qui n'était liée directement ni aux formes, ni aux entités cliniques...

³³ Pourtant, tantôt elle ne s'était pas posée le moindre problème pour le "méconnaître" entièrement dans ce qu'elle appelle sa "première confusion", au sujet de laquelle il s'est aussi prononcé "avec une telle précision": dans l'article posthume (Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. VII.A.1 p. 218) auquel elle donne précisément une énorme importance, nous lisons... "Tous ces chiffres qui résultent du calcul des résultats... offrent pour l'interprétation une base que j'ai appelée dans sa totalité <<Psychogramme>>, et je tiens pour tout à fait exclu qu'on parvienne même avec la pratique et l'expérience les plus grandes, à atteindre une interprétation sûre et certaine par la seule inspection du protocole, sans passer par le calcul préalable" (traduction légèrement changée par nous pour qu'elle corresponde plus exactement au texte original; comp. aussi p. 250: "D'abord le psychogramme formel...").

³⁴ As soon as one acknowledges the *pathoanalytic* spirit discernible in her triadic typology, it is not at all surprising its close similarity with Szondi's system (cf. chap. III.C.2 below): the epileptic –or paroxysmal– and the schizophrenic types constitute also side-by-side a polarity at the center of the latter's schema, while the manic-depressive is located in the periphery; but this being a tetradic schema one misses the 4th sexual-pervert type, this maybe due in a significant measure to Minkowska's rejection of psychoanalytic findings. Her contribution has always been considered nevertheless as very valuable by the Szondian group (Stassart 1994).

Ces modalités ['esthésiques' de Monnier], nous les acceptons et les lions aux problèmes cliniques: le type à prédominance morphesthésique [F] rejoint le rationnel et le schizoïde, le type où se rencontre une harmonieuse répartition des F, C et K rejoint le syntone avec les tendances de coartation et de dilatation qui caractérisent les cycloïdes, enfin le *nou-veau type avec prédominance des C et des K* [chromesthésique et kinesthésique] *représente le sensoriel et l'épileptoïde.* (pp. 225-6)

We must say about this new formal typology that it looks a little *asymmetric*, a fundamentally related concept for Rorschach by the way (cf. Binswanger-Kuhn above), with *F* on one (rational) pole and *Fb+B* on the other (sensorial) (comp. chap. III.D.2 pp. #103-7 & #136-7 below, particularly footnote #57). For this latter new sensorial type Minkowska was also significantly inspired by an aesthetic pictural analysis of a unique genius' work: "Chez VAN GOGH, au cours de ses accès confusionnels allant jusqu'à la déchéance épileptique, la couleur atteint une *intensité* inouïe, le mouvement est *déchaîné*, [tandis que] les formes *s'enchevêtrent* de plus en plus jusqu'à disparaître entièrement dans cet enchevêtrement" (p. 223); while we agree on the *intensity* of the role played by color (*Fb*) on this type, we doubt that *unleashed* movement could represent the essence of Rorschach's *B* determinant: that sounds more like *acting-out* which is just its opposite (cf. Mélon's quotation pp. #III133-4 below), just as the typical *mimed Bs* of epileptics as Minkowska herself has also observed represent a degraded version of them (Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. II.5.b and p. 58); further proof of this diverging concept of the *B* is contained in Minkowska's discussion of the issue on pp. 268-9 particularly her saying that "à propos des kinesthésies, ...le sensoriel voit le monde comme le voit l'enfant, c'est-à-dire en mouvement avant tout", while in contrast for Piotrowski and many others this determinant "...expresses the most developed aspects of personality from the standpoint of both the human race and the individual" (1957 p. 120; comp. also Kuhn pp. 77-8 above, Mélon 1976 pp. 86 & 89, and our discussion on chap. III.D.2 below). Besides we are not so sure of the fact that the *F* determinant represents *thought* - the predominant function of the rational type (Minkowska loc. cit.), which many theorists have connected rather with the *B* determinant (cf. footnote #57 p. #III106 below). Contrary to Minkowska and others we do consider Rorschach's typology as still useful and therefore try to maintain it based on adequate arguments (pp. #III130-2 below), and in the process new -Szondian- pathoanalytic connections become evident close in spirit to her phenomeno-structural view however with some amendments (pp. #III110-1, 113 and Table #2 below).

Finally Minkowska takes position on the interpretation procedure exemplifying her technique with 3 cases *without* psychogram (in total contradiction with Rorschach as indicated above, footnote #33):

Le psychogramme, par son aspect quantitatif, a quelque chose de statique en lui et nous prive d'une donnée essentielle, à savoir la *façon dont se déroule le test*, ce déroulement nous montrant un continuel va-et-vient, en fonction des divers éléments appartenant à la personne testée, au climat de chaque planche et même au contact avec la personne du testeur. Ainsi nous épluchons planche par planche, comme RORSCHACH l'a déjà fait très intentionnellement dans son

article posthume, et nous donnons, à côté de chaque réponse, la cotation exacte des formes, ayant recours au langage chaque fois que la valeur métaphorique du langage se présente, en particulier, lorsque les réponses ne sont pas "formulables", selon l'expression même de RORSCHACH. (p. 226)

She's certainly right when indicating the shortcomings of the *purely* quantitative approach to the psychogram, but while the Rorschach interpreter should always keep that in mind (cf. Bins-wanger chap. III.A.2 p. #22 below, following Rorschach himself) we believe her harsh discarding of it is extreme and excessive: the initial, orienting and by necessity '**global**' view of the findings (cf. Rorschach's quotation chap. III.A.2 p. #21 below; comp. Bohm 1951/1972 chap. 7.I, '1st phase') must ground itself on an overview of the entire formal psychogram (as well as on the entire responding 'climate': Kuhn above) so as to be able to perceive "...a large number of *correlations* [comp. Kuhn p. 68 above] which can be grasped very quickly and thereby permit the establishment of the main lines of the psychogram without great difficulty" (Rorschach 1921/1942 pp. 192-3, italics added). Just as many of the best U.S.A. psychoanalytic experts, by promoting in reaction to the quantitative psychometrists (Beck, Exner) a '**detail**', response-by-response or plate-by-plate focused interpretation Minkowska deserves in our opinion the same criticism than Schafer or Lerner we have already expressed (comp. pp. 29-30, 34 above). We entirely agree in that interpretivewise there is much sense in dynamically following the subject's reactions plate by plate, but not to the point that this approach leads us away from a global comprehension of the *formal* (symmetric, or *Zeitrhythmik* -Simmel-) sense of this whole sequence that many seem to have overlooked as we believe to have been the first to grasp (refer to pp. 75-7 above and chap. III.D.2 p. #107 below).

Passing on to more isolated contributions, Klopfer & Spiegelman (1956) referred to this school in chap. 9 of the former's 2nd vol. of his trilogy. In a manner very similar to Kuhn above they present the subject from the point of view of the difficulties of quantitatively (in a statistical, generalizing, "sign" approach way) accurately interpreting the meaning of a high G%, which could only be attained by a phenomenological conceptual analysis of the internal level of complexity of meaning underlying this "score" in particular inside the whole classification system - i.e. its 'construct validity'. They define the phenomenological approach in the following way:

The process of adapting Husserl's approach to psychological research... coincides... with the application of Gestalt psychology to clinical problems.

The basic ideas of this adaptation might be formulated as follows:

The observable phenomena, both in the field of internal (introspective) and external observation, do not offer themselves in the form of an unstructured mass of unrelated items. Rather, they fall into a "natural" pattern [in a footnote: "...it is to be understood that these 'natural' patterns are not something outside of experience, like a *Ding an sich*, but part and parcel of the experience"] or configuration with specific foci and emphases.

The observer cannot avoid using a definite frame of reference in describing his observations. This frame of reference, however, may impinge on the natural pattern of the observed phenomena-even distort or destroy the pattern. On

the other hand, it may leave this natural pattern undisturbed, or throw it into clearer relief.

The phenomenological approach, as understood here, focuses on this interplay between the observer's frame of reference and the natural pattern of the observed phenomena. The phenomenologist deliberately attempts to modify his frame of reference in order to achieve maximal clarity of the natural pattern in the observed phenomena.

...The question arises, of course, whether such configurations or "natural" patterns exist objectively or are merely a projection of the clinical observer. The "New Look" movement in the psychology of perception has enriched our knowledge of the role such projections play in perception. But it would be extremely naïve to assume that the discovery of this new field of projection obviates the assumption of any objective subject matter in the field of perception... Our clinical observations may first be mildly distorted by the unconscious projections of our own need system. However, these mild distortions are harmless as compared with the crippling effect our theoretical biases may have unless we protect the natural pattern of our clinical observations by a careful phenomenological perusal before trying to understand them theoretically.

...It is impossible for us, of course, to proceed without theoretical biases; but the more we are *aware* of them, the better we will succeed in keeping them from interfering with the phenomenological task. This fact explains why some of the most theoretically committed ("seemingly biased") psychologists are among the best clinicians. (pp. 276-8; comp. Ellenberger's quotation p. 72 above)

Obviously Klopfer has come a long way since his initial almost atheoretical convictions (comp. pp. 11-2 above)! Then they finally consider...

The Rorschach Use of Phenomenology... The usual terms for this approach have been expressions like "the global use" of the record, "the clinical use" of the record, "the integrated use" of the record. Frequently these expressions carry the connotation that such procedures lack the objectivity of counting classificatory scores and combining them into signs or sign patterns...

If we define objectivity as an approach to the "true meaning" of observable phenomena, the use of the natural pattern to its fullest possible extent is the indispensable prerequisite for objective understanding. This idea underlies the generally accepted awareness of the interdependence among scoring categories...

The most important problem in the use of phenomenological method in the Rorschach technique is the task of subdividing the natural pattern of the total record into sub-wholes, without losing any of the important idiosyncratic characteristics. The divisions most generally accepted are the specific patterns of thought processes and affective processes [i.e. focusing roughly on the core concept of *Erlebnistypus* or *B:Fb*, respectively]. These two subdivisions have been created by utilizing the objective, structural characteristics of Rorschach responses (form, color, shading, and so on) in a phenomenological, rather than in a classificatory, manner. These subdivisions form a natural bridge between

the structural characteristics of the Rorschach and the structural aspects of the personality. (pp. 278-9)

We must say we agree in its entirety with these authors' position. However in this text they only presented a plan and did not enter into the paramount task, the specific and explicit theoretical articulation of the individual scores and the whole scoring system after due phenomenological attention to its 'natural pattern', as we will present from our part in chap. III.D.2.

With the occasional intention of thoroughly interpreting the protocols of a sample of 30 young enuretics and the structure of the disturbance, as a complement to the traditional but insufficient formal evaluation -as exemplified in Bohm (1951/1972)- in his first book Brückner (1957) develops a generally applicable, detailed method of Rorschach content interpretation and sequence analysis on a triple psychoanalytic, phenomenological, and expression-theoretical basis (p. 197). While for our purposes it is more of a practical than a theoretical text, the painstaking technical contribution is worth mentioning - even if he avows to have intentionally stayed 'in the "antechamber" of Existential Analysis' (p. 9). After due attention to classical formal elements and psychoanalytic content analysis, it is the turn of the analysis of Binswanger's 'meaningful directions' (resp. center-fleetingness or -strivingness, flexion and extension, falling and rising, etc.) including anthropological proportion (stretching of existence in the width and its 'height'...) and particular forms of developmental disturbance (horizontal stagnation, strong vertical-ization...). This appears like an important contribution to this Rorschach approach but we cannot enter here into more details.

We have to refer again here to Chiari's book (1961) already commented in the psychoanalytic section (pp. 53-7 above). In chap. IX he also discusses 'the anthropoanalytic point of view' towards the interpretation of the Rorschach, where he briefly comments the contributions of Binswanger, Kuhn, Brambilla and Minkowska. He points out quite rightly that the Rorschach comes into pertinent consideration for this psychological current since for diagnostic purposes it is particularly interested in any spontaneous -particularly verbal- production by the subject: dreams, letters, diaries, drawings, etc. (cf. Binswanger's quotation pp. 63-4 above), so any projective technique is an ideal instrument for these clinicians. However a particular criticism applies for him here:

The fundamental defect of this new current of general interpretation of human life is condensed in the fact, as long as it concerns us now, of having wanted to subordinate the psychodiagnostic instruments to the service of theoretical formulations, almost by a need of grounding on the concrete, of confronting theory with practice.

Now it happens that the psychodiagnostic instrument doesn't have anything more of its own, isn't anymore an objective, sure means, able to say the same thing to all who use it (knowing how to use it of course), by virtue of its own composition, of its "setting for work"; it becomes that which one wants it to become, it tells us that which we want it to tell us. How can it be asserted that three users (one who interprets it on the basis of calculations, formulas,

averages, percentages; one who considers the symbolism of its contents; one who searches there the existential manifestations) have used the same test, have applied Rorschach's test!?

About the anthropological existential orientation is also to be said that it has remained too enclosed in a psychopathological problematic for the observations made on the Rorschach method to assume a value *ad usum Delphini*. Without denying a value to the contribution which psychopathology could still carry for the understanding of phenomena of normal psychology, we cannot subordinate to the former the development and the validity of the latter. (pp. 108-9)

We know of course, against Chiari's assumption, that there is absolutely no "objective" means or instrument of its own, that no test has been or could be created isolated from the theoretical environment which surrounds it (cf. Mélon 1976 p. 46, and section A above) and particularly the Rorschach as related specifically to the phenomenological school of thought (Ellenberger, 1970 p. 842, 1954/1995 p. 78). As for the last, unfair discriminatory criticism against psychopathology, we can refer to Schotte's reflections about Freud's 'pathoanalytic option' (pp. 15-7 above).

Stewart (1964) presented what he called an "existential" interpretation of two protocols proceeding from a longitudinal research study in the sense that, the subjects having eventually presented life-threatening illnesses later in their lives, he looked *a posteriori* for warning signs in their previous sometimes quite similar Rorschach responses - perhaps by association to the existential meaning and thematization of the death issue in this school (by Heidegger, cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995 p. 404).

The phenomenological aspect (side by side with the psychoanalytical one: pp. 21, 26, 31-2 above) of the paramount Rorschach-theoretical work of Schachtel (1966) must also be given its due consideration. Although because of his strong development-psychological commitment he himself admitted the limitations of his eventual phenomenological view (1959 pp. v-vi, 173 footnote) he nevertheless considered this doctrine's share to be indispensable: "Binswanger's book *Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins* is of profound importance for an understanding of method and object of the science of man, especially psychology, psychiatry, and philosophical anthropology" (1950 p. 76 footnote 22). About this mutual relation we want the quote the always illuminating words of Ellenberger (1958):

It has often been supposed that psychoanalysis and phenomenology are opposed to each other; it even seems that a few phenomenologists have at times expressed anti-analytic feelings and vice versa. This is the result of a complete misunderstanding. Psychoanalysis and phenomenology do not exclude each other any more than do, for instance, physiology and morphology. They are two distinct fields arising from two different starting points, using different methods and different terminologies. Far from excluding each other, they complement each other very well. (p. 94)

Convinced as Binswanger himself (Ellenberger op. cit. pp. 120-4) of this existence of no essential contradiction, but in contrast to the criticisms of Kuhn and particularly

Minkowska above (and still others below), Schachtel keenly saw the possibilities of a fruitful collaboration between both depth-psychological disciplines and was inside the Rorschach field one of the very few (together with Brückner, perhaps also Klopfer) and for sure the most successful one in promoting this double approach - of which we following his example will also make great profit at the end of next chapter. Their smooth articulation in his writing can be confirmed in what we said on pp. 31-2 above, we just want to highlight still a few points. As we know he contributed a detailed and sensitive aesthetic-phenomenological assessment of the 'experiential qualities' of Rorschach's inkblots (chap. 3) very much in the spirit of Kuhn's quotation pp. 70-2 above (comp. particularly pp. 33-42 of his book). Although the general phenomenological inspiration in this part of Schachtel's book is evident for anyone with a fair knowledge of the subject, we want to stress the concrete filiation which can be established here through him between the symmetry-related aspects of the works of Binswanger (an existentialist) and Chabert (a psychoanalyst) respectively, at opposite ends of the Rorschach history: despite the fact that hardly anyone mentions him anymore on this matter, as we said earlier Binswanger was actually the first (1947/1971, cf. above) to dedicate a paper to this highly relevant aspect of the Rorschach microcosmos; Schachtel was undeniably directly inspired by him, as proved by the constant references to Kuhn (comp. pp. 27-9) and even to the specific *Jürg Zünd* case (p. 52 footnote 10)! And precisely this slice of Schachtel's text can be retrieved, unwittingly but in an almost identical fashion, in Chabert (1983 pp. 66, 84-5) obviously thanks to Rausch de Traubenberg's relay (1993, 1994). And just to mention another widely renowned contemporary Rorschach-psychoanalyst also much interested on symmetry, the direct influence of Schachtel on P. Lerner is too commonplace knowledge for us to insist on it. And finally in the same line of thought, we do not want to left unquoted a constructive criticism, in true Schachtelian incisive fashion (as he used to do concerning Rapaport's none-the-less relevant contribution), of an aspect of the work of Kuhn of which he was in general very fond:

... R. Kuhn seems to assume a basic trend in people to identify unconsciously with the central axis or figure, while the lateral figures are (unconsciously) felt to represent the environment [cf. pp. 72, 75-6 above]. He reports that if a testee gives more responses to the central than to the lateral areas of the blot, he will be inclined to hold on more to himself; if his responses to the lateral areas are more numerous he will tend to hold on more to the world around him. I doubt that the relative proportion of axial and lateral responses is always a reliable indicator of these tendencies. A concrete analysis of the experiential meaning of the center and the sides of each blot for each testee and of the relation of the center to the sides appears to me a more promising procedure. [Adding in a footnote:] Similarly... Booth considers the relation between axial and lateral responses and the quality of the axial responses a more basic indicator of introversion... and extro-version... than Rorschach's experience type (*Erlebnistypus*)... Both Kuhn's and Booth's studies would seem to presuppose that the testee unconsciously *always* tends to identify the center of the blot with himself and the sides with the environment. However, I have observed many responses in which the testee clearly identifies with a lateral area while the axial area represents somebody else. For instance, in

Rorschach's study of Ober-holzer's patient the axis represents the magical power and strength of the father to which the patient, identified with the lateral parts of the blot, clings... Of course, there also can be multiple identifications. (1966 pp. 28-9)

A similar criticism -but implicit this time- can be derived from Schachtel's text towards Minkowska's disparaging conception of Rorschach's Experience Types and particularly her assertion that by concentrating on the *B:Fb* proportion Rorschach "neglected" the *F* (pp. 83-4 above):

Rorschach believed that it is mainly the experience type, i.e., the relation of movement to color responses, that permits one to see how a person experiences and what represents the person's basic experiential attitude. This belief deserves the serious attention and thought of every student of Rorschach's method. While I have some question about his opinion that the importance of the experience type is based primarily on its representation of the relation of extratensive to introversive attitudes, the factors making up the experience type do constitute the core of the test and are of basic significance for the testee's personality, i.e., for his way of approaching, experiencing, and reacting to the world. The reason for this lies in the fact that *all* the determinants, not just color and movement, play a direct or indirect role in the experience type, and that the determinants represent certain basic experiential-perceptual attitudes. The absolute and relative strength and specific quality of these attitudes and their relation to each other show basic aspects of the testee's relation to self and world. In Rorschach's work the experience type has two dimensions. One is the continuum from predominant introversiveness to predominant extratensiveness, represented by the relation of movement to color responses; the other the continuum from coartation to dilation, represented mainly by the relation of form to movement plus color responses. It is true that Rorschach mentions explicitly only the number of movement and color responses "and a few other factors" when he discusses the coartation and dilation of the experience type. But it is clear from his presentation as well as from clinical experience that the significance of the absolute number of *M* [*B*] and *C* [*Fb*] responses for the coartation-dilation dimension of the experience type lies mainly in the fact that this number shows implicitly something about the relation of *M* and *C* to *F* responses: Where $M + C$ equals zero, it meant that all responses are form responses, since at the time Rorschach published his book (1921) the only determinants known to him were form, color, and movement. This means that the coartation-dilation dimension of the experience type tells us something about the relation of the emotional capacity for experience (roughly represented by the *M* and *C*) to the conscious, critical, logical, intellectual functions (roughly represented by the form responses, especially the *F+*). The quality of this relation can enhance or stifle the person's capacity for a full experience of reality. As Rorschach put it, "the coartated and . . . coartative types are distinguished by the extreme predominance of those factors which can be increased by direction of conscious attention to them . . . ; these types are distinguished primarily by logical discipline. In achieving this discipline, however, introversive and extratensive

features become atrophied; in other words, they sacrifice their ability to experience fully." Rorschach thus was justified in assuming that the experience type pointed to factors of basic, diagnostic relevance. The relevance derives from the central position of the *determinants* in the test. (1966, pp. 76-7)

Almost immediately afterwards and reflecting the beginning influence of this current in the U.S.A., the Society for Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment organized a Symposium titled "The role of experiential data in personality assessment" whose interventions were published in vol. 31 of its journal, inspired precisely in Schachtel's book contribution. The latter (1967) delivered a first paper on the experiential qualities of the inkblots, in many respects a summarized reproduction of his book's discussion on the above commented subject; but he offered in particular (p. 9) an excellent example of the alternate approach to the above criticized Kuhn's and Booth's fixed 'topographic' assumptions. Joseph Lyons (1967) on a much more general level -beyond the Rorschach-, started by questioning the present or absent *possessive* quality of the experience in question for the subject ("mine / not mine") i.e. about its *authentic* character, distinction useful for discriminating the assessment data (dissimulation, censoring, faking...) on an epistemological basis; as an interesting aside comment let us add that he used as an example a historical protocol produced by Rorschach himself while interpreting the plates of his disciple Roemer (1967). Then Mayman (1967) offered a well-known assessment of object representations and relationships from the contents of Rorschach responses, already commented in the previous psychoanalytic section. Finally Holt (1967) made an intelligent critical summary of the other participants' interventions, but in our opinion not devoid of some degree of ambivalence towards the essence of this current: although he firmly denounced the behaviorists' "...chase after the unattainable wild goose of a completely objective science" (p. 25) and explicitly praised Schachtel's "...sensitive application of a phenomenological approach to an understanding of all aspects of the [Rorschach] test... I look forward to studying in full detail what he has to say in his new book..." (p. 27)³⁵, he also avows rather acidly that "nor do I find the contemporary rhapsodies of many existentially intoxicated psychologists much more promising, with their disdain for scientific method" (p. 25) and defends a totally diverging method when stating that "in my own work with the Rorschach, I have come gradually to have the hunch that a person's inner experience of his own primary process thinking may be *the critical parametric variable for which we must find*

³⁵ Holt was not nearly so kind about the articles which constituted the basis for this book in a comment of some years earlier (1954, p. 504): "Theorizing is a very necessary activity, then; but it also has its dangers when it is not followed up by systematic (preferably experimental) checking... If a theory does not lead more or less directly to systematic and controlled observations of a new kind, it is a static structure of quite limited value. A superstructure of theoretical rationale (or rationalization) may be built on quite erroneous observations and may perpetuate entirely mistaken hunches, unless it is tried in the fire of experiment. This criticism may be levelled against even such otherwise admirable 'Contributions to an Understanding of Rorschach's Test' as Schachtel's [1941, 1943, 1945, 1950], which are required reading for anyone seriously interested in the test. Though they lack systematic rigor, these articles are the fruit of a sustained and very sensitive attempt to set down some hypotheses about the psychological processes that bring about many aspects of the Rorschach performance. In the very artistic form of these utterances lies their weakness; they give the reader a feeling of completeness and self-sufficiency, rather than impressing him with the hypothetical nature of what is proposed and the need for someone to verify or refute it."

measures..." (p. 27, italics added) or with his confounding, atomistic and measuring comments about the *B* responses (p. 30)!

The French psychologist Mucchielli published a booklet (1968) which seems to us, leaving secondary differences aside, as largely inspired by Minkowska's (1956/1978) work -at any rate more than he explicitly admitted- as reflected by the following entirely shared features: the insistence on formal analysis over content symbolism simultaneously disavowing any essential psychoanalytic conviction in Rorschach (pp. 1-2, 5; comp. Minkowska pp. 215, 261-2, 273-6), the need to surpass the purely quantitative psychogram (p. 4; comp. Minkowska p. 226), the key role attributed to Rorschach's posthumous article (pp. 5-6; comp. Minkowska p. 52, ét. #9), the importance accorded to a plate-by-plate dynamic sequence analysis necessarily implying due attention to individual plate features and an eventual specific shock (pp. 5-6, 7-8; cf. Minkowska ét. #5, pp. 13, 25-6, 28-9, 213-4, 226), the careful noting of the subject's reacting behavior and language (pp. 7-8, 48-52; comp. Minkowska pp. 14-5, 31-4, 42-3), but above all his avowed grounding on 'structural psychology' (*Avant-Propos, Introduction*; cf. Minkowska 1950/1978 pp. 223-4, Helman 1974 p. 89). Here goes a very summarized version of his leading theoretical conceptions:

En codifiant avec rigueur la formalisation des réponses, Rorschach exprimait ainsi une théorie selon laquelle chaque réponse signifie à sa manière *un mode d'appréhension du réel* chez la personne soumise au test... La perception la plus élémentaire est "informée", c'est-à-dire qu'elle a une forme *a priori*; elle est une structuration active du donné à partir d'une structure immanente qui fait partie des constantes dynamiques de la personnalité. Pour lui, la tache d'encre, comme réel "inachevé", devait être le révélateur de ces structures structurantes... Tout le système de codification formelle de réponses est l'application du principe structuraliste. Il s'amplifie et se perfectionne par la recherche du type d'appréhension, du type de succession, et de cet *Erlebnistypus* qui est le mode de réaction générale, le style d'existence même. (pp. 2-3)

Mais ceci n'est encore pas suffisant. La preuve dernière nous est apportée par le texte même de cette conférence que Oberholzer publia après la mort de Rorschach. Dans ce texte capital... celui-ci introduit, à l'occasion d'un exemple, une notion nouvelle dont on n'a plus jamais parlé après lui (comme par hasard): la notion de *programmatisation de la pensée*... Pour Rorschach, l'analyse structurale... de la succession des réponses par planche permet d'atteindre, *par une sorte de formalisation à la puissance 2*, la programmation de la pensée du sujet, c'est-à-dire *sa manière chronique d'analyser les situations et d'y répondre* ["structuration chronique de son être-au-monde": p. 153]. En face de cet appareil de formalisation des réponses... les planches. Mis à part leur flou, nécessaire pour étudier leur structuration active par le sujet..., peut-on les formaliser à un autre niveau et d'un autre point de vue pour en faire des révélateurs spécifiques de certains modes dominants du comportement réactionnel général? Là-dessus Rorschach ne nous a donné qu'une réponse incomplète [1921/1967 chap. III.1]. Cependant il a choisi ces 10 taches, nous

dit-il, parmi plusieurs centaines [faux: cf. Roemer 1967 p. 185], *pour leur valeur suggestive*, et d'autre part, il a remarqué et étudié *la spécificité de certains "chocs"* qu'elles engendraient. Intuitivement donc, il a perçu et utilisé une spécificité des planches comme *inductrices non quelconques* de schèmes réactionnels chez les sujets soumis à l'épreuve. (pp. 5-6)

A vrai dire l'étude statistique sur le problème de fond n'aurait ici aucun sens, les lois du champ découvert se retrouvant toujours sous la diversité apparente des cas particuliers, comme les constantes structurales sous la variété des contenus phénoménaux. (p. 9)

We are in complete agreement with this 'structural' presentation (which reminds us of Schachtel's refusal of the supposedly "unstructured" nature of the inkblots, as well as of Klopfer's very similar motto: comp. p. #III78 below) of Rorschach's theoretical views by Mucchielli. The book itself is divided in two parts, each composed of two chapters. In chap. 1st.I he offers a hardly original interpretation of all components of Rorschach's formal scoring system. In the following chap. II of this 1st part he briefly introduces his plate-by-plate 'programmatics' analysis from 3 points of view: the shock concept (definition, signs, identifying difficulties...), the subject's reactions (at both the behavioral and the language levels, as already said largely inspiring himself in Minkowska), and Rorschach's 'programmatics' as such (i.e. a sequence analysis following particularly the apprehension modes, finally trying to identify a general one common to all 10 plates). In the 2nd part -chap. I- he finally enters into the heart of the matter, the identification of the situational specificity of each one of Rorschach's plates from his own "phenomenological analysis" (p. 69) based on 'focused interviews' with his test subjects and by comparison to other authors' opinions. His conclusions are in general certainly more careful than the superficial attribution of "father" and "mother" symbolism for instance to one or the other of them (comp. for ex. his discussion concerning pl. I on pp. 69-71, or pl. IV pp. 97-100), but we are not always satisfied with the results which seem sometimes rather too superficial, if not too abstract, not attaining a true *specificity*; compare for instance the following two interpretations:

...le modèle de situation simulé par planche [la III] correspond aux situations d'action habituelle ou facile exigeant une reconnaissance et une décision immédiates... C'est donc la qualité et l'efficacité de l'action volontaire dans le cours de l'existence quotidienne banale, qui est mise à l'épreuve. (p. 91)

En conclusion, la Planche V est comme *un miroir du moi*, elle est le modèle des situations de réflexion ou de confidences du moi sur lui-même ce que l'on pourrait appeler *l'image de soi pour le sujet*, ou autoperception du moi dans sa relation fondamentale au réel, à autrui et à l'action... libre expression du "*sentiment de soi*" et du *sentiment d'unité personnelle*, comme fonction de synthèse, de création et de liberté. (p. 108)

According to our experience, while the first says obviously too little in respect to the kind of interpretations obtainable on that plate (ponder in contrast the generally recognized importance of the movement determinant, key on that blot: Mucchielli himself pp. 87-90), the latter says too much (comp. also his conclusions for pl. VII p. 123) and one could even wonder about the possibility of interchanging them! We will only refer here to our very contrasting discussion concerning plate III (Z-Test or

Rorschach Test, no difference) on chap. III.D.2 below. Finally, in Mucchielli's last chap. 2nd.II are presented four case studies exemplifying his complementary dynamic technique to the classical formal interpretation. The monograph is interesting and exploits in particular both the *structural* and *temporal* views, but it lacks the sensitivity of a profound phenomenological analysis as for instance Kuhn's contribution above.

Gradually, the worldwide popularity of this tradition seems to have attained a peak as demonstrated by the regularly published articles: Murase 1968 (in the far away Japan), Bolzinger & Durand de Bousingen 1969 (to whom we will return shortly), Drey-Fuchs 1970; we should detain ourselves for a brief comment on the latter one. As a paper delivered at the London VIIth International Rorschach Congress the author explains in it how the Rorschach works because, as with life itself, it provokes an existential dilemma Kierkegaard (cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995) clearly expressed in his famous quote "the nothing of anxiety is the endless 'may be' of having a chance", to be related with the anxiety-arousing large 'nothingness' (uncertainty) of the inkblots precisely complementary to their endless 'may be' of possible interpretations, the latter feature in sharp contrast with the U. S. Americans Harrower's multiple-choice and Holtzman's one-answer techniques; she develops the nature of this uncertainty of the Rorschach experience in three directions, the abundance (stimulating thrill), the vagueness (stimulating risk), and the unreality (stimulating fantasy) factors, each being related to possible Rorschach indicators in the positive as well as in the negative -too anxious- sense. She concludes by exemplifying with a protocol from her own parallel inkblot series or 'FuRo' Test. Without diminishing the merits of Drey-Fuchs' very interesting paper, we must say this approach is not altogether original: recently, but already, Schachtel (1966 p. 23# *passim*, whom she does not cite) had given exactly the same explanation.

As further proof of the popularity of this trend, in the same London congress was pre-sented a special Symposium on "The Existentialist View of Rorschach's Test" with participants from different countries, although some referred to projectives in general and to the Rorschach only incidentally and will be thus commented rather briefly. In an introduction Allen (1970) from the U.S.A. presented a very *cliché*-like assessment of the issue, summarized in this quotation: "The Rorschach Test epitomizes the open endedness of the existentialist view of personality and the human person. In short, it is diametrically opposed to the classical closed system of orthodox psychoanalytic posturing... Thus, the behavior in the perceptual situation becomes the source of information, not preconceived ideas beautifully systematized but equivocably [*sic*] applicable" (p. 962). Rawlings & Messina (1970) also from the U.S.A. concentrated on the compatibility between existentialism and the projective procedure, particularly from the concept of 'encounter' (cf. Ellenberger 1961/1995 pp. 411-2). Sattler (1970) from the same country too, exemplified the approach with anecdotal response examples from the Rorschach protocol of a schizophrenic and gave five suggestions to improve the examiner-subject test relationship. Andrade (1970) from Brazil, in a very confusing paper, relates animal, human, and anatomy contents of Rorschach responses respectively with the *Umwelt*, *Mitwelt*, and *Eigenwelt* aspects

of Being-in-the-World, besides also interpreting the latter as in close connection with prospection in the future dimension of time. Lyons (1970) again from the U.S.A. promoted attention to the underdeveloped interpretation of body experience in the Rorschach, in the way traced by Fisher & Cleveland (1958) with their barrier-penetration indices. Finally Minkowski (1970) from France gave an excellent overview of the anthropological current as represented by the Rorschach in the work of her wife (see above).

The French J. Verdeaux, also disciple of Binswanger and Rorschach practitioner, published in 1972 a short article on the Rorschach utility of his existential-analytical notions of sym-metry, significant direction and anthropological proportion, which -as recognized by herself (p. 27)- confines just to generalities and does not add anything to our earlier discussion (by the way she does not refer to Kuhn's key developments). Also in the same French journal, Miljkovitch (1976) from Canada contributed an impressive phenomenological case study which in its absolutely flawless logical interpretation procedure strongly recalls the ones of Binswanger ("Jürg Zünd") and Rorschach (Oberholzer's patient), which precisely suggested to Ellenberger (1970 p. 842) his shift towards this school. Miljkovitch based himself on three principles: the usually divided three-step interpretation process (scoring, interpretation of the psychogram, and content analysis) must be reunited in one unique movement, relating the different aspects of each individual response and the entire collection of them as a harmonious organic whole; the interpretation must be done following the protocol itself (its peculiar features, its originality) and not according to a pre-established schema; and the protocol (not an external criterion) must constitute the source of its own intrinsic validity. His masterful application of them complements Binswanger's words (pp. 63-4 above) and must be read in the original.

In 1982 Barison & Passi Tognazzo offered the first phenomenological Rorschach manual, quite not as soon -or as repeatedly for that matter- as inside the psychoanalytic approach. The book is composed of two main parts, the 1st counting 12 rather short chapters where basically the formal aspects of the method are successively interpreted according to this school, and in the 2nd 3 case studies attempt to exemplify the approach. A Preface ('Premise') opens the discussion offering an 'infinite choice-existential anxiety' inkblot response process theory entirely in line with Schachtel's and Drey-Fuchs' ones above, which according to them explains how such a temporally limited and contingent testing experience is able to reflect the general, life-long singular *Dasein* of the subject. The concrete technique proposed is summarized in chap. 2, as composed of three phases: the evaluation of the formal psychogram, followed by its integration with the detailed evaluation of the recorded protocol or 'theater', concluding by a final integration of the whole with the clinical data (practically not included in the book). In chap. 3 is briefly discussed the 1st phase, where one must question oneself about the authenticity (*B*, *Orig+*), the banality (*V*, *T*), and the pathology of this existence/psychogram. Chap. 4 is an introduction to the narrative, dynamic, temporal consideration of the interpretations which constitute a 'theater' in the sense that the subject is simultaneously the author, director, scenographer and actor in front of a public/producer (tester) of a sequence

of scenes (responses) and acts (each plate) of a whole play (protocol). With chap. 5 we finally enter in detail into the subject starting by the possible phenomenological interpretations of the *Erfassungstypen* (Apprehension Types) from the spatial (high-low, width, size, distance) and temporal points of view (broadness-limitation, from *G* to *Dd* resp.), including abnormal reactions such as *DG* and *Do*. In chap. 6 are analyzed the movement interpretations (including "minor movements" and devitalizations) particularly by relationship to the banality-authenticity dialectics. Color is studied in chap. 7 specifically as a *quality* of existence -'coloring' its authenticity-, inseparable from the unitary experience (*not* as feelings controlled or not by a separate intellect, according to the role of form), with the help of musical metaphors (melody, timbre, harmony). Light-dark is the subject of chap. 8, by relationship to its negative traits of nothingness (when black), but mostly of ambivalent -active-passive- threat, fear, occult (with a depth spatiality), anxiety, aggression, sickness, moodiness, etc. (gray) without excluding unfrequent but nevertheless possible attractive nuances (serenity, softness, sensibility...). Chaps. 9 to 12 are briefly dedicated to the *F+%* ('clarity'), animal inter-pretations ('elementariness, simplicity, poverty', excluding Piotrowski's *FM*), populars ('monda-nity, commonplace, anti-authenticity'), and perseveration (an existence which repeats itself, non-creatively, pathologically), respectively. Despite many interesting and true-sounding develop-ments (*B* = authenticity of, *Fb* = sentimental quality of existence...) the general impression remains one still unsatisfactory, for several reasons: sometimes one has the impression that the formal relationships Rorschach-Phenomenology are insufficiently discriminating, as when the components of the Apprehension Type become too hastily related with all aspects of spatial *and* temporal experience (chap. 5)...

We consider the place where existence inhabits and the time she lives. At both extremes, the *Erft*[*Erfassungstypus*] entirely developed towards the left (*G*) and the one entirely developed towards the right (*Dd*); to the infinite gamut of intermediate values correspond an infinite variety of spatial and temporal meanings... (p. 23)

Space-variety of the *Erft*. It represents the interest for the post where one lives, the house, the neighborhood, the work-place. Localism, nationalism; to be a citizen of the world. The diverse modes of experiencing politics, religion (from the rigidly obsequious secular attachment for the mechanical rites to the mystic who experiences the immensity of Transcendent), science: localized in the specialized sector or projected into the great problems of scientific knowledge. Provincialism (*D*). The vast longing towards infinity... The abstract, synthetic thinking, of the thinker, the philosopher attentive to the great fields of thinking (*G*), the limitation of the modest daily problems, action field of common sense (*D*), the formalism, the pedantry, the existence contained in minimal spaces; bureaucracy making vain each thrust but also the punctual spatiality of who occupies himself with precision works (*Dd*)... (pp. 23-4)

Time. But the meanings of the *Erft* have also a temporal aspect. Interest for the contin-gent, the immediate, today, yesterday, tomorrow; to live day by day. The interest for the great historical events above all if experienced by reference to the historical period in which one feels implicated; to experience one's own present-moment life with the imma-nent presence of one's own past

and the unattainable anticipation of the future not yet near. The fleeting instant and eternity. To feel as the bearer of "eternal" "human" values or instead representative of the man or woman "at fashion"; and with this the desperate search for the last novelty in all fields. Obviously also for time there would be the displacements of the Erft towards the left that would mean broadness of experienced time lapses and viceversa the displacement towards the right will tend to mean limitation. (pp. 30-1; comp. with our more discriminant discussion on chap. III.D.2 pp. #103-16 & 141 below);

but more importantly, Barison & Passi T.'s contribution cannot free itself from the impression of being in general too schematic. Given our persistent defense of the systematic aspect of Rorschach's formal *schema* (pp. 19-21 above, chap. III.A.1 and pp. #III102-3 below) particularly against certain phenomenologists -Kuhn, Minkowski above- this may seem contradictory from our part, but to talk as Mélon (1990, p. 6) "il y a de bons schémas qui aident à l'analyse, et de mauvais qui l'entravent"; we believe we can demonstrate (chap. III.D.2) our systematization of Rorschach's schema to belong to the former type, however we don't feel the same about Barison & Passi's putting-together of their 3-phase phenomenological interpretive technique (chap. 2; comp. Miljkovitch above) or their 10-act protocollized 'theater' (chap. 4, considering each plate one by one): they rather make it harder to achieve a final interpretive synthesis, as their examples in the IInd part of the book demonstrate. We cannot criticize them -as was the case with Verdeaux, belonging to this circle- not referencing Kuhn's monographs that have remained unpublished, but by comparison these latter as a fact definitely locate themselves at another level: comp. for ex. these author's short comments about time and rythm (pp. 30-2) with Kuhn's profound discussion in his 1949(?) unfortunately unpublished monograph above.

As a byproduct of her Doctoral Dissertation Osson (1983) published a short summary of a phenomenological paper presented at the Washington 1981 Xth International Rorschach Con-gress, strongly inspired in Minkowska's tradition. In a longitudinal Rorschach research with schoolers, to attain the genetic (common to all children, thus developmental) and personal (particular, individual) meaning of chronologically changing temporal and spatial expressions the author focused on a structural study of the language of the protocol. She developed a 'language analysis table' to be used after response scoring, and including the following variables:

- names, verbs, temporal terms, spatial terms
- 1st person pronouns, frequent expressions.

These reflected the structure and dynamics of evolving spatial and temporal personal experience.

One important author from this tradition we have been neglecting but that we must consider with some detail now is Bolzinger. Having published much earlier a couple of articles on the central role of the *structural* concept -'constitution', 'type'- in the Rorschach (& Durand de Bousingen 1969) and particularly on the possible 'latent structures' of the test plates (1972), on the occasion of the Paris XIIIth International Rorschach Congress finally published (1991) a paramount paper he had announced some 20 years before ("Nous étudierons dans un prochain article les relations entre les

facteurs historiques [*temporels*] et les éléments de structure [*spatiales*] au niveau du test de Rorschach": 1969 p. 626). This text is so important that we must quote at length from it:

Au début du XXème siècle, la psychopathologie trouvait ses coordonnées principales dans l'étude de la constitution et du caractère... L'analyse psychologique, qui trouvait son étayage dans le lexique des traits de caractère, tendait ni plus ni moins à cerner l'identité profonde et stable du sujet examiné. *La méthode Rorschach s'est construite dans ce cadre conceptuel et dans ce registre lexical... Nous y retrouvons la même option méthodologique: étudier les bases du caractère, ce que nous appelons maintenant la structure de la personnalité.* Nous y retrouvons la même passion pour l'identité de l'être; il faudrait dire peut-être: la même passion pour l'ontologie...

Aujourd'hui, la psychopathologie s'est détournée des orientations qui ont été si longtemps prévalentes... Les principes actuels de la clinique ne se fondent plus sur l'idée de constitution, mais sur l'idée d'évolution... Désormais les facteurs cardinaux de toute étude clinique tendent à construire une certaine dialectique du présent et du passé, à historiser les expériences vécues et à situer l'effet majeur du traumatisme dans le retour incessant de souvenirs traumatiques...

Les présupposés du Rorschach

Ces orientations méthodologiques sont très inconfortables pour le praticien du Rorschach. Il se trouve en quelque sorte partagé, et parfois déchiré, entre deux systèmes incompatibles. D'un côté les options cliniques et les références psychopathologiques de nos contemporains, qui ont pour axe principal la diachronie, la trame chronologique et les modalités d'interactions entre le présent et le passé. D'autre part, la méthode Rorschach en tant qu'elle est ordonnée à des références psychopathologiques aujourd'hui délaissées, qui avaient pour axe principal la synchronie, le fond mental de l'identité personnelle et la permanence d'un type biotypologique.

Malgré de larges emprunts au lexique psychanalytique et aux élaborations métapsychologiques, la pratique actuelle du Rorschach continue de s'appuyer sur les présupposés qui étaient ceux de Hermann Rorschach et de son époque. *Le praticien du Rorschach, lorsqu'il analyse et interprète un protocole, explore l'espace psychique d'un sujet, ses structures et ses modes de fonctionnement, ses potentialités et ses déséquilibres. Il explore l'espace plutôt que le temps. Comment pourrait-il entrevoir quelque chose des articulations de l'histoire singulière de ce patient, de la survenue datée de ses symptômes et de ses souffrances, alors que toute la méthode Rorschach pousse dans l'autre sens: une rencontre le plus souvent unique, une exploration en dehors du temps, un dispositif spatial standardisé, un appareil conceptuel visant la personnalité et ses composantes stables et constantes...*

Histoire d'un débat

L'histoire du test de Rorschach montre depuis plus de cinquante ans une série d'efforts et de tentatives pour se dégager du courant typologique caractérologique et pour rejoindre la clinique moderne, sa problématique du

temps et sa pratique du diagnostic par l'évolution. Evoquons brièvement [deux] moments significatifs de ce débat encore inachevé: ...

- en 1950, à l'occasion du Congrès Mondial de Psychiatrie à Paris, les discussions entre praticiens d'une clinique sans tests [cf. Szondi p. 1 above, Mélon 1982/1989 Avant-propos p. 12] et praticiens du Rorschach révèlent un hiatus méthodologique qui suscite un climat de suspicion et de méfiance réciproques.

- enfin dans les années 1970-80, les recherches sur le Rorschach s'accommodent de deux orientations contradictoires: mettre l'accent sur les structures latentes du matériel ou privilégier les structures latentes du discours...

Nous retrouvons **Manfred Bleuler en 1950 à Paris...** C'est peut-être la première fois que la méthode Rorschach rencontre aussi nettement l'objection que formule Bleuler. Dans le contexte des années 1945-50, les références fondamentales de la psychopathologie ont changé. La clinique phénoménologique de l'Erlebnis ainsi que la clinique psychanalytique des effets traumatiques ont créé de nouvelles exigences méthodologiques. Il ne suffit plus d'un examen psychologique qui proposerait un diagnostic typologique, une évaluation intemporelle des capacités mentales et des dispositions affectives. Le clinicien désormais s'impose de ne pas confondre l'inné et l'acquis, l'héréditaire et l'accidentel, la structure et la conjoncture [le bio-logique et le bio-graphique: Schotte]. Et il reproche au praticien du Rorschach de ne pas apporter sa contribution aux impératifs modernes du diagnostic et d'en rester aux formules caractérologiques d'hier... Les praticiens du Rorschach qui sont présents à ce congrès (F. Minkowska, J. Dublineau, C. Beizmann, etc.) répliquent sans relâche à ces interlocuteurs soupçonneux, mais ils semblent ne pas percevoir le hiatus méthodologique que révèlent les questions des psychiatres. Seul M. Bleuler prend la mesure de ce problème interdisciplinaire et il propose, en conclusion de son rapport, une solution de compromis...

Il ne semble pas que **depuis 1950**, le hiatus méthodologique entre la clinique et le Rorschach ait été effacé ou amendé. La majorité des praticiens du *Psychodiagnostic* demeurent sous l'emprise d'une inspiration typologique et ontologique. Bien sûr, le vocabulaire des constitutions prémorbides n'est plus en usage; les références psycho-pathologiques se sont détachées du soubassement caractérologique d'antan; si l'on évoque encore la structure de la personnalité, c'est en lui donnant un air de modernité phénoménologique ou psychanalytique. *Mais lorsque nous interprétons un protocole, nous n'avons pas renoncé à faire une étude synchronique et hors du temps; nos analyses psychologiques continuent à s'inscrire dans l'espace d'un portrait, non dans l'évolution d'une histoire. A partir des réponses données aux dix planches du test, nous construisons le diagnostic à la manière d'un instantané photographique. Les fondements de cette étude synchronique ont pourtant été déplacés. C'était naguère l'espace immobile des catégories caractérologiques: c'est aujourd'hui l'espace immobile des dix planches du test, dans la mesure où chacune d'elle est censée explorer un item particulier de la symbolique mentale...* A lire les multiples et hypothétiques inventaires qui, au cours des vingt dernières années, ont tenté d'analyser les structures latentes du matériel

Rorschach, on a parfois l'impression que le test projectif s'est transformé subrepticement en un questionnaire thématique.

Formes fortuites et système codé

Ce que la littérature rorschachienne impute aux taches d'encre du test et à leurs "structures latentes" supposées, qu'est-ce d'autre, à vrai dire, que les structures préétablies des théories du praticien? Là où Hermann Rorschach pensait présenter des formes fortuites, le praticien d'aujourd'hui a la conviction d'introduire le patient dans un système codé et porteur de significations occultes. Le patient est donc invité à prendre place sur ce lit de Procuste. Chacune de ses réponses serait, par hypothèse, déterminée par des sollicitations savamment dosées, et déposées par avance dans la configuration des taches d'encre. Il n'y a plus rien de fortuit dans ce matériel si on s'applique à le croire standardisé au nom d'impératifs théoriques: les images parentales, les symboles phalli-ques, les stimulations régressives, les formes massives du Sur-moi, le morcellement archaïque, et ainsi de suite.

Le protocole comme discours original

Parallèlement à cette typologie des structures latentes du Rorschach, il existe un autre courant de recherches dont l'orientation est sensiblement différente. Celui-ci consiste à découvrir dans un protocole, non pas l'écho déformé des archétypes induits par le matériel du test, mais le discours original et singulier produit par le sujet pour rendre compte de ces dix taches d'encre [cf. Kuhn p. 70 above]... *entre le premier et le dernier mot d'un protocole se dessine une séquence temporelle avec son cortège d'événements survenus dans un certain ordre chronologique. Ainsi la prise en considération de la parole et du langage vient imposer à l'espace Rorschach un autre système de repérage, dont la structure est diachronique: le temps d'arriver au bout de la phrase, le temps de scander une série de réponses, les fluctuations d'une planche à l'autre, l'incidence datée de tel mot, de tel commentaire. A ce titre, l'étude du discours et de sa structure toujours étalée dans le temps peut faire écho aux impératifs de la méthode clinique. Le praticien du Rorschach trouve dans l'analyse du discours une sorte de propédeutique pour se détacher d'une démarche synchronique et pour s'initier aux disciplines de la diachronie.*

Conclusion et suggestions

...Le hiatus méthodologique est un obstacle à la communication. De part et d'autre, les recherches se développent en circuit fermé; toute élaboration psychopathologique s'en trouve nécessairement appauvrie. *Pour porter remède à cette situation, il serait souhait-able d'introduire, dans les interprétations d'un protocole Rorschach, des éléments de stratigraphie chronologique.* Nous devrions apprendre à évaluer en fonction de critères à découvrir, ce qui est conjoncturel et ce qui est structurel. Comment faire la différence entre le fond immobile et les fluctuations de surface? entre un mode de réaction provi-soire et une cicatrice indélébile? entre une attitude régressive ponctuelle et une position infantile invétérée? [cf. Salomon, 1959b pp. 248-51, 1962 pp. 32-6 143-61] Il n'y a pas de réponse simple, mais il faut engager la recherche dans cette voie... (pp. 66-71; italics added)

This thoughtful, absolutely transparent presentation of the still problematic spatial (structure) - temporal (evolution) issue in the Rorschach field is in our view the most important conclusion of the successive contributions from this tradition: for instance Kuhn's when struggling to combine both dimensions in interpretation, and concluding that *G B* responses represent a particular achievement in this sense; or Minkowska finding the psychogram too "static" and suggesting as an alternative a both language-attentive and sequential response-by-response interpretive approach; and similarly Mucchielli proposing, beyond the 'structural' one, a more 'dynamic' method inspiring himself on Rorschach's 'programmatics of thought' from his posthumous case study. Bolzinger assimilated and perfectly articulated the essence of all these efforts proposing again a *discursive* approach. We agree completely with most of his argument - to the smallest details to which we will return one by one; however with one exception: in contrast to him we do not find pejorative that the 'latent structures' of the ten plates (which we believe do exist) may reflect the 'preestablished structures' of the tester's theories, we believe that is the normal order of things - actually we will demonstrate (chap. III.D.2 p. # below) that that was the case for Rorschach himself! And we will also offer an alternative solution to his final suggestions, a 'genetic-structural Rorschach technique' to use Salomon's words (1962).

Signorelli (1992) from Argentina, in the first Spanish-speaking open contribution to this Rorschach approach that we know of, just gives a general introduction and a few theoretical undeveloped suggestions on the basis of Szilasi's, Sartre's, and Binswanger's concepts exemplified -in an still unclear way- with the interpretation of the responses to plate II of the 'Silvio' case (cf. section B.3 above). Shortly after however and as if to quickly reduce this language gap, Simón Hernández (1993) from Spain contributes a -literally- huge 500+ page book on "The Rorschach Cosmodrama" that had been in preparation for some time. As asserted by himself his whole inspiration came directly from his thorough reading of Bachelard, a philosopher much valued by this tradition and a true enthusiast of the Rorschach (cf. chap. III.D.2 pp. #127-8 below), who according to him "...tried to went through the 'door' that Hermann Rorschach left open" (p. 20) in explicit reference to Minkowska's (1956/1972 pp. 278-9) metaphor concerning the final phrase of the latter's posthumous case-study. In other words, according to Simón's interpretation in his last paper Rorschach wanted -as a complement to his essentially formal method- to make the most out of the content of interpretations from the psychoanalytic point of view but had to 'leave the door open' in the long run, which was sort of a challenge for Bachelard, the expert on expression and on the imaginary, who looked almost obsessively for a better solution during decades - however with the limitation of not being himself a clinical tester. Direct guidance for him came from quotations by Bachelard like the following:

Si on mettait en rapport les travaux de Ludwig Binswanger et ceux de Moreno, on pourrait, peut-être, formuler le schéma suivant: au *Eigenwelt*, le monde des fantasmes personnels, on pourrait associer le psychodrame. Au *Mitwelt*, le monde interhumain, on pourrait associer le sociodrame. Il faudrait alors travailler le *Umwelt*, le monde appelé réel, le monde perçu avec les principes de l'imagination matérielle. On fonderait alors une instance psychique particulière à laquelle on pourrait appeler très bien l'instance du *cosmodrame*.

L'être qui rêve travaillerait le monde, il ferait de l'exotisme dans la pièce, il assumerait un travail de héros dans les batailles de la matière, il entrerait dans la lutte des noirceurs intimes, il prendrait parti dans la rivalité des teintes, il triompherait dans le détail des images de tout **"choc au noir"**. (1948b p. 77, boldface added)

Quel prix aurait alors **un album de sites** [les 10 planches?] pour interroger notre être solitaire, pour nous révéler le monde où il nous faudrait vivre pour être nous-mêmes! (1960 p. 21, boldface added)

The specific methodological principle was clearly formulated in the following quotation:

Parmi les dix planches de l'enquête du Rorschach figurent un tas de noirceurs intimes que produisent souvent le "choc au noir" (Dunkelschock), c'est-à-dire, que produisent des émotions profondes. Ainsi une seule tache noire, intimement complexe, dès qu'elle est rêvée dans ses profondeurs, suffit à nous mettre en situation de ténèbres. Ne s'étonnent d'une telle puissance que les psychologues qui refusent de **doubler la psychologie de la forme par une psychologie de l'imagination de la matière**. L'être qui suit ses songes, l'être, surtout, qui commente des songes **ne peut rester dans le pourtour des formes**. Au moindre appel d'une intimité, il pénètre dans la matière de son rêve, dans l'élément matériel de ses fantasmes. Il lit, dans la tache noire, la puissance des embrions ou l'agitation désordonnée des larves. Toute ténèbre est fluide, alors toute ténèbre est matérielle. Ainsi vont les rêves de la matière nocturne. Et pour un authentique rêveur de l'intérieur des substances, un coin d'ombre peut évoquer toutes les terreurs de la vaste nuit. (1948b p. 76, boldface added)

From the reading of these and other additional works by Bachelard: the Preface to the French translation of Kuhn's book on masks, "La Poétique de l'Espace", "Fragments d'une Poétique du Feu", but above all the "Introduction à la dynamique du paysage. Etudes pour 15 gravures de Albert Flocon" (where the author refers again to the 'cosmodrama' and equates to the Rorschach) and the similar "Châteaux en Espagne" and "Cosmos et matière", Simón believes to have discovered a new phenomenological Rorschach approach which he describes in this way:

From that moment emerges the "revealing flash". The true Cosmodrama would be a Rorschach Cosmodrama where one can invent stories from the responses, from the contents of the verbal Rorschach. The idea emerged sharp, overwhelmingly clear. We owe the discovery to Bachelard...

With the discovery of the Rorschach Cosmodrama in December 1988 we have the feeling of having found, at last, the master key of the contents of the Rorschach. That master key, that instrument, that *"imagination test battery"*, those *"keys to penetrate down to the bottom of the soul"*, that Bachelard searched for tirelessly during so many years using the "door" that Hermann Rorschach in his modesty left "open" with that *"we do not know"* of his last conference before the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society. (pp. 28, 36; our translation)

We must warn the reader here against a possible confusion of the meaning of Bachelard's words above (in boldface) while stating the 'methodological principle', since in a superficial overview it may appear as opposed to the Minkowski's (comp. pp. 80-2 above) relentless defense of the Rorschach primordially as a *Formdeutversuch*: on the contrary the latter always insisted also on how these forms are never 'empty', mere 'contours', but that they also possess as it were their own "content" or better 'substance'; nothing could replace here the reading of pp. 276-8 of Minkowska's book (1956/1978) which clearly explain just this point, let us only remind the difference stressed by her between Zulliger's indirect or 'symbolic' psychoanalytic interpretation of the manifest content -as opposed to 'form'- of the response "frozen hands" as an indication of guilt feelings (=latent content) because of something forbidden (sexual) done with these hands, and her (pp. 12-3, 214-5) contrasting direct 'metaphoric' phenomenological interpretation of the icy content -substance- as rather pointing to a cold and ungiving (human) environment (actually, Zulliger did also include this aspect in his interpretation!: 1949/1950 pp. 56-7). As methodologically defended by the phenomenologists -in accordance with Bachelard's words- while criticizing psychoanalysis, in dream analysis attention should *also* be paid to the manifest ('material', 'substantial') content which should not only be *replaced* by the latent one (Binswanger 1951/1970, pp. 98, 103; Brückner 1957, p. 8): compare however Rorschach's similar phenome-nological response interpretation (cf. Ellenberger) on chap. VII.A.3.c p. 243 of *Psychodiagnostic* (1921/1967) concerning plate I³⁶.

Simón continues describing more specifically his method with the following beautiful words:

One of the essential characteristics of the Rorschach Cosmodramatic Story is that of being written. To communicate it one needs to write it down with emotion, with taste, experiencing each one of its details. The Rorschach Cosmodramatic Tale or Story belongs to that kind of emotions and loves that are better written than told. "*Pour dire un amour il faut l'écrire*", indicates Bachelard in the "Poétique de la Rêverie":

*"Let us take note, furthermore, that a daydream, in contrast to the dream, is not told. To communicate it: one must **write it down**, write it down with emotion, with taste, reexperiencing it better when it is written again. With it we are even entering into the domain of **written love**... To tell a love, one must write it down"*.

...The verbal Rorschach, with the known instruction "What might this be?", faces the subject with a **test** of his capacity for empathy (Einfühlung), for "intropathy", P. Ricoeur would translate, to apprehend the intimate space of a blot with multiple symmetry on white background. The verbal Rorschach states a hypothesis about the way **how** a certain subject senses, "penetrates" (Einsicht) intellectually and affectively that space and "projects"

³⁶ Simón (p. 47) states that Rorschach used the adjective 'substantial' for the first time in the posthumous case study: we can see that at the beginning of chap. VII.A.3 pp. 237-8 of the French translation (1921/1967, the one he used for reference), but in the German original text (1921/1948) there is no such use of the term.

himself on it (Entwerfen)... We leave, thus, deliberately aside the discussions about perception, sensation, association to locate ourselves in a phenomenological point of view. The written Rorschach chooses one of its verbal contents -the preferred one in that moment by the subject- in each plate, to imagine and write down a story, a tale or a poem. The majority of the Rorschach Cosmodramatic Stories, according to our experience, would formulate life hypotheses, covering a vast zone of the "inner biography" of the subject... The verbal Rorschach tells us how we penetrate in the intimate spaces and how we experience them (Erleben). The written Rorschach indicates us the sense, **the meaningful direction** (Bedeutungsrichtung), the **intentionality** (Leistung) of our implications. The written Rorschach or Rorschach Cosmodramatic Story adds the **understanding** to our verbal choices, indicates the substance and the inner dynamic, the essence of a particular content. The verbal Rorschach apprehends butterflies, bats or masks. The Rorschach Cosmodramatic Story makes us climb on their wings, takes us for a ride in flowery fields or in silent caves, tells us what does that butterfly search for, what does that mask hide, puts it on or takes it off from us... (pp. 42-3)

In an effort to defend the originality of his method Simón proclaims furthermore that "...the Rorschach cosmodrama has nothing to do with the T.A.T." (p. 45), to immediately state however in an evidently logical but contradictory way that the interpretive systems or forms already developed for this latter test could also be applied to his version of the former.

The reference to the 'inner biography' above leads us to one last aspect of Simón's contribution: in his experience with 500 cases the shared 'meaningful direction' of the stories to the same plate suggested a specific 'meaningful direction' of the plate itself which would act as latent pull in all subjects, that he chose to designate by a latin name. Here follows their entire catalogue together with some relevant final hypotheses:

Contemplating now the order of the plates, one observes that this would correspond to a certain psychic organization proper to the human being. It is not an order constructed at random, it would be rather the order that follows the human psyche from the moment it intends to cover its own inner biography introspectively. The order of the plates would be one of the major proofs of Hermann Rorschach's creative intuition in the psychic domain...

From the first moment, the anthropomorphic plates of the Rorschach would put the subject in introspective situation. In face of plate I would be examined the attitude in face of one's own life, here and now, in that concrete moment of existence, without that being an obstacle to making references to the past or the future. The name proposed to the first plate, "**Homo peregrinans**" would express precisely the attitude in face of the inner trip which has just begun. In face of the "**Homo propugnans**" (Pl. II) the subject would interrogate himself about the nature of his present problematic, mobilizing at the same time, the EGO defenses. Later, in face of the "**Imago corporis**" (Pl. III), would be examined the problems concerning corporeity, between which would stand out the one relative to the feeling of identity, in particular... Now, [the subject]

can then explore the region which conceals forces of a great psychic implication: the inner kingdom of the father. The "Imago patris" (Pl. IV) would put the subject in face of the image of the father; the "Homo liber" (Pl. V), would interrogate him about his feeling of inner freedom...; the "Homo erectus" (Pl. VI), would ask from the subject a response about his feeling of self-assertion. But man would have the need to go deeper, still more, inside himself; it is then when the Rorschach proposes to him three plates which would approach another aspect of human interiors: the inner refuge of the mother. The "Imago matris" (Pl. VII) proposes to him the great question of deepness: the mother. But every man would have the need of nourishing substances and it is in face of the "Homo appetens" (Pl. VIII) where he can express his wishes, his deep maternal needs. Why, if not, would deep orality express itself almost invariably in face of plates VIII and IX? With the "Homo interior" (Pl. IX) man would be invited to enter inside his own deepness, to observe himself in his own interior, with the goal of exploring the world of his deeper life, the intimate maternal substances, life itself in its most deeper roots. When this process has been accomplished, Rorschach would invite man to contemplate somewhat his work and his surroundings, to throw a look over his world view in a global Weltanschauung. The "Homo spectans" (Pl. X) invites the subject to contemplate himself in his world.

Later on I felt the need to add, as a hypothesis emerged from experimentation, two plates: one black, which I call "Imago originum" (Pl. XI), the image of origins and a white one which I designate "Imago sui" (Pl. XII), the image of oneself. In face of both plates the subject would project himself freely, without the coercion of the latent pulls of the spatially structured plates. White returns to us the conscious image of ourselves. In the black, on the contrary, would be projected more primitive images: black invites us to explore the origins, our origins. Black would interrogate us about our deep unconscious. (pp. 50-1)

He defends again the original ('non-mimetic') quality of this last additional white plate of his -of which the black one would be just the reactive opposite (p. 254)- denying any suggestion from the TAT's card 16 and rather alluding to his inspiration on Bachelard's "La Flamme d'une Chandelle" (pp. 260-5).

Adopting Binswanger's concepts, this complementary 'meaningful-directive' and 'inner-biographic' aspect (for each particular plate and for the entire series of them, respectively) of Simón's approach actually is the medular aspect of his whole contribution to the point of announcing a forthcoming volume (?; cf. pp. 119, 288 note 81) entirely dedicated to this issue, and from which we will begin our critical review. Simón seems to have a very high opinion of his own 'discovery' (see his first quotation p. 101 above, whose proud tone is to be found again persistently throughout the book) which on examination does not seem that much of a breakthrough: first and in general, it concentrates on the interpretation of the contents of the Rorschach which is not the most *specific* aspect of the method that was conceived by its creator as an essentially *formal* instrument, from where the natural associations -no matter how persistently denied- with the TAT thus giving

reason to most of Piotrowski's similar criticism of Schafer quoted earlier (p. 30 above); second and more specifically, it gravitates entirely around the not-so-original, for long popular but insufficiently founded symbolism of plates IV and VII as the "father" and "mother" cards, respectively: compare Schachtel's criticism on this latter point...

Unfortunately, many students and quite a few professionals... assume that a particular inkblot has a specific content, for instance... card IV a male, and card VII two female figures, or even more specifically a father- and a mother-symbol, respectively. If the testee does not respond to these blots with this content, they assume that the actual content of all or some of his responses has to be interpreted *as though* it referred to the assumed "content" of the blot, for example as though the testee were "denying" the presence of this content or as though what he said or felt about the content actually seen by him referred to the presumed "objective" content of the card. Such fixed procedures would certainly simplify the task of interpretation if they were valid, and they also may meet the common human and especially the student's needs for certainty, security, and simple rather than complex "answers." However, they lead inevitably to the mistakes to which every dictionary type of interpretation is prone. Unfortunately, this kind of content interpretation is encouraged by the writings of some authors. (1966 pp. 260-1)

This subject of the meaningful-direction ('symbolism', in the more common term) of the particular plates has received attention by very many authors during the decades (Schachtel quickly mentions as many as 4 U.S.A. authors, only from the '50s: pp. 31-2) but Simón only refers to Minkowska as his only precursor, arriving to his own conclusions for each plate about which the least that can be said is that they are highly subjective-speculative and far from convincingly demonstrated: compare by contrast the solidity, diversity, and convergence of our own and others' arguments while discussing plate symbolism on chap. III.D.2 below. As concerning the inner-biographic aspect which is supposed to tie together the entire series of plates with their respective latent meanings, Simón takes ground on a rather distant basis:

The Rorschach plates, in that order dictated by the great laws of the functioning of the inner life of every human being, constitute the loyal paradigm of psychic autobiographic introspection. The discovery of a document of such characteristics is a fact without precedents in the history of psychology, as was too in the sense of a psychological biography the method followed by Aurelio Agustín de Hipona [St Augustine], while writing his exceptional work of the "Confessions" between 397 and 400 of our common Era. According to our observations, both authors, Aurelio Agustín and Hermann Rorschach, followed the same methodological paradigm. The former writing his inner biography and the latter proposing an album-guide of plates to write inner biographies. A paradigm that would respond, seemingly, to the psychic functioning of every human being when he tries to go deeper into his inner biography. The Rorschach Cosmodrama presents thus a new vision, absolutely original due to the methodology used, of an inner reality old as man himself. (p. 277)

[In a note to the preceding paragraph, after following in the chapters of the "Confessions" the succession of 'Homo peregrinans, propugnans, imago corporis,

patris... until imago sui:'] ...In the words of Binswanger, in the psychological document of the Confessions, "manifests itself a biographic factor of enormous meaning" due to the effort which supposes for this christian philosopher wanting to understand himself that in which he believes. When we compare the methodological paradigm of the "Confessions" with that of the Rorschach plates, important questions invade our mind: Are we in face of the universal paradigm of human psychic functioning when in a Rorschach Cosmodrama we follow the order of the Rorschach plates? And if that is the case, have we perhaps discovered the secret threads of the complex weft over which every man weaves his inner life? [Those are certainly questionable issues] In the affirmative the Rorschach Cosmodrama would be an ideal instrument to discover and given the case to help in recomposing pieces of that inner biography badly weaved or still to weave... And at the end I cannot evade being seized by the question of perplexed curiosity: How did Rorschach succeeded in composing these enigmatic plates and, above all, in ordering them such as we know them? (p. 289)

More specifically, in this respect Simón also followed an aspect of Jung's theory. It is progressively clear from his text (pp. 51, 219-20, 275-81) that, counting also his 2 additional plates, he organized his analysis in 4 successive moves of 3 plates each: I to III are sort of a prelude to the subject's inner trip, in IV to VI he is supposed to deeply and basically confront values of the *animus* so as in VII to IX even deeper values of the *anima*, while at the end and returning to the surface in X to XII a synthesis is to be achieved. It is curious in this crucial sense, and a manifest shortcoming of Simón's work, that he made no reference at all to -at least- McCully's well-known authoritative book (1971a) that should have been mandatory since their respective approaches share many similarities (content approach, plate symbolism and their sequence as reproducing some aspect of Jung's developmental views); having made the com-parison ourselves it is our clear impression though that, despite some isolated coincidences in particular plate symbolism, the main conclusions of the one do not back up the main conclusions of the other as manifested in these quotations: "A chapter will define and illustrate those concepts of Jung's that we will use or apply to our [Rorschach] theory... We have not included some of his concepts that he considered crucial, since they do not further our purposes here... We have excluded some of Jung's concepts that are central to his model (such as anima and animus)" (McCully, pp. xi-xii, 243-4; comp. also Bash, 1972). For those reasons we are absolutely convinced of the fact that Simón is mistaken in this biographic reading of Rorschach's sequence of 10 plates, and even more so when he criticizes in the same gesture (pp. 287-7 note 80) Zulliger's differing order for the 3 plates of his Z-Test: it is exactly the other way around as will be demonstrated by us in chap. III.D.2 below! Nevertheless Simón is certainly right when -again following Binswanger- he underscores Rorschach's plates qualities as 'conductors or corporeity' i.e. their analogy with the human body:

But, even conceding that we have at our disposal very few data about the composition of the Rorschach plates, the sparse, albeit eloquent historical elements that Rorschach has let us make out and the work in itself, the plates, allow to ask ourselves: of what language did Hermann Rorschach avail himself

to compose those plates with such an amazing "spatial rhythm"? Observing the fact in itself, it seems evident that the rorschachian composition follows the norms of a grammatic and of an arithmetic. The grammatical language used by Rorschach has a fundamental name and it's called **multiple symmetry on white background**. The arithmetic of the Rorschach is reduced to a figure which the ancient Greeks and Romans already considered as perfect: the number **ten**. Consciously or unconsciously Rorschach availed himself of the symmetry as norm to compose his ten plates... Paraphrasing Vitrubio through Joaquín Arnau we would say that in the Rorschach ***symmetry is the system*** [italics and boldface added]; proportion is the mechanics of the system... Following the Greeks we could say that, considering measure as vehicle of perfection, we could establish a certain analogy between man, perfect archetype by virtue of his optimum symmetry and the Rorschach, composition whose essence is equally an admirable symmetry... A datum that may seem curious, but that does not pass by unnoticed to Vitrubio, is the perfection of the number ten according to the ancient Greeks and Romans. Because "the figure proceeds from the articulations of man" (V. III7I, 48/I, p. 129). In effect, the fingers, of the foot as well as of the hand, are ten. Ten are the Books of Vitrubio's Treatise. And, -coincidence?-, ten equally are the Rorschach Plates. (pp. 99-102)

Those words by Simón are very perceptive and we share their anthropological implications, although at the end we interpret them differently and they lead us to different conclusions: the secondary role of the temporal-biographic aspect in Rorschach's symmetric system, on the other hand the primary or originary role of the number *three* in his work, the key importance of Zulliger in this sense... Anyway, in a Third Part Simón concludes his book with a very thorough, 200+ page(!) case study of an anorexia nervosa case ("Delia") which we chose to obviate for our purposes.

Finally, Paul Lerner organized a Symposium in February 1998(b) about the meaning of Schachtel's Rorschach contribution on the occasion of the Annual Meeting of the U.S.A.'s Society for Personality Assessment, whose interventions were published in Vol. 71(2) of its journal. Leichtman (1998) underlined how Schachtel's specific phenomenological approach allowed him to locate in-between empirical- and clinical-oriented Rorschach practitioners, questioning from and offering to both of them the benefit of theoretical rationales about the concrete working of the instrument - an interpretation of the issue by the way, and despite Leichtman's humility (p.152), more understanding of Phenomenology than Exner's for example (comp. pp. 14 & 17 above and chap. III.D.2 p. #115 below). Peterson & Sayer (1998) concentrated on the phenomenological meaning ascribed by Schachtel to *F* -particularly 'dynamic form'-responses. Handler (1998) explained the influence of Schachtel's experiential approach in his teaching of the Rorschach. Lerner (1998c) stressed what we said earlier about Schachtel's fortunate combination of Phenomenology with Psychoanalysis in Rorschach practice thus predating future shifts in psychoanalytic (object relations) theory, proposing on his side an updated Rorschach approach through an integration of Rapaport's structural and Schachtel's experiential perspectives. A final commentary by Smith (1998) closes the series.

D) Gertrude Dworetzki³⁷ and the genetic-perceptual approach

"On sait qu'un praticien du Rorschach expérimenté et surtout versé dans la psychologie psychanalytique peut parfois déceler des circonstances importantes de la biographie affective du sujet testé. (Nous citons ici pour mémoire les analyses de cas de Hans Zulliger). La psychologie expérimentale n'avait pas encore proposé d'explication satisfaisante pour cet aspect particulier des découvertes faites à l'aide du Rorschach... Non seulement la personnalité mais aussi toute *perception* est le résultat d'un processus évolutif... Il existe donc un rapport 'micro-macro' de type parallélisme, d'abord entre les phases du développement des perceptions isolées et l'ontogenèse en général... Ce n'est que par ces rapports entre minigenèse de la perception et ontogenèse de la personnalité que l'on peut comprendre qu'une expérience de psychologie de la perception telle que le Rorschach reflète et rend accessible non seulement certaines attitudes de base (orientation spatiale, mode analytique ou global du vécu, etc.) mais aussi très largement la 'pré-histoire' des modes de vécu et de conduite d'une personnalité."

Ewald Bohm (1951/1972, chap. 16.V.3).

We identify this section with the name of one of its many representatives not only because she was the first one (Dworetzki 1939) to publish a finished monograph on this particular theoretical approach to the Rorschach, but because -absolutely unfrequent occurrence- this was *a priori* the most complete and decisive of them all leading the way for the subsequent ones. Let us hear how she presented herself her published work:

Les expériences qui ont été le point de départ de ce travail avaient été entreprises dans le but d'approfondir la théorie de Rorschach. Au cours de nos essais dans ce domaine, nous nous sommes attachée à l'étude des problèmes de perception et en particulier au problème de l'évolution des formes...

La perception est pour nous une fonction qui obéit aux lois générales de la forme (prégnance, simplicité, etc.) et est conditionnée par les lois de développement de l'organisation psychique. C'est pourquoi, en envisageant l'évolution de la perception sous l'angle fonctionnel, nous chercherons à souligner qu'à chaque âge, certaines tendances lui sont propres, et que ce sont elles qui entravent la continuité graduelle de l'évolution des structures perceptives. Ainsi la "bonne forme" réalisée par un enfant de trois ans n'est pas la même que celle réalisée par celui de huit ans, ou par celui de l'adulte normal ou anormal.

³⁷ Having married the renowned Swiss psychologist Richard Meili in the 1940s, her name changed from then on to Gertrude Meili-Dworetzki as she became almost exclusively known in Rorschach cultures like the U.S.A.

Nous avons procédé à cette étude dans le cadre du test de Rorschach, objet primitif de notre recherche.

Parmi les nombreux problèmes impliqués dans ce test, nous avons projeté de nous limiter à un seul et de l'approfondir. Mais en face de l'interdépendance et de la complexité des phénomènes présents, nous y avons renoncé; notre étude s'est au contraire étendue à l'ensemble des facteurs dans leur évolution génétique. (pp. 234-5, italics added)

The ready acknowledgement and acceptance of this latter fact, in total accordance with the *Gestalt* and Rorschach's (1921/1967 chaps. V.3, VII.1&2 pp. 218-9) own laws, is probably what makes her research both so fitted to and so crucial for the instrument.

After reviewing Rorschach's few comments (1921/1967 chap. IV.9) on the mostly presumed results of his test from the genetic point of view, she remarks how the establishment of general and clearcut perceptual-developmental laws in his method has been hampered whether by the failure to include all age levels in one and the same research or, which amounts to the same thing, by the interference of regional or technical artifacts relative to each author's limited age-range research when compounding and tabulating them together (pp. 251-2): she cites Davidson & Klopfer (1938) in this sense who after adding-up and comparing the results of many international researchers with an age range from 5 years to adolescence only seem to find an understandable development in 2-3 of the 16 Rorschach factors investigated. An additional difficulty related to the material she reported in this way:

L'interprétation des taches d'encre met en jeu deux ordres de facteurs: les facteurs du développement et les particularités individuelles qui, elles, chevauchent sur les pre-miers... La répartition de ces deux ordres de facteurs varie évidemment avec le matériel employé. Le matériel du test de Rorschach aux figures mal définies permet nécessairement une très grande proportion de facteurs personnels, alors que ceux de l'évolution y sont moins favorisés. (p. 255)

Now, from the non-Rorschach, developmental research point of view there have also been contradictions about the predominance of specific perceptual attitudes (passivity-activity, globality-analysis, subjective-objective) at the different levels, perhaps related to the generalized use of abstract, non-meaningful stimulus material: "Remarquons que le rapport entre les formes (configurales) et les images significatives a été peu étudié par les Gestaltistes - et que leur matériel d'étude consiste presque exclusivement en modèles non significatifs" (p. 251).

She projects then to face the former problem by using a Rorschach subjects population of 210 normal persons: 10 children aged 2,4 to 3,6 years, then 10 groups of 20 subjects each aged 3,6-5, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10-13, 13-15, little educated adults, and educated adults, respectively; plus 20 schizophrenic adults and 12 oligophrenic children. Concerning the second one, she conducted a preliminary experience with 6 very clever 'double-sense' or ambiguous global/partial images created by herself: a cyclist and a skier formed of fruits, some common objects formed of other animal or human characters, and a human face composed of scissors and some sewing thread;

with this *ad hoc* material she hoped to clarify the disputed issue of global vs. analytical -or passive vs. active- perception in development (pp. 266-70). In effect, keeping with it at a minimum the personal factors, the genetic ones jumped sharply into the foreground: in the very young the global perception predominated absolutely, in the middle ages (from 6-7 years, and all the way through adolescence) it is the analytical one, until in adulthood the double vision became firmly installed. Again in her own words:

Le tableau ci-dessus nous montre d'une façon très nette les trois étapes qui, d'après [le philosophe Français Ernest] Renan, marquent l'évolution de l'esprit humain, et que M. Claparède applique à la perception:

- 1) "La vue générale et confuse du tout",
- 2) "Vue distincte et analytiques des parties",
- 3) "Recomposition synthétique du tout avec la connaissance que l'on a des parties". (p. 262)

Passing on then to the Rorschach results, she admits the obvious differences on the nature of both test materials:

Ces inégalités nous font prévoir que les stades découverts dans la première recherche ne peuvent se dessiner dans le test de Rorschach qu'à titre de "tendance"...

[Cependant] en bloquant les groupes d'âge, nous arrivons... à un résultat conforme à nos expériences préliminaires...

Pour faciliter la compréhension... remarquons que les G du premier niveau sont très primitifs, peu formés, alors que les G du dernier sont beaucoup plus élaborés, et en grande partie des combinaisons.

Voici comment se présente le développement: 1) Au premier niveau: prédominance des G, à côté d'un nombre important de Dd; 2) Deuxième niveau: accroissement prononcé des D, au dépend [*sic*] des G et des Dd; 3) Au dernier niveau: forte reprise des G, diminution de tous les détails. Mais en suivant les résultats âge par âge... le développement paraît plus compliqué... **Bien qu'irrégulier dans les détails, le développement peut être ramené à 4 étapes: 1) G, 2) Dd, 3) D, 4) G.** (pp. 273-5; boldface added)

She calls this 4 Rorschach developmental stages: 1) 'primitive globalization', 2) 'primitive analysis' (a transitional one), 3) 'analysis' proper, and 4) 'superior globalization', respectively.

Maintenant que nous avons analysé la perception, sous ses différents aspects et dans son évolution génétique, au moyen du matériel du test de Rorschach, nous constatons que malgré la diversité des individus et du matériel, le principe de Renan-Claparède s'affirme à travers toute l'expérience. Nous avons retrouvé les étapes esquissées lors de notre recherche préliminaire: *Synchrétisme - Analyse primitive - Analyse - Synthèse*. (p. 343)

We will find again later on this global division in *three*, on a more careful analysis eventually *four* developmental stages -subdividing the middle one in two consecutive moments or sub-stages-, in Schotte's theorization of the Szondi Test (chap. III.C.2) and in Zulliger's composition of the Z-Test (chap. III.D) but for the three authors entirely independently from each other!

After these clearcut conclusions concerning the Apprehension Modes she pays then due attention to the Determinants. But she had already unconspicuously interrelated both dimensions: for instance when analyzing primitive globalization with comments like these about *Hd*...

Il est évident que les taches d'encre, de par leur forme objectivement indéfinie et diffuse, donnent lieu, tout particulièrement, à des perceptions syncrétiques. Nous examinerons maintenant les différentes modalités de la perception primitive dans notre test...

b) Vision confuse due à l'impression des teintes grises (et des trous), (G vagues de Rickers-Ovsiankina, clairs-obscur de Binder...): Très proche du type de perception pré-cédent [*a) "figure sur un fond"*], ce second type apparaît également pour les taches de formes compactes aux teintes claires-obscurées... (pp. 275-7)

Il y a encore un facteur qui, dans certains cas, influence directement la vision: le facteur *émotif*. Dans la réponse "grand méchant loup" donnée à la première planche, puis répétée sous forme de persévération aux planches suivantes, on sent nettement cette influence. Percevant quelque chose, comme des yeux immenses (lacunes), l'enfant projette une représentation effrayante dans la tache entière; (p. 287)

or when discussing the middle, analytic stages with the following references to *F* and *Fb*...

Cependant, au cours du développement, et jusqu'à 7 ans environ, la perception des petits détails schématiques tend de plus en plus à se substituer à la perception globale... *Tous ces petits détails sont de forme* [italics added] très simple: des saillies, des pointes, des lignes au bord ou au milieu de la tache... (p. 289)

Bien des petits détails ne sont pas interprétés par l'adulte, non seulement parce que les formes ne le frappent pas, mais encore parce qu'elles sont peu évocatrices en elle-mêmes. Pour l'enfant, par contre, le contenu importe peu, tant qu'une forme suscite son intérêt. Cela explique que nous trouvons une quantité de réponses à cet âge, qui ne dépassent guère la simple description de formes. (p. 292)

Nous pensons qu'à cette époque de son développement, l'enfant (du type *Dd*) obéit à une tendance particulière à la forme comme telle, et que c'est bien elle qu'il vise. Soulignons cependant que l'intérêt prépondérant pour les formes n'apparaît qu'à une époque donnée de l'évolution: c'est l'époque où la perception originellement englobée dans la réaction totale (mouvement, instinct) devient une fonction spécifique, - on dirait que l'enfant exerce sa fonction visuelle. De ce fait le besoin de signification qui généralement prime dans la perception, passe au second plan. (p. 295)

Il y a une catégorie de détails plus vastes que les *Dd* qui est aussi interprétée par les tout jeunes enfants, lorsqu'ils fixent leur attention: *ce sont les parties diversement colorées* [italics added] (pl. II, III, VIII, IX, X)... (p. 299)

...Nous avons rencontré à plusieurs reprises le facteur *couleur*. Une partie des formes partielles (D aux planches de couleur) résultait de la disposition des couleurs et de leur délimitation. (p. 316)

and finally with the following mostly implicit connections between superior globalization and B...

Les globalisations supérieures, comme les détails supérieurs, reposent sur des formes bien articulées [*comme les membres intégrés du corps humain en mouvement*] et sur un processus d'interprétation complexe... [et] s'expliquent par le développement de la perception:

1) G *bilatéral*, dont le plus facile est: pl. III. "2 hommes"; autre exemple: pl. II. "des bonshommes qui font comme ça; ils ont des chapeaux rouges"...

2) G *combiné*... Vu l'intérêt que présente l'évolution des processus de combinaison, dont les G combinés sont le sommet, nous allons l'analyser plus en détail... (pp. 305-6)

Les G combinés présentent l'évolution la plus nette. L'analyse, la synthèse des formes et la mise en relation logique des perceptions successives sont impliquées dans ces G. (p. 309; comp. Piotrowski's quotation chap. III p. #126 below)

Until she finally reached the explicit relation in her 1956 paper:

The movement determinant also plays a part in superior globalization. (p. 140)

Reading between lines while following the chronological order of all of the above quotations precisely in the chapter about the firmly established Locations genetic emergence one could immediately withdraw fundamental suggestions about a parallel and similarly important developmental sequence of the different Determinants, leads which we will specifically follow in full detail in chap. III.D.2 below. But Dworetzki was not herself as clearly aware of these genetic conclusions concerning the more complex Determinants as with the Apprehension Modes. Any-way some other similar passages in her chapters on determinants merit to be retained:

Parmi toutes les qualités optiques, les nuances du blanc et du noir sont les plus primitives: avant de percevoir les formes et les différentes couleurs, l'enfant réagit à la lumière et aux différences de clarté. Les malades retrouvant la vue ne discernent tout d'abord rien d'autre que des taches de clarté diffuse. De même, dans la vision périphérique, l'individu normal ne perçoit ni forme, ni couleur, mais éprouve seulement une sensation lumineuse. (p. 317)

Ne voyant aucune évolution dans la proportion des réponses aux planches colorées et noires (fait peut-être dû au petit nombre de nos sujets), nous avons examiné plus particulièrement les deux planches II et III: si le jeune enfant est plus attiré par les couleurs que l'enfant plus âgé, sa première réaction aux dites planches sera d'interpréter d'abord les taches rouges, ou même de n'y interpréter que celles-ci. Comme ces taches noires sont généralement plus évocatrices (surtout pl. III) nous verrions dans cette préférence des taches rouges la prédominance de la couleur. En effet, le tableau suivant prouve que l'importance des taches rouges diminue avec l'âge. (pp. 323-4)

...la couleur représente l'excitant le plus fort de toutes les qualités perceptives. Elle a pour effet de renforcer l'intérêt et l'attention. Dans cette première phase l'enfant attribue peu de signification aux taches, parce que ses représentations sont encore trop faibles et ses moyens de langage trop peu développés... Bien que la couleur impressionne fortement l'enfant, dans les interprétations mêmes, les formes prévalent. Les interprétations-couleur proprement dites "sang", "feu", etc., sans ou avec considération de la forme, sont très fréquentes dans la phase qui suit, entre 6 et 8 ans... Ces mêmes types de réponses C ou CF [Fb ou FbF], diminuant après 8 ans, sont particulièrement rares chez les enfants plus âgés (10 à 15 ans). En même temps que les interprétations basées surtout sur la couleur diminuent, nous voyons apparaître des signes de choc à la couleur. (pp. 326-7)

Suivons maintenant le développement de la perception kinesthésique chez l'enfant. Tout d'abord nous sommes très frappés par l'absence d'interprétation de mouvement chez les enfants les plus jeunes... De tous les facteurs, les K [B] marquent l'évolution la plus distincte. L'augmentation importante des K chez nos enfants les plus âgés va de pair avec: ...une baisse des interprétations-couleur du type "sang", "feu", et les premiers chocs-couleur; l'augmentation des structures combinées, et des interprétations d'êtres humains. (p. 333; comp. quotation on combined G's in the previous paragraph)

It is important to note that with this last finding of a successive development of the color determinant *before* the movement one which comes last, Dworetzki has experimentally proved Rorschach (1921/1967 chap. IV.20) wrong who theoretically considered the small child -2½ to 3 years- as presenting an experience type both ambiequal and dilated, the task of education being of progressively and adequately - not excessively- controlling (coartating) these opposed dis-positions thanks to learned logical discipline (represented by the third and last determinant, form). This was the main reason why she (pp. 394-6, conclusion 4) finally refused Rorschach types proposing instead a genetic assessment of character types exposed in her chapters IV & V, close in spirit to Zulliger's contemporary views (comp. pp. 22-3 above, and p. #III46 below) based precisely on another aspect of Rorschach views (1921/1967 chap. V.5). We will reconsider these issues on chap. III.D.2 (pp. #113-5 & #131s). Dworetzki expanded her research specifically as concerning movement interpretations in a later article (1952, 1953), and a condensed English version of her work was published as chap. 5 of Klopfer's Vol. 2 (1956).

Changing continents and languages (from Europe to North America, from French to English) we must consider immediately Gardner Murphy. Despite his not being a clinical psy-chologist and Rorschach practitioner as such, he maintained a close contact with this group of colleagues (cf. Wood, Arluck & Margulies 1941, pp. 154, 162) and contributed a number of papers where he tried to illuminate the essence of the method from the personality-theory viewpoint, particularly a *developmental* conception of personality inspired in the British H. Spencer's evolutionary philosophy (cf. pp. #III117-20 below) which as accurately pointed out by Bohm (1951/1972 chap. 15.II.1 footnote 17) is entirely parallel to Renan's one referenced above. In his main

book (1947/1966, cf. pp. v-vii) we find a number of dispersed passages that nevertheless merit an interconnected quote and analysis here:

As Herbert Spencer first pointed out and as Heinz Werner has documented so fully, the growth process necessarily entails three developmental levels^[38]: (1) *a level of global, undifferentiated mass activity*; (2) *a level of differentiated parts, each acting more or less autonomously*; (3) *a level of integrated action based upon interdependence of the parts*. (The phrasing, not the idea, is the writer's.)... We shall have occasion to refer frequently to these three levels of development. (pp. 66-7)

PERCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT. There are a number of reasons for believing that perceptual responses in the newborn are relatively diffuse; sensory projection areas being poorly developed, sense impressions are massive, blurred, incompletely differentiated... *there are probably no clear distinctions between colors or tones... The mind as a whole is a blur; there are no sharp outlines within it* [italics added]... The qualities of sensation which do not belong to any *one* sensory field, the "intersensory" effects are well marked in infancy... But differentiation and learning go on rapidly...

The process of perceptual development seems, then, to involve marking off, reacting to element after element as a distinctive entity. *From the blur, from the mass totality, emerge well-defined individual elements*. For the most part, integration lags behind... The process is still one of differentiating, separating, breaking down... *Learning to see parts, learning to break up wholes so that you can manage the separate components, satisfies drives and eliminates frustrations* [italics added]... (pp. 333-5)

The "blur" stage of perception, stage one of perceptual development, is replaced by *differentiation*. A third stage is possible: *integration*, the articulation of the differentiated parts. All three stages are manifest in the child or adult whenever he confronts a *novel situation*. A visit to a factory is likely to mean, first, a vast blur; then a series of specific machines or of individual wheels, cams, shafts, pistons; and finally, but much later, an integrated pattern of how all the various pieces of machinery are integrated for production...

These three stages, then, are present even when the maturation problem is not involved in any way. But these are the same stages which characterize the process of maturation and motor learning. Since this is the case, it may well be

³⁸ Werner (1940/1948, pp. 40-1) grounded himself though on Goethe: "It is no mere coincidence that Goethe, a man of powerful intuition who saw deep into the nature of all things, should be the first to express in clear language the idea of organic development. For him the very essence of the development of biological forms is symbolized by the differentiation of the organic parts and their subordination to the whole of the organism. In the introduction to his *Morphologie* Goethe says: 'The more perfect the creature becomes, the less similar become the [morphological] parts to one another. On the one genetic pole the whole is more or less similar to the parts, and on the other the whole is dissimilar to the parts. The more nearly equal the parts, the less are they subordinated one to another. Subordination of the parts indicates a perfect creature.' ". Werner called this "the fundamental law of development" ("the orthogenetic principle" later on), and recognized it also in mental life (p. 51). We must add that this clear *triadic* division (as in Renan above) did not exist as such neither in Spencer nor in Werner, but could be easily derived from them which was precisely Murphy's significant contribution.

asked why the stages should be the same in relation to these very different problems. *The answer seems to be that the theory underlying the three stages is, as Herbert Spencer made clear, just a logical ordering of a developmental necessity. The theory proves to be nothing but an axiom; it has to be found in living things and everywhere else* [italics added]. No problem of development arises unless a thing changes; a homogeneous thing can only change qualitatively by breaking up into recognizably distinct parts; and it is only when such a breaking-up has occurred that the heterogeneous elements can be integrated into an articulate whole... *In the same way, if in either childhood or adulthood the individual confronts something for which he has no preparation [like a Rorschach inkblot], the only thing that he can do is to look at it until he finds parts with which he can cope; and the only thing that he can do thereafter is to put them together in a pattern which mediates between himself and his behavioral environment. We appear to be dealing with a general principle of development.* (pp. 342-3, italics added)

After these generally pertinent, illuminating developmental arguments already experimentally demonstrated by Dworetzki, let us pass on to what Murphy has to say explicitly about the Rorschach struggling particularly with its reflection of the key 3rd developmental level:

When a person has once gone through the three stages he can respond instantly in third-level terms; he can take in the meaning of a sentence before he attends to individual words. This aspect of perceptual dynamics is clear in the Rorschach procedure. The preponderant tendency is from whole to detail, and usually from large detail to small detail^[39]. Rorschach himself was keenly aware, as for example in his discussion of the personality structure of the pedant, that the need to differentiate in order to control, and the need to be systematic and orderly in such differentiation, reflect basic perceptual dynamics. In general, the details perceived as figure against the background of the rest of the ink-blot pattern (and the card as a whole) are directly suggestive of the individual's drive structure... (p. 346)

But it is not merely the *quest* for form which the student of personality must be prepared to recognize; it is also the *capacity to achieve it*. [And after making an interesting reference to the kinesthetic example of roller-skating]... so the capacity to organize depends not only on the quest for form but upon an integrating power, *Gestaltungskraft* (Klages and Rorschach). This over-all organizing capacity [he's almost certainly referring to Beck's Z] cannot at present be measured, except in the crude ways provided by the comparison of whole responses and details in the Rorschach technique... The problem of form perception has been used as a rough test [*Formdeutversuch*] of the theory we have developed [pp. 360-1]... [In] the Rorschach approach... we

³⁹ While we do believe this assertion applies specifically to Rorschach's (1921/1967 chap. II.6.b) 'simultaneous-combinatory' or intuitive *G* of gifted imaginative people, we don't agree here with the general validity of this reverse developmental conception of the usual 'orderly' sequence, opinion spontaneously corrected by Murphy himself later on by the way (see below).

recognize all degrees of the capacity for organization-*Gestaltungskraft*. Organizing power, highly correlated with intelligence as measured by standard tests, appears in the tendency to use appropriately much interrelated material, *especially in the tendency to use wholes that are sound and genuine rather than forced resemblances to the objects named* [i.e. combinatory G's: italics added]... (p. 642)

...It seems appropriate to give a few paragraphs to the way in which our theory of personality structure, with its conception of levels and of architecture, influences our efforts to define what the projective methods can achieve in assessing personality traits and their interrelations. Some... tests... may be placed at the first developmental level... Tests... are usually at Stage 2... There are relatively few personality tests which hit the organism squarely at the third level, the level of organization as such... But tests are seldom conceived in terms of a specific theory as to developmental dynamics... Personality measures are often competent to give a cross-section picture of traits and their interrelations, but they must be repeated from time to time if the continuity and evolution of individual functions... is to be clarified... *Even so, there are a number of measures in which there is enough of the third-level approach to suggest what the first and second levels in the same person may have been; we can thus guess to some degree the developmental history of the prestructural whole... A fruitful field for such studies is the analysis of general bodily kinetics, particularly posture and gesture* [i.e. Rorschach's B!]... We have emphasized the importance of personality approaches at the third level, the delineation of structure, even though tests as they exist today are not completely satisfying in this respect... From the present point of view, the measurement of personality will be most fruitful when concerned with complex processes, when it attempts to catch the whole integrated personality at each of its levels. (pp. 663-8)

Rorschach was convinced that the main outlines of psychoanalytic theory... could be applied in a study of unconscious factors in perception, and that many other dynamic factors could be revealed in a perception test... This test differs widely from the many personality tests that are not explicit regarding either the level at which they attack the personality, or the sense in which the concept of structure is to be applied. *In contrast to the frequent vagueness on these points, the Rorschach method offers a full-fledged approach to the unity of personality; its systematic quest for wholeness in approaching all three levels is striking* [pp. 674-6, italics added]... This brings us to the use of the Rorschach as an approach to Stage 3 problems, those concerned with the hierarchical organization of the personality structure as a whole. The Rorschach catches phases of the individual life at many points and can be interpreted in different ways according to the context; a good examiner will make the most of such contexts... He asks himself what the specific detail might reasonably mean, in the light of the picture of the personality as a whole... The final question as to the degree to which the Rorschach reveals permanent as contrasted with temporary personality dispositions is not as yet answerable... a

systematic study of Rorschach changes throughout the growth period has not yet been made available... (pp. 682-3)

Of course, however sharp his theoretical views on many implications of this extraordinary test and despite his having all the right hunches, he didn't go as far as Dworetzki whose results -100% compatible with his own but unfortunately unknown to him- specifically contradict his last assertion and had already given a superb demonstration of the theoretical as well as practical capabilities of the method for neatly reflecting developmental facts with its formal factors. In a subsequent paper with his wife included as a chapter in Rickers-Ovsiankina's book (Murphy & Murphy 1960/1977) he finally adds:

Rorschach... thought of himself as striving to cut through a forest of difficulties to the achievement of a brief, yet subtle representation of personality structure, as given to a very large degree by constitutionally grounded trends of development. (p. 536)

It will hardly be necessary to explain to the reader of this book that Rorschach's test is redolent with the problem of [the 3 developmental] levels and, likewise, with the problem of interdependence; but a few examples may be useful. The Rorschach test distinguishes between levels two and three, in which the "large detail" is typically a response to a component already analyzed out from its context in what we have called "stage-two behavior," and the integral response often appears in highly structured interpretations ordinarily classed as "wholes." The concept of global or *undifferentiated* response is, of course, not fully developed by the Rorschach method, though some "poor" wholes may give us a suggestion of this... stage-one process... The concept of sequences through the three stages is frequently almost exactly what is involved in some of the succession patterns, such as $W[=G]$ to D to $[D]d$ when followed by a new whole at a higher (articulated) level. (pp. 545-6)

All these discussed issues together with Dworetzki's previous conclusions will prove to be fundamental to a theoretical foundation and systematization of the method. In fact both these researches implicitly but unmistakably point to the key role to be played by Zulliger's material in this respect (Murphy & Murphy even mention it!: p. 549), but this will have to wait for our full discussion in chap. III.D.

J. S. Bruner (1948) on his side underlined that, while presenting his method as " 'A Diagnostic Test Based on Perception,' ...in an era which disdained the problem of the diagnostic significance of perception the better to promulgate the perceptual laws governing mind-in-the-abstract... Rorschach implicitly [given his avowed incomplete foundation of it] provided the axiom around which the first chapter of a dynamic theory of perception must be built" (p. 157). He then tries to put forward the first bricks for such a theory -trend which came to be known as the "new look" on perception-, Rorschach-specific and general-psychological at the same time. He also acknowledges the fact that the personality theories favored by the Rorschachers, in particular Psychoanalysis, already contained premises on perception - but that is not enough. Neither is it the addition of more purely empirical data to our knowledge, to ultimately explain *why* or *how* the Rorschach works. So he offers his conceptions - partly inspired by Psycho-analysis- on a general view of perception (as a means for

constructing a world in which to survive, conditioned both by external reality and by the perceiver's state) and on its defense (as when deviating from common -for ex. sexual- responses in the plates), structured stimuli (which may hinder the role of personal factors, but on the other hand may better allow to understand the process of recognition), and vivification (i.e. selective accentuation, or the subjective "strikingness/vividness" for the perceiver thus expressing personal relevance) aspects in particular.

Bühler, Bühler & Lefever (1948) published a painstaking, sometimes obsessive-looking (number of responses aimed per card, administration and inquiry technique) research on 518 adult including normal but mostly clinical (neurotic, psychopathic, organic, psychotic) cases in an attempt to arrive at a "Basic Rorschach Score", i.e. a quantitative approach to interpreting the Rorschach by weighting and algebraically summing the relative presence of certain formal Klopfer-scores or "signs" resulting in a unique ranking figure that may grossly extend anywhere from +30 to -30 which is supposed to be an index of total personality integration level (similar to the well-known Pascal & Suttell scoring method for the Bender-Gestalt Test). In the words of Wheeler (1949, p. 8), "the central method of quantifying the test data has been to study certain signs in terms of their relative incidence in the several groups... the weighing of each of these signs was determined on the basis of a careful analysis of their levels of statistical significance in differentiating the clinical groups". Bühler et al. divided their subjects' results in four successive groups or levels of diminishing integration which she named: I. Adequacy (+30 to +16), II. Conflict (+15 to 0), III. Defect (0 to -15), and IV. Reality loss (-16 to -30), grossly corresponding to normal, neurotic, organic, and psychotic cases respectively (Bühler 1950, p. 317).

Despite its being conducted only on adult subjects we include this research here because, in a distantly similar way than Dworetzki's reference to Renan's very close one (cf. pp. 107-9 above) and certainly inspired by Murphy's work, it is supposed to be based on Spencer's evolutionary theory (Bühler 1950) which will acquire an enormous importance in our discussion on chap. III.D.2 below. Although Spencer implicitly (becoming explicit in Murphy's reinterpretation: p. 112 above, which Bühler quotes) gave grounds for a 3-level understanding of *evolution*, Bühler considered more pertinent a division in 4 reverse *dissolution* levels related to pathology as we saw above. But her quantitative psychopathological views (1949) are entirely germane to Weiner's "continuity" ones and deserve exactly the same pathoanalytic criticism we voiced against the latter earlier by quoting Schotte (pp. 14-7 above), even more so here due to Bühler's addition of the totally heterogeneous, disabling *defective* disturbances (pp. 10, 12) to Freud's anthropological views on conflict resolution and reality-testing which correspond in contrast to *personality* aspects (cf. Schotte 1981, 1990 pp. 35, 111, 114, 139-40, 167, 184 note 8; comp. Table # p. #III117 below). It is quite astonishing to us how a research based on such entirely shared and Rorschach-relevant concepts as Spencer's, due to a narrow predominantly quantitative approach can look so dissimilar from Dworetzki's or Zulliger's closer-to-Rorschach's-principles and more neat-systematic ones (chap. III.D.2 below, comp. with Bühler's results 1949

p. 12, 1950 pp. 318-9; and with Goldfried et al.'s quotation p. 127 below) to both of which fit even better Bühler's concluding words:

...Even if used only as a guiding principle, the four-level theory seems helpful, since it assists in clarifying and organizing an immensely variable and complicated material. I consider it an important advantage that this organization of the clinical material could be based on the Rorschach's own merits, on its basic inner structure, without borrowing from other sources of information. Especially if the theory is not used dogmatically, but as an explorative device and as the first step before further individual study and interpretation of each case takes place... (1949, p. 13)

In a detailed article Stein (1949) described his experiment of tachistoscopic presentation of the Rorschach at four increasing -decreasing also, but as to be expected with less useful results- time exposure levels, as a way of artificially reproducing perceptual development (cf. Hemmendinger & Schultz 1960/1977 pp. 95 sqq., without citing him). The text is full of technical details of no interest to us here, and the presentation of 2 rather arid -not really clinical- case studies takes a lot of place, but the general conclusions do neatly coincide with Dworetzki's results (he cites Claparède by the way):

Whole responses decrease in percentage as exposure time becomes greater.

At the same time there is a congruent improvement of the quality of whole responses. The smaller the proportion of W[G] responses, the more carefully elaborated.

D per cent and W per cent vary inversely, underlining their differential appropriateness to perceptual data available at the different exposure levels. The same holds for the relation of d[Dd] per cent and W per cent...

The findings on location bear out the well known hypothesis that at brief exposures perception tends to be global and undifferentiated, only achieving differentiation [and integration] with time. (p. 408)

As with Dworetzki, the determinants' results were less clear - maybe even less due to the use of Klopfer's scoring here.

In 1951 Robert Blake and Glenn Ramsey edited an immediately successful, collective book titled '*Perception - An Approach to Personality*', based on a Symposium held at the Uni-versity of Texas. Its "new look" theoretical orientation is transparently conveyed in its title, and we will comment only on those passages directly relevant to the Rorschach which, although *not* one of its main subjects (like physico-chemical determinants, learning, social and developmental factors, unconscious and pathological features, etc.), was conceived by its creator in the same vein as a 'perceptual-diagnostic experiment' and according to Schachtel (1966 p. 1) "Rorschach's test and his book offer, among other things, so far as I know, the first major contribution to the problem of perception and personality". Bruner, already mentioned two pages above and still following the same trend of thought, justly criticizes those exclusively "perception-centered" Rorschachers -by distinction to "personality-centered"- who use what Schachtel (pp. 11-2 above and III#3 below) would call an "immanent" or "esoteric" Rorschach language or psychology: "In so far as

'perceptionists' make forays into the theory of personality, the result is usually a projection of perception categories on to the nature of personality. Rorschach's work is typical, and we find investigators today who, in conversation if not in print, will refer to a patient as 'typically a rare detail kind of personality' or 'highly coated' or 'very CF[FbF]' " (pp. 121-2); he insists on how for science's sake the two approaches must inevitably converge and the distinction (originally coined by Frenkel-Brunswik) eventually disappear. Dennis is even more generally -and un-fairly- Rorschach-critical, calling the use of the test "a major professional problem"(p. 154). Clearly contradicting the entire book's (title!) theoretical framework and thus many of his immediate coauthors, he contends that cultural or social factors may be more determinant of Rorschach perceptual responses than personality *per se* whose actual role upon them remains to be proved. Actually he makes sort of a sharp split between culture and personality as if the latter were not embedded within the former, using for ex. the term "experience" in such an idiosyncratic way -as if only operative in the outside-to-inside sense- that nothing remains of Rorschach's rich *Erlebnis* concept!: "Rorschach research has not been oriented toward discovering what in experience influences perception on the Rorschach. Investigation has not been concerned with what sort of experience leads to the seeing of wholes, of details, of movement, of color, of space, etc." (p. 156: comp. Schachtel's 1966 '*Experiential Foundations of Rorschach's Test*' whose main basic articles/chapters were already published at this time!). Not only that, he repeats as a decisive contribution 'set-influence' experiments already made and more richly interpreted (i.e. not all factors are equally influenced, and due to good reasons) by Rorschach himself (1921/1967 chap. IV.2). He presents as an example of his views the widely differing Rorschach results with primitive cultures: can he really sustain that the Pilaga Indian children's culture-sanctioned abundant Sex. responses "are not necessarily accompanied by changes in [eventually less] anxiety, emotionality, etc." (i.e., in "personality structure": p. 154) despite their concerning one of the main personality drives? The Alorese's "fewer movement responses [*B*] and many more achromatic color responses [*Hd*] than... American and European groups" (p. 155) on the other hand, neatly express the general primitiveness of their shared cultural personality exactly as Dworetzki's small children above and in total agreement with our conclusions (chap. III.D.2 below) and besides with Mélon's (1976 pp. 86, 132-41) and Bogaert's (1992 cap. IV) converging theoretical views. It is finally interesting to note that in the 2nd part of his chapter concerned with 'developmental factors in perception' the very demonstrative work of the above reviewed authors plays no important role. Bronfenbrenner (p. 239, footnote), again in contrast with the former, accurately points that "it is unfortunate that preoccupation with the technical aspects of his [Rorschach's] test has distracted attention from the theory which underlies it" that intimately connects personality and perception; he makes this comment while presenting Rank's Ego-theory which he views as a fusion of Lewinian (Spencerian) and Freudian personality concepts, more or less our own orientation while unearthing Rorschach's underlying theory. Then Miller, focusing on unconscious processes and perception, refers to Stein's (1949) experiment that to him suggested how the irrational components of perception genetically precede the rational ones. Klein on his side tells us about how, while studying individual differences in well-known perception experiments, the Rorschach was able

to clearly recognize the perceptual attitude of 'intolerance for the unstable or the equivocal' (resistance to experiences such as apparent-movement *phi* phenomenon, or visual distortion through aniseikonic lenses, or autokinesis of a light in a dark room, or flicker-fusion threshold) through overconcern with sharp forms and preference for obvious and safe percepts (i.e., *F+*, *T*, *V...*) in subjects that could otherwise be clinically described as rigid, pedantic, com-pulsive. Finally Frenkel-Brunswik analyzes how Psychoanalysis and dynamic psychology, or the science of personality in general, have had an impact on the psychology of perception promoting an approach from the angle of needs. Another line of thought which, according to her, had also promoted this synthesis of personality-and-perception research from another point of view is represented by the German typologists (Kretschmer, Jaensch, Goldstein, Werner) who have stressed over-all styles of personality '-types'- as expressed in behavioral patterns and in the cognitive-perceptual approach to the environment, as for instance the synthetic vs. analytic, or diffuse vs. articulated, or color-dominance vs. form-dominance, opposites. In her opinion Ror-schach's work represents a merging of both these trends, whose test aims to differentiate wholes vs. details or *FbF* vs. *FFb* like the latter but also, "unlike the materials used by the German typologists, Rorschach used his vague ink blots in order to get as much projection as possible and proceeded to an interpretation at least in part along the lines of his psychoanalytic orientation" (p. 375).

H. Friedman (1952, 1953) published a research that appeals to us for several reasons. Not only is it based -just as Bühler's one above- on a developmental view of the important domain of psychopathology, schizophrenia as a form of regression (Werner's sense) in particular, but it deservedly reserves a special place for Dworetzki's valuable work ("discovering" it for the English-speaking public before its translation: 1952 pp. 70-6) which is a direct precursor to his own (cf. p. 75). Adopting much of her distinction between primitive and superior forms (particularly *Gs*) to arrive at a detailed Developmental Level scoring of locations (later on much used in research: see below), but also basing himself on Rapaport's and Beck's works (fabulized combinations, contaminations, perseverations, etc.), he applied the test to 30 normal children ages 3 to 5, 30 normal adults, and 30 schizophrenic adults, expecting to find similar perceptual results in the former and latter groups in accordance with prevalent -including psychoanalytic- 'regressive' theories of the disease (1952 pp. 63-5, 67-9: Osborne, Fenichel, Kant, etc., vs. Cameron). Analyzed statistically the results clearly backed up this hypothesis:

On the whole, the results would suggest that the perceptual functioning of the schizo-phrenic, in its structural aspects, is intimately related to that of the child. From the point of view adopted in this study, its characteristics may be understood as those of a primitive globality, syncretism, lability, diffuseness, and rigidity. In the capacity for differentiation and hierarchic integration which marks the normal adult group, the schizophrenic group seems to suffer considerable impairment. *Although there is this similarity to children, certain aspects of higher level functioning are identifiable. In terms of an interpretation in the light of regression, it would be possible that such aspects may be vestiges which point to the incompleteness of regression. Thus, the*

previous operation on a higher developmental level may not be completely erased. (1953 p. 184; italics added)

Friedman certainly did a good work, but his results are still subject to an alternate inter-pretation - if placed in a wider context. They enter in total contradiction with Schotte's noso-taxic-genetic views in particular (cf. above pp. 15-7) which we happen to share and that need a more extended presentation here:

...Le psychotique nous révèle sur le mode d'une certaine impuissance souffrante ce problème de l'auto-constitution et de la créativité nécessaire à toute existence en tant qu'humaine.

Dans les "moments féconds" de l'évolution psychotique s'atteste qu'il s'agit de sujets - pour varier un mot de SARTRE - condamnés à la créativité, davantage que nous ne le sommes tous dans l'existence quotidienne. Il y va du tout de l'existence et des possibilités mêmes de la vie dans ces moments. Aussi le psychotique incarne-t-il spécialement la figure malheureuse de l'homme condamné à la créativité et qui n'arrive pas à vivre à la hauteur de ce problème, qui dépasse de loin les aléas de la vie quotidienne.

Pour situer de façon plus évocatrice cette problématique "personnelle" ou de la personne, référence peut être faite à certains cas particuliers d'individus qui montrent l'existence de rappports mystérieux entre la créativité, au sens des grandes personnalités créatrices qui ont changé le cours de l'histoire, et une certaine proximité vis à vis de la psychose, voire des manifestations psychotiques avérées. Le cas d'HÖLDERLIN est exemplaire à cet égard, puisqu'il est à la fois un schizophrène patent et pour beaucoup le plus grand poète des Temps Modernes, dont la recreation du langage poétique et de l'idée même de poésie sert de modèle pour tous ceux qui suivent. On peut, à son propos, étudier la façon dont certaines phases psychotiques sont en rapport avec l'exhaussement de son pouvoir poétique. Il est notoire, par exemple, qu'au cours de son oeuvre, le langage d'HÖLDERLIN s'est profondément transformé et se présenterait, aux yeux de n'importe quel psychiatre, comme un véritable langage schizophrénique. Or, et c'est là le point capital, ce langage est aussi celui qui recrée la poésie. De tels exemples de rapports éminents entre psychose et créativité se retrouvent aussi dans d'autres domaines que la poésie. En mathématiques notamment, chez CANTOR, l'un des créateurs des mathématiques contemporaines. Mais, plutôt que d'accumuler les exemples, évoquons le cas plus simple et plus démonstratif du poète suisse de langue allemande C. F. MEYER. Ce cas a ceci de particulier que MEYER, qui était un poète mineur, a connu, après une poussée psycho-tique de nature schizophrénique, une phase de production poétique géniale qui a duré quelques années. Par la suite est survenu un deuxième épisode psychotique, qui a coupé court à toute production. Un tel exemple permet de poser un problème intéressant. S'il est avancé dans tous les traités de psychiatrie que le dément est diminué et qu'il peut à la limite, devenir autre, il est au moins dans les meilleurs, reconnu qu'*après la crise, le psychotique est d'abord autre qu'il n'était avant la poussée psychotique, même s'il apparaît la plupart du temps comme diminué. Le cas de MEYER ne montre-t-il pas à cet égard que la*

diminution peut n'être qu'adventice et que l'être autre qui se manifeste au terme de l'épisode peut être un "plus être" [p+] plutôt qu'un "moins être" [p-]? (pp. 120-2, italics added)...

A tout prendre, le système des "pulsions" szondiennes pourrait bien n'avoir fait qu'expliquer lui-même les quatre moments structuraux de toute pulsion chez FREUD: C-S-P-Sch dans l'ordre devenu classique, nous en diraient plus sur "ce qui se passe" du côté du but, de l'objet, de la poussée et de la source de la vie pulsionnelle comme telle, soit de la vie humaine conçue comme problématique-pulsionnelle. Cette "source" à la source de tout le mouvement d'ensemble, n'en est pas moins pourtant ce qui ne se manifeste comme tel qu'en tout dernier lieu [cf. pp. #III138-40 below]. Occasion de redire comment notre modèle complexifie celui qui est reçu en psychanalyse postfreudienne, d'une échelle de progression-régression qui irait des psychoses au normal à travers les névroses. Si la psychose pour nous (et au sens désormais du seul "groupe des schizophrénies") est bien, en effet, le trouble, le seul, originaire, il s'avère par là-même [pour eux] rien moins que le plus "primitif". A cette conception "progressive-régressive" simpliste, le modèle szondien notamment du "moi" (dans lequel les trois autres viennent, nous l'avons dit, aussi se représenter), permet d'en opposer une autre, qui fait son juste sort à la formule fameuse, encore trop peu fameuse où FREUD a posé bien plutôt le "normal" au carrefour de névrose et psychose (et non pas - position parfaitement psychiatrique-classique! - la névrose à mi-chemin de la psychose et de la normalité): les positions moïïques directrices des psychoses et des névroses étant respectivement celles que SZONDI propose comme fonctions p et k , plus exactement celles qui se donnent comme $p+$ et $k-$, nous pouvons les redoubler par celles des perversions ($k+$) et des psychopathies ($p-$). Les névroses s'avèrent bien littéralement "le négatif des perversions" (FREUD). *Les psychoses, elles, seraient le positif des psychopathies. "Progressant" de ces dernières (sur les rapports desquelles avec les troubles de l'humeur nous ne pouvons insister ici) vers les psychoses en passant par les perversions et les névroses, certes nous "avançons", mais non vers le normal (comme si l'adulte était plus "normal" que l'enfant), mais tout ensemble vers des possibilités accrues de "normalité" créatrice et de morbidité. "Là", disait HÖLDERLIN, "où croît le danger, là croît aussi ce qui sauve", - et réciproquement.* (Schotte 1977 pp. 161-2, italics added)

This mysterious and intimate, subtle connection theoretically and eloquently established by Schotte between psychosis (schizophrenia in particular: "la schizophrénie est bien, selon le mot de Blanchot à propos d'Hölderlin, 'la folie par excellence' "; Schotte 1990 p. 112) and creativity, with 'being more', enters in sharp contradiction with Friedman's experimental results concerning their diminished mental functioning in the Rorschach ("primitive globality, syncretism, lability, diffuseness, and rigidity"). If the theory is correct, why is that? We believe we can point to a reasonable and specific explanation: *the exclusion of paranoids from the experiments!* Friedman (1952 pp. 75 & 78) reports how in her 20 schizophrenics Dworetzki counted 17 hebephrenics, 2 catatonics and only 1 paranoid, and in his own

group of 30 he included 12 hebephrenics, 16 catatonics and 2 mixed but no paranoid. This is an oversight of no small consequence if one truly locates oneself in the Schottian perspective: since not only "la seule véritable psychose est la schizophrénie [but also] la paranoïdie en constitue la forme primo-génétique. *Elle constitue l'essence de la psychose et donc de la psychiatrie*" (Schotte 1981 p. 76; italics added). As is well known paranoids are the most productive ('creative': Rorschach 1921/1967 chaps. IV.1 p. 60 & IV.4 p. 72) psychotics, and their total exclusion certainly explains Friedman's opposite results in his otherwise valuable experiment:

Dès lors, la schizophrénie ne présente à mon sens des formes tout à fait primitives d'existence qu'au moment où se passe ce que vous pouvez appeler sa "psychopathisation"^[40], c'est-à-dire une certaine façon de régresser *secondairement* (non au moment fécond, non au moment décisif, mais *secondairement*): celui qui aspire au plus haut, celui qui est confronté au problème le plus élevé, peut aussi retomber au plus bas. En ce sens seulement il peut y avoir régression. (Schotte 1990, p. 166)

Some ulterior researches in this same Wernerian developmental line (Siegel 1953, Hersch 1962) have corrected this omission and have included paranoid schizophrenics in their samples. The extremely interesting result has been not only that the paranoids maintain in general a significantly higher developmental level than the type of schizophrenics on which Friedman's (and Dworetzki's) "regressive" conclusions were based (Siegel), *but that in particular -just like with Schotte's examples above- in their back-and-forth developmental-Rorschach behavior (Siegel) the paranoids strongly resemble not just "normal" but creative persons* (Hersch):

Werner (1957)... suggests that the ability to utilize processes at varying developmental levels is of particular significance in creativity. He states: "Now, creativity, in its most general meaning, is an essential feature of emergent evolution, and this, in turn, implies progression through reorganization. Since we assume that such progress through reorganization cannot be achieved without 'starting anew' ['recircuiting' or 'shortcircuiting', in Schotte's sense], that is, without regression, it follows that a person's capacity for creativity presupposes mobility in terms of regression and progression." (Werner, 1957, p. 145)

...The creator, by virtue of his available controlling operations, is able to shift frequently into relatively primitive modes. This shift is temporary and, as has been noted, the creator not only performs readily at a genetically advanced level again, but objectifies and utilizes the primitive process by imposing upon it developmental operations of a mature nature... The [paranoid] schizophrenic, ...lacking in controls, is overwhelmed by his primitive functioning. (Hersch 1962, pp. 193, 198)

⁴⁰ Just as neurotics are by heart nothing more than possessive sexual perverts (*k+*) hold in check by their own neurotic-repressive mechanisms (*k-*) according to Freud, according to Schotte psychotics are nothing else than self-inflated, possessed ambitious creators (*p+*) hold in check by their regressive psychopathic mechanisms (*p-*). It is very interesting in this last sense that the perceptual features exhibited by Friedman's schizophrenics are in close resemblance to the Rorschach characteristics of psychopaths, according to the best authors: Boss 1931, Binder 1932/1979, Schachtel 1951 (case Y, pp. 155-62).

Furthermore, there is the research result that "the Fi [Functional integration] score, because of both the organizational and ideational capacities it reflects, may be viewed as the highest developmental index in the revised scoring system [by Phillips et al.: see pp. 127-8 below]. This score not only indicates a high level of cognitive ability, but also the capacity for mature interpersonal relations... Despite these findings, Friedman [himself!] (1960) was unable to distinguish between schizophrenics and normals on the basis of this score" (Goldfried, Stricker & Weiner 1971, p. 71) (cf. also how Bohm suggests as a sign of schizophrenia the simultaneous presence in a protocol of amazing $F+ O+$ and completely absurd $F- O-$; cf. also Deri 1984 p. 37). This very interesting issue will be taken up again in full detail below in chaps. III.C (pp. 74-95) and III.D.2 particularly in reference to Tables 1 & 2 (pp. #111-4, 117).

The latter, condensed version of Friedman's paper (1953) was published together with others as part of a Symposium on "Perceptual structure in pathology and development", a subject now become common to us. Wyatt (1953) introduced the entire session with an interesting, predominantly Ego-Psychological discussion aiming at connecting the Rorschach method with this theory:

The most encompassing quality of the ego is the continuous effortful, goal directed, self-experienced activity-what we mean when we speak in common parlance of "*thinking*." We have to be more specific and hence will relate the functioning of the ego to the concept of *cognition*... Thus, the quality fundamental to the ego is not only that it controls motility or that it sets up defenses against instincts (Freud, S. 1927), all these are but facets of the *cognitive function of the ego: differentiation and organization*... How that present state of a given personality came about, and what it means, will be determined by the fact that it has been subject to a development from rudimentary and diffuse to highly differentiated and integrated systems, the course of which can be predicted in its major stations (Werner 1948)... for personality functions and develops as *one* organismic system, rent and contradictory though it may be in some of its aspects. These conflict-free dimensions of the ego (in Hartmann's term) (1939) had been the subject of psychological investigation for a long time so that a considerable amount of information had accumulated and frameworks had been developed which only waited to be joined with the dynamics of conflict into a dynamic theory of personality. Frames of reference such as those of Field Theory or of Hierarchic Integration, data such as those pertaining to concept formation and configurational quality, or as in the recent trend of investigation, to the structure of perception, essentially all mean the same thing. They represent aspects, perhaps often abstracted and overdrawn, but integral aspects still of the *ego's cognitive functioning for the purpose of adjustment*... As long as it functions at all, the ego will have to differentiate, organize, and integrate. In so doing, it will maintain itself and if interfered with will struggle to preserve the integrity of its functioning. How well it functions will depend on the job at hand, on the endowment of the ego, and on its personal history. Trauma, dissociation, fixation, regression hence are events not only of consequence for cognition, but they *are* states and processes (or failures) of cognition. If we

accept the axiom that the organism functions as one, we must assume that every experience has cognitive aspects... We might in this way envisage a general psycho-pathology rewritten in terms of the cognitive events of the ego... The specificity of individual development might become clearer, as might in reverse the personal nature of cognitive functions and their developmental hierarchy. We might come nearer thus to the central goal of all psychological research: a unified theory of personality. Convergent upon it, we might be able to investigate man's experience and behavior more systematically than we have been able so far.

What is the place of the following papers in this prospect? These studies have used the Rorschach experiment as a means of isolating a dimension through which genetic development and its reversal in psychopathology could be demonstrated. The dimension is that of differentiation and organization in the perception of blot-areas in the Rorschach Test. The theoretical premises are those of Psychoanalytic Ego Psychology and of the organismic Psychology of Development as formulated by Heinz Werner. (pp. 146-9)

There is hardly a better description of our work as exposed in the next chapter III.D.2 concerning the *systematization* of the Rorschach method specifically through Zulliger's technique, where precisely the key role of thinking, the perceptual structure, a general psychopathology, a clearer view of individual personality development, ultimately a unified theory of personality which includes outstandingly - between others- psychoanalytic Ego (though not necessarily Hart-mann's) and Werner's developmental theories, all find their respective place. In contrast, where we entirely disagree with Wyatt is in the following unfair, condescending and petty criticism seemingly aimed at retiring priority from where it is meritoriously due:

...Dworetzki had pursued a similar idea in her studies on the evolutionary aspects of perception. Her study was deficient, however, not only because of insufficiently defined samples and of an inadequate methodology, but even more so because of the absence of a systematic theoretical framework. Psychoanalysis and Werner's Genetic Psychology seemed to provide such a frame of reference. (p. 149)

Not even Friedman, who still recognized "the value of such a genetic approach... [as] very apparent" (1952, p. 76), dared to go that far in his criticisms. In fact Dworetzki solidly grounded her excellent, from the get-go theoretically conceived study (despite her subtitle!) both on Gestalt psychology and on Renan-Claparède's genetic psychology (equivalent to Werner's!), and there was in fact hardly any new discovery in the works that composed the Symposium not already pointed out by her results.

Then Hemmendinger (1953)⁴¹ presented in a very schematized way his developmental location results with a tested population of 160 normal children (8 groups of 20 children each at yearly intervals from ages 3 to 10), compared also to Friedman's 30 normal adults. His findings, as could be expected, are practically the same as Dworetzki's (pp. 108-9 above) with this difference that he rather draw from

⁴¹ In this paper his first name is reported as "Larry" which is just a nickname for his real given name: "Laurence" (cf. Rickers-Ovsiankina 1960/1977, pp. xv, xvii, 83, 103).

his data in succession a genetically-low W[G], D, Dd, W (gen.-high) developmental sequence, i.e. with a reverse order of the two middle analytical stages; this is most probably due to his exclusion of what he scored as purely descriptive "(Dd)" from statistical analysis (p. 163), but anyway his data (Table II, p. 164) could still be read exactly as Dworetzki's (1939, Tableau III pp. 274-5): the peak frequency of Dd% actually precedes that of D%, also coinciding by the way with the lowest W% just as in Dworetzki's (pp. 289, 293) individual cases with many Dd and almost no G, not to mention the more meaningful character of her analysis of Dd appearance (pp. 288-98). He also contributed (eventually together with a co-author: & Schultz 1960/1977) a chapter in Rickers-Ovsiankina's prestigious treatise from where we reproduce the following key passages, giving in passing the above denied due credit to Dworetzki's work (which he did not mention in his original paper):

If research data are to be meaningful, the observations they represent must be guided by questions that are formulated in terms of concepts derived from a systematic theoretical position. This does not necessarily imply the testing of deductions from theory since there are other ways of working within a conceptual framework, e.g., by the ordering of observations selected from diverse sources. The choice and suitability of any particular observational technique (in this case, Rorschach's test) depend in large part on what one wants to observe.

The material which follows is intended to illustrate the research potential of Rorschach's test when used in conjunction with a particular theory... namely, Heinz Werner's developmental theory. (p. 83)

This previous, shared stand-taking reminds us of Holt's position discussed earlier in this chapter which we will also sustain in chap. #III.D.2 p. #103 (with further cross-references) while presenting our own original contribution. Hemmendinger goes on:

A detailed look at Hemmendinger's [his 1953] ontogenetic research shows that the data... reflect the expected sequence of developmental processes... Thus, the ontogenetic research provides a developmental scale that can be applied to a wide variety of research problems in which a change of function and/or performance is relevant.^[42]

[Continuing in a footnote:] In Klopfer's *Developments in the Rorschach technique*, Vol. II, there is an article by Dworetzki describing some of the research into the genetic aspects of Rorschach determinants that have been carried on in Europe... Development was conceived of in the same way as described here... In her application of the three laws of mental development... Dworetzki has not so adequately and quantitatively defined the kinds of perception of location areas as has Friedman, but she has related various response determinants, such as movement, shading, and color, to perceptual organization. Dworetzki, furthermore, discusses the influence of color and shading during development, and the development of movement responses themselves. **A critical study of this article is fundamental to all future work**

⁴² From the point of view of the comparative value of Rorschach instrument, it is interesting to consider that the alternate series of the Holtzman Inkblot Technique failed to reproduce these theoretically meaningful results (Penk 1970) as amply demonstrated by the above discussion.

with the Rorschach and to the developmental approach as an organizing theory. (p. 90, boldface added)

...work with this Rorschach scoring system has tended to stick closely to the idea of "genetic and structural aspects of *perception*." It is, of course, possible to think of Rorschach responses, including the location categories, as reflecting other psychological processes, such as thinking... If **psychologists were in possession of concepts relating motivating processes and externalizing processes by the developmentally conceived Rorschach factors of "determinants" as well as of "locations,"** it would be possible to study some of the processes and products of thinking in various age and clinical groups. Some early aspects of this work have been done by Dworetzki... No one yet knows enough of what an examination of developmental sequences in the "other-than-form-determined" Rorschach scores would reveal about the creation of the ego's various control functions, although certain implications emerge from the information provided by the genetic location scores... (pp. 101-2, boldface added)

With these words Hemmendinger, without any direct knowledge, has brilliantly pointed towards Zulliger and Salomon's specific contribution being done simultaneously in Switzerland, in line with Dworetzki's but independently from it, as reported and developed by us in chapter III.D.2 below.

The earlier mentioned important chapter by Holt (1954) in Klopfer's Vol. 1 contains a couple of references relevant to this genetic-perceptual approach, for instance he asserts on p. 518 that:

...personality is not just a cross-section of a person in the specious present. It is a Gestalt extended in time, and "a satisfactory analysis of personality requires a biographical tracing through of the main branches of personality organization." This is a good rule for us to remember when, in our enthusiasm for the richness of the cross-sectional picture that the Rorschach allows us to paint, we start claiming that it is a test of the *total personality*. (conviction shared with Anzieu: cf. p. 25 above)

Although Holt may be right in principle we sustain this biographical, not just cross-sectional analysis of personality is attainable in the Rorschach if we follow precisely the theoretical leads of the authors he immediately goes on referencing:

It may seem paradoxical that so firmly ahistorical a thinker as Lewin should have made basic contributions to genetic psychology, but it is a fact. He was among the first to apply the concepts of differentiation and integration of biologists as Coghill [or Spencer] to an understanding of human development. Topology was an excellent means through which to represent the three principal developmental stages as Lewin described them from his direct observations of young children, and by which to derive certain properties of these stages. (1) Much of the neonate's behavior could be understood by thinking of him as a very simple total structure, reacting in diffuse and massive ways because of the *lack* of appreciable differentiation. This primordial unstructured unity was followed by (2) the differentiation of the person into

relatively independent action systems (regions). And finally (3) unity could be attained again through intercommunication and connectedness of the differentiated regions, forming a hierarchical or other type of integration... Later on, we shall see how Murphy has taken this basic three-stage developmental conception and has extended it and combined it in ways that are helpful to our present purposes with similar ideas that Heinz Werner had been independently developing. (pp. 518-9)

We do agree with the particular importance accorded by Holt (pp. 527-34) to Gardner Murphy as a personologist in a position to contribute enormously to Rorschach theory, but his comments in these final pages do not add anything to our earlier discussion.

Bruno Klopper, who always showed a definite interest for children's Rorschachs (cf. p. 108 above), dedicated the entire 1st Part of his Vol. 2 (1956) to the application of the method to Genetic Psychology. We have already mentioned (Meili-)Dworetzki's chapter 5 from this volume -author referred to as "Meili" in the following papers- and will now comment on a couple more of them. Klopper, Spiegelman & Fox (chap. 2) and then Fox alone (chap. 4), after an instructive criticism (pp. 22-4) of the "statistical approach" in the field as represented by Ames et al. (1952), took up again and more accurately redefined now with a more theoretical bent -psycho-analytic, Gestalt, and Piagetian combined- the former's earlier (Klopper, Margulies, Murphy & Stone, 1941) technical distinction of the Rorschach reactions of preschool children in *three successive patterns*⁴³ of the development of concept formation: 'magic-wand perseveration', 'confabulation', and 'confabulatory combination'. The first 'magic' one is related to Gestalt -particularly Lewin's- conceptualization of primitive typically *global* perceptions-tensions which spread to all regions in a global organismic response, just as the initial whole response of the small child to plate I spreads to the rest of the plates; from a psychoanalytic viewpoint Fox (pp. 91-2) refers to acting-out, pleasure principle, and anal -by contrast to oral- dynamics: following Zulliger we disagree with this latter explanation, since even the 'magical' implication itself clearly refers still to oral omnipotence. The second confabulatory pattern reveals a relatively larger share of reality orientation and testing (discriminant responses to practically each card) over sheer wish-fulfillment in action, however by *pars-pro-toto* ideation (realistic attention only to a part) implying immediate reaction and gratification in thinking ("jumping to conclusions"); or in Piaget's terms by characteristically *centered* thinking at the prelogical or preoperational level. The third and final confabulatory-

⁴³ Not to be confused with Renan's, Spencer's, Werner's, Murphy's, or Lewin's above repeatedly discussed and conceptually wider *three developmental stages*; Klopper's patterns are just subdivisions of the first 'global' stage only as recognized by Fox while summarizing his ideas on the latter's three response patterns: "There is one feature that seems to characterize the Rorschach responses of all children below five years of age [i.e. including all three patterns]: they tend to produce almost exclusively whole responses. The correlate to this is that they do not give usual detail responses..." (1956 p. 102). However this poses an interesting theoretical issue already articulated by Spencer: how development *formally* repeats itself at different sub-levels, always reproducing the same sequence of formal events in each one of them which all together also form one comprehensive developmental sequence - sort of an "1,001 Arabian Nights" model. Klopper's 1st pattern is obviously a pure *global* undifferentiated reaction, and while in the 2nd the mental operation centers in an outstanding *detail*, in the 3rd a first attempt is made at *combination* of the parts - which neatly corresponds to a microgenesis of the overall three fundamental developmental stages. Compare also with Schotte's *periodic* division of his whole drive-circuit theory (chap. III.C.2).

combinatory one testifies of the final predominance or *regulation* of accommodation over the assimilatory character of the previous two patterns, without yet achieving true equilibrium between the two; however the end result is still unrealistic because of the *shifting* of learning and experience now to the abstract level, i.e. the subsistence of impulsivity in relations and thought and as yet lack of hierarchical organization.

After generating such a strong flow of Rorschach research and publication based on his organismic developmental theory, Heinz Werner finally published a couple of articles directly related to the Rorschach. Werner & Wapner (1956), as part of a symposium on "The non-projective aspects of the Rorschach experiment", explained their take on this perceptual issue -exactly as sustained by Bruner above-*not* as a dichotomous distinction between an "objective" (general psychological) and a "projective" (personological or clinical) aspect but as an opportunity to stress the need for an integrated sensory-tonic (organismic, i.e. wholistic) theory. They assert:

What we are suggesting then, is that general perceptual theory, from the very beginning on, must assume that any perception is essentially projective. That is, the organismic state has to be considered as an intricate part of perception, whether we deal with Rorschach responses or responses in any non-clinical experimental situation, such as judgments of sizes, form, verticality, etc. In this connection we have shown, for instance, that perception of verticality is affected in a lawful way by changes in the organismic state. That is, in this area of space perception, usually considered as non-projective, there is again interaction between organismic and visual factors because both are essentially sensory-tonic. (pp. 194-5)

These last words connect with the earlier phenomenological discussion on space by authors like Binswanger or Kuhn, that will also acquire particular relevance in our own Rorschach systematization at the end of next chapter. Werner & Wapner then exemplify the implications of this theory through Rorschach's compatible conviction of the antagonism between motion (*B*) perception and actual motility, as demonstrated by several researchers (Korchin, Meltzoff, Singer, etc.), and through the developmental Clark University studies (Friedman, Hemmendinger, Siegel, Framo above). In the last part (pp. 140-6) of a following paper Werner (1957) also summarized the Rorschach results of his above mentioned Clark University students.

Friedman's genetic Rorschach-scoring technique generated much endorsement and was adopted by an important number of authors for research purposes (cf. Goldfried, Stricker & Weiner 1971, chap. 2; Lerner 1975). Between these there have also been a couple of prominent attempts to revise and extend his technical procedure. Becker (1956/1975), mostly on quanti-fiable grounds⁴⁴, considered

⁴⁴ According to Becker (p. 7), "the empirical findings of Friedman and Siegel, as well as Werner's theories were employed in making these [his 6 further] differentiations". As we said above (footnote #38) Werner conceptualized mostly *dual*, contrasting genetic poles and didn't even explicitly articulated the meaningful *triadic* division of his many conceptually-close authors, not to mention 6 levels! On the contrary it seems clear to us, as in the case of Bühler above, that for Becker the purely statistical considerations predominated over the meaning-full and meaning-giving theoretical ones (comp. his reference to the "stanine system" on p. 16).

Friedman's dichotomous, extremes distinction of a genetically-low and -high levels as not discriminant enough and suggested a subdivision of each pole in three sublevels into which were ranked the specific scores, finally assigning a developmental weight of 1 to 6 to each scored response which allows to calculate an average Developmental Level score for a whole protocol (cf. Becker pp. 10-1, Goldfried & al. pp. 32-3; comp. Bühler & al. above pp. 115-6). Despite Lerner's (pp. 21-2) enthusiasm for it, we rather agree with Goldfried & al.'s opinion that...

The method of summarizing a protocol by means of a single score, although extremely convenient for research purposes, nevertheless has both theoretical and empirical draw-backs. From the theoretical viewpoint underlying the concept of developmental level (Werner, 1948, 1957), one may argue that this single summary score obscures the hierarchic integration of developmentally high and low modes of functioning which characterize the individual. Further, from an empirical standpoint, results have indicated that some groups differ not so much in their overall developmental level, but in their differential *patterning* of developmentally high and low W [G] and D scores. (p. 33)

Much more interesting on the other hand, and more or less in the spirit of Hemmendinger's sharp considerations above while praising Dworetzki's work, is the contribution of Phillips, Kaden & Waldman (1959; cf. Goldfried & al. chap. 3) who proposed a rather complex amplification of Friedman's scores -who limited himself to the developmental assessment of locations- to include also determinant considerations: adequacy and specificity of form sharpness, presence or absence of form dominance when combined with other determinants, perception of activity (Piotrowski's and Klopfer's M, FM and m), and adequacy of the organization of blot elements (functional or other integration vs. fabulized combination, contamination or confabulation) (cf. Goldfried & al., p. 57). As well perceived by Goldfried et al. (loc. cit.), as with Becker above these authors' rationale seems to have worked again mostly in the abstract and "the revisions which have been made have as their base the past experimental findings with the Rorschach in general" rather than Werner's specific theoretical considerations, or than a concrete leading experimental study like those of Dworetzki or Hemmendinger. Despite the promising intentions thus the general results with this Phillips et al. revised developmental scoring system reflect then these limitations, as soundly expressed by Goldfried et al. in their overall evaluation:

The revised developmental scoring system differs from Friedman's system primarily in the addition of the developmental use of determinants. As the revised scoring uses more than just location scores, it does not parallel the purely structural aspects of Werner's developmental theory of cognitive functioning as well as Friedman's approach does... One may question whether some of the distinctions added to the scoring are warranted (e.g., classification of integration into structural, positional, and collective categories), particularly as neither a theoretical description nor empirical evidence is available for the interpretive significance of the scores.

In addition to the structure of the system itself, the revised developmental scoring does not match up to Friedman's approach on empirical grounds. This is true not only because relatively less validity research has been conducted on

the revised system, but also because of the less consistent findings of the research that has been done. The progression of the revised developmental scores with age has not been as firmly established as it has for Friedman's system. (p. 87)

There is however one of the positive results of the Phillips et al. work definitely worth-mentioning, whose implications could *in principle* be extended to its model the Friedman system, and beyond to the original Dworetzki system:

INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE SCORING SYSTEM. Podell and Phillips (1959) have intercorrelated and factor analyzed the revised developmental indices for two groups of normal males. **The three general factors that have emerged correspond favorably with the theoretical description of the three stages in the developmental sequence, namely, an initial globality, an articulation of parts, and finally a reintegration and organization (Werner, 1948, 1957).** The "globality" factor found by Podell and Phillips was represented by W-, Wv, XF + X, and IPT. At the intermediate developmental level-"varied productivity"-there were positive loadings for R, Di, FX, and a negative loading for D-. The third factor, "accuracy and human movement," represents the highest level of functioning; on this factor, Wi, Fi, and M were positively loaded, while D-% had a negative loading^[45]. (Goldfried & al., p. 84; boldface added)

It is our impression that not long after Hemmendinger's 1960 excellent and enthusiastic summary above commented this specific fruitful trend of Wernerian developmental Rorschach research reached a ceiling and then lost impetus, as can be gleaned from the disappointed tone of his & Schultz's 1977 'Epilogue' to the same chapter (p. 103). At the same time and following Fox's lead, there seems to have been an alternate increasing interest in having recourse to Piaget's theory for the understanding of developing Rorschach reactions. Würsten's 1970 chapter in Klopfer et al.'s Vol. 3 is maybe the most visible effort in this sense (distancing himself from Fox however by pointing repeated, not necessarily valid shortcomings of both the psychoanalytic and Gestalt views). After voicing his belief -shared with Piotrowski-that the many theoretical approaches to the Rorschach have yet "not been able to provide a valid assessment of the total personality" (pp. 99-100) particularly in children, this author introduces the subject (up to p. 106) precisely by offering a summary of the works reviewed in the present section, recognizing in particular that Werner's ideas on child development "resemble Piaget's theory in many ways" (p. 101). He enumerates immediately (pp. 106-9) a series of 15 discrete, unarticulated "conclusions" or very general recommendations of his -a Piagetian- to the Rorschacher, specially as concerned the adoption of his 'clinical method' (cf. pp. 133-4) by the latter. On pp. 110-32 he offers then a detailed but rather loosely organized view of Piaget's main theoretical concepts from his developmental system. Finally, pp. 132-40

⁴⁵ To translate somewhat all these strange symbols, the Phillips et al. scores representatives of the 1st level correspond to inferior *G*, *F* subordination and absence, and primitive thought as expressed in 'inadequate organization'; in the 2nd level are found more responses as attention is shifted to the diverse *D* and their integration, as well as *F* dominance; finally in the 3rd predominate integrated, superior *G*, the highest organizational and ideational capacities of 'functional integration', and *B*. There is an obvious close relationship with our own final systematization as discussed in chap. III.D.2 below, cf. in particular Table # p. #.

are dedicated to the specific exploration of a selection of these (structures, adaptation, and equilibrium; the relationship of perception, intelligence and affectivity; mental images and memory; emotional-social aspects) that appear to him as the most applicable to Rorschach practice. After a careful, interested study of this text one gets however the clear impression that Würsten, who was a disciple and research assistant of Piaget's (p. 106 footnote 4), was not as knowledgeable a Rorschach practitioner and consequently his thorough paper makes a disappointing effect from this point of view: even his mentor avows that "this [Piaget-Rorschach] coordination remains still somewhat vague" (p. 99 footnote). Only a few of the specific connections made by him seem truly clarifying to us: the explanation of the - particularly Dworetzki's- developmentally changing Rorschach results by the dynamics between initially passive perceptual 'field effect' and increasing perceptual activity from the part of the child (pp. 119-20, 136-7), and of the relatively late appearance of *B* responses by the newly dynamic and anticipatory character of truly operational mental images from 7-8 years on (pp. 124-6, 137-8).

A decade later Valente Torre (1983) also made an effort to relate Rorschach's and Piaget's systems, some of whose rapprochements are the same as Würsten above: *F* as thought (?) is supported by the 'construction of the image' concept, *B* as dynamism of thought by 'interiorization of movement' thus revealing reversibility; the other determinants *Fb* and *Hd* could be considered as projections of emotivity, and *T%* as automatism in thought. An effort is also made to clarify the whole interpretation process "from the consideration of images as doubly projective: as a choice between a repertoire of experiences that are the fruit of processes of assimilation and accomodation, and in keeping with expectations linked to the subject's current interests" (pp. 43-4). But this being just the summary of a congress paper (Xth, Washington 1981) a more ample publication is needed.

But the real achievement of this tradition is represented by the original work of Leichtman. In 1988 as a chapter in Lerner & Lerner's book on "Primitive Mental States and the Rorschach" he published a paper in which he invests his interest in pre-schoolers Rorschach performance, not so much to identify developmental-psychological stages as others have done but to establish their stages in *the mastery of the test task itself* so as to better understand the nature of the Rorschach as a psychological testing method, i.e. the theoretical reconstruction of the always enigmatic 'response process'. He concludes in practically the same 'concept-formation' stages of Klopfer et al. discussed above: I. perseverative Rorschachs, II. confabulatory Rorschachs, and III. "the [standard, interpretive] Rorschach" (for him Klopfer's 3rd stage is just a transitional period towards this last one). An important theoretical consequence of his work is that he came to believe, contrary to Rorschach's own conception, that the method is not so much 'a diagnostic test based on perception' as it is on *representation*. This interesting paper eventually lead to the publication of his valuable theoretical book (1996b) which will be commented in full detail when we enter ourselves on the nature of the Rorschach (chap. III.B.2, pp. #59-63).

E) The Gestalt or Experimental Psychology approach

"The Rorschach test is not a mechanical method. Its isolated formal elements, of which we have exposed the fundamentals, are not translatable like the symbols of 'the egyptian dream books'... Each isolated element has, certainly, in each parti-cular case, a symptomatic value which is not rigid and immu-table, but which oscillates, according to the cases and the relation in which it finds itself with the total picture. Several authors (between others, ROLAND KUHN, 1944, p. 41; also RUTH BOCHNER and FLORENCE HALPERN, 1942, p. 17) have showed, with reason, that a Rorschach protocol appears as the whole of a 'form' in which one cannot take into consi-deration an isolated part disregarding its relationships... the Rorschach *protocol as a whole*, with its succession and its apprehension modes, could be conceived as *a form (Gestalt)* and as such has been considered intuitively by those with knowledge of the method."

Ewald Bohm (1951/1972, chaps. 4.A.II & 7.I; our translation)

According to Anzieu & Chabert (1961/1983, p. 14) "les tests projectifs ont suivi de près les progrès de la *Gestalttheorie*: Jung est un peu postérieur à von Ehrenfels, Rorschach un peu postérieur à Wertheimer, Murray un peu postérieur à Kurt Lewin; toutefois, ils ne semblent pas avoir subi leur influence directe". This assertion concerning a nevertheless indirect influence rings very true when one analyzes the issue in detail. Some of the very early experts such as Binswanger (1923/1967), Binder (1932/1979, chap. II), or Beck (1933a, 1942) clearly recognized this connection, stemming unmistakably from Rorschach's insistence on the *correlational* or *configurational* nature of his interpretive method (cf. p. III21 below, section on hermeneutics). As indicated by Bohm in the above quotation, in the 1940s this was already a widely shared conviction, precise time when appeared the first specific studies in this sense.

Despite -or because of?- the very early clash between the Rorschach and Experimental Psychology (the W. Stern affair: cf. Baumgarten-Tramer 1944/1946 pp. 1-3, Ellenberger 1954/ 1995 pp. 71-3), and thanks to the original suggestion of Molly Harrower (1971, p. 103) probably in no insignificant measure also due to Beck's (1939) expressed fifth 'qualification' required from the Rorschacher, on April 19-20 1941 took place in New York City an interesting group discus-sion (Wood, Arluck & Margulies 1941) "to enable [more than 30 attending] Rorschach workers and experimental psychologists to consider various problems inherent in the Rorschach Method" (pp. 154, 165). Many very reputed names⁴⁶ -outstanding between them Kurt Koffka-

⁴⁶ The attending lists of Wood & al. (p. 154) and Harrower (p. 103, footnote 1) do not coincide entirely and several new, equally striking names became added in the latter.

expressed their candid views on the issue, from which we make a selection to point the tone of the conference:

KLOPFER [opening the discussion from the Rorschachers side]. Among the problems which we will probably find of mutual interest are problems like the following: To what extent are the assumptions upon which the Rorschach method is based capable of scientific verification? What are the effects of various administrative procedures upon test results? Problems of validation. The Rorschach method as an aspect of the experimental study of personality. Rorschach and Psychopathology. The Rorschach and Sociology and Anthropology. The ten cards which Rorschach selected after considerable study and experimentation had certain structural characteristics which make some demands upon the subject. These include symmetry, figure-ground relationships, and colors-chromatic and achromatic. In contrast to both the [Stern] cloud-pictures (which are quite loosely structured, placing heavy demands upon the imagination of the subject, also allowing him great freedom and almost unlimited variability) and thematic aperception test (which is quite highly structured and the interpretive value of which seems to lie very largely in the field of content) the Rorschach is at the same time somewhat loosely structured but still has definite structural elements or features which make real demands upon the subject. These structural features of the cards provide the constant elements in the test situation to which each subject is subjected and enable us to compare and contrast the reactions of different subjects to different demands from his environment. It would be desirable to construct different series of cards in which various of these features were systematically varied. The subject is customarily introduced to the test situation and to each card in a certain specific fashion. Variations in this process of preparing the subject, and of presenting the test material to him, would probably provide illuminating variations in response. Instructions and other features of this preparatory process may well affect the attitude of the subject, as Wertheimer has suggested, and, through his attitude, his responses^[47] [p. 155]...

PIOTROWSKI. The essential problem is that the Rorschach is a projective method. The Rorschach analysis is not based primarily on the original verbal response of the subject, but upon the percept which he projects into the blot. It was a fundamental principle long before Rorschach that perception is selective. Another accepted principle is that responsiveness to color corresponds to a capacity to respond emotionally to the environment. This can be tested experimentally. Also, psychoanalytic symbolism may be linked to Rorschach responses...

BECK. The Rorschach can be approached either scientifically or artistically and there is need for both types of approach... We are not standardizing personality when we control method. We should check the scoring categories against experimental studies. This is the same problem the physician has in bringing physiological studies to bear on diagnosis...

⁴⁷ This reference remained as such imprecise, unfortunately – considering that this issue had particular importance for Koffka and even motivated his 'experiment' with Harrower (see later on).

KLOPFER: If the Rorschach is the instrument we believe it to be, it will certainly reflect the basic attitudes and the more vital life situation of the subject...

FREMONT-SMITH. Does this mean that one needs to know the recent life situations of the subject when interpreting the Rorschach?

KLOPFER: That is exactly the question. There are three lines of problems involved here. We must try to understand: (1) the interplay between the structure of the personality and strong situational pro-vocations. (2) What such "beclouded" Rorschachs have in common with a Rorschach from the same person under normal conditions, and (3) what the Rorschach situation adds to, or subtracts from, the rest of the life situation. Matching experiments have astonished people who find it impossible not to match two records of the same person while it is extremely difficult to match records of identical twins...

KOFFKA: We come again to the point where not only the Rorschach but the psychology of personality comes to a dead-end. We have no systematic knowledge, from any of our avenues of inquiry, as to what goes on in this area.

FRANK: Dr. Koffka has prepared a discussion of certain aspects of the Rorschach which I will now ask him to present.

KOFFKA [opening the discussion for the experimentalists]: There are two kinds of interpretation taking place in the Rorschach. The subject "interprets" the blots and the examiner "interprets" the subject's responses. Here we shall restrict ourselves to a consideration of the first process [but see his last quotation bearing on the 2nd two pages below]. This is a problem of perception and we may recognize two phases of the process. First, a unit of a certain shape and color is seen and then this unit is seen as a particular thing (it comes to have, for the subject, a particular "functional character"). About the first stage we know a good deal, about the latter, very little. That the relations between color, shape, and functional character of things seen in the blots are very complex, is recognized by the Rorschach system of scoring which includes the three major categories of Location, Determinants, and Contents. Content is definitely related to functional character but location and determinants are variously related to different aspects of form and color, some of which are on the card and some are not. There seem also to be some points of confusion and overlapping between some of the content and some of the determinant subdivision.

Some of the cards, as I and V, have considerable internal continuity and clear boundaries, features which more or less demand or encourage whole reactions on the part of the subject. Other cards show these features in moderate degree or almost not at all. But the category W [G] is assigned to three distinct types of response - real wholes, pairs, and a collection or aggregation (botanical exhibit). The last named does not have the features described above. It would be well to distinguish these types in the scoring, and also, when scoring F, to know, if possible, just why this particular form appeared to the subject in a given reaction. Answers to this latter question will include factors of continuity, balance, prägnanz, and others [cf. Arnheim later on]. Good and bad form can be defined without recourse to statistics. Good and bad form, that is, either in

the gestalt sense or in respect to the correspondence between the shape of the blot and the shape of the object seen.

Furthermore, shading in the blot may cooperate with, or conflict with, color and shape in determining a response, and which of these is the case, and how, should be determined before attempting to interpret the diagnostic significance of a given response.

Movement is perhaps not in the cards in the same sense that color and shape are. Or is it? [cf. Arnheim again] There seem also to be some reactions in which the movement functions more as content than as determinant.

It seems possible that content can function as an additional determiner of perceived form in certain reactions at least. An experiment by Zangwill [is this "Dorothy"? (see below)] showed preceding content to influence succeeding forms.

Returning to the question of whole responses, why do feeble minded subjects give so few Ws to [plate] V? Do they fail to see the blot as a whole, or do they fail to connect the whole seen to some functional character? The interpretation of the meaning of the D/W quotient will depend on the answer to this question. We might suggest tachistoscopic exposure of the cards with the instructions, "Draw what you have seen".

Most subjects give more than one response to a card. How is the reorganization of perception which is involved here determined? As a rule, there are probably simultaneously involved both purely formal factors (as in spontaneous fluctuations of reversible figures), attitudes and content perseverations. Where the primary change is purely formal it may or may not lead to a new functional character, where it is determined by content it may lead to a "Good" form. These two cases are psychologically, and therefore symptomatically very different. But, can the Rorschach scoring system distinguish between them? If we oversimplify the matter somewhat, we may describe four personality types with regard to plasticity of form and content. 1) Plastic form and content, 2) plastic form, rigid or poor content, 3) rigid form, plastic, rich content, 4) rigid form and content. Again, can Rorschach scoring distinguish between them?

In conclusion: the ink blots themselves, however good they may be for personality diagnosis, are not adapted to the investigation of the theoretical questions underlying their use. There will, therefore, be no satisfactory Rorschach theory until research has gone beyond the use of the ten cards.

FRANK: In our discussion at this point, let us attempt to stick to questions of theory and of possible experimental explorations, and avoid details of Rorschach interpretations.

HELSON: There seems to be interesting relationships between the F category and the work on visual form perception we have been doing at Bryn Mawr [College]. In one of our studies, subjects were asked to reproduce simple visual figures or "to make the figure better". These two different instructions produced different results. Also in tachistoscopic studies of visual perception, the instructions produced very different results. It would seem that we cannot assume that the absence of specific instructions will invariably cause the

subject to assume an attitude which will be indicative of his personality structure...

MacLEOD: The problem seems to be to discover the significant variables in the Rorschach situation and then to isolate and control these variables so that we may observe their effects...

MUNROE: Let us not lose sight of the suggestion of using the Rorschach cards for straight studies of visual perceptual phenomena...

SIIPOLA: A very significant feature of the Rorschach situation is its relative freedom in which many variables function. One of the difficulties is that if we approach these problems from the point of view of experimental psychology and find out which variables do function in which ways in cards which have certain objective features different from those in the ten cards of the Rorschach series, we may not have proved anything about the reactions in the standard Rorschach situation...

BECK. The experimental bed in which the Rorschach lies most comfortably is Gestalt, and the experiments suggested would help us greatly.

KOFFKA. We should consider not that personality is given, and is to be found, but that the Rorschach is an instrument for deriving information concerning the structure of personality. It can lead us to the formulation of hypotheses, some of which, at least, can be experimentally verified...

RAPAPORT. Rorschach thought of his test as an association test. This is a side of the test which can well be studied both by the clinician and the experimental psychologist. The question of attitudes is not an all or none matter. There is a whole series of attitudes which may be differently related to the personalities of different subjects, and these attitudes come out in various aspects of the subjects' reactions in the test situation [pp. 157-62]...

KOFFKA. Behavior is so exceedingly complex that it cannot be predicted except under the most rigidly controlled circumstances. Quantitative prediction certainly is an ideal goal, but it is doubtful if it will ever be achieved phenotypically. **What we should seek is a method of describing our data not by quantification but by reference to a system of psychology. Rorschach interpretations require such a system, but, meanwhile, the method may be helpful in developing the system.** (Wood & al., p. 164; underlining and boldface added)

This is an infrequent opportunity to see the greats in spontaneous interaction, discussing and arguing such an important issue. To follow the order of intervention, Klopfer first posed some key scientific questions to then grossly outline the role of some perceptual Gestalt factors, repeating his usual -and correct-insistence on the transitional yet still *structured* aspect of the blots (cf. p. #III33 footnote 16 below) and finally posing the issue of attitude. Following him, Piotrowski introduced his eventually expanded view of the Rorschach procedure as a percept-analysis. Beck insisted on his well known science-art artificial opposition (by contrast to Arnheim below, and to Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 pp. 16-7, 80) and outlined his "experi-mentalist" position which had already generated such a strong criticism from Klopfer (cf. quotation p. #III23 below). Then Koffka makes his very thoughtful

contribution as an experimental, Gestalt psychologist. He just mentions the 'double interpretation' implicit in the procedure (cf. Baumgarten-Tramer below) and concentrates then on Rorschach response process which he subdivides in two phases, the 1st Gestalt-perceptual in the common sense and the 2nd ('functional character'), less known, that corresponds to Rorschach's 'perception as interpretation'. He recognizes the multi-dimensional, complex character of the Rorschach system of scoring as adequate to the complexity of the process in question. He then points to the recognized need of discriminating between different kinds of *G* responses, adding short pertinent comments on *F*, *Hd*, *Fb*, *B*, and content. Concerning the interesting issue of multiple responses per card (perceptual 'reorganization') he repeatedly questions the ability of the Rorschach scoring system to make the pertinent symptomatic distinctions, questions that we firmly believe can be answered in the affirmative: since Rorschach himself plasticity of content has been adequately assessed through *T%* and overall variability, and meaningful distinctions about plasticity of form during development -closely corresponding with known perceptual laws- had already been made by Dworetzki (1939; cf. her quotations above and #III121-2 below) at that time. He concludes with the open to discussion assertion that theoretical-experimental research must be made with other material than the standard series (comp. again Dworetzki, who prepared an *ad hoc* double-meaning material but still could demonstrate her theoretically-meaningful results with Rorschach's plates). After him then the discussion centers around experimentally "isolating" and "controlling" the relevant variables (MacLeod) with the pertinent reminder by Siipola, in true Gestalt fashion, that this procedure destroys the meaning of the whole Rorschach situation! (comp. Kuhn above). Rapaport underlines one aspect (association) of his own perceptual-associative rationale of the response process, and finally Koffka makes -by contrast to his preceding experimentalist colleagues- a paramount systematic-theoretical observation concerning the Rorschacher's interpretation with which we entirely agree, and in fact will follow up thoroughly in the next chapter.

It is instructive to mention directly here Harrower's (1971) subsequent article since it refers to her and Koffka's private exchange immediately preceding, and motivating in the main, the just discussed meeting. She tells us there how she had formerly been his disciple and how, thanks to her own intense interest, he became himself provisionally, earnestly albeit skeptically, interested in the Rorschach method. In August 1940 Koffka borrowed the '*Psychodiagnostik*' and decided to test himself one of his current students, a very gifted young woman ("Dorothy"), to send the protocol to Harrower for blind interpretation. Circumstances (insufficient skill or knowledge, pressing time, no inquiry) led to a hasty, uninterested administration and to him overtly but incorrectly criticizing "the enormous amount of animal reactions and the absence of both color and movement reports" (p. 113) in Dorothy's protocol, which provoked days later a 2nd administration with very different results in many respects; from where the idea of the 'experiment': to send both records to Harrower as if from two different persons and then compare the interpretations. As he expected both interpretive profiles were quite different and an animated discussion by correspondence ensued in an attempt to clarify the factors responsible for the

discrepancy. Of course, due to Koffka's incomplete knowledge of the method at that time -obviously adequately remedied for the above meeting- his arguments are weaker than Harrower's to which we do not have much to add, perhaps just an explicit reference to Rorschach's 1921/1967 chapter IV.2 which already explained much of Dorothy's new results who was of course willing -maybe even too much- both to meet her Master's expectations and to do justice to her true assets, and also point to the nevertheless retained introversive Experience Type; but he managed to raise some interesting points nevertheless: the issue of the different attitude⁴⁸, the role of content, the inconsistency in Klopfer's *m* score... We will just quote some passages by Koffka to give an example of how a reputed Gestaltist and scientist reacted to the contemporary enthusiastic and even passionate (re)discovery of the Rorschach by Psychology:

...I'm not trying to be critical at all costs. *I want to know what is behind this method which has worked so amazingly well in the few cases I know, as for example the extraordinary report on the [2nd] record of [Dorothy].* [p. 116]

I am glad that you have decided to experiment with card II, but your argument in favor of color shock [which he doubted to be provoked specifically by the *color*] based on the last cards is no more convincing [disregarding the fact of course that shock tends to differentiate all of them from the ones that have no color at all]; for the same experiments would have to be done, of course, on all colored cards. Card X for example is, as you told me yourself, one least prone to evoke w[G] responses [fact also intimately related to the presence of *different* colors by the way: cf. chap. III.D.2 below]. So why cannot this be the reason for the shock [perhaps and more decisively, because many subjects say out loud: "Those colors!... They annoy me..." or words to that effect]. Don't you see that it is this aspect of the Rorschach method that I find messy. Categorical assertions without proper proofs. [p. 120]

I am glad that I read the article [by Klopfer, sent to him by Harrower] because it gave me a much more concrete insight into the actual procedure than I had before. But [just as Rorschach himself] I am still not satisfied as to how many claims rest on pure factual correlation, how many on psychological derivation, how many on both? What is the principle of selection among the different possibilities... Don't be angry with this letter. I mean all I say quite sachlich [factually, in German]. Nor do I criticize the clinical application of the Rorschach at all. What gets my goat is when Rorschach people sail under a false theoretical flag. I have learned a lot from our discussions. (p. 121)

⁴⁸ Although Koffka had certainly reason in part (*and was also responsible for the undesirable attitude both times: hurried-uninterested the 1st, overly eager and with a set against T and for Fb, B, probably also R, Dd... the 2nd*), the following intervention in the subsequent New York meeting demonstrates how he came to have a more careful and informed idea of the issue: "HELSON.[reacting to MUNROE's long intervention] Why do you dismiss the hypothesis that the attitude of the subject affects his [Rorschach] responses? [Koffka's own previous position by the way] We know how attitude affects such a simple thing as the judgment of the presence or absence of a light... KOFFKA. Helson's example involved such a simple process that it is more likely to be affected by attitude, than the more complicated processes involved in the Rorschach performance. Nevertheless we should not overlook the fact that the skilled Rorschach worker probably does achieve substantially the same attitudes from subject to subject" (Wood & al. 1941, p. 157).

Following the former suggestions from a specific theoretical position Brosin & Fromm (1942), after indicating the current trend -then at its acme- for subdividing and adding countless scoring categories (cf. chap. III.A below), introduced the subject with this senseful and courageous warning:

The similarities between the principles of Gestalt Psychology and those of Rorschach have long been noted by a number of workers... But, in general, little effort has thus far been made to apply Gestalt principles to the Rorschach experiment... We have found the Gestalt attitudes and vocabulary the most useful in trying to describe the clinical approach to a Rorschach protocol. Such new categories or subdivisions of old categories... are easier to understand and interpret in terms of a more uniform approach... All writers on the subject stress the necessity of interpreting the record as a whole, but only a few are consistent in the practical discussion of the single variables. We all acknowledge the general principle that Rorschach categories are inter-related and inter-dependent variables whose significance depends upon the total configuration, but the primary focus of our interest is upon the categories. (p.

1)

Then they discuss some of the Rorschach categories in terms of Gestalt psychology. The judgement on sharpness of the *F* responses depends not from frequency of previous experience (as in Beck's tables) but from that Gestalt quality critical in *recognition*. The Rorschach cards, being a compromise between chaos and relatively rigid patterns, offer a wide although limited range of possibility for recognition of good forms based on *Praegnanz*. The concept of Gestalt boundaries helps in understanding Rorschach's technical *G* in plate III, which also points to the special abilities (intellectual achievement, personality development) involved in the perception of combinatory by contrast to simple *G*s. *D* responses have the properties of sub-wholes (teil-Ganze) 'complete within themselves' thanks to strong boundaries, size being just a secondary factor. Obviously the clear *Praegnanz* character of *V* responses is an excellent starting point for the study of good Gestalts in the Rorschach blots. From the point of view of the Type of Approach the remarkable stability of the 1*G*:3*D* proportion, even despite differences -with limitations- in level of psychopathology, number of responses, mood, interest, or attitude, made them call it "the single axis which compels attention in a formal manner to the ten cards as a single Gestalt" (p. 12). The total configuration becomes essential also in the practical rather difficult judgement of the important factor of succession. The all-significant and equally stable Experience Type, particularly its constitutional basis, can be connected to Kohler's assertions about the physiological, fundamental nature of the sensory process underlying Gestalt perception.

Almost simultaneously Endacott⁴⁹ (1942) published a paper where he also stressed the Gestalt, wholistic character of the Rorschach. To begin with and generally, in contrast to the pencil-and-paper personality tests, in this method the total personality forms part of the total testing situation, it is actually participating

⁴⁹ As with the former author Henry W. Brosin, also from Illinois (Chicago?) which most probably points to being under the direct influence of Samuel J. Beck.

and functioning ("doing, feeling, thinking") in the experiment and not just reporting on itself in abstract situations. Moreover as Wertheimer has taught, "in a perceptual field... the whole is primary and the parts evolve out of it and are secondary to it" (p. 2), fundamental principle which Endacott finds exemplified in three leading, specific Rorschach factors: the organization of the response (as Beck 1933 has shown extending from the concept of combined *G*, numerous other non-*G* 'good' responses also possess organizational i.e. Gestalt qualities; poorly organized responses/Gestalts such as *DG* violate precisely Wertheimer's principle), the mode of apprehension (the same conception of Brosin & Fromm above about the adequate proportion between whole and parts), and response sequence (again, well-ordered thinking proceeds from whole to parts, from *G* to *D* to *Dd*). He adds that *Zw* responses imply the Gestalt phenomenon of figure-ground reversal. And finally, in Rorschach interpretation also the total Gestalt or pattern -not isolated factors- must be the leading principle. In this modest paper Endacott was able to perfectly demonstrate the ever-present Gestalt character of the Rorschach.

After these two Gestalt contributions, Baumgarten-Tramer (1944/1946) offered a wider, quite exhaustive assessment of Rorschach's method from the point of view of Experimental Psychology. Referencing specifically perception and Gestalt psychology (since Rorschach conceived his test, discarding imagination, precisely as a 'perceptual-diagnostic experiment') and the obligation to deepen this theoretical explanation just before entering into her own analysis, she mentions the particular importance -mostly still to be played- of the work of Dworetzki (1939) in this sense with the following words:

The paper by Mrs. Dworetzki encountered much praise, however we have not been able to establish that one has taken her results into consideration. The first most important consequence would so be to raise the question: if, as Rorschach said, a certain way of perceiving the blots contains the hint of a certain mental structure, so by logic the 5 evolutionary stages of perception must correspond to 5 developmental levels of personality [right: cf. p. 111 above with further references]. Until now the attempt at such a control in a genetic way has failed to happen. This probably co-depends also from the fact that one has properly still too little dared to deal oneself with the problem of *interpretation*. In all the works and criticisms about the Rorschach test until now the question of interpretation as a psychological procedure has been too little considered. It constitutes however the axis of Rorschach's methodology; with the correctness of its interpretation rises and falls the diagnostic value of his test.

It is then absolutely necessary to take position on this question, even more so since the interpretation of the test has gradually become in general the central problem of test methodology as such. Each good psychotechnician that comes from experimental psychology *interprets* today the findings of his assessment, no matter if there it is about the assessment of intelligence or of vocational aptitude. We must then consider more closely the Rorschach test from the standpoint of general test methodology. (p. 6; our transl.)

Her developmental analysis of test methodology inside experimental psychology confirmed this characterological-interpretive growing tendency, of which Rorschach himself was then a true precursor, and that may be compared to the wider application of the *projective methodology* to other, non-projective tests in their original conception (Wechsler's, Bender's: cf. Anderson & Anderson 1951/1978). According to her, from this point of view it is indifferent if the Rorschach test assesses imagination or perception, the *personal*(itywise) interpretation of the test performance is possible both ways (as with tests that measure still other things), but from the moment one chooses one conception the *reliability* of the interpretation depends from a theoretical deepening of the functioning of this concept -perception-throughout the procedure (which part of this perception of the blots is physiological, which psychological, etc.: comp. Dworetzki above), which Rorschachers had not already done (at that time): she particularly recommends Katz's (1944) book for this purpose. Of the many perceptual processes investigated by experimental psychologists that may be involved she mentions discrimination, comparison, recognition, and in particular the tendency to complete (*Ergänzungstendenz*) incomplete Gestalts. Then, concentrating on the key issue of interpretation she makes notice how Rorschach assigned it to the test-subject ('*Deutenlassen von Zufallsformen*') which may give the wrong impression that the subsequent tester's evaluation is purely empirical, objective, quantitatively-statistically based (cf. Kuhn above); but with the help of a series of relevant quotations out of the '*Psychodiagnostik*' she demonstrates it is in fact still an interpretation, particularly every time the scoring judgment depends from uncertain factors or subjective considerations (*B* or *F*? *FFb* or *FbF*?), not to mention the further personal-characterological interpretation of these formal signs:

Not only the testee carries out an interpretation of the forms, but also the tester interprets in various modes and ways the findings of the examination.

To the test subject corresponds the *interpretation of the perception* (the stimulus), to the tester the *interpretation in the personal sense* (the testee has this or that nature). The testee undertakes there a *meaning interpretation*, while he tries to recognize in irregular forms a meaning, a shape, a figure; the tester undertakes a *symptomatic, characterological* or as Stern [sic!] says: a *personal* interpretation, while he considers the statements of the testee as expression of a mental attribute or structure. So we have as final result of the test: *the interpretation of an interpretation.*

Since each interpretation is much burdened by subjective factors, so the circumstance of the *double interpretation* in the test procedure constitutes purely theoretically considered a strong factor of the subjectivity of the test evaluation. The factor of subjectivity in the Rorschach test is therefore greater than in the interpretation of the tests applied by the psychotechnician, because in psychotechnics is interpreted the behavior or work product, therefore what the tester perceives in the testee himself, in the Rorschach test by contrast *he interprets an already undertaken interpretation (of the figures) by the testee...*

This double interpretation is however exactly that in which the psychologist trained in the methodology of tests sees the unreliability of the test, and which instils in him a distrust against the Rorschach test. (pp. 23-4; our transl.)

Besides indicating the fact that this interpretive evaluation requires scientific controls to judge its adequacy (cf. Binswanger), following Römer she stresses that the Rorschach test is a highly subjective method and carries with it the character of its creator, and following his model can only be correctly used by particularly gifted, empathic interpreters like Hans Zulliger (cf. chap. III.D.1 below). And just contrary to the evolution in experimental psychology, Rorschach began limiting his interpretive evaluation to the formal aspects to gradually pay due attention to content - aspects that should go hand in hand since both appear in the same perceptual act: very beautifully expressed...

One reads with pleasure, on purely aesthetic grounds, the construction of Rorschach's evaluations that are unique in their kind. Here shows itself the *formalist Rorschach* at its best; it is conceivable that he placed such an emphasis on the formal components of perception out of this disposition. He appears to us however like an architect, who builds a house about whose residents, the only ones that bestow character to the house, he states nothing definite himself. (p. 29; our transl.)

After some technical comments and recommendations (lightning, physiological states affecting vision, subject's repression of interpretations, interest or attention level, timing, "casual respon-ses", new plates, the dated character of the "Psychodiagnostics" terminology, color- and initial-shock, etc.), she concludes that the distantiation between psychiatrist and -experimental- psy-chologist has hampered the mutual benefit from each other's experience: the former from the study of scientific test methodology, and the latter from the systematic extension of the personal interpretation which the Rorschach has incarnated.

In his rather schematic essay on the theoretical foundations of Rorschach's test, Bohm (1951/1979) also reserves a special place for Gestalt psychology. There he makes a quite thorough enumeration and description of the main Gestalt -particularly Wertheimer's- laws, but afterwards their specific application to the Rorschach domain remains just at the level of mere indications: the "normal" succession as a function of the *objective attitude factor*; the *G*, *D* and *V* responses as "wholes, subwholes, and good forms" respectively; *B* interpretations as depending not only from previous kinesthetic experience, from where the widespread resort by interpreters to depth psychology; etc. His specific conclusion runs like this:

On the whole, one can say that Gestalt psychology, despite some valuable stimulations, has not offered "the" basis of the theory of the Rorschach. In this respect, it has rather disappointed, which depends, mainly, from the fact that its endorsers have occupied themselves much more with *general* psychological problems than with those of the psychology of personality. As briefly and rightly formulated by WITKIN and LEWIS [et al. 1954, p. 481] they "neglected the role of personal factors in perception". (p. 406; our translation)

The art psychologist Rudolf Arnheim constitutes an interesting case. In the Introduction to his 1954/1974 book "Art and Visual Perception" he presents his personal view in the following way:

The principles of my psychological thinking and many of the experiments I shall cite below derive from gestalt theory... The word *gestalt*, the common German noun for shape or form, has been applied since the beginning of our century to a body of scientific principles that were derived mainly from experiments in sensory perception. It is generally admitted that the foundations of our present knowledge of visual perception were laid in the laboratories of the gestalt psychologists, and my own development has been shaped by the theoretical and practical work of this school.

More specifically, from its beginnings gestalt psychology had a kinship to art. Art pervades the writings of Max Wertheimer, Wolfgang Köhler, and Kurt Koffka. Here and there the arts are explicitly mentioned, but what counts more is that the spirit underlying the reasoning of these men makes the artist feel at home. Indeed, something like an artistic vision of reality was needed to remind scientists that most natural phenomena are not described adequately if they are analyzed piece by piece. That a whole cannot be attained by the accretion of isolated parts was not something the artist had to be told. For centuries scientists had been able to say valuable things about reality by describing networks of mechanical relations; but at no time could a work of art have been made or understood by a mind unable to conceive the integrated structure of a whole. (pp. 4-5)

Despite a couple of confusions in his assessment of Rorschach's ideas his contributions nevertheless turn out to be always worthy. He begins (1951) by concentrating on the paramount issue of the *B* response. Maybe because of his not being an in-depth Rorschach, clinical practitioner, or more probably because of his concentration mainly on Rapaport's rationale, he became convinced of the fact that for Rorschach the movement response implied an actual or virtual displacement through space in the blot (illusory movement phenomenon); through a series of examples of the identical concept of 'movement' in artworks he demonstrates how things are the other way around, that paradoxically 'visual dynamics' do not flow freely unless any tendency to actual movement is rigorously checked by a balanced composition, offering in fact arguments in favor of Rorschach's similar conviction regarding bodily motility! (1921/1967 chaps. II.5.b & IV.4, cf. Kuhn 1953/1977 pp. 507-8; and contradicting that weak part of Rapaport et al.'s rationale: 1945-46/1968 pp. 355-7). He also contradicted furthermore Rorschach's assumed role of kinesthesia in this process because, in Arnheim's interpretation, this underlines one-sidedly the subjective contribution of the observer (inner feeling, eventually introversion in fantasy) supposedly neglecting the objective, dynamic Gestalt qualities of the visual stimulus itself: besides this being untrue as demonstrated by the recognition of the

greater 'movement' quality of some blots over others (cf. p. #III107 below⁵⁰), nothing in fact prevents this combined visual-kinesthetic (allo-autocentric: Schachtel 1950) intersensory perception from representing a superior level of object-subject shared experience like the one that constitutes precisely the artist's eternal goal (Schachtel 1959 pp. 179-81, comp. Arnheim pp. 276-8). In this last sense not only does he criticize Roschach's supposed limitation to "subject matter" (p. 278: while the Master always insisted on *form!*), but also his predecessors Beck (1933a) and Brosin & Fromm (1942) asserting that "in the few attempts that have been made to discuss the structure of the Rorschach [blot] patterns the tools of the modern psychology of perception have not been used" (p. 279). Let us pay attention to his interesting, brief Gestalt analysis of card II:

...since the attributions of meaning are induced by the figural patterns, it would seem useful to analyze their objective perceptual properties in terms of the gestalt rules of grouping, figure and ground, etc.⁵¹... For instance, in Card II, similarity of color suggests grouping of the reds against the blacks, while consistency of form ("good continuation") unites each red spot with the adjacent black area because of the continuous contour lines... the white central area readily assumes figure character because of its symmetrical shape, convexity, and enclosedness; but when the glance encompasses the whole card, this white area combines equally well with the outer white surface of the card into a background for the black figure. (p. 279)

Certainly, the clinical usefulness of this approach was demonstrated afterwards by the card studies of Schachtel and, later on, of the French psychoanalytic school. But we want to insist on the fact that, without diminishing the original quality of his followed-through contributions, Arnheim exaggerated somewhat his differences from traditional Rorschach practice: for instance when he asserted...

If perceptual organization is the counterpart of personality organization, as Klein and Schlesinger have recently suggested [from the contemporary, uprising 'new look' school on perception: Bruner & Krech 1949, p. 32; meeting by the way Bohm's criticism above], the most direct and striking reflection of the testee's personality might be the visual structure which he finds in the inkblots. Rorschach clinicians pay some attention to perceptual properties with regard to

⁵⁰ A direct comparison of the there referenced passage of Rapaport & al.'s book (1945-46/68 pp. 359-60, particularly sign #4) with the following words by Arnheim prove the latter entirely wrong on this score: "Rorschach clinicians use the 'popularity' of responses as an objective basis for the evaluation of individual behavior. A perceptual analysis of the cards would allow a comparison of individual interpretations with the objective properties of the stimuli. For instance, the degree of visual dynamics inherent in each pattern as a whole, as well as in parts, could be determined with some accuracy by application of the perceptual criteria which make for movement. This would provide a yardstick for measuring the extent to which a response conforms to, or deviates from, the stimulus" (p. 280).

⁵¹ Schachtel (cf. pp. 31-2 & 88-91 above), who followed his example in a very admirable way from a very akin aesthetic-phenomenological viewpoint (cf. Arnheim's previous quotation), made the following relevant precision: "A purely objective exploration of the different structure of each inkblot has been suggested by Rudolf Arnheim [1951]... Klein and Arnheim [1953, cf. below] have given an example of it in an analysis of card I... While their statement that 'the stimulus in itself is a perceptual thing that can be defined objectively by measurable shape, size, proportion, orientation, color, etc.' is quite true, their own analysis does not rely on objective measurement but much more on what I would call the human perspective, and rightly so" (1966 p. 33 footnote 22; comp. for ex. Arnheim's comments on 'expression' with Schachtel, p. 30).

color and shading, but they obtain information on whole vs. detail responses and on movement only indirectly-and therefore quite incom-pletely-through the content interpretations offered by the observers; (p. 280)

isn't that exactly the position sustained by Klopfer -here following Rorschach- with his motto that "the interplay between the structural characteristics of the stimulus material and the personality structure of the subject is reflected in certain formal categories" (& Kelley 1942, p.4)? Bohm's in-depth Gestaltic discussion of locations (comp. 1951/1972 chap. 4.A.I.1) also entirely contradicts Arnheim's last assertion.

In Klein & Arnheim's (1953) subsequent paper all these ideas are followed-through and applied in full detail to a thorough Gestaltic analysis of Rorschach's card I, finally giving a con-crete example of the kind of specific theoretical Rorschach contribution which a 'new look' per-ceptual approach can in fact offer - by contrast to other rather Rorschach-neglecting ones (comp. above, and Schachtel 1966 p. 1). We do not need to enter here into the many albeit interesting technical details of their analysis, the above example should suffice; we should rather concentra-te on the main theoretical conclusions to be derived. Besides an eye-opening, competent descrip-tion and qualification of the main perceptual features of our test material (for a continuation of this theoretical analysis, refer to pp. #III47-54 below), the most important one being in our eyes the complete refutation of the hypothesis that Rorschach's projective test works because of his plates being "unstructured" (as suggested by Frank, 1939b 3rd section pp. 402-5, 1948 chap. IV.1 pp. 48 seq.), these rather prove to be *ambiguous*: "The ink blots are suitable for projective work because they are ambiguous. Ambiguous patterns are not unstructured. They are combina-tions of different structures which are mutually exclusive... The Rorschach blots allow attribution to different, relatively clear-cut perceptual patterns which are mutually exclusive" (p. 61). More specifically, and to compare with what Arnheim had already said in his previous work...

It would not be difficult to show in detail that in the ten blots perceptual qualities counter-balance each other in such a way that mutually exclusive groupings would have an equal chance to occur, if neither memory traces nor personality factors influenced the act of vision... In all the cards, contours are organized in such a way that they may either lop off smaller units or swing across the vertical axis and thus connect areas in both halves of the blot. The symmetry of the whole blot makes for horizontal connection between corres-ponding form and color units and thus counteracts groupings within each half of the blot... The hierarchy of perceptual units within each card is also ambiguous; that is, different units compete for the role of dominant structural features which determine the organization of the rest. In consequence, the over-all structure of each blot can be seen in several mutually exclusive ways...

The question would be: What kind of pattern does the observer see when he looks at the card? Just as some artists interpret their environment by strongly dynamic forms while others prefer relatively static ones, testees could be expected to find significantly diffe-rent degrees of visual dynamics in each inkblot as a whole and in its parts. For instance, is Card I seen essentially as a

combination of three vertical blocks or as a system of soaring diagonals?... The modifying influence of the search for subject matter hides this basic response. (1951 pp. 279, 281)

It is easy for Arnheim to make these analytical distinctions, but how can we ask them from the common Rorschach test subject when -as he criticized himself: p. 279- not even experts as Beck or Brosin & Fromm were able to identify them? In contradiction to his last assertion, we believe Rorschach (1921/1967 chaps. I.2&3, II.1, IV.12, V.2, VI) was right making this detour via "subject matter" (*what might this be?*), a task easily understood by almost any subject, while insisting on the other hand on the fact that for the tester the main interpretive factors must be precisely the *perceptual-formal* ones (against Roemer); in fact, for Rorschach this purposely "distracting" task was an essential condition for the procedure to work: "L'épreuve d'inter-prétation des formes... fait strictement appel au 'libre choix'... Dans l'épreuve normale, les sujets, à de rares exceptions près (type G), se préoccupent du contenu des interprétations. Ils choisissent [alors] les composantes formelles de la perception d'après leurs dispositions personnelles" (1921/ 1967 chap. IV.2 pp. 61-2). But the creator of the method did clearly understand the basic role of the formal pattern and had already recognized that "Plate I... stimulates form and movement responses equally. Easy to interpret [as well] as a Whole and in Details. There are a number of small Details which [also] frequently give rise to answers" (chap. III.1); Klein and Arnheim just made these intuitions of Rorschach's more explicit:

The structure of the visual pattern which is spontaneously perceived may reveal a direct and elementary kinship with the dynamics of the observer's personality. For instance, one person may perceive Card I as a relatively stable and static configuration of vertical and horizontal units, while another may see triangular shapes flying away obliquely from the central axis [comp. their fig. 6 on p. 66, last two 'skeletons'; and Rorschach loc. cit.]. This isomorphism of percept and personality may conceivably offer a more immediate access to the root pattern of psychological forces than the detour via subject matter...

In most cases, a structural hierarchy is created by the relative strength of the whole and the parts. For instance, in Card V the whole pattern predominates, even though sub-wholes, such as the pairs of prongs, can be distinguished; whereas in Card X the unity of the whole is threatened by the highly self-contained parts but still discernible. A hierarchy is not ambiguous. But when the unity of the whole is about as strong as the independence of the parts, subordination gives way to an ambiguous co-ordination of two different conceptions which are mutually exclusive.

In Card I, the almost homogeneous blackness of the blot, as distinguished from the white ground, together with its symmetry in relation to a central vertical axis, establishes a strongly unified pattern... Although the symmetry of the whole blot enhances unity, effective subdivision is produced, e.g., by the internal white areas... They establish a central black column... which is symmetrical in itself and therefore tends to be a relatively self-contained unit. This induces self-containedness also in the lateral areas... which are not symmetrical in themselves and therefore have much less unity of their own. Thus the blot is easily subdivided vertically into three columns. But this

subdivision is delicately balanced against the conception of the whole blot as one unit. If the four white spots were larger, the blot might break up irreparably into three entities; if they were smaller, they might be too weak to counteract the over-all symmetry. Rorschach chose his cards, with admirable sensitivity, in such a way that perceptual ambiguities are created throughout by the balance of different, mutually exclusive conceptions [comp. Rorschach, loc. cit.].

In addition to the splitting-up of the total pattern into three vertical units, many other subdivisions are possible, all the way down to the smallest detail... In the Rorschach blots, the position of the parts is often ambiguous in that they fit equally well into more than one context...

Once the main perceptual traits of a pattern have been analyzed, it becomes possible to describe the expressive qualities that derive from them. For instance, there is the stability of horizontal-vertical axes as against the excitement and tension of oblique ones [cf. still Card I above]... The expression conveyed by a visual pattern will be as ambiguous as the perceptual structure that creates it... the objective expressive properties of the stimulus can be compared with what individual observers report [or choose, or emphasize] to see. (1953 pp. 60, 62-3, 70)

The continued fruitfulness of this kind of analysis will be further demonstrated in chap. III.D.2 with a more direct relationship with Rorschach's system of formal categories. Anyway Arnheim has the undisputable merit of having been able to clearly demonstrate, after Frank's first approximation, the true functioning of this aspect of the Rorschach response process.

In his praise-deserving attempt to find help in several personality theories for developing Rorschach theory, Holt (1954) dedicated due attention to Kurt Lewin which should be a promising undertaking for us here since the latter represents practically the only Gestalt psychologist interested in personality - the usual 'new lookers' criticism⁵². Let us follow his analysis on this point:

Topological and vector psychology has some promising features as a theory for our purposes, even though Lewin does not seem to have written anything about the Rorschach test. To begin with, his basic formula, $B = f(P, E)$, is a constant reminder to us that behavior must be explained always in terms of forces deriving from the environment (E) as well as from within the person (P). In field theory, E is not the objective physical environment; it is the subject's "private world," his own world as he sees it and as it has effects on him. Since L. K. Frank has told us that the Rorschach and other projective techniques are *par excellence* ways of getting at the subject's private world, this might appear to be a happy beginning.

Unfortunately, however, Lewin does not provide more than occasional hints to guide us in constructing the life space out of what he called "the hull of

⁵² Even more so since his concepts were so important to another projective theorist, Susan Deri (cf. 1949, 1984), the best Szondi of her time and the first able to offer a theoretical rationale for this test, issue to which we will also give deserved attention in this Thesis (chap. III.C.2) due to its parallel relevance for Rorschach theorization.

physical facts". It is not that he failed to recognize this as a problem; he was simply more interested in problems of action than those of perception, and wanted to explain overt behavior in terms of an already created personal world. Consequently, we find at the outset that the very problems that are central for Rorschach theory are passed over in Lewin's field theory...

...Because of Lewin's strong ahistorical emphasis, he constructed a system that was limited to momentary dynamic constellations. As such it was excellent for representing the kind of interpersonal situation created in Rorschach testing, and for clarifying the complex nature of this apparently simple relationship for Rorschach examiners. But it had no place for the representation of enduring features of personality, no vocabulary for discussing the personality trends that we usually diagnose from the Rorschach. (pp. 515-7)

He concludes his mostly disappointed excursion with these words:

As a sort of concluding footnote on Lewin, it might be noted that one reason for his neglect of perception may well have been the fact that his colleagues Köhler, Koffka, and Wertheimer had concentrated so much of their effort within this very field. By the same token, they tended to leave problems dealing with the total person up to him; the concluding section on personality in Koffka's monumental *Principles* [1935] is brief-barely three pages-and disappointing. There are many features of Gestalt psychology that look hopeful for Rorschach rationale (for example: emphasis on organization, the super-summative nature that is invoked in pattern-analysis, careful analysis of perceptual phenomena in terms of a definite brain model, the theory of traces), but its formulations are consistently aimed at the general case. Thus, the subtle and complex propositions of Koffka and Köhler about the process of recognition are not directly helpful because they never suggest how individual variations might come about or what might determine them. Koffka says nothing, for example, about ways in which motivation may affect perception. As Bruner puts it, "Gestalt theory has means of handling variables like set, motive, value and past experience [in their influence on perception] . . . But it has not exploited these means"... It is probably not accidental that quite a few leading Rorschach workers [Beck, Klopfer...] have their main allegiance in academic psychology to the Gestalt school, but so far none of them has been able to add much to our understanding of the test through attempts to apply Gestalt principles to it. (pp. 519-20)

This criticism clearly echoes the ones of Bohm and Arnheim above. Anyway, for another paradoxical and definitely usable aspect of Lewin's theory refer to the previous section (p. 125 above).

Following the early example of Binswanger and others, and predating the firmly defended position of Blatt and Leichtman (cf. pp. #III56-63 below), Gibson (1956) questioned the nature of the Rorschach task as specifically one of perception -thus entering in contradiction with all the above reviewed authors- proposing the alternate formula of "picture-perception". Hence the inkblots in his eyes become *pictures*:

A picture can be defined in objective terms. It is a physical surface so processed that it can reflect to an eye more or less the same sheaf of light-rays

as would the original object or situation for which it substitutes. This definition implies that a picture is always man-made, that is to say a fabricated source of optical stimulation, and that it is always an intended substitute for something removed in space or time. Whether it is traced, or painted by hand, or produced by photography, or in any other way makes no difference for the definition. (p. 203)

Gibson makes the further precision that the Rorschach's inkblots are pictures "with extremely low fidelity" (p. 205), such as an 'abstract' (non-representative) painting. This sort of aesthetic conception of Rorschach's plates certainly coincides with the ideas of many other authors: particularly phenomenologists like Binswanger, Kuhn and Minkowska (cf. section C earlier), also Arnheim above, the already mentioned Leichtman, and Schachtel below, and even -we believe- with Rorschach's own intentions (cf. pp. #III33-4 and footnote #16 below, and Schachtel 1966 p. 26); but it does not do complete justice to all aspects of his plastic creation which *simultaneously and willfully also contain accidental, no voluntarily-man-made features at all* as will be fully discussed later on (cf. pp. 75-6 above and #III47-54 below). Anyway, the conclusion for Gibson is clear:

...Insofar as Rorschach reactions are diagnostic of personality, it is not because perception as such is diagnostic of personality or because the "structure" of perception reveals the "structure" of personality. *It is because the perceptual game played with pictures of low fidelity is diagnostic of personality.*

In order to make progress with the Rorschach experiment, an explicit and testable theory of visual perception is necessary. Within such a general framework, I suggest, a special theory of pictorial perception is what we need. To remain satisfied with a loose application of the Gestalt concept of perceptual organization is not sufficient. The vague notion that all perception consists of the structuring of unstructured stimulation is in danger of becoming a sterile formula, if it is not actually misleading. We must analyze stimulation, including the peculiar optical variables produced by light reflected from paper on which ink has been distributed by the unusual procedure we call blotting. There are surely still many untried variations of this procedure. The opportunities for experimental research are wide open. (p. 206)

This was precisely the suggestion followed by Leichtman (1996b; cf. pp. 123-5) and as already indicated will be confronted later on.

Bash (1957, 1983b) made an interesting contribution in an original sense. Following the concepts of the less known Gestalt author W. Metzger about the three main 'properties of the whole', he believes to have found hints towards a theoretical foundation of Rorschach's determinants: *Essence* (expressive or physiognomic properties of things: for ex. "friendly") includes a certain 'feeling value' i.e. arouses affect and is then related to the visual experience of color, a connection explicitly made by Metzger himself by the way; *Quality* (material state or properties: "transparent") is according to Bash best seen in shading and so represents literally and psychologically the quality of moods; and *Structure* (organization and articulation properties: "straight") is easily related to form and, since Metzger included not only static spatial structures but also dynamic-transitional ones (for ex. "crescendo"), also

to movement. The paper is very suggestive -but also very short- and points to a definite *systematization* of this dimension of Rorschach's scoring schema according to the Gestalt theory of this author, whose phenomeno-logical observations strongly reminds us of Peirce's also triadic system (refer to pp. #III122-8 below). But Metzger's three concepts are not as clear, distinct enough to our eyes and so inevitably doubts appear in their application to Rorschach's determinant categories, even in his own examples: "brightness and color profile" are also mentioned as related to Structure, "mood" and "gloomy" as related to Essence, and just how to conciliate the experience of "the most simple system of [6] colors" with a *whole*-property (by contrast to light-dark: cf. Bohm 1959/ 1977 and our discussion in chap. III.D.2 below) remains unclear to us. We have to leave open the issue of the eventual, possible articulation of these ideas with the ones of Peirce which were so extremely clarifying to us.

Michael Wertheimer (1957)⁵³ offered sort of a more organized overview of the successive contributions from this tradition, since he still complained of the as yet insufficient perception-theoretical interest from the Rorschach worker. He begins by reviewing, with examples, the demonstrated autochthonous (stimulus) principles operative in the Rorschach, mostly Max Wert-heimer's: similarity, proximity, symmetry, good continuation, closure, contours, figure-ground, perspective cues, physiognomic perception (Werner), visual dynamics (Arnheim), dependent part qualities, color perception, etc.; two or three short quotations should highlight particularly important issues he calls attention to in this part of his paper:

The subject responds to a total organization of the material on the card; he sees it as one gestalt (or, in time, as several different ones). *The interrelatedness of the total percept is attested to by the concept of determinant*; if any determinant were changed, the total percept would undergo a reorganization. In Tinbergen's sense, the determinants are "releasers" (as also pointed out by Berliner); a determinant is that without which the response would be different. (p. 209, italics added)

...But in the case of the Rorschach blot [following Klein & Arnheim's analysis] there are more alternative figure-ground organizations possible than in such traditional diagrams as Rubin's vase; *perhaps one could call the Rorschach stimuli multiple reversible figures*, in that several equally, or almost equally "prägnant" organizations are possible for most cards... (p. 210, italics added)

Before leaving the area of autochthonous factors, one must mention that *the subject of course responds not to the blots or cards alone, but to the entire situation within which he finds himself*, including the room, the examiner and his manner, the circumstances leading up to his taking of the test, and the like. Thus, among other things, the subject's perception of the examiner and of the subject's relation to the examiner will also affect the responses he produces. (p. 211, italics added)

He passes on then to an enumeration of the complementary intra-individual principles of perceptual organization such as set, motivation, personal values, or past

⁵³ We wonder if there is a family relationship to Max Wertheimer, head of the Gestalt 'Berlin school'.

experience, on which 'new look' researchers have particularly insisted and which coincide, of course, with the Rorschach's personality-diagnostic intent. It is here that he introduces some clarifying synthesizing formulas:

...It is of course just such factors which are the Rorschach worker's chief concern; it is assumed that through his perceptual responses, the subject's personality structure is laid bare. Bruner and others have tried to arrive at a formulation of the influence of such factors; one of the most widely accepted seems to be that their influence on the percept is a direct function of the strength of these factors and an inverse function of the structural strength of the autochthonous factors in the stimulus... From this it follows that with more ambiguous material, a greater influence of the personality factors can be expected...

The Rorschach blots are indeed ambiguous, at least for the examiner, in the sense that the stimulus material is perceptually unstable; the stimulus complex and the autochthonous factors, as mentioned above, permit many equally or almost equally "prägnant" organizations, and hence leave room for the operation of factors within the individual. Strictly speaking, then, it is not correct to consider the Rorschach card "unstructured" [as Schafer did]; rather, it is a multiple reversible figure, with many possible alternative organizations. Under such circumstances, one would expect from the Bruner kind of formulation that the personality factors will contribute rather heavily to the total variance, and that therefore the Rorschach is admirably suited to its task. (pp. 211-2)

Very neat, but the persistent problem with the Rorschach research, Wertheimer adds, is that it has naturally tended to side with this latter more recent and less firmly established side of experimental perceptual psychology whose principles are not completely systematized somewhat disregarding the former, falling necessarily back into intuition and the phenomenological method; he does not in fact denigrate the latter, but stresses the need to develop also the former as applied to the Rorschach so there could eventually be a more mutually profitable 'inter-penetration'. He admits that the Rorschach can and does contribute to the scientific study of perception, praising for ex. -between others- its definite contribution in the study of the development of perception (cf. previous section). The difference according to him, apart from the already discussed issue of being "one step further removed from the actual data" (p. 213: "inter-pretations of interpretations", cf. Koffka and Baumgarten-Tramer above), lies in the contrasting scientific approaches between Rorschach expert and perceptual researcher, the latter possessing a theoretical system (comp. Koffka above) and being thus able to work in an hypothetico-deductive way out of reach of the Rorschacher: we are in fact one of those few contrasting "Rorschach analysts who try to use a hypothetico-deductive system" he mentions (cf. pp. #III6-7, 85-6, 103 below), but who does furthermore truly attempt to overcome the limitation he also indicates that "the entire system must remain within the confines of a single Rorschach protocol" (p. 213, cf. next chapter).

As we have seen the work inside this tradition has concentrated generally on the issue of Rorschach response process, not only from the formal-perceptual point of

view but also regarding the role to be played by content in it (cf. above Koffka stressing it, Arnheim diminishing it respectively). The work of Draguns, Haley & Phillips (1968) fits into this latter trend. With an absolutely uncommon, laudable attention to the international literature they review many theoretical (mostly experimental-psychological, perceptual as well as 'new look') accounts for the already established but imperfect diagnostic value of Rorschach content. From a general viewpoint they voice their allegiance to Dalla Volta's 'ambiguous perception' conception of the Rorschach response (essentially the same as Blatt's and Leichtman's 'representational' one, cf. pp. #III56-64 & 79c below) "...that falls in the borderlands of perception, imagination, and cognition..." (p. 17), which they equate to Metzger's "...'fundamental qualities' (Wesenseigen-schaften) that are perceived over and above the objective character of a configuration" (loc. cit.; cf. above). In other words, since according to them "...even a disturbed schizophrenic does not 'see' a face, an animal, or a pelvis in a Rorschach card; rather, he operates on the basis of an assumed analogy" (loc. cit), focusing on this content-assigning process can throw light on the entire response process which they pass on to review from its classical three intervening factors. 1) The stimulus: criticizing traditional projective theory that one-sidedly equates the blots with a "blank screen" disregarding perceptual and cognitive general laws, they cite research data that completely contradicts this suggesting two novel, relevant conclusions:

For one, it has been conclusively established that projective test stimuli are not maximally or completely ambiguous [rather, unstructured]. Further, it has been demonstrated that wholly amorphous stimuli are not conducive to the externalization of personally revealing motive states and themes. Instead experimental results... suggest that affect arousing properties accrue particularly to stimuli that are presented just below the level of recognition and which, consequently, may be described as being only slightly ambiguous [we would say instead, slightly unstructured but *very* ambiguous]. These results suggest the need for focusing on the stimulus value or demand characteristics of projective test materials, including the Rorschach inkblots. (p. 17; this is almost exactly Arnheim's theoretical position above, except for his formal-over-content emphasis, whose terminology we prefer to retain)

In fact this had already been done in the earlier Rorschach manuals from a clinical viewpoint (specific 'shocks', etc.). They suggest on their side a "laborious and time-consuming" content frequency tabulation separately for individual cards and even for suggestive blot areas, a procedure already criticized by several Gestaltists above, that would offer relatively objective "thresholds" for interpretation which would allow the application of the following principles derived from Bruner's 'hypothesis theory' (cf. Michael Wertheimer above): the strength of a perceptual-cognitive hypothesis (a given personal preoccupation) would be greater.. a) the rarer the content *per se* (*Sex*, by contrast to *T*); b) the more unusual the area ("blood" on card I, by contrast to II or III); c) the greater the accompanying affect ("fighting", by contrast to "facing"); d) the more elaborate the percept (specific to the subject); and e) the more frequent the content (5 *Sex* resps., by contrast to 1). They indicate how Rorschach researchers have only concentrated on the latter one.

2) The subject: however, since the Rorschach stimuli are constant and the responses variable, other influences must also determine individual responses...

...we may plausibly refer to personality, in the sense of the individual's unique accumulation of past experience... however... given the variety and scope of impressions assembled during an individual's lifetime, what factors govern the selection of impressions that are actually imposed upon the inkblots? (p. 19)

Several of these possible subjective determiners of response content indicated by the theoretical literature are then reviewed: *familiarity* certainly but only to a limited extent since if it "were the dominant or the sole concern, the sociological variables of culture, ethnicity, class, and occupation would be the principal sources of interpersonal variation in Rorschach content", which is not the case; concerning the intensely investigated topic of *drive state* the accumulated data suggest "...that the Rorschach inkblots are an unclear and uncertain screen for the projection of" them (p. 20), as exemplified by the homosexuality content research (Salomon's work, a key omission in their bibliography, may explain much of this difficulty with his formal vs. content theoretical arguments: 1959b, 1962, cf. also end of section B.2 above); not only blot structure but also internal barriers like *conflict* may also inhibit certain contents; personal perceptual *style* (leveling-sharpening, scanning-focusing...) may also complicate the drive issue, sometimes reducing and other magnifying the same motivational-content expression in different individuals; they also complain of the few research done on *defense mechanisms* and how they may affect the content manifestation of needs, point that makes us criticize anew the overlooking of Salomon's relevant research (1959a, 1962); but changing point of view, how about the predominant affectively neutral content of most Rorschach protocols? From the work of several authors out of the psychoanalytic traditions (Baer, Bohm...) and particularly the theory of the anxiety-arising triggering the Rorschach response process, they draw the conclusion that "Rorschach content provides clues to both the person's unfulfilled drives and desires combined with his most successful devices for coping with the world at large" (p. 25) the latter explaining the innocuous contents; another explanation comes, of course, from the widely shared psychoanalytic concept of (indirect, camouflaged) *symbolization* of drives in content.

3) The relationship: *direct examiner influences* based on his general attitude (cf. Koffka's 'experiment' above) have proven to affect the content elicited; *selective elicitations of contents* even unconsciously depending from the hypothesis the tester intends to prove are also to be counted with, which makes them recommend the 'double blind' method in research; more generally, what Schachtel has called the *subjective definitions of the test situation* based on the testee's preconceptions or misconceptions enters also in relationship with the former factors thus producing significant differences in content (cf. again "Dorothy" above); but remains the general issue of the real *modifiability of Rorschach content* under volitional influences, with Rorschach himself and his more classical followers (cf. Salomon again!) minimizing the importance of this eventuality due to their predominantly formal approach while others -themselves included- regard content clues as highly significant and not so much susceptible to conscious modification:

The argument can in part be empirically resolved by using content and more structural perceptual clues separately as bases for interpretive statements, and by checking the results obtained by these two operations against *external and objective criteria*. There is only a small number of studies... that are addressed to this issue; their results point to the superiority of content indices over formal scores as sources of valid *externally verified inferences* about subjects' personalities. (pp. 28-9, italics added)

Since it contradicts an essential tenet of the method, this last issue becomes of key importance and we will dedicate some adequate discussion to it. The above suggestion immediately recalls to mind Römer's (1938 pp. 24-6, 1948 pp. 531-3, 1967) experiment or "competition" between him and Rorschach concerning the interpretation of the record of a famous Diplomat taken *with the former's Symbol Test series*: he tells us...

On the occasion of a two-week visit in Herisau in October, 1921, I brought Rorschach the protocol of a German diplomat. What particularly elicited Rorschach's attention was the symbolic content of the interpretations. This situation made an analysis desirable. Accordingly, Rorschach readily agreed to a content evaluation, and a plan was formulated. Rorschach would make a purely formal analysis with the technique he had developed, and I would write an analysis upon the basis of only a content evaluation. The two analyses, it was decided, would be turned over for evaluation to a lady of the Swiss aristocracy, who was intimately familiar with the personality of this German diplomat. She was requested to decide which analysis, from her point of view, was most typical of this personality. She decided without qualification in favor of the content analysis.

From this moment Rorschach, who especially valued this woman's judgment regarding people, voluntarily gave the go-ahead to content analysis, a decision diametrically opposed to the opinion which he had expressed in his book, *Psychodiagnostics*. (1967, p. 187)

So, Roemer's results go in the same sense as the ones referenced by Draguns et al., even when compared to the best formalist of all (Baumgarten-Tramer above)! However, the problem with this account of Roemer is that it finds itself in the context of the biased, self-serving writings of a person that dedicated his entire work - unsuccessfully- to "supplant" Rorschach (2004, pp. 164-6 footnote 1). Another, more reliable disciple of Rorschach offers us another side of the story:

Hermann Rorschach had not considered his report "on a perceptual-diagnostic experiment" as incapable of expansion... Between his first disciples in Switzerland circulated for learning purposes a number of interpretations along with recorded protocols and calculations of form-interpretation tests that had *Rorschach* as the author, and which are witness of the "astonishing, almost dizzy height" [*Oberholzer* in the Introduction of the above mentioned essay", added in a footnote] of the evaluation of the findings. In front of me lie 18 such works of *Rorschach*, copies and originals. They stem from the years 1921-1922, the last two being dated III/1922 [a month or less before his death, and are so contemporary to the one published as chap. VII of *Psychodiagnostics*].

The test subjects are in 12 cases⁵⁴ known, in part by me personally known musicians, painters, writers, scientists, the remaining concern young persons of both sexes, educated and employed, students and a twelve-year-old girl. The protocols were taken by friends and acquaintances of *Rorschach*, the diagnoses being thus all so-called "blind diagnoses". They show so very correct images of the test subjects that one could identify them without nothing further, even if one did not know their names. This might be the reason why nobody published the expertises, although they are instructive in the highest degree and let us learn a variety of things that don't let themselves be taken out of the "Psychodiagnostics" [because of its compressed examples]...

We find nowhere in the later interpretations of *Rorschach* an indication that he held the test plates as inadequate, or that he considered this or that part or [formal] commitment in the "Psychodiagnostics" as misleading or quite false ["Roemer is of this opinion..." added in a footnote, cf. 1938]. I don't remember either that he had ever expressed himself in this sense on the occasion of the very thorough discussions in the bosom of the Swiss Psycho-analytic Society or as guest in *Oberholzer's* house... *Rorschach* was himself afraid of [content] evaluating a test protocol by analogy to the dream and daydream symbolism. Such a technique seemed to him too close to "wild Psychoanalysis" - he didn't want the tester to "interpret in" his own "complexes" in the test results of a test subject. When such analogies - in his later interpretations - pressed themselves upon him, then he formulated them with the most extreme caution with the terms "perhaps", "possibly", "it could be" and so forth. As every real psychoanalyst he was of the conviction that symbols let themselves be interpreted with certainty only when one can support oneself on the respective associations of the test subject. (Zulliger 1949a, pp. 293-5; our translation)

Roemer reserves for himself the merit of having brought to Rorschach's attention the higher degree of importance of content interpretation than the latter initially recognized, and that is probably true since Rorschach himself explicitly and repeatedly referred to the Diplomat's case in his psychoanalytic interpretation of Oberholzer's case (he said "politician" for secrecy purposes), a measure of how impressed he was by it; but let us pay careful attention to the comments with which he accompanied these references, in line with Zulliger's quotation above:

...Si donc il y a des interprétations qui, dans l'épreuve d'interprétation des formes, trahissent des contenus de complexes, nous nous attendrons à les trouver en première place parmi les réponses individuelles et originales qui sont aussi bien des inter-prétations K [B] que des interprétations C [Fb], puisque dans ces interprétations il y a des rapports entre le formel et le substantiel.

Tout d'abord l'hypothèse de l'existence de tels rapports s'est vérifiée pour les inter-prétations K. *Sans doute ce qui intervient ici n'est pas tellement l'objet interprété lui-même [le contenu] - aussi peu que dans l'interprétation du contenu manifeste du rêve l'image rêvée intervient - c'est l'allure déterminée*

⁵⁴ We received via Roland Kuhn, himself at his time disciple of Zulliger's, a copy of this dozen reports (from where we extracted case A in chapter IV below) which allow us to confirm Zulliger's assertions first-hand.

des kinesthésies [le formel]... le protocole d'un homme politique qui m'est parvenu il n'y a pas longtemps comporte comme unique interprétation kinesthésique deux Dieux géants qui s'accrochent à quelque chose [pl. VI de Roemer: 1967 pp. 193 & 191]. A côté de cela se trouvent plusieurs interprétations-couleur originales qui reproduisent toujours le même thème: intérieur de la terre, intérieur d'un volcan, noyau de la terre - comme chez notre sujet [d'Oberholzer] - quelques interprétations abstraites auxquelles il a été également incité d'abord par la ligne médiane puis par les détails de l'image situés dans le milieu et qui tournent autour d'un thème déterminé: le germe duquel tout doit sortir [pls. IV, V, VI et VII de Roemer: 1967 pp. 190-3]. Ainsi donc d'un côté des Dieux géants, de l'autre l'intérieur de la terre, et le germe duquel on tire tout, ce qui porte au moins à supposer l'existence d'imaginaires cosmogoniques et permet de deviner pourquoi l'homme en vint à se faire politicien et surtout organisateur d'édifications politiques. *De telles expériences permettent de conclure que les contenus des interprétations, dans l'épreuve d'interprétation des formes, peu-vent aussi être significatifs - significatifs avant tout par les relations qui existent entre la "forme" et le contenu, entre le formel et le substantiel de la perception.* [pp. 237-8, italics added]

...Mais le problème: dans quelle mesure les contenus de telles interprétations appartiennent-ils au conscient et dans quelle mesure à l'inconscient, n'a pas pu être résolu sauf dans quelques cas qui s'y prêtaient. Un cas de ce genre est celui du politicien dont nous avons déjà parlé, le constructeur de mondes. Il revenait toujours au point central de la terre, au chaos, à l'intérieur de la terre, dans ses interprétations-couleur, et aux Dieux géants dans ses interprétations kinesthésiques, et nous concluons: il veut reconstruire lui-même la terre. *Mais ce n'est là que le contenu manifeste, et le contenu latent dit autre chose:* ses dieux géants se trouvent dans une position singulière, car les kinesthésies donnent l'image de la position fœtale. Le point central de la terre et l'intérieur de la terre pourraient, d'après cela, signifier tout autre chose, peut-être le corps maternel [phantasme de régression au sein maternel donc]. Cela voudrait dire que les réponses-couleur pénètrent beaucoup plus profondément dans les complexes qu'il ne le paraît d'abord, que l'affectivité égocentrique a réellement sa source dans les psychismes les plus chargés d'affect et que *les contenus des interprétations-couleur doivent être évalués à peu près comme le sont les contenus manifestes du rêve par comparaison avec les contenus latents qui ne s'en dégagent que par l'analyse [formel] des rêves.* (1921/1967 pp. 241-2, italics added)

So Rorschach's own approach to inkblot responses content interpretation was still in the main formally shaped, *so much like Freud's approach to dreams manifest content interpretation* and at the same time so little like Roemer's who wanted to discard the formal method of analysis altogether (1938 p. 23), the former's *specific and most original scientific accomplishment!*: the detailed discussion and satisfactory demonstration of this point is to be found in chap. III.B.1 below, where we equate

Roemer's case to the one of Stekel *vis-à-vis* Freud⁵⁵. That is the reason why we consider potentially dangerous Draguns et al.'s assessment above, and in need of qualification.

First of all, and to stay still with the prototypical case of Roemer's "bet" against Rorschach, we must keep in mind that the Diplomat *was tested only with the former's plates* which were not so well-known to Rorschach and this may have understandably affected the accuracy of his formal evaluation (cf. Rorschach 2004, letter 226 of 15/III/22 p. 430 and endnotes 1 & 2 p. 432); more importantly, this material eventually proved to be formally "unbalanced" by comparison to Rorschach's own, i.e. generating in general less *B* and more *Fb*-responses (comp. the Diplomat's resps. above) and so was bound to give a distorted assessment of the crucial Experience Type, despite Roemer's later (1967) repeated assertions to the contrary defending their being "parallel" (cf. pp. #III99-100 below) and "really comparable" that stand in sharp contrast to Rorschach's repeated specific comments in his letters to him (cf. p. #III108 below). Second, and still connected with this case but already touching the issue raised by Draguns et al., we don't think an exclusively or predominantly content interpretive approach should be applied to Rorschach's classical plates since *this procedure runs counter to their true nature* thus compromising the eventual results: as so clearly viewed and expressed by Schachtel...

...in Rorschach's thinking, content interpretation is always closely linked to the specific perceptual quality of the response as well as the total configuration of the test record. There are good reasons for not using specific content outside of this linkage for [symbolic] interpretation... The reason for this lies in the fact, already stated by Rorschach, that his test does not elicit a "free flow from the subconscious" but demands adaptation to given, external stimuli. Such adaptation is "an activity of the 'fonction du réel.'"... The reason that content, by itself, is of relatively little value and unreliable as a diagnostic indicator lies in the fact that *Rorschach's test was not constructed and not intended to use verbal content of the responses as a basis for diagnostic conclusions regarding personality structure and dynamics, unconscious trends and personal interests.* There are other instruments available and more suitable for the exploration of possible symbolic and other meanings of verbal content. (1966 pp. 258-9, italics added)

In exact opposition to its formal imperfections, Roemer's test may be just one of those. As already recognized by Draguns et al. the concrete perceptual features of the (Rorschach) stimulus limits content possibilities, fact clearly demonstrated also by Roemer's statistics locating the normative *T%* of his plates in a low 25-30% (1967 p. 193). Now, anyone may say to us: "OK, your arguments are reasonable and the first may even explain Rorschach's losing his 'bet' with Roemer, but doesn't the second make in fact even more impressive the superior content-interpretive results obtained

⁵⁵ The following delightful comment by Freud will convey exactly what we mean: "...But Stekel[']s... success in the field of symbolism made him feel he had surpassed Freud. He was fond of expressing this estimate of himself half-modestly by saying that a dwarf on the shoulder of a giant could see farther than the giant himself. When Freud heard this he grimly commented: 'That may be true, but a louse on the head of an astronomer does not.' " (Jones 1955, p. 136).

with Rorschach's plates referenced by Draguns et al.?" Here is where the third and most crucial qualification finds its place: *Rorschach did not aim his formal assessments mainly towards the external appearance or behavior of the subject* (cf. italics in Draguns & al. quotation above) *but to the hidden personality structure ('Erlebnistypus': Beck's 1952 p. 58 'inner resources', French 'résonance intime'; cf. 1921/1967 chap. IV.5), and the more superficial-conscious content aspect may just be precisely closer to that opposite aim.* Not long afterwards their exchange concerning the Diplomat, and in response to Roemer's contention that "again and again I seek after the 'impression, which the test subject makes in life [*Leben*, by contrast to *Erleben*]", the better to characterize it" (Rorschach 2004, p. 381), Rorschach wrote him in one of his last letters (28/1/22):

The "impression, which the test subject makes in life", is a difficult question. *There will always be enough differences between test findings and plain observation.* With the impression, which the person makes in life, it is perhaps something similar than with knowledge. There is so much "learned" possible, so much drill effect. *Basically it seems unreasonable to me to expect from the test that it should also answer these questions.* At best it will still come out the impression which he makes in emotional relationship, however motility and behavioral activity seemingly will always could be determined only uncertainly. It enters there a volitional moment that still is not always quite achieved out of the test, and still other things... *Now in the test come however to light above all the dispositional factors, the compensatory factors [in Jung's sense: see next section F] however only imperfectly, sometimes overflowed, then again only in part and much too unclearly...* (2004 p. 412; our translation, italics added)

This crucial fact is what also explains Rorschach's (chap. V.1) apparently -structurally-'schizo-phrenic' results in normal people just children or siblings of true schizophrenics, which is precisely the achievement that makes his method so special, so sensitive, so unlike "plain observation". That said, let us pay attention to Roemer's more superficial, mostly descriptive assessment of the famous case in question:

...By a direct comparison of the tests result of the diplomat with those of Rorschach, the reader can best attain an impression of the fruitful possibilities offered by this [his Symbol-] test series for *achieving a symbolism of the personal atmosphere of the subject...* In a composite overview, there stands a world of beautiful pretense and ideas of oriental splendor in which lotus flowers bloom and trembling water lillies swim on the surface of Indian ponds⁵⁶. Opposed to this idyllic world is another world with symbols of seclusion, ominous suppression and menace. Both themes have a harmonious exaggeration and unreality. Between them stands a motive of outright aggression, which unexpectedly thrusts itself out from an obviously repressed psychic stratum... It is as if a landscape, which is couched in nocturnal darkness, is suddenly illuminated and revealed through the lightening. *Actually*

⁵⁶ We believe it a fair assumption to wonder if this Diplomat was actually at some time appointed in the Far East; we tried to check for some confirmation in Rorschach's correspondence (2004) but found no relevant reference about either the identity of this subject or his whereabouts.

this unusual combination, according to the judgment of the previously mentioned lady of the Swiss aristocracy, was the typical personality pattern of this diplomat. The contrast perfectly portrayed his true nature; (Roemer 1967, pp. 190 & 193; italics added)

and compare it to Rorschach's for sure deeper, more dynamic/unmasking evaluation (comp. also his comments out of Oberholzer's case study above; cf. Ellenberger 1970 p. 537, 1966/1995):

From Rorschach's analysis of the protocol the following points are especially noted: ...Many types of whole responses can be noted... [between them] a quickly formulated conscious construct [type], often in a compulsive manner (most frequent)... In the *experience balance (Erlebnistyp)*... introversion is clearly repressed. This... leads to a confabulation, which is consciously cultivated. On the whole, there is here represented an extratensive type. His formulations are very rapid, as if he were continually engaged in clambering. When hasty conclusions must be reached, the paroxysmal anxiety appears, but otherwise he functions with very adequate *compensatory mechanisms* [cf. previous quotation]. The *consciousness* is potent, although his all too conscious attitudes and impressions are frequently spoiled by obtruding intuition. Doubtless industrious, he can give the *outward impression* of a zealous, striving individual. *In the subconscious*, grandiose ideas play a very significant role. In the *contents* one notes a preference for stable forms, such as architecture and landscapes, *as compensation for the labile state of the affect*... With respect to the *aggregate data* there is noted, despite all the expanse, a restless, mildly anxious uncertainty. *This he seeks to conceal* through a strong, conscious adjustment to the environment and an emphasis upon a constructive theme... (Roemer 1967, pp. 194-5; italics added)

No doubt these complex psychic mechanisms and concepts must have been harder to understand for this aristocratic lady, ultimately a laywoman in psychological matters however insightful her "judgment regarding people", by contrast to the well-grounded positive impressions of professional psychologists/psychoanalysts like Oberholzer or Zulliger regarding Rorschach's 18 unpublished blind analyses.

After this very long parenthesis, let us finish our review of Draguns et al.'s paper by concentrating on their conclusions. They assert to have arrived at a "midway" valuation of Rorschach content, while our above theoretical arguments have maintained us still siding with Rorschach's classical, *predominantly* (not exclusively) formal position. They rightly criticize the insufficient attention by researchers to the three intervening factors (stimulus, subject, relationship) in the response process, almost exclusively favoring the second -personality, if not only "diagnosis"- parameter in their designs. Their last paragraph seems capital:

...it is well known that Rorschach practice and research have developed in an atmosphere of stark empiricism. This atheoretical orientation has led to a luxurious if somewhat chaotic growth. In quantity, Rorschach research is abundant; its quality is all too often marred by a disregard for pertinent theoretical formulations and empirical findings that have evolved from the experimental study of interacting personality, perceptual, and cognitive

variables. In the light of this theoretical and laboratory work, the assumptions upon which the use of the Rorschach test rests appear plausible and sound. The study of response to the Rorschach inkblots is only a special case of this field of investigation. It is our hope that a fusion of these two spheres of research will be achieved and that the present series of papers constitute a step toward that goal. (p. 29)

From these words one must say we have come a long way since Stern, or even Koffka. We of course completely agree with this last position and it is in this sense that we actually make our own contribution.

In an excellent paper that in spirit very much resembles the one of Endacott (whom he does not reference: cf. above) and in which he tightens his previously looser concepts, Bohm (1970) takes up again the Gestalt issue from the unsatisfactory state in which he had left it above to demonstrate that this theory do can constitute the systematic foundation of the Rorschach method, concentrating on two of its main concepts: that all which is psychological originally consists of Gestalts (configurations), i.e. of differentiated, dynamic and self-regulated wholes all of whose parts are interdependent; and that consequently the whole is always primary ('primacy of the whole') and is not a composed "end-sum" of the elements. The fact that in the domain of Rorschach's 'Forms' we are dealing with such Gestalts was already recognized by Binswanger, Binder, Brosin & Fromm, and above all Kuhn (1944, pp. 40-1). This is easier to see in the Apprehension Modes, for Bohm the 'main area of application' of Gestalt principles, where the *G* obviously stand for wholes, the *D* for sub-wholes (or 'part-wholes') from which the *Dd* are still to be differentiated according to the Gestalt principles of good-form, closure and *Prägnanz* (of course applicable to begin with to all of these scorings). But Bash (1957, cf. above) has also applied a similar, complementary Gestalt-systematic view to the foundation of the Determinants' distinctions, based of Metzger's concepts of the three kinds of 'whole-properties'. Even more, "as things are in the Rorschach procedure that it offers sort of an applied Gestalt psychology, there is also sort of an *applied Gestalt psychopathology*" (p. 329): for instance, primitive, un(dis)-integrated *G*-interpretations of brain-damaged people can be understood as 'pre-Gestalts' in the sense of Sander and Conrad, and his own special phenomenon of bad 'figure-ground-fusion' can be also understood as a fused 'superfigure' which violates Rubin's 4th distinction between figure and ground and so indicates a disturbance of Wertheimer's isomorphism.

Now, a less understood conception is that *also the entire, sequential Rorschach record is to be regarded as a Gestalt* (Bochner & Halpern, Kuhn) which makes impossible the mecha-nistic "standardization" of scoring: one and "the same" response, i.e. a response verbalized in the entirely same way must be scored once as a *F* and at another time as a *B* depending from the responses or aside observations which immediately precede or follow it. This eventuality he compares to a 'red-hot iron' nobody wants to touch, and probably presupposes an extension of the concept of Gestalt (Kuhn p. 41) which he then decides to confront by reference to the interpretation of this concept by competent authors. He refers to von Ehrenfels 1st

(Gestalt-qualities lie in the form or in the grouping itself of the elements, which however can be separated or represented without the others) and 2nd (transferability of the Gestalt-quality, which applied to the Rorschach protocol seems possible according to Caldwell & al. 1952) criteria, and to Köhler's following conception:

"The most general concept of Gestalt theory: Wherever a process dynamically distributes and regulates itself, determined by the actual situation in a whole field, this process is said to follow principles of gestalt theory"... It means then further for KÖHLER, that objects of Gestalt theory would be "the processes of learning, of reproduction, of striving, of emotional attitude, of thinking, acting" ... "insofar as they do not consist of independent elements, but are determined in a situation as a whole". Accordingly in any case the evaluation of a Rorschach test would be then object of Gestalt theory. For the rest KÖHLER counts also the ontogenetic development into the Gestalts. (p. 330; cf. Holt above)

He passes on to indicate how opponents of Gestalt theory like Rubin, who did not count himself as member of this school, warned against such a generalization of the Gestalt concept since in most cases the definitive number of the parts is not known, so how can one know that "the whole is more than the sum of its parts"? But Bohm makes remark that the divisibility of the individual parts was not excluded (as in v. Ehrenfels definition), so for him the decisive point is not that the whole lets itself be split in parts and their relationships and correlations -in the statistical sense- (such artificial subdivisions were already the elements of pre-Gestalt psychology, he adds) but rather that they let themselves be regarded and correspondingly manipulated as subordinate to the Gestalt. In Woodworth's words a Gestalt implies "a total pattern... [which] includes relations as 'dependent parts', but is not composed of relations, being psychologically prior to relations, in the Gestalt view" (p. 331) such as the organism itself. Bohm's important conclusion follows:

Therefore: Also the Rorschach protocol in its entirety can very well be a Gestalt, even if one can artificially peel out of it a number of quantitative and qualitative factors. And the clinical evaluation of such a protocol consists of a very complicated *global* evaluation of all of these factors in their interchanging relationship. That is why are condemned to fail beforehand all attempts to manipulate quantitatively some few factors picked out of context, and with that to construct "proofs" for or "counterproofs" against clinical experiences. Such attempts are counted by hundreds. Some advocates of an auxiliary science of Psychology, mathematical statistics, clearly show after all the tendency to fall back into the pre-Gestalt-psychology elementary psychology. Mathematical statistics have the important task of controlling the reliability of research results and of securing the mathematical basis for quantitative measures in Psychology. When it pretends to be Psychology and tries to construct clinico-medical or clinico-psychological totalities as with building-block toys, then it oversteps its limits. (pp. 331-2, our translation)

The turn has come for the first text in the Spanish language that we have found focused on this approach, which is at the same time only the second book (after Bohm's) where it plays a significant role: Orlando's (1976) is presented as "a valuable

contribution for the task of Rorschach interpretation from the gestaltic and dynamic framings" (back flap). It is entirely dedicated to a not-so-original three level interpretation of an unique case (a 20-year-old amenorrhoeic girl called "A. X.") following a very thorough inquiry and testing-the-limits technique inspired by Klopfer's, which amounts to a double-retesting whose undeniable dynamic characteristics remind us of Salomon's double administration of the Z-Test: some features are certainly interesting like to let forgetting play its role and the attention to space-time expressions. But at least two general criticisms can be immediately addressed to this huge effort: if the "Psychodiagnostics" has often been taxed as a rather disorganized book thus lacking clarity, Orlando's manual (cf. pp. 226-7, 230) is certainly the epitome of confuse organization and of lack of an adequate step-by-step introduction to her approach - too much is erroneously taken for granted from the reader; and we very strongly wonder if the result was worth the effort (one year of work *full-time*, as the author herself avows!: p. 230) thus making this interpretive technique unpractical for day by day Rorschach usage (an ever-present preoccupation of its author) which should be taken more as a theoretical exercise. We also miss a more detailed clinical presentation of the case in question, which maintains as still questionable the validity of most of the in-depth psychoanalytic interpretations made (cf. Rorschach's fear in Zulliger's quotation above) and makes one wonder if the excessively followed-through interpretations -maybe beyond what the material actually warrants, due to the exclusive concentration on this protocol to the neglect of everything else by the author- are but just unfounded, speculative constructions: take for instance the shaky ground for the following diagnostic conclusion, which is also a concise example of her whole working procedure in the book...

We will arrive now at analyzing in detail the type of link she establishes with the primordial, basic figures, or prototypes; the degree of maturity with which they are confronted or the distortion they suffer, or so we suspect it happens... **Responses to plates I and VII** - The election of these plates was based in their being the ones that most usually provoke responses related to the feminine figure. In plate I the subject gives the response "Bat" [not a G, just the upper half], then "A vertebra" [G] and later says "Here a face" (in the bat). She shows in the sequence something like an initiated work, the change, and retaking the first anew [footnote: "...in analytic theory, repetition compulsion and return of the repressed"!!]. Something like an incomplete work which is retaken or completed. This gives place to the *or* response (bat or eagle). In the inquiry...: "Bat. Here a face. No, by the face seems more an eagle, nesting. No, standing on a mountain like to fly away..." ...We incline for the scoring Dr[Dd]. We see that the response in the inquiry goes on to include all the central area, that is from Dr to Dr D, and the determinant which was F becomes FM. The bat becomes eagle. The static animal goes on to "almost realize an action". And no less than a feminine action. Just at that moment the action "about to be", changes, "is about to leave". Just at the moment in which to integrate the response A.X. integrates all the central D, which is normal from the gestalt point of view, usual in the Rorschach test language, and exactly in the place which is most frequently used in this plate for giving a response of human and feminine content. To indicate the bat... she cuts with

the index finger the Gestalt just at the bust level, of what would be the human figure. Below is what she indicates as mountain when she talks about the eagle, without totally separating it since the eagle is resting on the mountain... Let us go on now to the analysis of the responses of plate VII. In this plate she gives one sole response which is SW[ZwG]. Figure-ground inversion; figure-ground fusion, if you wish. She gives for the white space a geographic response and the figure, usually given as two women or two old ladies, or two little animals, etc... goes on to be the lake and later the sea which surrounds the peninsula. The feminine [element] appears in the geographic response: it is "the Iberian peninsula". Let us see the progression of the response from the first to the third level.

Test: "This looks like a map. A lake. Shores" -touches- "of a country. Peninsula. Looks like Spain." [footnote: "Is one not tempted to say 'the mother country?'" (i.e. for an Argentinian); no, not particularly]

Inquiry: "This looks like the Iberian peninsula. The white part and all around the sea. The gray part which borders the shore. The gray like they draw the seas. They have depths. Darker places which make it deeper. That make the shore stand out. There seems to be an isthmus here. Something that unites, but there is no other land."

Extension of limits: "Here everything flat. A desert. No difference. Always the same. Here the sea, which is sky blue, has different tones of gray."

Progression of the elements. The land is first "...Spain" (we would say it is personified). What surrounds it is a lake (is it more placid than the sea?). Immediately: The land is decidedly the "Iberian peninsula" (a little more intellectual). The lake was transformed into sea, which if at first wants to be seen as a drawing, is immediately a sea with depths, darkneses, etc. And this differentiates it and makes it stand out from the peninsula? No, what comes immediately makes stand out how deserted the peninsula is. How always the same [response]! In the Rorschach language: SW F geog... [footnote: "The responses of plates I and VII are the only two geographic responses of the protocol in proper; fact which would affirm the relationship with the omitted feminine [element]"; ??] But in its meaning, how much it changed inside a response which almost does not change if one considers it superficially! From an F response without any manifest affective companion, it goes on to a response which shows everything anxiety-arousing [shading]... It goes on from the possible subject-object, usual human or anthropomorphic animal subject-object relationship, to the land, Iberian peninsula, island, "desert" which although it has an isthmus for communicating does not have with what, because there isn't anything, a "desert, arid land"... subject-object relationship.

Hypotheses. 1.- Facing the external stimulus that usually promotes the projection of the feminine element and the affective relationships which accompany it, our subject does not perceive the usual. Neither the feminine figure nor equivalents. 2.- The way of approaching that stimulus is modifying it. She does not "see" the usual content. She does not take the usual area of the plates. The modification takes place at the symbolical and structural level. In

other words, the level of manifestation of the conflict does not occur, in these plates at least, in a level possible for a subject of this age with a relatively normal evolutionary development... The conflict must be deduced from the omissions and alterations of the material in its more elementary structural aspects... 3.- The Gestalt laws are not fulfilled in the human being when the psychological motivations are of such intensity and quality that force him to modify the stimulating gestalten, so they are able to manifest themselves at their possible level (Work to be published). [Plus 3 further hypotheses]... [pp. 77-84]

GENERAL SYNTHESIS... Since at this [human] level she offers simultaneously fanta-sized beings, coverings, etc..., but not feminine beings, we think that what she most skips or covers is the relationship with herself, as a woman. And that this maintains an intimate relationship with a high level of confusion relative to her identity [footnote: "Figure-ground inversion in the feminine plate {VII} and broken Gestalt in plate I"]. (pp. 98-101, our translation)

This whole interpretation is suggestive and certainly has some *internal* consistency in itself (the "nesting eagle" and "Spain" both as mother symbols), but one could say the same thing about certain systematic paranoid delusions (cf. chap. III.C.1 below)! The motherhood archetype occupies such an essential role in human existence that we believe such connections could be established *by the psychologist* almost everywhere⁵⁷. The key point is the contact with *external* reality, i.e. with the concrete clinical features of the case (which are nowhere detailed in the book) on the one hand, and with established Rorschach theory on the other. Schachtel for one has insisted on the unfounded character of these automatic and presumably universal plate sym-bolisms. And what about hypothesis 3 in particular? We would like a more detailed exposition of the arguments in question (we were not able to find the promised published[?] paper), particularly since no Gestalt psychologist has ever made such a bold assertion: in fact in neither of both plates was a Gestalt law actually violated (cf. Arnheim's quotation above about Zw perception [pl. VII], and Klein & Arnheim 1953 pp. 63-5 Fig. 2 in particular re pl. I). We also believe the final, straightforward conclusion ("General Synthesis", if true) could have been arrived at by other, much shorter cuts than a cumbersome analysis in "three levels". But to insist, the most important flaw in this work is that the author never resorts to the specific clinical features (besides the unique presenting symptom) or case history of the patient to ground her assertions: the conclusions would have been more scientifically convincing if A. X.'s responses were related to *her own* associations and carefully reconstructed emotional biography during a subsequent psychoanalytic treatment.

On a more appreciative note, on pp. 26-30 Orlando gives a somewhat more reasonable assessment of the Gestalt behavior of this Rorschach subject plate by plate, totally in line with Arnheim's earlier discussed character-revealing position, which certainly is a good starting point for evaluation; and on pp. 52-8, on the

⁵⁷ Maybe the best example of this bias is to be found on pp. 91-2, footnote 87 of Orlando's book: the association (*by the author and her controlling analyst!*) of the content of a response to plate IX to Pavlov's dogs salivating as a symbol of desire; we seriously doubt this association could ever have been made by the patient herself.

occasion of a similar perceptive analysis centered on pls. II-III (whose correctness we accept, although not necessarily her conclusions), she makes an interesting reference to a specific allusion by Koffka (1935) to inkblot perception previous to the events with which we started this section. What we consider as most relevant and definitely usable of her analysis are the following observations which occupy a important place in her perceptual evaluation of this case:

...As is known, the color plates in Rorschach's test have as characteristic which dis-tinguishes them from the gray plates not only the color, but that in them the stimulus material is offered in separated or easily separable areas, by contrast to the gray ones. The presence of the color heightens even more the formal fact, provoking for each one of these areas to have a greater internal cohesion and, thus, greater "separability" from the surrounding areas if we hold ourselves to the findings of Gestalt psychology. In other words, they facilitate analysis... [p. 52]

...the Gestalt does not facilitate... dissociation... in the measure it presents itself as a totality (whole blot in gray plate)... (p. 195; our transl.)

We will have the opportunity to include these important, accurate Gestalt observations as integral part of a complete system in chap. III.D.2 below.

Having been her disciple Passalacqua (1983/1992, cf. p. 9) reproduced in her own text-book this general psychoanalytic-Gestalt double theoretical approach (pp. 33-9). More specific-ally following Timsit's (1974-75) incidental -undeveloped-arguments she dedicates a special, short section to the relationship between Gestalt theory and the Rorschach:

The influence of psychoanalysis on H. Rorschach is irrefutable. It is not demonstrated [on the other hand] that Gestalt theory had had the same effect upon him; although everything makes one think that yes, in his writings he does not mention it explicitly. However their language and their contemporaneity

(and even their geographic proximity) makes one think that he knew the writings and shared the ideas of Max Wertheimer⁵⁸...

Another doubt is how these two approaches integrate themselves: the gestaltic and the psychoanalytic, and, previously, if in reality they are integrateable. As a response, we have recourse... to Timsit...: "This test was elaborated in a very determinate perspective: that of Gestalt Psychology which, one gladly concurs, has been preponderant upon its author, even recognizing at the same time that the influence of psychoanalytic theories has not been neglected. The psychoanalytic concepts of defense mechanisms, of object relations, of Ego strength, have found their seat in a practice -psychoanalysis- very different from that one which takes place in the administration of the test. Even if one admits that the one and the other explore the same field, the psyche in its depths, one can be tempted to ask oneself, when one is disposed to interpret the data collected with the help of the test, about the legitimacy of the passage from a gestaltic approach to a psychoanalytic approach... Rorschach already answered yes implicitly, and an extra-ordinary illustration of this is found in his posthumous work: 'Contribution to the use of the form interpretation test'..." (pp. 35 & 39; our translation)

Just like Bohm, she offers a review of the main Gestalt laws and examples of their application to the Rorschach -that do not add anything to our discussion above- concentrating above all on Koffka's ideas. Of these we would like to reproduce just a portion which touches on the important aesthetic slant underlined by Arnheim above:

Kurt Koffka is, without doubt, one of the most important representatives of the Gestalt school. From his main postulates, we select [the following:] ...Our perception aims to the aesthetic; under a series of stimuli which impress the retina, is initiated right away a spontaneous agglutination process, and in this way the form is born, grows and is structured with an aesthetic ['good'] form. That is, the stimulus which excites the visual organs is afterwards introjected

⁵⁸ Today we know that this is most certainly not correct. Binswanger, who knew Rorschach personally and shared ideas with him during his last two years of life, tells us: "...It isn't even clear *that in Rorschach's test it is effectively about a diagnostic experiment based on perception*, as its author believed... And here should also be estimated that which RORSCHACH, by not knowing modern psychology in enough depth, did not do... In that which concerns the participation of the diverse 'inflows of sensations' into perception—that is, that which RORSCHACH describes as the role played by the formal, kinesthetic and chromatic aspects in the perceptual process—... we encounter to begin with factors that again have nothing to do directly with perception as such, but that rather correspond to sensation data and represent, therefore, stepping points which make perception possible. One would have to talk, thus, of a 'diagnostic test based on sensation'. To that should be added, furthermore, that in the mentioned 'formal inflows' it certainly isn't about data corresponding to sensation, but about sensations in front of new and completely independent factors that are included by empirical psychology inside the problem of 'Gestalt qualities' and its apprehension. This problem had also been alluded to by HENNING [in a letter after the "Psychodiagnostics" publication: cf. Rorschach 2004 N° 206 pp. 386-9 and endnote 5], whom indicated to the author that in the perception of forms it wasn't properly about a perception, but about an apprehension of configurations... That which RORSCHACH names 'formal inflows', form responses, etc., certainly does not correspond to what is understood by 'form' in psychology, but to a part of that which is covered inside the concept of 'Gestalts' " (1923/1967 pp. 230-2, our translation); Henning, an older colleague of Roemer, was the first to make this Gestalt connection, observation to which Rorschach responded but, unfortunately, this letter is not available (op. cit. pp. 397 & 400 endnote 4). Bohm (1951/1972, chap. 4.A.I.1.b footnote 7) also indicates us that while Rorschach in his location distinctions must have intuitively based himself on Gestalt principles, Wertheimer's fundamental paper on Gestalt laws did not appear until 1923 – the year after his premature death.

and an internal elaboration process is initiated which will awaken emotions, these seek to liberate themselves through external forms of expression which always imply the notion of form. An activity could not be recognized if it did not acquire a form or a structure. To structure means to give form, to give harmony, to combine, to unify parts to constitute a whole. (p. 36; our translation)

Despite its inherent importance and the valuable contributions made, it seems as if this current lost its impetus with time.

F) The Jungian Complex approach

"Evans: - You knew Hermann Rorschach, I believe, did you not?

Jung: - No. He has circumvented me as much as possible.

- But did you get to know him personally?

- No. I never saw him.

- In his terms, 'introversive' and 'extraversion' [*sic*], of course, he is reflecting your conceptions of introversion and extra-version, in my own estimation, that is.

- Yes, but I was the anathema, because I was the one to first outline the concepts; and that, you know, is unforgivable. I should never have done it...

- Are you familiar with Rorschach's test which uses ink-blots?

- Yes, but I never applied it, because later on I didn't even apply the Word Association Test anymore... I learned what I had to learn from the exact examinations of psychic reactions; and that, I think, is a very excellent mean.

- But, would you recommend to other psychiatrists, clinical psychologists or psychoanalysts, the use of projective tests, like the Word Free Association, invented by you, or Rorschach's test?

- Well, perhaps. It seems to me that for the formation of the psychologists who wish to work directly with people they constitute an excellent method to learn the functioning of the unconscious. I believe I don't exaggerate by talking about the didactic value of projective tests."

(quoted through R. S. McCully, 1973 p. 257; and R. I. Evans, 1976/1987 p. 338)

"The [Psycho]Analysis... Most institution Psychiatrists, even if they have progressively accepted it somewhat, will gradually repress it again. Repression processes are in operation all around that gnaw at it. After all Adler and Co. are also actual-ly nothing else than repressors. Also Jung, Mäder and others have much of repressors. Why should the analysts be exempt from the repressive drive of every human being!"

"About the psychoanalytical literature it is always hard to advise... As an introduction Jung is not to be

recommended; he has many more fuzzy concepts [than Freud]... Shortly shall appear a big 'Human Types' book by Jung."

"I read Jung[s 1921 book] with mixed feelings... There are certainly many, a great many things right, but built-in in a quite awkward architecture..."

"...The book has very much which is good, and it is difficult to say condemnatorywise where the speculation wanders into mystery... I gnaw at the book, and whenever I want to begin summarizing something until now, creeps up on me a sus-picion against myself. If I only had his [test] findings, it would be much easier for me..."

H. Rorschach (2004, pp. 174, 256, 343, 374; our translation)

These selected quotations are, if anything, very expressive of the mutually ambivalent attitude between these two great Swiss psychiatrists of the past century, but do not yet offer the whole story which we will precisely begin by clarifying - concentrating first on Jung's side. To begin with, his initial assertion above -besides sounding somewhat self-inflated- is doubly incorrect. At the time of this interview with Evans, C. G. Jung was 82 years old and had comple-tely forgotten that Rorschach as a medical student followed a couple of his courses in 1907-8 i.e. 50 years earlier (cf. McCully loc. cit., Rorschach op. cit. p. 175 endnote 5); this was precisely the period of Jung's ascension as the favorite disciple of Freud (and Bleuler) and as an internatio-nally renowned psychiatrist (Ellenberger 1970, p. 668), and for a younger Swiss psychiatrist-to-be like Rorschach it should have been very natural to have taken him as a model - in any case from then on he followed his publications and work with particular interest. And at the other end, even after Jung's separation from the psychoanalytic movement of which Rorschach eventually became an integral part, the latter's last quotation above continued immediately with his voiced plan to approach Jung through his disciple Adolf Keller hoping that he would not "respond contemptuously" to the testing proposal, fate having prevented this renewed contact from taking place; so we do not see a basis for a real "circumvention", in the sense of evading a confrontation of ideas or even a face to face meeting. Evans/Jung go on mentioning above their relationship through his conception of the couple introversion-extraversion, complex issue which will occupy our full attention below, but which then may very well have caused Jung's "circumvented" remark through Rorschach's famous, lapidary phrase that "I am going to use the concept 'intro-version' in a sense which has almost nothing except the name in common with Jung's" (1921/1967 chap. IV.4 p. 82). And finally, about Jung's view of the Rorschach test as such, McCully -the most original and active of the Rorschachers from the Complex perspective- adds to this quotation:

...There is indeed a mystery about the absence of further personal contact between these two men who could have been easily accessible to each

other^[59]. Jung gave us a clue in his remarks to Evans. He often spoke in allegory, and it was through allegory that Jung often expressed his keen sense of humor. He was sobered, but often amused by the effect he had on others. He would disclaim any effect on others as being due to something "personal" in him, but he knew about the power he had through contact with archetypal sources in himself. He regarded those qualities as impersonal. His ego could take no credit for them. So, when he said to Evans that Hermann Rorschach "has circumvented me as much as possible", he probably used an allegory. He meant that the powerful effects of what Jung saw in the world of archetypes were aspects of the psyche that Rorschach kept away from or circumvented. He assumed this from the nature of Rorschach's writings. Jung probably did not know about Rorschach's wide grasp and personal interests, and since he had already lost interest in his Word Association Test, he may not have given Rorschach's technique much thought, when it was published. Our point is that, through ignorance, Jung may have done Rorschach an injustice. Rorschach may have been much closer to grasping the collective side of the unconscious than Jung thought. (op. cit. pp. 258-9; comp. a similar judgment by Freud: pp. #III38-9 below)

However, even from a distance -his giving-up-tests argument being entirely correct- Jung's real view of the former student's form-interpretation test is not fully conveyed by this previous quotation which shall need a complement from earlier sources not consulted by McCully:

[In a 1943 letter to F. Baumgarten-Tramer, cf. pp. #146-8 above:] ...Receive my best thanks for the friendly sending of your paper "About the history of the Rorschach Test", which I have read with pleasure. Stimulated by Justinus Kerner's *Klecksographien*, already in my high school times I have laid out myself a whole collection of such blotographies, since these irrational formations have stimulated my fantasy activity in so fortunate a way that they caused in me an often all-day-long pleasure. That's why I was particularly amused as I learned that Rorschach had applied the same technique for establishing psychic peculiarity on it, which was without doubt a fruitful enterprise...

[In a 1945 lecture:] The beginnings of psychic Phenomenology lie in the so-called psychophysiology and experimental psychology on the one hand, on the other in the illness descriptions and the diagnostic methods of psychopathology (like the [word] association experiment and the irrational Rorschach images)...

[In a 1958 book, commenting a painting by Yves Tanguy:] The psychological effect equals that of the Rorschach Test, in which a purely accidental,

⁵⁹ Personally, we think that Jung's in-between distanciation from both Bleuler and Freud on the one hand, and his almost exclusive dedication to his self-analysis on the other (cf. Ellenberger 1970, pp. 669-70 & 672-3 respectively), explain this fact quite well without further "mystery". In answer to Römer who was to present his inkblot method as "arising from the circle around Jung, Bleuler and others...", Rorschach wrote that "we [in Switzerland] do not actually know the circle around Bleuler, Jung and others. That has indeed very little interest in Germany [where Römer's intervention would take place: the Marburg 1922 congress]. All the same, Bleuler has broken up with Jung; that orientation in which I confess myself as [Psycho]Analyst has likewise broken up with Jung, so that from a circle isn't much more remaining..." (2004, pp. 348-9 & 352-3 endnote 1).

irrational image calls upon the likewise irrational forces of fantasy in the guest and by that brings into play his unconscious disposition... (Quoted by the Editors in Rorschach op. cit., pp. 175-6 endnote 5; our translation, italics added)

So, Jung's actual appreciation of Rorschach's method was on the whole quite positive, to the point of equating it to his own Word Association test. But obviously some bittersweetness remained until the end of his life (Evans interview)...

This was most probably due, as already mentioned, to Rorschach's critical attitude when-ever mentioning his typological concepts, which the latter more or less adopted anyway in their general orientation. In the "*Psychodiagnostic*" (1921/1967, chap. IV.4 pp. 79-82) he dedicates some pages to sort out the differences particularly between his concept of 'introversivity' and Jung's 'introversion', and there we can clearly see why he considered in the above quotation the latter's concepts as 'fuzzy' (comp. a similar criticism by Freud: 1914): from "On the conflicts of the child's soul" (1910), to "Transformations and Symbols of Libido" (1912), and to "The Psychology of Unconscious Processes" (1917), he follows three successive transformations of Jung's concept of 'introversion' finally preferring to adhere to the non-scientific, common language meaning of the term. In some ulterior letters he explains more precisely his standing on this issue:

...Above all the theory of the test must still be quite considerably established in a more thorough way... *The concepts introversivity and extratensivity for example are at bottom completely new*, perhaps they will bump into fierce resistance. Introversive is that, that in common linguistic usage is designated today as introverted. But in the analytic terminology the word actually means something different than in common usage. In the publication ["*Psychodiagnostics*", which was still in print] I have given some details about the development of the concept until the common usage version. At present there are several meanings of the concept introverted. For the most part it means: submersion in oneself in a pathological measure. In Jung in the newest [1917] version, differentiated thinking with undifferentiated feeling - but [this] Jung's "introverted Type" is certainly false [cf. *Psychodiagnostic* pp. 81-2]. *So there is no book about introversivity and extratensivity, and my concepts are provisionally empirical and more or less found and must still be first theoretically founded.*

By the way it will appear in a very short time by Jung a book about "Human Types", about which one can be eager. (2004 p. 288, letter of 11-12/1/21; our translation, italics added)

When Jung's "Psychological Types" (1921) finally appeared, a short time before his own book, Rorschach read it of course with the same eagerness trying to find some theoretical foundation for his beloved *Erlebnistypen*. He even set for himself the purpose of publishing a book-review, which gave him great pains however. The thing is, nobody suspected then the in-depth inner journey Jung went through of which this complex book was but the reflection; Ellenberger (1970) offers us a very useful summary of the elements in play:

At the end of 1913 Jung broke with Freud and soon afterward resigned his post at the Zurich University. In 1921 his *Psychological Types* offered a full-fledged new system of dynamic psychiatry. During the intermediate period (1914-1920) he did not publish much, but achieved three great tasks. Intimately connected with each other were his journey through the unconscious, his preoccupation with psychological types, and his study of Gnosticism...

Jung's self-experiment enabled him to ascribe a wider meaning to his earlier concepts of the psychological types... In the contrast between the psychological syndromes of hysteria and of [paranoid] schizophrenia he saw the extreme degree of a contrast between two attitudes that also exist in normal individuals [comp. Minkowska above], extroversion and introversion... Now Jung's journey through the unconscious led him to understand that extroversion and introversion were not just two opposite attitudes but two complementary psychological functions. He experienced the gradually increasing state of introversion himself when the perception of the outer world fades while interior visions and fantasies become the main reality, and later he experienced the gradual return from extreme introversion to overt extroversion with its sharpened perception of the world and other men, and its need for activity and enjoyment...

...*The Psychological Types* is a somewhat puzzling book. The reader who opens that volume of seven hundred pages expecting it to start with a clear psychological description of the psychological types is soon disappointed. The clinical description of the types occupies only the last third of the book, after a lengthy survey encompassing the works of [conflicting-visions or opposite-types] theologians, philosophers, psychologists, poets, and historians of science...

Most accounts of Jung's psychological types are oversimplified. To grasp Jung's theory in its full complexity, nothing can replace reading the arduous Chapter X of *The Psychological Types*... Introversion and extroversion are attitudes, spontaneous or voluntary, that are present in each individual in varying degrees. Introversion is the attitude of those individuals who derive their motivations chiefly from within themselves, that is, from inner or subjective factors, and extroversion is the attitude of those persons who derive their motivations chiefly from outside, that is from external factors [cf. Klopfer's definitions, & Kelley 1942]. The same individual can be more or less an introvert or an extrovert or may shift from one attitude to the other in the course of his life. But one of these attitudes may be fixed in individuals and then one speaks of introverted or extroverted types. It is not always easy to classify an individual because there are intermediate types and, as Jung put it, "every individual is an exception to the rule." [With these just described, newly elaborated concepts Jung certainly approached, but not quite met, Rorschach's own conception: see following discussion; but the problem remained with the immediately introduced "unconscious compensation" and "opposite functions":] A high degree of introversion or extroversion tends to arouse a compensatory process from the subdued attitude in the unconscious. This extroversion of the introvert (or vice versa) is a kind of return of the repressed...

To the notions of introversion and extroversion Jung added the system of the four fundamental functions of the conscious psyche. They comprise two pairs of opposite functions: the two rational functions of thinking and feeling, and the two irrational functions of sensation and intuition. Thinking is the opposite of feeling, and sensation is the opposite of intuition... The four functions exist in every individual, but in each one function predominates that places the opposite function in a position of inferiority.. The notion of introversion and extroversion and of the four functions enabled Jung to establish a system of eight psychological types, of which four are extroverted and four are introverted...

After Jung left the psychoanalytic movement, he no longer called himself a psycho-analyst, nor did the Freudians recognize him as such. From the very beginning he had brought forth a number of non-Freudian concepts and now he was free to follow his own ideas and to develop his system, which he called analytic psychology or complex psychology. His new concepts were defined in 1922 in the last chapter of *The Psychological Types*. This is the material that he was to develop for the rest of his life in at least twenty books and numerous articles...: psychic energetics, the unconscious and the archetypes, the structure of the human psyche, the individuation, the dreams, and Jungian concepts of psychosis and neurosis. (pp. 698-701, 703)

It is from the confrontation of this difficult, system-inaugurating work that Rorschach's last quotations above (p. 160) originate. Below his remaining remarks (as a substitute for his projected but never-finished book review):

I read Jung with mixed feelings. About the review I still will not bring it so quickly, but it will come... It is reasonably true that in Jung introversion now means exactly the opposite from what one had understood under introversion until now. That really comes however only from the fact that the attitude of conscious thinking towards the object has now become the measure-giving important figure. Below conscious thinking, all remains as it was... [p. 343, letter of 17/VI/21]

...In addition the concept introversion, as I have grasped it chiefly according to the sense of the common language usage for "introverted", has been for a long time other than the Jungian concept. Jung has arrived now to the fourth conception of "introverted"; when-ever he writes something the concept is shifted again. In the newest book "Psychological Types" the concept introverted means now in general terms exactly the opposite from what it meant in the second Jungian version, approx. 1911. But from this second Jungian version the concept passed on most extensively to the common usage of educated people, and my concept approximates itself to the concept of common usage closer than to any other concept of introversion. So it means therefore quite the opposite from what the concept "introverted" means in the new Jungian book! Admittedly how unfortunate, but nothing can be changed. [p. 349, letter of 18/VI/21]

About Jung I should be able sometime to talk thoroughly with somebody. The book has very much which is good, and it is difficult to say condemnatorywise

where the speculation wanders into mystery. The concept "differentiation" seems to me to be the baddest. And bad is also the construction of opposites to the goals, after indicating the overcoming of the opposites... [p. 374, letter of 15/XI/21]

...In these questions I must draw myself nearer to Jung, who distinguishes an attitude of the Conscious and an attitude of the Unconscious and says: When the attitude of the Conscious is extroverted, the attitude of the Unconscious is then compensatorily introverted. Those are naturally horrible concepts, a formally massing together of forcibilities, but the concept of compensation is obviously very meaningful after all, and if instead of "attitude of the Unconscious" one said "disposition", and instead of "attitude of the Conscious" one said "compensation attempts against the unilateralities of the disposition", then that looks already more meaningfully plastic after all... The introversion with slighter compensation is the easily recognizable introverted, the extroversion with slighter compensation the easily recognizable extroverted; like Jung described them, particularly [in reversed order] in the feeling-type and the thinking-type; to describe them better, i.e. more "from the inside out", one must know seemingly much more from these "compensation processes". The form-interpretation test should be however an appropriate means to gain more experience about that... In most cases one does find introversion and extroversion moments, and each type is actually an individual mixture of both. It seems to me that one must always stress that a lot, and that the dogmatic separations of Jung have caused much confusion there. My principle is always: Not to set up types or other generalizations too early, if one wants to continue building over that, but rather to venture generalizations only there where one can further pull them down and correct them without having to undertake drastic changes of the whole, or to stress then that "types" are always quite indistinctly delimited things. If there are really definite types, then they must surrender themselves already with time. And they should surrender themselves indeed in another way than in Jung: one should not differentiate according to the conscious orientation but rather just from the genetic structure, from what he names "attitude of the Unconscious". (2004 pp. 412-3, letter of 28/I/22; our translation)

A careful consideration of all of this material leads us to conclude that Ellenberger (1954/1955, p. 64) was certainly right when asserting that "...nous devons comprendre que cette introversion [conçue par Rorschach] n'est pas entièrement superposable à celle que Jung désignait sous le même nom. Nous pourrions l'appeler *introversion créatrice* pour la distinguer de l'introversion selon Jung". The fundamental difference(s) resides not so much in the fact that for Rorschach introversion is not necessarily a fixed or pathological state, since Jung also reached that view as already recognized by Rorschach himself (1921/1967 p. 80), but in other key features of the former's conception without correspondence in Jung's system: first the straightforward fact of the absence of opposition or mutual incompatibility between the two sides (Jung eventually discarded it in between the *attitudes* of intro/extroversion, however maintaining it between the closely related *functions* of

thinking and feeling, respectively) which specifically guided him to coin the unopposable term of 'extratension', resulting that "elles sont aussi peu opposées l'une à l'autre que le seraient, par exemple, la vision et l'audition" (Ellenberger p. 66; cf. Rorschach's quotation p. 162 above in the sense that "Jung's 'introverted Type' is certainly false") and can perfectly coexist both in "differentiated" form for ex. in the dilated type; then the irreconcilable fact of Rorschach's type and method referring directly to the "unconscious attitude" (disposition) and not to the inverse conscious one (the actual compensation, in his understanding), while for Jung it is suddenly the other way around (cf. Ellenberger p. 163 above) which explains his criticizing "Psychological Types" for presenting "exactly the opposite" of previous conceptions (cf. quotations above); and last but not least, the more subtle fact of the higher existential, dynamic, not-predetermined nature of Rorschach's *Erlebnistyp* which is closer to the individual -the person- by contrast to Jung's ideal i.e. more abstract *Einstellungstyp*. In this latter sense let us hear Binswanger's (1923/1967) competent opinion:

I don't have the least doubt that RORSCHACH's *experience types* constitute a valuable contribution to typological psychology. Precisely here manifests itself the experimental character of his results in front of the typological research focused merely on the delimitation of "ideal types"... Such "experience types" might suppose a connecting link between the ideal types, so to speak, "spiritual-scientific" (in JASPERS' and SPRAN-GER's sense) and the clinical natural-scientific types... Until recently the functional-natural-scientific analysis and synthesis were applied, above all, to types in the sense of common psychology or else of a unique medico-psychological tendency (see, for example, JUNG's [8] "psychological types"). That which makes RORSCHACH's typological research specially valuable is that it does not disregard the individual to enthrone the generality, the type (with which, at best, the individual is assigned a label and one says about him that he is "an introverted", a "theoretical man", etc.), but that, as it is deduced directly from its diagnostic use, it is always disposed to capture the individual in its unique and unrepeatable essence. In there, naturally, we should not lose view of the fact that also here, in RORSCHACH's typology, as in every "natural science of the soul", it is not about grasping the individual psychic *person*, but the corresponding individual psychic *structure*, since the *test* does not show, as RORSCHACH himself makes notice, *what* the person lives (whoever this may be), but *how*, and only precisely him experiences it and the *test* makes it manifest in all the isolated functions and possible complexes. But the author knows very well that it is not enough to know the psychic structure, the psychic apparatus. Since he does not know HUSSERL's phenomenology-which is the only one that can offer absolute clarity here-, he searches for the specifically personal in the instinctual-drive-like, in the libidinal occupation of the diverse dispositions or registers of the psychic apparatus: "the drive transforms dispositions into active tendencies." With this differentiation, which finds itself at the basis of FREUD's psychology and whose methodological importance has not been yet sufficiently emphasized, one reaches the border of the natural-scientific consideration of psychic life and a new domain begins: the one of the

psychology of the person. (pp. 237-8, our translation; cf. Rorschach 1921/1967 chaps. IV.5&17).

That, as Binswanger implicitly suggests, Rorschach's own concept of introversion in the long run rather coincides widely with the Freudian conception of it could have been already induced from a similar criticism of the latter to Jung's 'indiscriminate' use of the term in *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus* (1914b); but more specifically, and by contrast to Jung's more fixed (*gestellt*: Fierens 1970 pp. 39-40) or predetermined *Einstellungstyp*, just as it is for Rorschach an *Er-lebnistyp* introversion is for Freud an *Er-krankungstyp* (1912; in the anthropological sense of 'neurosis, human privilege') the shared German prefix indicating that there it is about a way of life up to a certain point chosen or actively *-intentionally-* adopted by the subject (cf. Fierens pp. 47-50) inside a very complex dialectic and dynamic interplay of factors: the 'play of drives' (cf. Binswanger 1920/1970). This has been sustained and theoretically demonstrated with more explicit detail (thus satisfying Rorschach's wish of not remaining in the bare common-usage conception, cf. quotation above) by several authors from the psychoanalytic-Rorschach trend, particularly Rapaport (1945-46/1968, cf. pp. 357-9), Salomon (1962, chap. V.1), and Mélon (1976) who grounds himself on and makes an excellent summary of the conclusions of his illustrious predecessors:

Ces réflexions succinctes à propos du schéma de l'appareil psychique de FREUD... nous permettent de comprendre pourquoi et comment l'ERLEBNISTYPUS de Rorschach nous renseigne utilement sur un aspect essentiel du fonctionnement psychique. Le binôme introversion/extraversion hérité de la typologie jungienne peut être avantageusement remplacé par le couple représentations/affects.

Un sujet extraverti est quelqu'un chez qui la résolution des tensions pulsionnelles inter-vient en mobilisant les soupapes affectivo-motrices (hystériques, psychopathes, psycho-somatiques), un sujet introverti se libère plutôt par la production de représentations, fantasmes (obsessionnels), délires (schizophréniques) ou pensées (sublimées) qui sont des produits dérivés, plus ou moins lointains, de l'hallucination.

Rorschach avait noté que la production de kinesthésies, à la différence des réponses forme et plus encore des réponses couleur, impliquait un moment créateur... Il avait également remarqué que la production de kinesthésies postulait l'inhibition de la décharge motrice. A ce propos, il avait bien vu l'analogie avec le processus onirique.

D'une manière générale, on peut dire que les réponses mouvement sont en rapport avec l'activité de pensée dans la mesure où celle-ci est créatrice et antagoniste du passage à l'acte immédiat...

Les réponses couleur, à l'inverse, n'impliquent pas de moment créateur; elles sont le produit d'une réaction affective immédiate. Elles sont purement réactives; elles sont produites dans le moi mais le moi ne les produit pas: elles surviennent un peu malgré lui... Autrement dit, la part du ça dans la production des réponses couleur est toujours plus importante que celle du moi. Les réflexions qui précèdent expliquent pourquoi... l'Erlebnistypus (TRI)... reflète à sa manière une position fondamentale du moi en face des pulsions...

Les kinesthésies... sont capitales et témoignent du génie observateur de Rorschach. Il est dommage qu'il ait eu recours au concept d'introversio promu par JUNG pour qualifier le sujet K. En s'engageant dans la voie d'une typologie confuse, il s'est empêché de fournir une interprétation dynamique des K articulée autour de l'opposition dialectique entre la pensée, l'affect et la mise en acte, alors qu'il en avait manifestement l'intuition. (pp. 56, 83)⁶⁰

That said, in line with what we said above we still want to stress how extensively was the young psychiatrist Rorschach influenced by the early Jung: the practical use of the Word Association experiment in the detection of complexes, the persistent preoccupation with the mechanism of introversion and its connection with collective unconscious symbolism when studying schizophrenics or religious sectarians, etc., all point in the same direction (cf. Rorschach 1965/1967). But this undeniable influence however was not accepted uncritically at all, as demonstrated by his not following the example of breaking up with Psychoanalysis and by his persistent criticism to Jung's concepts *through the application of his own judgement* in every case, as amply showed by the above quotations. In this connection it is rather perplexing that one has to wait until Wells (1935) for the first paper that dedicates itself to a detailed comparison of both the Rorschach and the Word Association tests (cf. Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. V.4). We only mention this work for its historical interest since its theoretical contribution is exiguous: the "seeming" correspondence between Jung's objective -extraverted- attitude (for ex. 'contrast' associations: "good-bad") and Rorschach's *F* (curiously, not *Fb*), and between the subjective -introverted- attitude (for ex. 'predicate' associations: "good-boy") and the *B* determinant obviously.

But not until the 1950s does the Jungian theoretical approach make itself really felt in Rorschach research. As his intervention in the Zürich 1949 1st International Rorschach Congress Bash (1952a) published a paper focused precisely on the experimental behavior of the Experience (or attitudinal) Type. With a population of 28 normal adults to whom the usual Rorschach procedure (11 introversive, 8 ambiequal, 9 extratensive) had been applied at least one week earlier, he conducted a perceptual satiation experiment -in Karsten's sense- exclusively with plate IX (because of its dual color- and movement-values): in a dark room the plate was illuminated for 5" 200 times, with 15" darkness intervals, requesting a response each time. He wanted to investigate the experience field (closely tied with the concept of dilation, or what is known today through Beck and Exner as the Experience Actual) and expected at most a balanced dilatation of the ET, or an increasing flow of *F* responses. Unexpectedly, the results were very surprising: for almost every subject the ET suffered a total reversal, including for the not exactly ambiequal, mostly due to a significant increase of the initially -in the spontaneous, normal testing- unfavored determinant: the *Fb* in

⁶⁰ In certain passage of "Two Essays on Analytical Psychology" (1928) Jung also agrees with this view though: "The reflective nature of the introvert causes him always to think and consider before acting... and so he always has difficulty in adapting to the external world' [p. 54], whereas the extravert has 'the ability to fit into existing conditions with relative ease... His action is swift, subject to no misgivings and hesitations.' [loc. cit.]" (quoted according to Mindess 1955, p. 244).

the introversive, and the *B* in the extratensive. Another feature recorded in the experiment was the gradually changing character of the responses, becoming more and more of a complex and dream-like nature, an often the subjects themselves spontaneously compared them with dreams. Based on this reasonable analogy he explained his surprising results according to Jung's theory of the compensatory attitude of the Unconscious in respect to the Conscious, and since he had since then limited access to the today, only more than a half century later published Rorschach-Roemer correspondence (!: Rorschach 2004) he could quote Rorschach's supporting compensatory convictions he shared with Jung (cf. above, letter of 28/1/22). Bash's results are truly suggestive, and actually even imply a virtual demonstration of the perfectly balanced (symmetric) and core character of Rorschach's pivotal conception of the *Erlebnistypus* - if one accepts plate IX as an adequate representative of this relationship (Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. III.1) and if, furthermore, one disregards the above discussed also existing inverted and irreconcilable 'compensation' conceptions between both authors. In an immediately following theoretical paper (1952b) he elaborated more deeply his results towards an experimental foundation of Jung's dream analysis, which by the way implicitly poses the interesting question (p. 282-3) of the formal/content diverging conceptions of Freud's and Jung's respective dream-interpretations (cf. Mannoni 1968 pp. 32-3 & 68-71, and chap. III.B.1 below). In a subsequent paper (1955) dedicated to Jung's 80th birthday he defends, in contradiction to our preceding conclusions, the identity between Jung's Attitudinal Type and Rorschach's Experience Type. We reproduce here some of his arguments:

In the same year [as *Psychodiagnostics*], 1921, Jung's *Psychological Types* was published. As Rorschach died on April 2, 1922, it is doubtful whether he ever read it. Had he been able to do so, he would have remarked that Jung's conception of the attitudinal types as well as of the basic psychological functions had undergone a fundamental change between 1917 and 1921 and had assumed the form it still holds today... Thus for Jung too by 1921-2 the introvert had become a person [as quoted from Rorschach] "who lives more toward the inside than the outside," with no connotations of pathology, of a tie to one or another psychological function [thinking, feeling...], or of the rigidity that Rorschach imputed to the concept when he substituted his term "introversive" for Jung's "introverted."

Even when regard to the historical circumstances already mentioned is taken, Rorschach's flat statement that his "concept of introversion... really has hardly anything still in common with Jung's... but the name" strikes the unprejudiced reader as an exaggeration. Klopfer [1955] has recently called attention to a probable psychological reason for it. Rorschach was an active and enthusiastic psychoanalyst and one of the founders of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Association as well as its first vice-president. His teacher and mentor in this discipline, Emil Oberholzer, was a highly orthodox Freudian and the first president of the same Association. The *Psychodiagnostik* was published [only] eight years after the breach between Freud and Jung, while feelings between the two camps were bitter and the adherents of the two leaders tended to carry on something not unlike a "Holy War." Rorschach's exceptional scientific integrity kept him from being blinded to the importance of Jung's contribution, but a defense

mechanism against it seems nevertheless to have guided his pen as he wrote the statement in question.

...In his otherwise excellent, careful and illuminating biographical study Ellenberger [1954/1995] unfortunately has perpetuated the hoary error... (pp. 237-8)

We now know his first assumptions, the doubtful reading of Jung's 1921 book by Rorschach and above all his possible reactions, to be entirely wrong as exposed above. As for Klopfer's half-flattering argument, however historically rational(ized?) it is also incorrectly applied in this case: Oberholzer could not reasonable be considered "his teacher and mentor" but a friend i.e. an equal (Rorschach 2004) and by all accounts Rorschach's scientific attitude was very independent and above these petty details plus, *wherever deserved*, equally critical though not less sound towards Jung as towards psychoanalysts (op. cit., cf. for ex. letter 84 pp. 174-5; Morgenthaler 1958). Bash goes on summarizing his previous results with the plate IX satiation experiment, quoting again Rorschach's words of agreement with Jung (pp. 164-5 above) but *stopping just short of the subsequent criticisms* that offer a much more complete view of his true conceptions. And he finishes with some statistical seemingly useful indications about how to represent the Experience Type formula as a linear measure.

Much more interesting is Bash's 1965/67 epilogue to his edited volume of Rorschach's "Collected Papers" where he thoroughly analyzes the role of these minor works in the develop-ment of the ideas that ultimately lead to the realization of the main one, "*Psychodiagnostik*". He acknowledges the importance of what Ellenberger calls Rorschach's 'initiation dream' as the seed of his conception of movement responses and introversion, but pointing to the as yet absence of its counterpart which he tries then to trace historically. If it is true that in a passage of his Dissertation Rorschach (1965/67 pp. 121-2, 310-1) already establishes a dialectic between 'motor' and 'optic', subjective and objective types (just as in the future Experience Type), this contraposition did not appear in force until later:

According to MOURLY VOLD, many of the moments determined in the dream by the cutaneous-motor states [stimuli, experimentally induced by him for ex. tying both feet together with a bandage] do not represent predicates [term already used by Jung in his word association experiments: cf. Wells above] of the dreaming subject, but of other living beings... The author speaks in those cases of "objectivation" and is of the opinion that, when the stimulus is weak, it simply emerges an inversion of that same mechanism which is known in waking life as concomitant [*kinesthetic*] sensation to an observed movement-that is, the stimulus would be experienced in that way due to its weakness and would determine the *optical* image of a movement by somebody else. By contrast, a more intense stimulus would give place in the dreamer to a subjective image, in which he would appear himself as acting subject-. In my opinion, things are not so simple. In the dream one can very well feel oneself walk and see at the same time somebody who walks beside. On the other hand, in the same dream can often mix themselves subjective and objective movements. There must enter in play, therefore, other determinant moments. The *individual* moments probably play a role; a subject in which visual memory predominates will

rather tend to objectivation, another with motor predominance will rather tend to subjective sensation. And there must be furthermore psychic factors or complexes which operate for or against objectivation. (Rorschach 1965/67 pp. 121-2, cf. Bash pp. 310-1; our translation, italics added)

More specifically, the concept of *color* (the representative of extraversion) is largely absent in his early works; and when he began to occupy himself and experiment with them (already in Herisau), Bash remarks, the thing was about incongruent, paradoxical colors (images of a cat colored like a frog, a squirrel colored like a rooster, a frog colored like a chaffinch: cf. Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. III.3, 2004 p. 355; Ellenberger 1954/1995 p. 60). Anyway, particularly in three of Rorschach's minor works the theme of opposite poles gradually takes an obvious central place: "On the election of friends by the neurotic" (for the case in question: one "L." overtly imposing, the other "A." shy and withdrawn, "G." the patient himself representing the doubt-ridden and moody *tertium comparationis*) about which Bash asserts...

The schema of the Experience Type, still to be discovered, is patent here. RORSCHACH even indicates it in a more clarified form: "After what we have said, circumstances seem clear. L. is for G. a substitute of the father; A., a substitute of the mother; G. remains being like a child who needs the father and the mother. In the way of a dual receptor he had attracted towards himself a friend substitute of the father and another friend substitute of the mother." Ambiequality rings already through the terminology. Without doubt, RORSCHACH's own psychology contributed to the election and elaboration of this subject; (pp. 313-4; our translation)

in "Analysis of a schizophrenic drawing" the design in question represents an unification or complementation of opposites, a subject typical of Jung's psychology which Rorschach still does not mention there; and in his sect studies all turns around a contrast between two complementary leaders, Unternährer and Binggeli, a schizophrenic and a neurotic (epileptic?) respectively, or between predominant introversion and predominant extraversion according to the Jungian conception which he began to openly use in this work:

Since 1913 until his passing away, RORSCHACH occupied himself with the two sect founders: Johannes Binggeli and Anton Unternährer, only alluding to other sectarians as concerned the relationship they could have had with those. He was aware of the complementarity of the two mentioned sect founders and also of the fact that both were not opposed, but complemented each other... At the end of his posthumous work about the sects, RORSCHACH makes the following summary: "Binggeli took something from [the earlier] Unternährer's doctrines, above all the sexualization of the religious. But he did not elaborate them schizophrenically, as you can easily confirm. An essential difference between both resides in the [extraversive] adaptation to the environment. They both come from superstitious populations and both used those superstitions to earn their living as healers. But while Binggeli adapted himself, also in his doctrines, to the usual language of the local superstitions, Unternährer's doctrine does not maintain the least relationship with the latter. Unternährer grows too distant from the inferior mythology proper of popular superstition and heads himself rather towards the superior mythology, towards

the myths of humanity in general, until reaching those tremendous prehistorical, primitive depths, previous even to all mythology [the collective unconscious]..." Binggeli practiced a kind of priapic cult tinged with christianism. Unternährer went much farther.. The consequence of that was "a markedly desublimated sexual symbolism", a far-reaching and radical inversion of all values which the successor of Anton, Binggeli, never dared to preach.

RORSCHACH leans himself on the respective psychiatric diagnosis of both sectarians to explain the essential differences that separate them, despite a superficial similarity between their lives. Nobody will doubt that Unternährer was a schizophrenic. Rorschach confirms all along his life the presence of several outbreaks of "deepened introversion", from which emerged the antonian doctrine. He deduces from that a consequence rich in derivations: "That which the schizophrenic who falls into introversion due to the weakening of his *fonction du réel*, or rather said in another way: of his continence of extraversion, experiences in a forcible way, the artist, the mystical, the philosopher experience it in an active way. The introversion is in all these cases identical and reaches the same level of archaic thought than schizophrenic introversion. Even the respective productions show a close kinship between themselves... The difference resides perhaps in that the philosopher, for example, descends into introversion through the scale of ontogenetic fixations, step by step, and because of that he can find in an active way the road towards full extraversion, while the schizophrenic is thrown down, rushed towards introversion and spends the rest of his life trying to find more or less fruitlessly the reverse road" [comp. Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. IV.4 pp. 80-1]. These thoughts are not completely original. The leaning on Jung is manifest...

...It is of the utmost interest to know what is it that RORSCHACH thought about the [years] consecutive to the thirty seven ones of Binggeli, years that were more quiet for him: "Between 1872 and 1892 we know almost nothing about Binggeli. He has fame and enjoys from the admiration of his growing community. He cultivates in his daydreams and fantasies the self divinization and he feels free forever of the devil. His literary activity becomes easier copying quietly big chunks written by others. Anyway, the election of such copied pieces is very interesting. He has married, has children and seeks, better or worse, to make his family advance. The [initial, from where his own written doctrine emerged] state of introversion [albeit inferior, more shallow than Unternährer's] seems to have ceased, but his production has become extremely stereotyped. Guilty of that is, perhaps, the exterior success. Despite the introversion being pathological, its products had provided him success: followers, admirers, a community. The success reinforces the extraversive tendencies; it cures the introversion, but with that it anni-hilates productivity as well. With Binggeli it happens as with a novelist who, after a first work created from a profound introversion, doesn't succeed anymore in writing anything of worth, because the success achieved through that first work has teared him apart from introversion; his ulterior production isn't but an echo of the first-born work, or else conventional novels whose essential determinants do not lie on the writer's own intimacy, but on the fancies and whims of the

world of the readers" [comp. Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. IV.17 p. 121]. (pp. 316-7 & 333, cf. Rorschach 1965/67 pp. 288, 285, 266-7; our translation)

The most original part of Bash's analysis of Rorschach's creative process concentrates then on this important work, and in his opinion Binggeli in particular represented for Rorschach no less than a shadow figure (Ellenberger 1970 p. 707) due to the striking resemblances between their respective biographies: both lost their mothers at an early age suffering ulteriorly under the strict authority of a stepmother, each time one of the father's marriages represented some sort of incestuous relationship, eventually losing also the latter early towards adulthood - all of these traumas making them prone to powerful defensive introversive reactions; aspects *stressed by Rorschach himself* not only regarding Binggeli but also comparing him in this regard to the contrasting religious-sublimatory figure of Jakob Böhme which explains the common complexes between them, and which probably made Rorschach aware of his also similar personal dynamics. But of course the pathological nature of Binggeli's introversion marked a difference: here we follow again Bash's own argument...

...The material is enough to clearly show that RORSCHACH considered deep intro-version [the one of Unternährer], more than as a general danger, as a highly personal danger, as a vital threat, on whose threshold he must have found himself. It is probable that he went through a phase of introversion which, if previously well outlined, was deepened because of external happenings during the puberty years, above all after the parents' death and under the rule of the stepmother until the beginning of studies..., that is, from the twelfth until the twentieth year. We suspect that he went through a second phase, despite his apparent cordiality and sociability, during the great stay in Russia of 1913/14. Certain allusions of his widow would support this: "...In a not entirely conscious way he felt in some way an anxiety of yielding to the charm of Russia".. His wife has described as well RORSCHACH's tendency towards introversion: "He was always interested in 'fantasy', which he considered as the 'divine spark' in man... He was attracted by archaic thought, the formation of myths and myths themselves." Even when they are almost completely missing direct biographical data about it and the descriptions of ELLENBERGER and of Mrs. Rorschach present us an almost rectilinear vital trajectory during the years 1915-1922, passed in Herisau, the indirect data about a deep phase of creative introversion during the years 1917/18 are numerous and cannot be overlooked. We believe that it was initiated by the first and brief study about sects, appeared in 1917. RORSCHACH did not abandon the subject anymore, which had begun to interest him four years earlier in Bern. The introversive phase came to lead to the creation of *Psychodiagnostics*. The study about the sect founders and the *Psychodiagnostics* kept maturing, mutually complementing themselves, along RORSCHACH's life. In view of all that, it seems evident to us that RORSCHACH's works about the sects could be considered as a product of the mentioned introversion. The latter preceded the *Psycho-diagnostics*. Even when this one's premises are located in a much earlier time and begin in the dissertation about "Reflex hallucinations" and even before, its starting point must be recognized in the introversive observation of the own kinesthesias. But the *Psycho-diagnostics*

was only completed by means of the addition of extratensive traits, that is, of all that refers to the colors, with which it became a masterpiece, although unfinished. In this sense it represents as well an "extraversion task" from RORSCHACH...

Our hypothesis, then, is the following: the encounter with the own intimate and dark contradictor, with what C. G. Jung calls "the shadow", in the figure of Binggeli, must have plunged RORSCHACH in a deep phase of introversion prolonged during years, whose dangers he recognized and surpassed not without sacrifices. He has exposed the dangers that stalked him in such depths with all desirable clarity in his analyses of sect founders. It would be childish to see but a mere casuality in his so intense and persistent preoccupation for the destiny of Binggeli, parallel to his own. To exorcise the danger not only did he leave his studies about sect founders unfinished, but unpublished furthermore, and he channeled himself, in a hesitant way at first, towards his extraverted task. We have already seen how became pronounced his need of complementarity, conciliation and balance in his first minor works. This time he was subjected to the toughest test. Despite his fundamental ambiequality, RORSCHACH tended towards introversion. His decisive encounter with the figure of Binggeli must have pushed him very far, consciously or unconsciously, in that direction, up to the vicinity of a dangerous limit. He initiated a road in the reverse sense, marked by his experiments with colored plates, paradoxical and inadequate. In that phase they were in reality an *opus contra natura*. Only later on and motivated by HENS' [and FANKHAUSER's] works, which came to operate in an already prepared soil, could take place the opening towards the light, towards the proper taking in consideration of the colors... That which he had seen, intuited or sensed in the sect founders affected him in an intimate and direct way. His analysis of Binggeli is, in reality, a self-analysis realized facing a dark mirror and, maybe, he recognized it as such, although we ignore up to what point. We understand thus, be it or not due to a conscious self-knowledge, why he responded to the suggestion of his colleagues for submitting to a training analysis saying that he didn't consider it necessary (ELLENBERGER). (pp. 324-6; our translation)

Bash makes much of an argument ("ambivalence") of the supposed failure by Rorschach to reach the diagnosis of epilepsy in Binggeli in favor of the one of neurosis, which we consider irrelevant from our Szondian perspective (the Oedipal dynamics being the same); anyway, even if it seems to us that Bash exaggerates the facts somewhat (the supposed "danger" faced by Rorschach) and some of his inductions to be highly speculative, his general interpretation of the facts in a personal sense for Rorschach is convincing and has merit (for ex. his "borrowing" the extratensive side of his schema, just as Binggeli). According to Bash thus, this confrontation of the Unconscious by Rorschach was very similar to Jung's, producing in both cases a perfected theoretical system where contraries are balanced and conciliated - from where the reference to the renowned *Tabula Smaragdina* in the title. He then summarizes by the way in this text his previously commented paper in English about the essential correspondence between their respective Attitudinal/ Experience typologies, modifying Klopfer's psychoanalytic-anti-Jungian explanation of

the rejection of the term 'introversion' (cf. above) in the sense of another instance of Rorschach's contemporary fright facing this process.

Bash's conclusion is also particularly suggesting and relevant to our discussion in the next chapter III.D.2, which we will finish by quoting before our final comments relative to this interesting work:

...The most important refers to the tensional relation existing between the fundamental numbers 3 and 4, which appears in almost all the dreams and visions of Binggeli and is exposed by RORSCHACH, but without dedicating it a detailed investigation. It is known in analytical (jungian) psychology under the denomination of *axiom of Mary the Seeress* [in a translator's footnote: "...The mentioned aphorism is the following: 'The one becomes two, the two becomes three and from the three exits the one as fourth.' The sense of this aphorism is commented by JUNG in several passages of his works, above all in *Psychologie und Alchemie* (Rascher Verlag, Zurich), and is related to the problem of the psychological process 'of individuation'."]... It seems suitable to me, however, to underline the "axiom of Mary" and quaternary, since the theoretical building elevated by RORSCHACH is based on the number four. We meet him in each page and in almost every table of *Psychodiagnostics*. His classifications are (almost without exception) of a crossed schema. Suffice to recall the two crossed pairs introversion-extraversion and dilatation-coartation, on which is based the *Psychodiagnostics*. We have in addition the quaternary division of the apprehension modes (G-D-Dd-Do), of neuroses, of schizophrenias, etcetera. The tensional relation between three and four, the *axioma Mariae* properly speaking, remains expressed in two characteristic places. The first is represented by the election or the number of determinants, originally three: form, color and movement. The fourth, light-dark, recognized by RORSCHACH, but grasped in an incomplete way, was finally elaborated by BINDER. The second one refers to the color responses in proper, and of which the *Psychodiagnostics* indicates three main classes (FFb, FbF and Fb). We have seen how RORSCHACH became aware late of the meaning of color, in the manner of *opus contra natura*. Here was left also a remainder of ambivalence..., since he didn't reach a sharp separation of color and light-dark, as the score F(Fb) established by him and the respective explanations in his posthumous work show...

The four, as fundamental number of a theoretical construction, is in no way exclusive of RORSCHACH. We will limit ourselves to mentioning that it dominates the entirety of jungian psychology. It dominates also the western philosophy, since PLATO and ARISTOTLE until SPINOZA, KANT and SCHOPENHAUER, who has designated with terms the members of the quaternary in *The quadruple root of the principle of sufficient reason*. It seems that it predominates there where empirical philosophy or psychology are cultivated as independent sciences, not derived from the somatics. Conversely, three is a fundamental number when thinking is dominated by representations about the somatic determinism of psychic phenomena. So it happens, in a very patent way, in KRET-SCHMER's and SHELDON's typologies and in the entirety of FREUD's

doctrinal building, where triads abound (Id, Ego, Superego; unconscious, preconscious, conscious; orality, anality, genitality, with the respective character types, uretrality not succeeding in occupying a fourth place equiparable with the others; the topic, dynamic and economic metapsychological aspects; the triadic division of psychoneuroses in hysteria, phobia and obsessional neurosis, as well as of actual neuroses in panic neurosis, anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia, etc.)... (pp. 335-6; our translation)

This conclusion by Bash is very perceptive and he was even ahead of us in some of the arguments we will make at the end of next chapter. But we think he still continues forcing things a little to make them fit into his schema (cf. his treatment of 'uretrality'), on his way to demonstrate the close(r) correspondence between Rorschach's and Jung's respective methods and ideas. Without denying a tremendous influence particularly at the beginning and still present in a significant measure at the end, we have already seen the -predominant- overt contradicting of Jung by Rorschach in his last letters, with good arguments furthermore, and how Bash carefully quoted just the part which fitted with his construction. We from our side rather perceive in Rorschach's work a clear predilection for the number 3 in his original theoretical system (cf. chap. III.D.2 below), which gradually became a 4 just as in the axiom of Mary - and that is certainly impressive; but we prefer to refer to philosophers and scientists than to alchemists for the corresponding theoretical understanding. The apprehension modes were initially 3 (you cannot seriously put *Do* at the same level of the others, as something intrinsically different), just as the determinants, and this triadic schema even derives from Bash's own analysis of Rorschach's minor works. And what about Hegel's aphorism, which contradicts his psychological predilection for the 4?: "3 est le nombre de l'esprit, 4 celui de la nature" (Schotte 1990, p. 36). Things are not so distinctly established as he in general would have us believe.

A subsequent article by Bash (1972) is dedicated to the investigation of the possible *general* projection (by contrast to the *specific* individual imagos searched for by Simón H.: section C above) of Jung's concept of the soul image (anima and animus) in the movement responses to the test, which since Rorschach are considered as closer to the Unconscious than other kinds. More specifically, the spontaneous gender identification of the *B* human images by the subject were theoretically expected to grow in the direction of contrasexual identification to the conscious one -in the direction of the soul image then- in neurosis which by definition is dynamically more conducive to projection, by contrast to mental health. The empirical results in general confirmed such theoretical hypothesis, a weak part of those results by contrast to theory being the quantitative predominance of male *Bs* (39%, against 26% female) in healthy women to begin with, which just accentuated in neurosis, and a limitation of the interpretation was the absence of a complete sexual reversal in the gender percentages of neurotic men, characterized again just by an accentuation in this reverse sense.

Kadinsky (1952), quoting Rorschach & Oberholzer's posthumous case study, became interested in the *affective* value of the apprehension modes which has been

investigated by just a few other researchers (Dworetzki, Zulliger, Kuhn, Schachtel). Taking as his main premise the all-important correlational (Kuhn), Gestalt (Bohm), or systematic nature of the formal Rorschach structure, in a 1st part he began by a thoughtful statistical establishing of the relationship between locations and determinants in a population of 200 children aged 7 to 13 years old, assuring the same interrelationships have been found in adult protocols. Dividing the *G*-interpretations in two affectively-defined categories, vague and sharp (by the way practically the same than Dworetzki: section D above), in the groups where the former predominated he found them significantly related to more unstable affectivity (more immature *Fb*- and *Hd*-responses) and where the latter predominated were visible affective stability and *B*. As *Dd*-interpretations rose in quantity so did the form-predominant responses (*FFb*, *F[Fb]*), except the *FHd* due to their known relationship to larger location areas) and a tendency to coartation was discernible (particularly with the *B*), the higher point of dilation being found with an adequate *Dd%* = 1 to 9. In a different response-against-response (i.e. location-against-location instead of the previous division in groups according to the respective *G%* or *Dd%* of each subject, since a varying *D%* may be equally due to the indistinct personal preference for one or the other of the former apprehension modes) statistical approach, *G*-responses in general -comp. above for a finer differentiation- were found again coupled with *B*, with *Hd*-responses even more than with *Fb* ones, and more related in general to introversion; *D* were found related to ambiequality (due to both a lesser coupling with movement and a greater with color); and *Dd* were coupled with *F*, *F(Fb)*, and related to extratensivity (exclusively due to their most rare coupling with *B*). *Do* were negatively related to the *G* and positively to the *Dd*, i.e. with decreasing location area. Then, separating from his normal sample (70) those children with education difficulties due to either harmful environmental influences (66) or internalized neurosis (64) to concentrate on them, he found in the former a differentiating tendency towards higher *G%* while in the latter by contrast towards higher *Dd%* and viceversa; other significant neurotic signs besides high *Dd%* were *BT* (Klopfer's/Piotrowski's FM), *F(Fb)* equalling *FFb* and disappearing *FbF*, failures, and *Do*. In the IInd part he attempted a psychological interpretation of these findings as concerning the value of the apprehension modes, concentrating on (vague, i.e. primitive) *G* by contrast to *Dd*:

...The *G*-tendency leads to affective unadaptability, at its extreme it refuses the adaptation to the external world, but leads to little inner conflict. The *Dd*-tendency on the other hand is tied with anxious-painful adaptation to the exterior, but at the expense of inner stability and elaboration and by that leads at the extreme to an inner splitting up and conflictual position. With this formulation it is obvious for the moment to think about a connection with the opposite pair extraversion-introversion: the *Dd*-stresser as the one turned towards the external world, the *G*-stresser on the other hand the introverted, the one that follows the demands of his inner side, without consideration for the reality of the external world. But a more precise examination indicates that this conception is not to be maintained: both behaviors are not differentiated. The *G*-type has no or few *B*, his Experience Type is clearly extratensive, the *Dd*-type has indeed a rather extratensive Experience Type, but this results from repression of the *B*, and also the high *M%* speaks against

this conception. One could therefore speak rather of inferior extra- or introversion, but for that the foundations are also insufficient and we must better look out for another way of conception. (p. 47; our translation)

Here we disagree with Kadinsky and feel from our side that these conceptual approximations could hold and do are a promising hypothesis: in his Table 5 corresponding to his particular location-against-location statistical approach these connections between Apprehension and Experience Types clearly present themselves despite his own denial, and if we more carefully take into consideration the distinction between sharp/vague *G*s the former type do has a close relationship with the *B* (Table 1), and it is rather the latter *Gv*-type the one with few *B* but as discussed above it is more related to *Hd*- than to *Fb*-responses (Table 5) and these light-dark interpretations are again related to introversion as sustained and explained by Salomon (1962 pp. 63-8); but more about this hypothesis below. Anyway, for his alternative explanation Kadinsky remarks how both these opposite apprehension types have been classified at one time or another as anxiety indicators (the *Dd* by Zulliger, the *Gv* by Rapaport): it seems more appropriate to him to designate them as anxiety-defense signs, the *Dd* operating against the anxiety provoked by the outer world through adaptation at any cost to evade the external conflict, the *Gv* against the anxiety from the drive world through giving up any argument against that power. He also considers the choice of a determinant by the subject as belonging to a deeper, less conscious layer of personality than the more conscious choice of a location about which one can reliably ask the subject himself, therefore the anxiety-defenses through the latter must be closer to the conscious than the determinant-influenced shocks, *Hd*-reactions, etc. He concludes then:

...The Apprehension Type must therefore be something that stands next to the Conscious on the one hand, but on the other is relatively stable and hence fundamental. It seems therefore, to use Rorschach's expression [did he meant Jung?], that here it is about a customary attitude of the Conscious.

We have henceforth sufficiently circumscribed the problem from different sides to come now to the conclusion that the Apprehension Type reflects the basic attitude with which the Conscious approaches life, where it tends to experience the powerful, commanding agent: in the drive world and the Unconscious, as the *G*-tendency does, or in the external world and the Conscious, to which the *Dd*-tendency tries to refer to.

If we express this polarity more comprehensively, we arrive to the archetype of the mother as the world of the Unconscious and of the father as the world of the Conscious. *Accordingly the G-tendency is the representer of the relation to the mother-archetype, to the Unconscious, the quintessential of the drive and life energy, and then further to the ground, the family, the world of matter, and in contrast to that, the Dd-tendency of the relation to the archetype of the father, to the Conscious, state and society, duty and law, in general, to the spirit.* (pp. 48-9; our translation)

These very interesting reflections could be considered a welcomed suggestion to approach the problem faced by Rorschach (cf. above) while reading Jung's newer, reversed conception of the intro/extraverted Attitudinal Type in his "Psychological Types" (1921) from then on focused on the *conscious attitude* (cf. Kadinsky above)

about the Apprehension Type) instead of on the unconscious one or 'disposition', the one actually favored by Rorschach in his Experience Type (with Kadinsky agreeing again above): in our opinion a promising hypothesis for an eventual research would be to start from considering the Experience Type in effect as representative of the "unconscious attitude" -in Jung's term- as Rorschach sustained, and if the Apprehension Type of the same subject contradicts the above interrelationships found by Kadinsky (i.e., a G-tendency in an extratensive or a Dd-tendency in an introversive) then this would perhaps mean a conscious reverse compensation closer to Jung's final Attitudinal Type, fact to be confirmed clinically. On the other hand the theoretical connections made by Kadinsky with the mother and father archetypes respectively, sound less distant and forced when we consider what Bash said above about the schema behind Rorschach's 1913 article "On the choice of friends by the neurotic" antedating his future intro/extra polarity⁶¹. Kadinsky also warns against taking the Apprehension Type of a protocol at face value, without following the dynamics of the G-Dd polarity (to be understood more or less in the sense of ambition vs. exactness, respectively, whatever the location in question may be) in the individual responses themselves. Going on, *Do* are inter-preted as a special kind of Dd-tendency, as a sign of anxiety before the image of the castrating father, as in pl. III because of the separated "legs" (to relate with Salomon's interpretation as 'repressed oral aggression transformed into anxiety' and tendency to regression, now supposedly facing the father archetype: 1959b pp. 236-9, 1962 chap. VII). From a genetic point of view, Kadinsky makes then the following reflections:

For the previous results of this research to be tenable, we must find in the course of child development certain changes of the Apprehension Type and shifts in the emphasis of the apprehension tendencies.

The small child lives in a world that is dominated by the archetype of the mother, but at 4-5 years is then driven out through the anxiety for the power of drives on the one hand and for reality on the other, and driven into the identification with the father-archetype. It happens a revolution and a reorientation that could be designated as a transition from the matriarchal to the patriarchal stage of development. A barrier is erected against the world of the Unconscious which lasts until prepuberty. This turning towards the fatherlike, which was interpreted personalistically by Freud as the Oedipus complex and its overcoming through the erection of the Super-Ego, runs equally sensible in boys and girls even if, personalistically considered, the directions seem to be reversed: both develop-ments begin in a being strongly drivebound and end in an attachment to the spiritual and moral values (interpreted by Freud as the Super-Ego)...

Corresponding to this child development the G-tendency must dominate in the small child up to the absence of the Dd-tendency. We must expect then whole-interpretations without any consideration of the blot details. Then with

⁶¹ We keep of course in mind that Zulliger, a precursor of Kadinsky in this affective interpretation of the apprehension modes, related them to Freud's psychosexual developmental stages: G-orality, Dd-anality. The connection of orality with the mother figure is an easy one to make (in fact, Zulliger himself interpreted G FbF or Fb responses as an indication of "intense fixation to the mother"). And Kadinsky himself in an ulterior article (1973) directly connected also anality with the father figure (i.e. the Dd, in Rorschach language).

growing emergence of consciousness the arbitrary whole-interpretation should be transformed into DG and DdG and with the turning point of the 5th-6th year of life should grow the Dd-tendency and with repression of the G-tendency it should step into the foreground, the whole-interpretation should draw back completely (barrier against the world of the Unconscious), until with beginning prepuberty and puberty the whole-tendency steps again stronger into the foreground from now on as sharply apprehended interpretation (argument with the Unconscious, end of Freud's "latency period"). (pp. 53-4; our translation)

Dworetzki's (whom he references, unfortunately, only indirectly) and others' Apprehension Type developmental results completely confirm his depth-psychological interpretations. In the IIIrd and last part three cases are discussed in some detail which exemplify very well the above assertions, and a particular contribution is made concerning an original interpretation of failures: that they are a consequence of an exaggerated G-tendency (since D and Dd are easier to interpret). The paper certainly appears very soundly grounded on clinical depth-psychological knowledge.

As a reaction to the criticisms towards his at first explicitly almost atheoretical Rorschach approach (cf. section A above and #III9-10 below), following Rapaport's example Klopfers (1954) espoused an Ego-psychological point of view on the matter but with two important qualifications: his own view is supposed to be more focused towards the non-intellectual "constructive" Ego functions than Rapaport's axing mostly around its intellectual (thought processes)-defensive aspects, and his fresh introduction of the Ego-Self polarity in Jung's sense; in a word, he contends to be more interested in the productive-creative relationship of the Ego with the Unconscious⁶². His argument presentation is interesting, particularly the part on "The systematic meaning of Rorschach hypotheses for Ego organization" (pp. 588-95) which approaches somewhat our own systematization, but on careful analysis some weighty differences and criticisms emerge from our side. A first, general shortcoming to point out is, despite their convincing nature, the definitely lower level of theoretical rationale of the Rorschach factors (in Klopfers's case exclusively the determinants) than Rapaport, as explained by Schachtel (1966) concentrating on shading:

Since Rorschach's few remarks, the literature on his test has distinguished a greater variety of shading responses than of any other determinant. Both their scoring and the meanings attributed to them vary considerably. In contrast to the variety of scores and of the meanings assigned them by various authors is the paucity of attempts to validate these meanings empirically or to develop a rationale that attempts to explain why they might have these meanings.

The main exception to this is to be found in the work of Binder... A less elaborated, detailed and explicit, more aphoristic rationale than Binder's and one that is intended to apply to all shading responses is contained in a brief statement by Klopfers, who has developed the greatest number of different scores for shading responses. He believes that the shading response shows how

⁶² Klopfers certainly draw a lot from psychoanalytic theory but with a strong Jungian-analytic accent, having been the latter's personal disciple during his short stay in Zürich during 1933-34 before emigrating to the U.S.A. (Klopfers 1955, Vorhaus 1960, Skadeland 1986).

the person deals with his need for *affection*; that shading creates in the testee some kind of "contact sensation" which evokes the need for basic emotional security (to be held, to belong), and that the different types of shading responses represent different ways of handling this need [the reference is to Klopfer's chapter we are now discussing, p. 580]. While I believe that an imagined contact sensation plays a role in some texture responses, I do not believe that it applies to all shading responses, nor do I share Klopfer's view that all shading responses are directly related to the need for affection although, again, this need probably does play a role in some shading responses and often it may have an indirect relation to other shading responses as well as to other determinants. (pp. 243-5; comp. also pp. 250-1 footnote 15)

Klopfer elaborates from a graphic schema (p. 569) of the constructive Ego functions basically divided in two downward-developing columns which may give the wrong impression of being based on the intellectual (left) - affective (right) distinction, but that is not the case: in Jungian terminology they correspond -implicitly: our interpretation- rather to the rational-irrational functional distinction respectively (cf. pp. 570-1), or even more appropriately to the extraversion (outer reality, or Jung's *Ego*) - introversion (Unconscious, or *Self*) growing developmental progressions (cf. Fox 1954, pp. 701 & 704-5). Striking similarities between Klopfer's and our view are the reference to his 3-stage developmental form-level sequence as related to the left column progression (p. 588) and our own 3-level developmental systematization however with some important differences (cf. pp. 124-5 above, particularly footnote #42), and the reference to the *B*-response after the *Fb*-one as the culmination point of the right column Self-realization, shading being the starting point of it all (also p. 588). But, as can be deduced from the foregoing by comparison to Klopfer's figure in question, a fundamental criticism is that his partition of Rorschach's formal factors doesn't seem very balanced or even symmetrical given that both schemas were very much so to begin with (for a better insight in Klopfer's view comp. pp. #III106-7 and footnote 61 below), unwittingly approaching somewhat the tilted presentation of Minkowska (1950, section C above) what can also be said of the later one of Jidouard (1988, cf. section B.4 above): why doesn't the extraverted orientation (left column, cf. above) correspond with color responses, particularly in a Jungian presentation? That is an intriguing flaw of Klopfer's schema. A final but no less important criticism is that the main deduction of his theoretical contribution is the development of a quantitative, narrow Rorschach Prognostic Rating Scale (RPRS: pp. 575-88) for the evaluation or "measuring" of Ego strength.

Together with Bash's paper earlier commented, Mindess' (1955) one forms part of a "C. G. Jung and Projective Techniques" series dedicated by Klopfer to honor the latter's 80th birthday. The author begins by complaining that few Jungians have interested themselves in the Rorschach Test, fact he explains quoting Klopfer's conviction of the limited scope of the method to the (mostly conscious) Ego and not beyond i.e. towards the (more unconscious) Self: this position is contradicted not only by Rorschach's own final views (cf. above) and even by Jung's own opinion (1958, cf. p. 162 above), but also by McCully's ulterior contributions to be discussed shortly. Mindess attempts then to make two contributions to bridge this alleged distance, first

concerning the Jungian Ego and the Rorschach. In this sense Jung's concepts of attitudes and functions, i.e. the question of psychological types he considers a relevant Ego-psychological issue. As to be expected, he adopts the same position of Bash regarding the essential identity between Jung's Attitudinal and Rorschach's Experience Types:

It is surprising to find that Rorschach takes pains to disclaim any similarity between his theory of experience-types and Jung's introversion-extraversion concept... Not only do the qualities of the introverted and extraverted personality parallel to a great extent the descriptions of the introverted and extraverted experience-types, but both Jung and Rorschach agree that these characteristics are constitutional, both agree that an individual's behavior may belie his real type...

Jung's approach is primarily an introverted one-i.e. one which stresses the importance of inner psychic contents-so he considers an individual's *attitude* to be most important in his adaptation, and constructs a theory accordingly. The majority of modern psychologists on the other hand, have an extraverted standpoint-i.e. they stress the importance of outer observable events-so they translate Jung's theory into a description of observable *behavior*...

...A theoretical difficulty is introduced by the admitted fact that behavior may be out-of-accord with the individual's underlying 'type.' Since both Jung and Rorschach agree that the type is a constitutional element, it is necessary to explain why in certain cases behavior may deviate from the expected pattern. Such explanation is best rendered, I believe, in terms of acquired motives... In the functioning individual there is a constant interaction of predisposition and [acquired] motives... (pp. 244-6)

Entirely contradicting this rendering of Jung's as an agreeing constitutional-introverted conception, we have already seen the diverging orientations of both authors on this specific issue: as Rorschach said in his last letters while criticizing *Psychological Types*, "...the attitude of conscious thinking towards the object has now become the measure-giving important figure", "...in another way than in Jung: one should not differentiate according to the conscious orientation but rather just from the genetic structure, from what he names 'attitude of the Unconscious' ". Mindess on his side recommends then to also pay attention to the 4 functions as they express them-selves in the Rorschach, suggesting specific indices for each one: without entering into all details one is intrigued by the absence of any mention of the paramount movement determinant on his list, establishing a thinking-feeling polarity obviously based on the contrast between the form and color determinant respectively which is not very convincing to us (about the Rorschach representation of thinking cf. pp. #III126-34 below). The second part of this article is dedicated to the Jungian interpretation of the unconscious material which appears in the Rorschach protocol, starting from an erroneous/stereotyped premise: "Whereas the scored categories of the test elucidate the organization of the ego, symbolic expressions of the unconscious may appear in the content" (p. 247; comp. above and chap. III.B.1 below). While we (following Salomon) do not agree with this symbolic-exclusivistic view of content, let us follow Mindess' analysis. He makes an interesting criticism of Brown's and W. Klopfer's contributions in this sense, the former agreeing with his

unconscious-symbolic interpretation of content but often going too far, the latter favoring a conscious-Ego interpretation of content which he discards. He reviews then the Jungian conception of unconscious symbols, differentiating three possible facets of their interpretation: the personal, the collective, and the general - which is the one he favors in Rorschach practice:

The *general* meaning of a symbol is simply the implication any perceptive individual can discern, regardless of psychological training. It is the facet which is utilized in poetry, drama, painting. And it is the most accessible area of meaning which can be explored in the Rorschach test, for the simple reason that collective symbols are infrequent (except in the records of psychotics or some gifted individuals) and personal symbols can be interpreted only on the basis of free association. (p. 251)

He finally recommends an interpretation not based on *physical appearance* (as in Freudian phallic symbols) but on *intrinsic quality* (fighting animals as symbols of the subject's own hostile impulses, for ex.).

Missaglia (1956) offered an interesting but not-much-elaborated collection of 10 Behn-Rorschach and Rorschach complete protocols of subjects of different ages and occupations pulled from a hundred-sample, out of which certain recurrent 'archetypal' responses (demons, mythological heroes, divinities, fabulous monsters...) demonstrated to his eyes the existence of the Collective Unconscious: "All these figures cannot be personal reminiscences, in spite of each one of us having heard from them. In fact we would be far from referring to the same group of ink blots figures of devils, of monsters or of satyres and fauns or of divinities and totems if we did not participate of the same historical collective psyche" (p. 41). The article does not go beyond this purely anecdotal demonstration.

For some unknown reason there was a gap in the development of this Rorschach tradition, until the 1970s when it took impetus again with the prolific work of Robert S. McCully, and in what way! As hinted at earlier and as if following Missaglia's lead, contradicting in the same gesture Klopfer's-Mindess' opposite conviction McCully (1970) stated the principles of his approach to be developed in an shortly following book and several other publications:

MINDESS (1955) has remarked that one of the reasons making for difficulty in applying Jung's approach to the Rorschach is the rarity of material which can be identified with the collective unconscious. May it not be that because Rorschach stimuli do activate the collective as well as the personal layers that we get such meaningful material? The limitations of certain projective techniques may be a function of inability to stimulate the collective layers. We do not need to identify collectively determined responses on Rorschach at all, but rather to examine the set of stimuli as having the potential to activate the psyche-as-a-whole. In an effort to apply Jungian concepts to the TAT, SPIEGELMAN (1959) suggested that a father archetype is activated when someone responds to a TAT picture of a father and his son. We would suspect that [Jungian, i.e. limited] ego attitudes are activated primarily with such a stimulus and that archetypal processes may not be at work at all under those

conditions [i.e., Klopfer's-Mindess' limitation applies to the TAT instead of the Rorschach]. We tend to believe that collectivestimulated reactions are most likely to come into play when archetypal stimuli are outside conscious awareness... If we can locate archetypal images inherent in the stimulus qualities of the Rorschach plates, we might be better able to understand the nature of the Rorschach experience. Some of the blot areas may have the potency to stir collective roots in us all, though content depends on the individual psyche. We suggest that a fundamental factor in individual differences in general may be an individual's accessibility and relationship to layers of the psyche. The Rorschach reflects these differences. In a subject identified with his persona, we may obtain a record composed primarily of ego attitudes and defenses. In another, personal unconscious layers and complexes dominate the materials, while collective aspects appear as traces. In still another, collective material may pour forth, and personal material may be more recessive. The pattern that emerges depends on how open the individual is to inner processes.

We do not expect a subject to identify an archetypal image or pattern and report it as such (though this may occur in the psychotic). We are interested in looking at what comes into consciousness when an identifiable archetypal stimulus-area activates psychic processes. One may posit that the psychic structure itself may be something like inkblot structure in which images form around stimuli that are potent enough to precipitate them. An archetype contains the essence of a range of fundamental experiences which life has brought to all alike. They may include food, fertility, father, God, circle, sex, femaleness, goddess, almost anything that is prototypal and laid down repeatedly. Images from the personal unconscious are more specific for an individual, while symbols and archetypal imagery may serve to link or unify the different aspects of the psyche-as-a-whole. It seems reasonable to assume that images played a role in the development of conscious-ness. Archetypal images combine an infinite number of primordial counterparts which went into the wresting of consciousness from man's dark, unconscious origins. It is consistent with archeological evidence to state that certain uncomplicated archetypes dominated the psychic experiences of early man. Paleolithic and Neolithic times were the periods when man first differentiated himself from nature and animals, and glimmers of this difference were experienced, expressed, projected into cave paintings, and incorporated within as psychic substance... Humanity has an affinity for concretizing experience in a picture. Pictures enable us to grasp the meaning of an archetype. Both the dream and the Rorschach experience are forms of pictography. The processes involved ally us with experiences which took place at the dawn of human development. The Rorschach experience puts us in touch with meanings associated with picture-formation. We suggest that there are some startling corollaries between Paleolithic pictures and the stimulus qualities of the Rorschach plates... In his assessment of Picasso's art, JUNG (1932; 1966) has remarked, "Seldom or never have I had a patient who did not go back to Neolithic art forms." RHODA KELLOG (1967) has called attention to the strong similarity between motifs

which recur in children's drawings and those found in Paleolithic cave paintings... Experiences which took place when man's consciousness evolved are basic, and they may define the very nature of some of our core substance. We suggest that stimuli which might activate those extant archetypal qualities within may be particularly potent arousal media. We wish to show that archetypal stimuli may exist in Rorschach plates which link us to our Paleolithic roots, and that they connect us with man's treasury of collective experience. Stimuli which may link us with our ancient past may be especially potent because they may have a structure similar to the nature of the structure of the psyche itself.

We suggest the Rorschach may mediate archetypal experience. When this happens, ego consciousness does not grasp it. Nor does the ego grasp the meaning of the dream. Consciousness has to be by-passed for these experiences to take place.

Both the mood elicited by the card structure and the nature of some of the most common Rorschach images ally the subject with the psychological world of Paleolithic man. Then, as in the Rorschach experience today, animal and human worlds blend with great ease. As the cave was the frame against which Paleolithic man hung his imagery, so the inkblots often evoke cave qualities in the way white, dark, and bold red and black are combined [as in some cave paintings: but what about the last 3 multicolored cards?]. Commonly, Rorschach animals are prehistoric. As the animal skin was a means of adapting to life for early man, so we interpret skin responses today as mirroring the state of the subject's adaptation. (pp. 31-4)

The author offers then a summarized list of areas in each of the 10 plates which supposedly carry this archetypal potency and responses to which are to be interpreted accordingly (more details shortly), in a way that strongly reminds the earlier contributions of Lindner and Brown, and selected examples from a case close his exposition.

His announced book appeared as such the next year (1971a). According to the author's Preface one of its major objectives was...

...to call attention to the Rorschach experience as a means toward furthering our knowledge about psychic structure. We will present a new theoretical rationale associated with the structure of these plates and thus provide a framework for extending our grasp of those processes which occur through the Rorschach method...

We expect to make use of a number of ideas found in C. G. Jung's depth psychology as we proceed. Our position is that he has provided the widest grasp of the psyche in Western tradition, and we will use his model of the inner world as a frame for our own position...

Our definition of Rorschach behavior is those psychological processes which occur as perception is diverted from outer to inner stimuli and experience... We hold that the plates activate psychic processes, and that those psychological phenomena flow without regard to the questions in the mind of a particular examiner or researcher. Rorschach behavior is an example of natural

phenomena, and nature's values cannot be exclusively human. What flows out from [archetypes] inside carries with it some imprints of the source. The Rorschach plates provide us with a means of studying the nature of the psyche itself and extending our knowledge of those processes that underlie the essential substance that we call human nature. We will suggest that these inkblots activate psychic centers *because* the structure of the blots may be not unlike the nature of the structure of the psyche itself. (pp. xi-xiii).

Chapter One (reprinted in 1973 as a separate article) begins by an assessment of the influence and relationship between Jung and Rorschach. After equating the scientific significance of both figures here is where McCully first sustains "that both of these Swiss men of genius did not combine their efforts personally provides us with a remarkable mystery" (p. 1; cf. above). As we mentioned before this author knew about the fact of Rorschach's being a student of Jung at the university, and of the former's following with particular interest the latter's works on psychotic introversion and the collective unconscious citing as an example the similar orientation of the former's sect studies (but, interestingly enough, without any reference to Bash at all). Like some of the authors we discussed earlier, McCully also saw no fundamental difference between Jung's and Rorschach's respective typologies. Let us only remind here that we were able to have access to wider bibliographical sources than McCully in our diverging assessment of the scientific relationship between this couple, particularly to Rorschach's correspondence earlier commented in detail. Chapter Two is dedicated to a review and pragmatic schematization of Jung's relevant concepts, given the book's particular objectives. In the important Chapter Three on the nature of the Rorschach experience which gives us ample opportunity to disagree, after criticizing the "unfortunate predisposition" of Rorschach's towards formal analysis McCully defines his own approach: "In our efforts to understand Rorschach processes we will focus around the implications associated with content... This work is not dedicated to uniting the two approaches, content versus pattern analysis... At the same time, one of our chief purposes is to provide a method of dealing with symbols that may enrich our approach. In doing this, we will attend more to content than patterns amongst the determinants" (pp. 24-5). In this sense, from subsequent recurrent comparisons and assertions by the author it becomes clear that he aspired to produce for the Jungian approach a contribution equivalent to Schafer's (1954/1982) predominantly content-oriented for the psychoanalytic one (cf. section B.2 above) by reference to which his was to be considered an extension⁶³ (exactly what, in his view, the work of Jung represented for the one of Freud), in contrast to his criticizing the theoretical shortcomings of other more formal-focused works like the one of Schachtel (p. 26). From our point of view, this is a *major* flaw of the book: since determinants and other formal factors are much more out of awareness -a key condition for him- than content. The same implication has also the significant and parallel fact that, *inside the Complex current*, he praised the earlier contributions of Masters such as Klopfer and Kadinsky (p. 27) but totally ignored Bash, the one of his predecessors who most insisted on the *formal* expression of Jung's theory particularly

⁶³ Interestingly enough, as indicated above Schafer was very critical in his book (1954/1982 p. 118 footnote) of Lindner's and Brown's approach, the distant precursors of McCully's specific interpretive technique.

in Rorschach's *Erlebnistypus* or determinant dynamics!⁶⁴ As Smith (1994) has so perceptively sustained, in a truly systematic and internally consistent Rorschach theory *all* aspects of the data must be accounted for and we cannot coherently contend that one theory (Jungian or depth-psychological) applies to one aspect of the data (content) while another different theory (Gestalt, or whatever) should take charge of the remaining formal or other aspects, ideal synthesis achieved only by few theorists like Zulliger. This position led McCully to an exclusively content-oriented attention to the stimulus characteristics of the inkblots, as expressed later on by him in this same chapter:

It should be clear by now that we are suggesting that Rorschach's plates may contain stimulus powers with potentials for activating any or all aspects of conscious or unconscious psychic contents... To the author's knowledge, no one has attempted to view Rorschach's plates in just our manner before [well, Lindner and Brown actually did, even if not from a *specifically* Jungian perspective].

We believe that the way we are applying the concept of archetypal forces takes us further in understanding Rorschach processes *because* it gives us a wide enough frame... Roy Schafer's work based on Freud's libido theory took us a long way toward extending our knowledge about Rorschach processes. No major follow-up work on theory has emerged since [Salomon's! Schachtel's!]. We believe this has been due to insufficient knowledge about a wider frame necessary to extend such a purpose. (pp. 41-2)

This concentration on the inkblots on its turn led him also to promote the "mystery" of the creation of the extraordinarily stimulating, irreplaceable 10 standard plates, mistrusting at the same time consecutive series such as Behn-Eschenburg's (contrary to Zulliger's results) and Holtzman's: "The set Behn-Eschenburg developed did not seem to have equivalent stimulus power or to provide the same qualitative features of richness in imagery. This supports our point that the processes that were associated with the development of the original plates may not have been entirely clear to Rorschach himself. At the very least, since Hermann Rorschach assisted Behn-Eschenburg, one may assume that the construction of psychically potent inkplate stimuli requires special gifts associated with special circumstances. Rorschach's plates have never been equalled, even in later attempts by Rorschach himself" (p. 28); this is another assertion we question, besides sustaining that those two mentioned sets cannot be compared with each other (chap. III.D.1 below). Coming back to the original plates, although we agree in general with the larger Jungian concept of symbolization he endorses (cf. Deri 1984 pp. 120-5) when the author explains his theory of the symbolizing nature of the Rorschach experience we believe, to paraphrase Rorschach's earlier criticism to Jung, that "the dogmatic separations of McCully have caused much confusion there". We reproduce in detail his main argument concentrating on one example which will take much importance later on:

⁶⁴ Compare these key formal/content positions with our discussion on chap. III.B.1 below, particularly with the long quotation from Mannoni (pp. #42-4). Aside from that, it is an arresting fact how inside this Jungian tradition important contributions have remained entirely isolated from one another: that is the case not only with Bash's and McCully's respective works, but with Simón Hernández's ulterior book (although already reviewed: section C. above).

Archetypal power is an essential ingredient in symbol formation. Not all Rorschach protocols contain genuine symbols. When an individual's materials tend to have personal contents as the most prominent feature, sources underlying the personal unconscious may have dominated. No symbols may have appeared [however, how does this "2nd class" unconscious communicate with consciousness if not by symbols too? Cf. Deri op. cit. chaps. 4 & 6]. In that case, we would indicate that no collective sources were activated or put into arrangements necessary for symbol formation. We hypothesize that symbols do not form when no corresponding power is activated in the collective side of the uncon-scious... Rorschach images and symbols take place in a context of conscious perception of them. The ego functions alongside the formation of Rorschach material, though what is formed has its roots inside the wide range of unconscious sources. The *laws of symbol formation* come into play against the confluence of diminished awareness alongside open perception *and* a range of unconscious processes which must include active archetypal energy. Unlike dream symbols, the requirements include forms of conscious participation, and the waking state is not eliminated. The ego continues to function, but without a prominent requirement for logical judgment-awareness of meaning about the symbol [comp. Jung's 1958 quotation p. 162 above]... In normal conditions, a symbol emerges or forms around a stimulus through the influence of the *law of incomplete understanding*. We hold that, if consciousness is fully active and it is possessed of the meaning which would influence the appearance of a symbol, we would not have a state of psychic conditions in which a symbol could appear...

Examples of this may be seen in sexual symbols, which are common occurrences in Rorschach patterns. We must be careful to define exactly what we mean. It is important to distinguish between important ego attitudes reflected in Rorschach material and genuine symbols. We do this by making a judgment about the source for the material. For example, an individual's comments about the "bisexual" aspects of the human figures on Plate III does not usually indicate visual symbol formation. Those comments may provide us with useful information, but they are reflections of ego attitudes and not verbal reactions to emerging symbols. In such an instance, we would say that an essential ingredient in the *law of symbol formation*, collective sources, has not been activated. Rather, we have gathered information associated with an ego attitude, a persona problem, or possibly a complex associated with faulty development. If one sees a sexual organ attached to a figure on a Rorschach image, it is not a symbol; it *is* the organ... Noting that figures on Plate III have bisexual qualities does not imply that a symbol has crystallized around parts of the inkblot as an image. On the other hand, when a blot area usually associated with a specific sexual shape (objectively looks like it [F+]) is experienced as an image of the opposite in sexual shape, then the symbol for sexual reversal has formed. We must not take this as a matter of course; it calls for our sense of wonder. We believe this astonishing kind of visual alteration [F-] occurs *only* when archetypal power has been at work. This usually has nothing to do with wish fulfillment [but cf. Deri pp. 46-8]. The

subjective *law of altered visual perception* has created an image of the opposite. When... the objective form of the configuration is appropriate to the image reported, we have something else besides symbol formation... (pp. 38-40)

This is certainly a dogmatic view of things. In the example in question the blot shape is quite appropriate to the associated image (it is an F+ response), but the latter is -to use Schafer's term- 'incongruent' in itself to begin with: is McCully really prepared to sustain that the mythical full-body image of the hermaphrodite does not have archetypal or collective-unconscious sources⁶⁵? This narrow view of unconscious symbolic projection as exclusively associated with F- responses coincides with the one of Exner which we will analyze in full in chap. III.B.2 pp. #III47-55 below, together with a fuller criticism of this plate III Schafer/McCully example. A final criticism to this chapter is the continuous pejorative view McCully expresses towards the psychopathological approach to Rorschach theory all along its pages, which enters in sharp contradiction with our convinced 'pathoanalytical' view (cf. Schotte section A. above and chap. III.C.2 below).

Chapter Four is dedicated to a limited and difficult 'paleopsychology' of the collective mind, which is equivalent to an individual early developmental or infant psychology based on spontaneous productions and theoretical reconstruction, through the projective-psychological interpretation of some chosen examples from genesis myths and parietal art as a means of identifying symbolic analogies useful for the subsequent interpretation of the Rorschach plates' stimulus values. The conclusions are sometimes convincing, others highly speculative and still questionable. An example of the former is the following analogy between cave-and-Rorschach imaginal creativity (in both, we must add, predominated the animal world or T%):

We will conceive of the walls of ancient caves as the frame on which early men penned or drew their psychology. The chief principle which operated for them is the same principle operating when we project visual forms into inkblot structure today. In her book on the paintings and engravings in the Paleolithic cave at Lascaux, Annette Laming noted that in some cases the actual surface of the rock "must often have suggested the silhouette of an animal to the Paleolithic artist." Laming [implicitly] compared the experience a cave artist may have had as being similar to Rorschach's test. She said, "the natural curves of the rocks, the bosses, the hollows, the stalactites, and the variations of color in the world underground conjure up an extraordinary variety of animal shapes-croups, legs, necks, shoulders etc. In the silence of the cave, the flickering light of a handlamp intensifies illusions; and if but a day is spent in

⁶⁵ At any rate, this image does fulfill the requirements of his own definition: "The collective psyche makes itself known via archetypal activity. These are the carriers of experience that exist behind a potential image or symbol... They are products of basic human experience repeated so often through the history of man that they carry essences of that basic experience. They have the potential to create resonating responses in all men... Jung defined symbol as a pictogram which expresses complicated processes in the most succinct way possible. Eagle, as an emblem for the United States would not qualify as a symbol under this definition. It does not come about as the end product of complicated processes, nor does it necessarily carry essences of common experience" (McCully 1970, pp. 30-1; comp. Deri 1984 p. 51).

the study of the Paleolithic paintings a whole world of fauna of infinite variety of form and movement will seem to come to life." Annette Laming has given us a wondrously accurate description of the Rorschach experience as she portrayed the visual and psychological response that comes from a visit to those particular caves that caught the psychology of our ancestors. (p. 59)

At another place he adds:

Commonly repeated images created by Paleolithic and Neolithic men include *round circular openings* carefully carved by hollowing stone; stylized, fecund *female torsos*; male and female *sex organs* joined but not engaged; *human figures juxtaposed with animals* in painted scenes; and application of *red ochre* to burial objects.

...A sculptured circle in stone probably had to do with Paleolithic men's psychological attitude toward the matriarch or fertility goddess and was perhaps meant to illustrate the birth passage. It was associated with men's grasping meaning about the power to give birth held by women. The highly stylized female torsos, referred to as "venus figurines," were doubtless fertility objects... They were religious-magical talismen and they point to the *importance* attributed to the female torso as bearer of life. Carvings of unattached (separated from the body) male and female sexual organs were formed for purposes other than erotic ones. The organs were juxtaposed, not engaged. The technique was so skillful in some of those artifacts that, turned one way, one organ dominated, and when reversed the opposite dominated. These were bisexual symbols, and they had significance as basic principles for creation of life. As such, they were magical-religious objects. Bisexuality includes the potential for self-regeneration... At a later time we will consider the importance of disembodied organs in detail. We will show that when body organs or parts are separated from their physical sources, they take on a different significance for symbolism. Archetypal energy is more readily associated with separated parts [cf. earlier plate III example]... Red ochre painted on burial stones or other artifacts symbolized lifeblood and stood for a magical means of re-creation. The ways men were mingled with animal life in their paintings reflected the importance of the nature of their relationship with animals. Some certainly pertained to success in the hunt. Yet, the search for food and clothing was only part of man's need to value his relationship with the animals around him. Their habits taught men a great deal about what they were themselves. Early men seemed to have *disciplined* their impulses through symbolic relationships with numinous or sacred animals. Animal siblings played a role in furthering man's consciousness... (pp. 63-4)

Of course, some reasonable alternate interpretations could be proposed in an equally easy way. We for example are impressed by the general predominance of the *partial object* (genitals, torsos, blood; cf. still the part-plus-part compound animal/humans and the hands, mentioned in pp. 68s) in those representations and by the easy *participation* with animal life, which are expected characteristics of primitive thought. But is it proved or just speculation that animals for instance symbolically represented discipline or consciousness, particularly for supposedly male artists? As mentioned earlier we particularly disagree on the symbolic value exclusively of partial

objects (genitals) as sustained by McCully, and propose that the evolutioned integral, total-object body image should have meant an archetypal distant mature ideal for primitive men from where precisely its less-frequent representation.

All the previous groundwork leads to the central and most voluminous Chapter Five about the specific archetypal stimulus value of each plate:

PLATE I - The stimulus power of this plate is complex, and it contains a capacity to activate archetypal sources. The large center detail (frequently reported as a woman's figure) is important in that regard... This center detail has a startling resemblance to Paleolithic fertility figurines. Shaped in bone or stone, those figures had large hips and breasts, while arms, feet, and hands were often either completely absent or stylized. The significance of the figurines and sculptures centered around the fecundity of the female torso as fertility symbol... These votive figurines were associated with psychic needs for abundant food supply and fertility, so as to insure survival. Archetypally, this takes us into the world of the matriarch...

In our view, Plate I appears to have a capacity to stir material associated with the *archetype of the functioning female* through its connections with matriarchal dominance as it functioned psychically.. A comparison between Plates I and VII may be illuminating in that regard. Plate VII reflects another side of the feminine and pertains more to *structure* than functioning. (pp. 78, 84)

According to McCully -who presents supporting visual reproductions of relevant artworks each time- the center detail has a close resemblance particularly to the "Goddess of Laussel" relief, which together with the associated headless or double-necked image, the bell-shaped lower-center detail, the often dancing or mythological lateral figures (all found in other ancient goddess representations), and the white triangles (female vulva-symbols) heighten the connection. This interpretation is not to be assumed as always applicable but only when archetypal sources have been activated, particularly when the center detail is taken for a male figure.

Our position has been that those men who existed at the time consciousness began to develop have left us clues in their artifacts and paintings which reflect their psychology. We have interpreted that psychology as reflecting developmental tasks that were needed so that the human condition could emerge. After the long stretch of time required to differentiate himself as a separate species of animal, man had to learn what defined his masculine substance [against the original matriarchal power: plate I]. We suggest that they did this through grasping their differences against the frame of their opposite, the female of the species. Animals, ritual, and religious fervor probably served as vehicles assisting in objectifying psychological experience. In his discussion of the religion of Paleolithic man, Leroi-Gourhan made some interesting parallels between paired sexual opposites among parietal art animals... Plate II provides us with an excellent example of paired animals. This takes us into the archetypal world of opposing forces. Paired animals that face each other occur often in parietal art... For our purposes, this represents

the psychology of differentiation from the opposite, male and/or female. (pp. 87-8)

...As early men learned to discipline their instincts, those psychological aspects bonding them to an animal state, they were initiated into a new stage. Plate II may call up elements related to initiation, some roots of which may go back to dethronement of the animal gods. Our ancestors, as they began to carry consciousness, were apparently immersed in such a psychological task, alongside a more immediately pressing one, that of separation from matriarchal dominance [symbolically related precisely to the bison and other animals]. We suggest that Plate II has the potential to stir aspects of the psychological task of differentiation in a subject. That *task* (not something we inherit) relates us to the Paleolith, since all men recapitulate aspects of those tasks in their development. Plate II has a potential for becoming the arena for the psychological qualities associated with *masculine mysteries*. Paleolithic men had to initiate themselves into masculinity... The human condition requires that each man do this at some point for himself today. All men move from a state of helplessness to a state of relative independence. Men begin through the grace and nurture bestowed by matriarchal energy and care. When no psychological differentiation takes place, one remains a drone in the service of the mother... (pp. 90-1)

For McCully the former 'differentiating' interpretation is visible not only in the popular facing/relating bears of this plate (image which he compares with a similarly ornamented prehistoric spear-thrower), but is also assisted by the black/red color contrast (menstruation), by the dark 'circle' surrounding a white opening (birth canal), and by the bisexual structure with detached male and female sexual organs of which "the smaller phallus is above, and the larger, more visually dominant vagina is below" (pp. 94-5). He adds that "for a male subject, what we find on Plate II sets the stage for the kind of masculine structure we may find on Plate IV" (p. 95).

Since this plate [III] is dominated by two large details usually seen as human beings, one would expect this blot to stir up the more socialized, humanized, personal contents within the psyche. The complexes that are activated tend more to be associated with persona and shadow problems... It is important to note that each figure has well defined appendages that may be easily observable as sexual organs, which lead to a subject's identification of the gender of the figures... The *law of excluded awareness* is not at work nor has a symbol formed. One would not be dealing with an archetypal source. Such an image may reflect aspects of a personal sexual complex...

As a hook for projections, this plate commonly supplies us with information about shadow problems (the figures are appropriately dark) and qualities associated with what the subject has become as a result of his experiences with others... [i.e.] the archetype of *interaction* in the family unit, and the figures on Plate III are perpetually drawn into a form of interaction by the lower large detail that their hands join... We have emphasized that a central meaning behind the significance of human figures in movement in the Rorschach experience includes what the subject has become himself through

interaction with family figures and others in early development... which underlies later interpersonal behavior. (pp. 101-3)

Having compared this blot's structure with Henry Moore's sculpture "Family Group" (interesting-ly, not a prehistoric but a modern artwork), McCully adds that this early interaction influences specifically the extraverted or introverted development of the subject, and that this plate can give valuable information in this sense; however, in keeping with his general Rorschach convictions, he questions the formal representation of this attitudes by color and movement determinants of responses and suggests rather a careful content evaluation of the movement responses to this plate. Concerning conditions that may effectively further archetypal sources in this plate, he also suggests that the interpretation of animal instead of the usually human figures or the restriction to the lower half of them (the "fish-as-phallus" symbol) could be valuable clues.

Usually, archetypal energy is at work when the qualities aroused by a stimulus are consistent, though those features which account for stimulus reliability remain elusive. Most clinicians agree that Plate IV consistently produces material associated with masculinity. It is often referred to as the "father card." Quite unlike the Thematic Apperception Test (T.A.T.) picture associated with images of father and son, it is hard to explain directly Plate IV's relation to masculinity. This is because conscious connections about masculinity are bypassed through Plate IV, and not with the T.A.T.'s picture which portrays fatherhood or masculine authority directly. This plate takes us into the *patriarchal* world, including fatherhood, as it is related to the family, clan, or tribe... "Bull's head" is a not infrequent association for this blot and that image has considerable correlation in appearance with bull heads and horns in Neolithic religious cults.

Various means have been used to account for Plate IV's masculine qualities. These have included the plate's impact of power and strength, the common image of "giant," images of a giant ape, and the power evoked by the qualities of its shading. Boots, animal skin as trophy (prowess), horns, a large phallic form between two huge legs, easily seen dogs [which by contrast to cats are supposed to be "masculine", cf. p. 137], dog's head, and other features do pertain to the masculine side of life.

...Plate IV may best be understood as an *encounter*... Man encounters his own brute force if archetypal energy is activated through Plate IV... Plate IV may provide us with information about the *archetype of masculine structure* as a basis for the *masculine psyche*... Plate IV may [also] potentiate qualities associated with the *archetype of God-the-Father*. (pp. 108-10, 112)

Making an interesting comparison with "The Sorcerer" engraving at the Les Trois Frères cave (because of the human legs, masculine genitals and upper animal features including horns), McCully still stresses the dominant masculine genital symbol (the huge 'phallus' between the 'legs') against the recessive feminine one (the 'vulva' -dare we say, the symbol of the *Anima*?- in the upper part or 'head', "the seat of consciousness and the organ that enables us to govern our impulses" p. 116) adding that a response like "caterpillar" to the former may be a symbolic transformation of masculine power into weakness.

PLATE V - Like Plate III, a forceful design tends to impose itself on perception through the specificity of the contours of the blot. This leads the subject more to a conscious choice than do some of the other plates. However, more than for Plate III, when a subject does not respond to the obvious shape of butterfly or bat, rather powerful material from either a personal complex or archetypal sources emerges. This is one reason why prolonged blocking in a subject for Plate V has been associated with schizophrenia. The subjective experience behind "blocking" may be the astonishment and confusion the ego experiences when it is confronted with images from two worlds simultaneously. One is the obvious, the reasonable and the logical, and the other may be something fantastic, unreal, and even frightening. Plate V may challenge the ego's authority to rule consciousness, under certain conditions. Something archetypal about the separation between consciousness and the unconscious may get stirred up by Plate V's center line. Subjects respond to a belief that "something is hidden," or one thing is behind another, for this plate... (pp. 118-9)

McCully avows that the meaning of this eventual symbol remains in a large part unknown, and compares it to very similar and enigmatic, rather geometric deltoid- or boomerang-shaped signs often encountered in cave art. According to him the supposed clash-between-opposites inter-pretation could apply to bisexual male/female conflicts, good/evil ones, or to powerful instinctual struggles between identical opposites (as with responses of "two rams bumping heads") whose powerful resolution could lead symptomatically to overt or self-violence.

While Plate IV has to do with the structure and energy associated with the masculine psyche, Plate VI has to do with masculine functioning. Maleness has to function against structure, so this plate may add to the information one may have obtained with Plate IV. We may see qualities emerge that pertain to the way energy is spent in life. Through this we may see something of a subject's mode of adaptation... A given plate has qualities to push the ego aside or pull the subject toward it. This plate stands somewhere between IV and V in that regard. A subject may give little more than "animal skin" or "totem pole" here. Yet, through the powerful means of displaced sexual features (dominant male and recessive female), processes may appear through the laws of subjective consciousness. If a subject is male, some features of psychological initiation into masculinity must have been accomplished if he may be expected to *function* as a man. Hence, we have a reverse of Plate II, where the female organ was dominant, and the male more recessive. Here, the phallic form dominates, and the center line or other aspects of the lower part of the plate may be perceived as female genitals... When a male subject has become independent from female authority (which rules more over Plate II), he is freed to form a different relationship with females and the feminine side of life. He is no longer frightened of anything feminine [free of castration anxiety]. The psychology behind weak masculinity or sissiness in a boy is wholly a matter of a son against patriarchal power [i.e. according to him, no father figure or Oedipal triangulation; by Jungian principles McCully rejects psychoanalytic explanatory theories but the described situation is nothing more than becoming

'the phallus/desire of the mother' in the typical male homosexual evolution, and if there is a boy there *must* have been a desired father]... (pp. 124-5)

Through the suggested image of two bearded authoritative figures ("kings" or "priests") in reversed plate VI and the well-known "winged phallus", the author finds support for this inter-pretation in the myth of Gilgamesh, "the prototype of the independent masculine ego" (p. 127), as represented in the relief at Nimrud. Furthermore the common "totem pole" signifies an identification of who you are, how you function including who (not) to choose in marriage (like Lacan's 'name of the father'), and furthermore in known Paleolithic artifacts feathers were specifically associated with the phallus.

The qualities of this [VIIth] plate that stir aspects of the feminine side of life are well known... [But] While matriarchal authority and its influence are not difficult to define, other aspects of the feminine psyche are. Beyond its essential ingredients, masculine qualities and functions may be isolated and defined with relative ease. We have assumed, rightly or wrongly, that prototypes for masculine psychology existed in Paleolithic artifacts. Paleolithic art provides us with corresponding female psychological structure only vicariously. The psychology of the feminine is much more elusive and fluid. For that reason, a thread around the feminine side has been pulled through all the plates, even when the focus was on masculine components. The masculine psyche can be comprehended, while the feminine can only be apprehended. This is because female psycho-logical structure depends in part on *interplay* with the masculine...

Plate VII has to do with that side of woman that *contains* what a man is in relation to her, and what she energizes through that in him. Males do not have a similar psychological counterpart of containment for their opposites. This is because archetypal sources differ in male and female psyches. Plate VII may energize qualities associated with the sides of the woman that further companionship and develop spousehood... Plate VII extends feminine values beyond those qualities insofar as a feminine psyche is differentiated from matriarchal power. She becomes individuated when she discovers her own values apart from those of her mother. They may even be the same for the daughter, but she should win them for herself...

Plate VII has easily identifiable female contours. Rightside up, two female forms are easily perceived, and the lower large detail has a clear shape of a vulva. Reversed, two dancing female figures may be seen without a great deal of difficulty. The plate's open center has been likened to a safe place, like a harbor or a cove, a shelter from a storm. Motherhood provides such a refuge for her children, and sometimes her husband. As such, it would be inside the nurturing function of the mother. It is not unusual for a subject to perceive food in this plate, which may carry information about the subject's relationship to the nurturing side of his mother...

Held rightside up, Plate VII is a vessel, a container. If it was smoothed out, it would make a crescent, giving it an essential moon quality... Plate VII has a cyclic quality because of its segmented sections [need we to recall Fliess' seemingly systematic, albeit purely fantastic theories? Cf. Mannoni 1968, pp.

52s]. Physical and psychological cyclic changes in women have connected them with the moon since earliest times. The moon comes and goes, and with it a female's capacity for fertility approaches and recedes... Two crescents crown the female heads on Plate VII... (pp. 130, 134, 137-8)

As avowed by the author himself, the subject begins to complicate itself and one cannot avoid anymore the impression of a somewhat forced quality of his interpretations that must fit with a predetermined schema (which is not inadmissible as such, but does it coincide with Rorschach's own?) disregarding empirical data, compromising thus the smooth integration of the overall results with each other. Anyway, this time McCully compares this plate -as for pl. VI, less convincingly than before- to another sculpture by Henry Moore, "Draped Reclining Figure... the personification of Eros and timeless relatedness" (p. 133). Viceversa than with pl. IV, now recessive phallic symbols (the *Animus*?) are positioned or displaced on the "heads" of the "women" and the dominant vulva-like one "roughly appropriately" below. The reversed-plate large *Zw* may symbolize the relationship with an authority figure, father or other. Following his idea of the inkblot series reproducing a general 'individuation' of humanity, he finally adds that the mentioned feminine archetypical stimulus qualities have more paleopsychological roots in the Middle Ages than in the Stone Age.

...Plate VIII takes us beyond structure and into functioning... We would conceive of Plate VIII's pertaining archetypally to a subject's manner of functioning through the combined forces of masculine-feminine interchanges on all planes of living. It is the stuff of what one becomes through marriage or an important depth relationship with another. We have called this central aspect of life functioning through Eros...

Plate VIII has primary perceptual qualities of bright colors and definite shapes. Like Plate II, these stimulus features bring feelings (color) and instincts (animals) into juxtaposition. Feelings experienced around basic instincts provide the essential ingredients of *initiation*... Plate VIII follows the material associated with the structure of the Eros principle (how both sexes are, or are not related through it), so we are taken to a higher psychological task on Plate VIII than one of role definition (which was the initiation task associated with Plate II)... With its powerful qualities associated with feelings and instincts, Plate VIII takes us into the world of male and female initiation as they begin life *together* through the Eros principle...

In comparing Plates II and VIII, aspects of their structure pertain to our thesis. Ostensibly, the central, rounded white space on II has disappeared on VIII. Perceptual stimuli for displaced sexual organs (male and female) are recessive on VIII, while one dominated over the other on II. [On] Plate VIII... the action moves vertically, while on II, the action is horizontal, where two sides appear engaged with each other. Plate VIII's animals are separated from each other, while on II the animals are in direct contact. Linkings with the psychology of the mother-world and the tasks of the Paleolith or Neolith tend to be recessive or remote. The psychological roots of the plate extend more to archetypical sources from the Middle Ages [as in the rather common response "coat-of-arms"]... (pp. 145-7, 149)

The selected art piece to illustrate by comparison the archetypal valence of this plate is precisely a XIVth century German brilliantly-colored tapestry with a motif of two birds "climbing" in the same direction (symbolizing "goal-directed unity in functioning" p. 148), with probable Byzantine-Persian influence according to McCully for whose philosophers the upward-soaring birds were symbols of development. Significant symbols of parietal art are still discernible for him but recessive, i.e. small and mostly located in the white background (suggested circle, delta-form, bisons, bones of a horned animal...).

From the standpoint of psychological growth and what an individual expects to attain in life, Plate IX provides us with information about archetypal energy associated with *goals*. It is the plate that may show us something about the way a subject's consciousness has brushed against his *Erlebnistypus* or *Karma*, and whether he has taken an active or passive role against it. By goals, we mean psychological ones surrounding development as a subject passes or does not pass along a path of [rarely accomplished] individuation. Inside the viewpoint of archetypal psychology, that is one reason fundamental to Plate IX's being frequently rejected, and its being judged to be the most difficult plate of the series... From our view, Plate IX *ought* to give the most difficulty since its archetypal power seems to pertain to goals and growth... A subject who has not moved into life through the Eros principle, or is not engaged in genuine relational behavior of an order that is open enough for growth, may be quite realistically perplexed by Plate IX. (pp. 151-2)

In a rather confusing way, this plate is symbolically related *again* (cf. previous two ones) to Paleolithic images such as the earlier mentioned stylized female torsos (center *Zw* reversed) and parietal drawing of hands (*Dd* between green and red), and archetypally in contrast to developed Self, evolving states, death, nonmaterial union of opposites (because of the non-imposing, both equal and now engaged female and male genitals for the first time in the series), and 'clear thought' all at once. It has been obviously hard for McCully to accomplish coherently the whole tour from his assumed premises.

Many clinicians have noted that Plate X has a quality that enables it to summarize or pull together what has already emerged about a subject's psychology. If we look at it as a stage following that associated with the archetypal psychology of Plate IX, we would consider it as a means for observing the integrative functioning of the subject. The perceptual power of form and color tend to be balanced. There is no dominant perceptual push, vertically or horizontally, when the whole blot is considered... If a subject has psychological resilience, and his color experiences have been powerful to him, Plate X may enable him to display the quality of his adaptation in the midst of bright color and fairly clear forms. Plates V and X may give a subject a psychological rest more than the others because of the relative ease with which percepts arise against rather definite form...

...On the other hand, because of the many life forms here, and a quality of figures evolving, or stages of basic development in creatures, patients or subjects open to inner processes sometimes experience "evolving life" for Plate X... one may see qualities associated with a variety of life forms, including

animals, insects, humans, and seeds of trees or vegetation. Nature seems more prominent on Plate X than do human affairs... While, in addition to its color, its position as the last plate of the series may give it qualities because it does come last, archetypally speaking, it would seem equally appropriate as the first plate... We suggest that it has archetypal qualities associated with the source of life, or the *Sansara*, the Hindu notion of the vast wheel of life on which all living things turn... The cycle of life precedes the Paleolith *and* follows it as the archetype of the *eternal round*. As a sea-source, Plate X is like an archetypal pattern for the unconscious itself, the source of all things. It is nonspecific, it is general, integrative, summarizing, repeating, returning... The tiny ego-consciousness against the whirl of multidetermined forms of life has an archetypal counterpart in something of the stimulus nature of Plate X. Reversed, a small figure suspended between the green seahorses may carry something of this in its significance for a subject... Since archetypal energy associated with sources or beginnings is feminine as an experience, one may find a relationship between Plate X and "mother nature," as an impersonal archetypal source of life... (pp. 162-5)

McCully finally compares this plate with "The Garden of Venus" painting by Minnie Evans, "both in array of color and in the circular spray-like movement" (p. 164); he also associates it with the Pleistocene when nature supposedly experimented with a large variety of life forms, as symbol of the source from where everything came - as the unconscious itself.

It must have been obvious by now that we reject McCully's whole idea of a symbolism of Rorschach's plates turning around the conviction of a developmental progression, as clearly stated by him in the following summarizing statements:

In understanding archetypal forces associated with Plate II, it is useful to consider their range as being restricted. As we see it, its stimulus potentials focus around early stages of individual growth, taking us in a rough way to the level Paleolithic men faced as they differentiated themselves. We may see potentials for more advanced tasks, such as may be required in the process of individuation, as we examine Plate IX. One of the extraordinary features associated with Rorschach's plates seems to be related to chronology. From the first plate to the last one, some order in sequence appears to correspond to progressive stages in man's psychological development. We, as modern individuals, may be fixed at a stage, anywhere along the course of psychological development.

...We have been suggesting that there is some kind of psychological progression connected with the succession of the Rorschach plates. In order to give our hypotheses a structure, we have suggested that they may correspond in a rough way to the stages Jung described as individuation... In order to be consistent, we will approach Plates VIII, IX, and X as higher levels of psychological differentiation. This keeps us to the task of dealing with archetypal influences in the stimulus plates, but we are quite aware that the level of differentiation we may refer to may not apply to a particular subject at hand. The last three plates may offer no more than a summary, or additional information about the

psychology of the subject which has already been suggested, or new facets associated with the same may appear. We have attempted to illustrate the last three plates around psychological correspondence to what we assume to be the appropriate stage, and not so much to visual correspondence... (pp. 99, 145-6)

Aren't these last words a sincere avowal of a bias over empirical data, which are just made to fit the theoretical schema? Furthermore, in so doing formal-structural features in Rorschach's sense that reflect his test-construction rationale become entirely overlooked. When McCully refers to the last three plates for example, he is implicitly grouping them out of a shared formal characteristic (their being full-colored in clear contrast to the preceding ones, also the reason why he did not connect them to primitive cave productions) and not just because they close the series, which could have equally led to "the last two, or four..."; but because of his openly content-favoring approach this formal factor does not enter at all into his considerations (why is color specifically associated with development or maturity?), not even after having guided an important choice in his own analysis. Shifting our attention to the other end of the series, a similar criticism can be made to his treatment of plate III symbolism: how come the one-sided plate that by all empirical accounts most provokes kinesthesias and not-so-much color perceptions could become precisely the one more fit to reflect the introversion/extraversion experience balance (McCully p. 104), are Rorschach's painstaking determinant-formal results entirely useless? Also, precisely for this plate he could not offer an equivalent example proceeding from Stone Age or similar older times' artistic productions, a fact fully understandable from a different theoretical explanation we will propose in chap. III.D.2 that does give proper consideration to all those formal-conditioned facts.

A very short Chapter Six is dedicated to "Process Analysis" in Rorschach, to be understood as a diagnosis of flexible dynamics instead of artificial fixed states (as the psycho-pathological categories). A rather simple schema of two intersecting coordinates is proposed, the horizontal one going from withdrawal from (introversion?) to expansion toward the environment (extraversion?), and the vertical one from conscious to unconscious processes; the test responses are to be located according to these coordinates, in an attempt of reflecting more accurately on-going subjective processes than what derives from the use of expressions like "latent psychosis" or "emergence of repressed material". In Chapter Seven are presented five unusual, extraordinary cases (a South-American Indian supposedly 167 years old; a case of autovampirism; another of loss of Ego control after moving from the U.S.A. to Nepal; a female transsexual; and a case of in-family double homicide and suicide) of whose protocols unfortunately only one is scored and none has a psychogram nor was a classical formal analysis made. The Eighth and last Chapter makes an overview and concludes with these ideas very typical of the author:

Our main effort in this book has been to apply a psychology of archetypes to the Rorschach method, and to deal with symbolism through its universal significance and intrinsic content. In this way, we have attempted, along with the existentialists and others in recent times, a different means of approaching Rorschach data. Our focus has been more on how the psyche may work than on delineating particulars about an individual's dynamics. We have wished to show

the Rorschach as a means of taking candid shots showing how ego consciousness *reacts* alongside influences from sources we have called archetypal. How the ego reacts to material from personal complexes, and how it displays its defensive patterns, are well known...

...Hermann Rorschach... was careful to choose features from the theories of others that he felt pertained to his method, and he eschewed explaining his technique through one theory [false]. Yet, he fully grasped the importance of his technique's not being dependent on how a particular theory is regarded at a particular time. Jung avoided developing a specific theory [!?!], partly because he never claimed his psychology was a complete one. He was fully capable of devising a theory, but his humility kept him away from it. Particularly in the United States, Rorschach's method has suffered because it has been generally regarded against Freud's libido theory. Through that, a tremendous body of research grew, but it has about come to an end [not confirmed by post-1971 Rorschach history: see section B above]. It has been milked dry, though many valuable insights about certain areas of behavior have accrued...

A chief purpose for us has been to catch hands with Rorschach's dream about how his technique might lead us into understanding remote epochs. We have used the materials of a remote epoch to aid us in understanding ourselves... We believe that the [his] Rorschach method of investigation has usefulness for other disciplines. Archaeology, philosophy, and history are good candidates for apprehending data through it... We hope that we have contributed in a small way to paleoanthropology through the means we have used to look at Paleolithic art. The correctness of our interpretation is irrelevant [!?!]. Sociologists and anthropologists have used the Rorschach technique in some of their research. Yet, those two disciplines tended to use the technique when the libido theory was central in research in other cultures. Those studies sounded the death knoll for the universal aspect of the Oedipus Complex... (pp. 239, 242-4, 248)

McCully defends sort of an atheoretical, empirical approach from the part of Jung (cf. section A above): whether that may not be the case is less important for us than the much more evident *anti-theoretical* (anti-psychoanalytic) view of McCully. He asserts that "Jung has not excluded Freud's concepts from his empiricism" (p. 243), but he clearly contradicts this open-minded stand in his own approach: he seems to us to have been too much under the spell of the anecdote of Freud's fainting twice facing Jung as a model for his above focused conscious-Ego -role played by Freud- *reactive* conception in front of an emerging archetype -role attributed to Jung- (comp. op. cit. pp. 6-7). It seems to us that an exclusion or devaluation of the psychoanalytic contributions leaves us with too narrow a basis for a systematic all-inclusive Rorschach theory. Let us finally clarify that in 1987 was published a new printing of this book under the title "Jung and Rorschach - A study in the archetype of perception" with exactly the same unedited contents, except for the inclusion of a commentary on Adolf Eichmann's Rorschach as an appendix - a case study that we will find very useful in the next chapter.

In a couple of subsequent, interesting articles McCully (1974ac) added to his theorization a for us more relevant reference to Jung's concept of 'synchronicity', using as an analogically helpful model -following Gammon- the physical parameters of space-time which reminds the phenomenologists' similar conceptualizations; these texts allow us to concentrate on and gain a better understanding of the Rorschach response process, as well as to better explain our disagreement with a central part of McCully's theory. A quoted summary follows:

Aspects of Rorschach behavior (symbol formation) appear to have properties similar to Jung's notion of synchronicity. This principle notes the occurrence of simultaneous events which seemingly occur coincidentally apart from rational notions of cause and effect. Since some order appears to connect synchronistic events, Jung ruled out chance as explanatory...

...We cannot support Piotrowski's recently stated position, shared by Rorschach in some of his initial observations, that the inkblots require adaptation to external stimuli and therefore limit [though not necessarily *prevent*] what flows to them from remote reaches of the psyche.

Our first task is to define our view of symbolism in the Rorschach. Some Rorschach images appear to result from symbol formation, and others do not. In this paper our entire concern is with those images which do... These forms of Rorschach imagery are the end product of complex subjective phenomena. They do not arise *from* consciousness, but *to* it. Some aspects of the psychic conditions that allow such images to emerge do not conform to the conditions of outer reality...

In the Rorschach experience some confluence of forces creates an image-product associated with symbol formation, and this kind of image cannot be accounted for solely by the contours of inkblots... More complex forces must be operative when perception of well defined blot contours are clearly perceived by the subject through imagery which disregards or reconstructs objective form readily perceived by others. We are interested in the confluence of forces that creates this nonconforming image...

In his writings *On the Nature of the Psyche*, Jung (1959) gave serious thought to the nature of those forces which create symbols. He investigated symbolism in its own right, viewed apart from symptom, an approach followed here. We regard the Rorschach process as a radar screen which brings to visibility phenomena not entirely explained by the usual formulae of cause and effect, space and time...

Jung was impressed with a need to account for the appearance of simultaneous events in experience which occur outside a rational notion of cause and effect. He called the experience "synchronicity." **Outer happenings at times coincide in a *meaningful* way with an inner psychological condition.** Folklore and superstition are replete with examples of pseudoscientific efforts to explain synchronistic phenomena within an unsupportable frame of cause and effect. To illustrate synchronistic experience, the author will describe an event which occurred nearly 20 years ago.

At the time I was a psychology graduate student at Columbia University. I came across a title in lists of a scientific book club to which I belonged, and

purchased the book solely because of its intriguing title. The book was *The Origins and History of Consciousness* by Erich Neumann (1954). I had never heard of the author, was virtually ignorant of Jung's work, and had no preconception of the book's contents. Casually reading the first part of the book, in which various deities of Egyptian mythology are described, I came upon a description of a particular deity, Ta-urt, a composite of several animal and human forms, and remembrance of a dream experience the previous night burst into consciousness. **The similarity between the deity described in the book and the image of my dream was astonishing.** No less dramatically, one may observe the curious recurrence of a spate of similar original Rorschach responses in different subjects in a patient population. This usually occurs over a short span of time and seldom seems connected with verbal communication among the patients. If one wonders about the sources which create these experiences, he will rarely find a sufficient explanation within rationalistic psychology. We believe that the Rorschach affords us a method to examine experiences which occur as synchronicity... Jung held that it was unscientific to account for synchronistic phenomena as coincidence, primarily because some form of order appears to underlie the occurrences... Jung looked to collective sources in the psyche, rather than to conscious events, to form hypotheses about these matters...

Through Jung's work with the fantasies and dreams of psychotics and the analysis of some 20,000 dreams in the span of his professional work, he made note of **the startling fashion in which certain forms of images repeated themselves** in persons with widely different dynamics, personal experience, and cultural traditions. Since, in his opinion, many of these images could not be accounted for on the basis of one-to-one personal experience, he called such images "archetypal," or belonging to everybody, and postulated that they arise from collective deposits in us... We suggest that archetypal energy has power to precipitate an image-complex representative of itself, but only when the proper stimulus comes along. Archetypes manifest themselves only through their ability to *organize* images. We think that the Rorschach facilitates this occurrence, or has the power to do so...

Activity within the archetypal ground of the psyche may be necessary for some forms of Rorschach experience to emerge. Some Rorschach phenomena happen without any conscious intent. Conditions that further their emergence [are] in this case **qualities inherent in blot stimuli...** Thus, in Rorschach genuine symbol formation behaves like synchronistic experience. These images spring up simultaneously with those stimulus qualities that may activate archetypal energy. **...we were struck by remarkable visual parallels between contours of certain Rorschach blot details and certain images painted or fashioned in stone by prehistoric men...**

We offer the large central detail of Rorschach Plate I as an example of an archetypal source in inkblot stimuli. It bears **striking visual similarity** to prehistoric fertility goddesses. We suggest that this blot detail has the power to activate archetypal energy... This power is manifest only when a percept for

this blot area shows some form of particular perceptual organization which does not correspond to or re-orders the natural features of the blot area...

...We have noted that certain Rorschach events appear to have the properties of synchronicity. When a **visual stimulus with appropriate properties** activates archetypal sources in the psyche, image formation takes a synchronic route... When an image on the retina is described by the subject perceiving it as being the opposite of what is perceived by others, we must account for the startling disparity. Sexual reversals, which are common enough in Rorschach work, are an example of this kind of symbol formation. We suggest that archetypal laws determine such a transaction... Sexual reversals in Rorschach are remarkable... because they are a product of altered perception, itself a transaction with archetypal sources. The alteration takes place and imposes itself apart from critical conscious judgment. Such experiences are notably similar in properties to Jung's idea of synchronicity. (pp. 33-6, 38-43; boldface added)

First of all, we find ourselves in perfect agreement with this approach to 'synchronicity' taken by Jung but we must add a crucial explicit distinction perhaps not sufficiently emphasized above: as we see it, when he ruled out chance as an explanatory factor for those phenomena he did not mean that it doesn't exist at all in the exterior world, but that the *coincidence* or the *remarkable similarity* between *outer-and-inner* happenings cannot be acceptably explained by pure chance but besides by intervening psychic, collective-unconscious conditions (see Gordon below, for more confirmation). This is clearly expressed in his very fortunate formula of the Rorschach experience earlier mentioned (p. 171 above): "The psychological effect [of a certain painting] equals that of the Rorschach Test, in which a *purely accidental [rein zufälliges], irrational image* calls upon the likewise irrational forces of fantasy in the guest and by that brings into play his unconscious disposition..."; this conception is crucial for understanding the Rorschach response process, and let us not forget that Rorschach himself was the one to name his inkblots 'chance-forms' (*Zufallsformen*) a paramount subject we will deal with in detail in the next chapter III.B⁶⁶. But also this whole issue of chance, coincidence and superstition has been known to us since Freud's *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901) by relationship to which Jung's later 'synchronistic' position seems identical in its implications for our purposes. Where we cannot follow McCully is in his contradictory insistence on the subsequent "*alteration*" of the percept into a "nonconforming" image in "disparity" (F-) with its triggering stimulus as an essential element of the whole process inside the Rorschach domain: isn't precisely the *meaningful coincidence* or identity between outer and inner events what generates the intriguing synchronistic experience? That is absolutely clear in the example of the "astonishing similarity"

⁶⁶ Surprisingly, McCully did not exploit at all this avenue opened up by this concept when related to the Rorschach. Actually this role of *chance (Zufall)* in Rorschach's work has been widely neglected by the experts, a fact leading to assessments like the following one: "...Both Jung and Klopfer abhorred the method of averages identified with objective science. Both exemplified an arational empiricism – the experience of the 'inner'... A point of dissimilarity between the two men should be mentioned however. Nowhere in Bruno Klopfer's writing, nor in reflections upon his thought and work by others, are there any indications that he believed Rorschach data to be synchronous..." (Davis 1974, pp. 29-30).

between the Egyptian deity described in Neumann's book and McCully's own dream image, or of the "striking visual similarity" between prehistoric fertility goddesses and the usual female-torso interpretation of the central detail in Rorschach plate I⁶⁷. The rough, spontaneous visual approximation of the contours in a cave wall or in an inkblot (cf. Laming above) to a human body are matters of *chance*, but not so their further manual carving or visual shaping in this sense -out of outer-inner meaningful synchronicitous instigation- by prehistoric or modern man that specifically *interprets* or transforms the stimulus (Laming talked about 'illusions') as this or that kind of specific female character *without* necessarily distorting or doing violence to the original raw material. McCully adds a comparison of this conception of synchronicity with Einstein's space-time relativity theory (as if synchronical events connected immediately through worm-holes in psychic curved space and were thus outside of measurable time), rather pejoratively equating Freud's conceptions with Euclidean rationalistic, flat space-time conceptions and ordinary consciousness cause-and-effect notions (but cf. their widely coincidental conceptions of chance-happenings): whatever the inherent validity of this specific psychical-physical comparison may be we personally find it rather confusing and in violation of his hope in the sense that "...we are aware of some of the uses and abuses of analogies from other fields. Judith Hubback (1973), a British [Jungian] analyst, ...in commenting about analogies of psychic structure... suggests that the successful ones are those which enable us to understand the structure better than we would by studying the structure itself. Our hope is that by applying [physical] analogies to the Rorschach, we may see more about psychic structure at work" (p. 37); we on our side have found much more illuminating the physical spatial-temporal analogies derived from the phenomenologists (cf. in particular Kuhn, section C. above) which we have very profitably exploited in our own forthcoming theoretical contribution of this Thesis (pp. #III102-18 & 142-3 below). Particularly in the latter article McCully compares also the synchronicitous processes to a specific form of Eastern intuitive visual-art practice (Northern Tantric Buddhism), in whose cosmology *Sansara* would correspond to Euclidean ordinary space and time and *Nirvana* to Einsteinian relative space and time.

⁶⁷ This corresponds to Freud's notion of the 'search for perceptual identity', elaborated by Deri in chap. 4 of her book on symbolization (1984) as the outer-inner 'bridging-over function of symbols'. She argues: "The search for perceptual identity can be likened to the lotto game of children. The child holds up the picture of one object and has to find its duplicate on a board. Similarly, we wander around with images of wished-for objects in our preconscious mind and survey the environment for their matching counterparts, even though we are not consciously aware of all the steps in this process. Under normal circumstances, the lotto game between memory images and outside objects is played in a flexible manner. Memory images are not *point-by-point replicas* of the objects they represent; they are *schematized symbolic representations* of them. Yet, if the internal representations are *isomorphic* with the essential features of the object, then these internal symbolic representations will serve as dependable guides to the outside world. Their function is analogous to the ancient Greeks' *symbolon*. Just as the two matching halves of the broken ring lead to old friends, so do the memory-symbols lead to their corresponding counterparts in the outside world. Perception of things we know is always recognition, and recognition is always based on perceptual identity. Gestalt-forming principles, in particular those of pair formation based on symmetry, underlie this process of perceptual identity... The symbol is a guide toward the missing half that will complete a gestalt. In the act of perception, recognition takes place when a memory image, matching the present perception, separates itself out of the mass of existing internal representations exactly because it is symmetrical with the outside pattern. This gestalt-forming process by pair formation *is* the act of recognition. It manifests itself in the experience of knowing, for example, that 'this is a table.' This feeling of [synchronicitous] 'clicking' is the moment when the internal lotto picture, i.e., the image-symbol, finds it matching 'other half' in the outside world" (pp. 49-52).

McCully's chapter in Rickers-Ovsiankina's volume (1977) is just a condensed presentation of the nature of his entire previous work without anything new, except finally his first-time references to Bash's work. A useful summary of his whole outlook would also be his dedication (1985) to the late Walter Klopfer. A final article (Lewis & McCully 1994) suggests four practical, specific criteria to recognize those archetypally influenced Rorschach responses from more common ones: 1. a figure with mixed animal, human or mythological features in movement of an unusual/idiosyncratic nature; 2. unusual visual imagery or content, for ex. original relationships or interactions between two or more percepts "remarkable in origin and often pregnant for interpretation" (p. 5); 3. the fabulized combination just mentioned may also feature language reflecting suspended conscious-judgement (uncritical naiveté, fancifulness, no verbal value judgements or adjectives); 4. original "paired responses" similar in some shared feature (like the ones indicated by Zulliger through parallel-retesting). Some concrete examples close the presentation.

McCully's article (1974a) on synchronicity just discussed in the last four pages generated an important volume publication, fact he describes himself in a very clarifying way:

In 1974 I sent Walter [Klopfer, then Editor of the *Journal of Personality Assessment*] an article entitled, "The Rorschach, Synchronicity, and Relativity." The article took inspiration from a paper in a Jungian journal by Mary Gammon, 1973, in which she made a brilliant attempt to link psychology and physics at the microphysical level... This article of mine could most certainly have been considered far out, but Walter garnered the talents of Robert William Davis, one of his associate editors, who took charge of organizing a special publication to accompany the fall, 1974, issue of the *Journal of Personality Assessment*. Six scientists from here and abroad, including Margaret Mead, were asked to write critical analyses of this paper. The final work, combined with the publication of the first Bruno Klopfer Memorial Symposium, made up a monograph, edited by Dr. Davis, entitled, "Toward a Discovery of the Person," (1974). My paper and the responses formed a symposium commemorating the centennial of C. G. Jung. (pp. 633-4, underlining added)

We will review these six comments in series. In a sharp paper Gammon concentrated on the all-important issue of symmetry, in an attempt to demonstrate the validity of McCully's fortunate assertion in the sense that "the structure of the psyche itself may be something like [Rorschach's] inkblot structure", by relating the latter to Jung's concept of the similarly symmetric structure of the archetype of the Self and to the laws of symmetry in physics ('parity conservation'); our limited knowledge in the latter field sometimes makes the following of her argument somewhat difficult, since she does not have recourse to more nearby biological analogies like the bilateral symmetry of the human body, as Binswanger had done above, or like the symmetry of our genetic infrastructure, as Deri did afterwards (1984 pp. #50-1 & 81) precisely by relation to the issue of symbol formation. Her arguments are nonetheless stimulating: "It can be said that mirror symmetry, whether it be that of the spherical magnetic field of the atom, that of the structure of curved space or that of the mandala symbol

of the archetype of the self, represents a whole, self-subsistent and, therefore closed system" (p. 47) just as the structure of Rorschach's own cards and system (comp. Klein & Arnheim p. #III50 below, and next chap. sections A.1 & D.2). She also remarks that asymmetry ('parity non-conservation') exists in the physical universe as for example in "[radioactivity] decay or weak interactions", which might be meaningfully related to what Binswanger calls the "proximity of death" (*Thanatos*, as opposed to *Eros*). Craddick's paper offers hardly anything new besides a short summary by a hard-science academician apparently stunned by the liberal tone and subject of McCully's. Schmeidler makes a far-reaching "rational" criticism of McCully's ideas, explaining for example some of his claimed "irrational" events like complex Rorschach responses or collective myths by associationist concepts which seem completely expired: cf. Binswanger 1922/1971 1st section, particularly pp. 84s, for an illuminating criticism of this kind of "explanation". The contribution by Mead proposes also some interesting suggestions remaining however somewhat vague:

Dr. McCully's plea for a broadening of the use of the Rorschach test by the inclusion of Jungian concepts to supplement the clinical concepts of Freud, draws upon material on Paleolithic and Neolithic Man and ancient civilizations (McCully, 1971), but makes no mention of the very extensive use of the Rorschach by contemporary ethnologists and psychologists working in living [primitive] cultures [which is an excellent point, excluding perhaps his case 1]... While attempts to use the art of early man to illuminate the concept of synchronicity in Rorschach interpretation remains subject to a great deal of unresolvable doubt - as we know very little about the people who painted those cave walls - it seems to me that some reference to the use of the Rorschach with living peoples, both primitive and modern, should add to the kind of dialogue which Dr. McCully wished to introduce here...

The *depth* of the Rorschach responses can be referred either to: the nature of a cultural tradition, the experience of the individual, the biologically given within the organism, the way in which the cards were designed, or a combination of all of these... there is an enormous wealth of cross-cultural material that testifies to the evocative character of the Rorschach and the fact that responses from cultures unknown to the interpreter can be *translated* into personality categories used in our own society... into a kind of understanding of "unconscious," or "primary process," or "archetypal symbolism" which is cross-culturally intelligible. This cross-cultural intelligibility is, I think, one of the ways of describing the archetypal character to which Dr. McCully refers. Beneath the various culturally specific evocations of culturally loaded symbolism, there seems to lie, in some relationship between subject and card, or interpreter and response and card, a deeper layer...

We might then say that beneath the culturally regular and systematic responses to the Rorschach... there is another level of evocation which is more universal. We will not know how universal until we have a full complement of Rorschach responses from at least many very different cultural areas of the world. But for the purposes of this discussion of images that can be said to be collective in that they are shared among members of different cultures sufficiently for this kind of translation to occur, the next question might be why is the Rorschach so

successful in evoking them?.. I do not think it extravagant to suggest that it is just because the Rorschach cards were modelled on a cross-section of the most complex of living organs [e.g. the brain, cf. Ellenberger's account of Rorschach's 'initiation dream'], that that very complexity may be what evokes such deep levels of response. Iconography based on the body has ramifications that we know very little about (Mead, 1952) [cf. our comment to Gammon's intervention above]...

When we come to a discussion of the intensity of symbols, and the difference between those which carry a heavy load, and the "original" responses which carry no such load, and those parts of the Rorschach card which evoke loaded material, this takes us one step further into the collective nature of symbols [OK, but with her experience one would have loved more specific confirmation or disproof of McCully's plate-by-plate contentions]. The moon has been a symbol of women, of femaleness... for thousands of years, so that moon symbols have been used in painting and in poetry, in religious symbolism and in figures of speech. We may expect that the moon as a symbol for woman will be heavily loaded [cf. pl VII above]... Once the strength of the symbol has been established within a cultural tradition, it can then be carried, sometimes very weakly, for generations, caught perhaps in only one proverb but reinforced by the universality of the sun-moon contrast and the universality of women being slighter than men. But the tie can be broken, a culture found in which the moon is the sun's younger brother. In this case, the expected interpretation, for all its ancient association would misfire. It is this shifting of even what seem to be these most ancient recurrent and basic images, which makes the question of how archetypes are transmitted so obscure [exactly, and what makes the weakness of approaches like McCully's in individual practice: comp. Schachtel 1966 pp. 31-2]...

I have found that I have no difficulty in remembering, and at the same time, being quite unable to see, an earlier response. The fact that the Rorschach ultimately has to be translated into words, and that interpreter and subject never see the same thing, is both a strength and a weakness, as it permits a kind of limbo in which images of subject and interpreter can merge. The areas of ambiguity may be the necessary media within which premonitions of the future and vestiges of age-old traditional associations can merge into a communication of quite a different order, in which both time and space, as ordinarily conceived, are irrelevant. (pp. 62-6)

Mead raises some very interesting points and recounts some very interesting anecdotes, but as already said her opinion about the validity of McCully's archetypal Rorschach location areas remains unclear. Booth sees "the interlacing of genius" between Jung and Rorschach in their respective contributions toward a psychobiological -psychosomatic- typology ("Each somatic personality type is constituted by the dominance of one biological system... just as Jung's personality types are determined by the most differentiated of the four psychological functions", p. 70), explains how he was able to differentiate with the help of the Rorschach Test his 'cardiovascular' and 'locomotor' types (even with prehistoric roots) in his psychosomatic researches, and profits from the occasion to present his own views on

the 'existential situations' symbolized by each of the 10 standard plates. Finally Gordon on her side concentrates mainly on Jung's original concept of synchronicity which puts McCully's developments in their proper context:

In his long and important essay on synchronicity Jung speaks of a principle of 'acausal orderedness' which he seems to regard as the major category, with 'synchronicity' as a special sub-category of the acausality principle. What, according to Jung, characterises 'synchronicity' is that it carries the quality of 'meaningfulness.' In other words when a seemingly acausal event evokes the *subjective experience of meaningfulness* then he regards it as an instance of synchronicity, and so distinguishes it from 'meaningless [objective, i.e. exterior] chance groupings.' Now the concept of meaningfulness refers to the relationship between *a subject* and an object or event, that is between a knower and a known, and so it defines *a particular subjective experience* which then marks the spectator-spectacle interaction. In using the term 'meaningfulness' Jung, so I believe, intended to convey the perception of order and the experience of significance. It is thus *a person's involvement and affective reaction or preparedness* which determines whether a series of events shall be merely a chance grouping or whether they are 'synchronous.' Thus in order to determine which it is one has to ask whether any particular event *touches on matters that are intensely experienced, on some major concern or interest, or whether it is the focus of some deep unconscious conflict.* (p. 79; italics added)

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After the above commented author-related approaches the Jungian Rorschach tradition lost most of its impetus. We must still mention as products of their influence Lockhart & Siegel's (1976) research on a couple of cases of adolescent aggression by consideration of the maternal/paternal archetypes as expressed in the content of responses to plates I+VII/IV+VI respectively of their Rorschachs, according to McCully's patterns; the results are in line with the latter's contentions but one can see first-hand how this approach widely differs from Rorschach's own formal-oriented one. Jonte-Pace's (1986) interesting English-speaking paper would have gained a much more positive impression from us if it would not have left implicit the *ample, almost entire* inspiration it took from Bash's German-speaking work discussed above which is understandably not evident to the uninformed reader. And Squyres & Craddick (1990) empirically tested the correspondence between McCully's plate-by-plate themes, theoretically equivalent myths (Persephone, Cain & Abel, Hercules etc., each summarized in a one-page typewritten paragraph), and the Rorschach cards themselves with a population of 152 students asked to make the respective matches blind: with one myths-list exception both matches with the cards reached statistical significance lending *empirical* support to McCully's contentions.

III. To introduce the structural problem of Perceptanalysis

A) Methodological preambles

1. Systems and theory

"Une science d'observation se constitue en science théorique à partir du moment où elle consent à voir dans la réalité plus et autre chose que ce qu'en montrent les apparences sensibles. Autrement dit, une science ne devient vraiment une science que par l'acceptation d'une opération intellectuelle, dont le propre est de substituer à l'objet de réalité sensible, n'exigeant de l'esprit que la peine de le constater, un objet d'une réalité supérieure issue d'une opération constructive de l'esprit. Or cette substitution est chose virtuellement accomplie dès l'instant qu'on introduit dans la science... la notion de système!..."

Gustave Guillaume (1948-49/1971b, pp. 10-11)

Important as many of those theoretical works that we have reviewed in the previous chapter are, and with due recognition to the successive concrete contributions they have represented for the understanding of the instrument and its mechanism - including as a basis for our own research, the fact remains that none of them is truly *systematic* in the sense of embracing all of the formal aspects of our method and fittingly interconnecting them into the context of a coherent and explanatory psychological theory applied to explain the rationale of the Rorschach procedure in its overall working as well as in its articulated component details. Even inside the sole and most recurred to psychoanalytic theory, not only does the majority of works remain as already said confined to partial aspects of the method but the few comprehensive others still do lack a more formally complete internal articulation⁶⁸. Let us explain our point here by choosing the examples of the top versions of this approach in the latter sense: the ones by Schafer (1954/1982), Salomon (1962) and Schachtel (1966), contemporary all three from halfway in the history of our method. From our view the weakness in Schafer's classical book (pp. 185-186) stems from the fact that he decided to overemphasize content analysis (cf. Piotrowski 1957, p. 389) at the expense of formal analysis, Rorschach's most original scientific contribution, in his attempt to reach some of the structural-dynamic Ego characteristics -mainly defenses- he missed (p. 2) precisely in Schachtel, while the latter in his own volume (chap. 11) staying closer to Rorschach's original view followed rather the formal

⁶⁸ Still another surprising overall feature is how these contributions have remained isolated from one another even when their respective results have been identical or complementary between themselves (Peralta, 1995b). The ones by Rapaport (et al., 1945-46/1968) -Schafer (1948) on the one hand, and the one by Bohm (1951/1972) on the other, constitute an eloquent example: their researches were completely independent and initially they did not reference each other, but the close and often detailed correspondence between the individual psychopathological Rorschach pictures offered by each, particularly concerning neuroses, paranoia, and schizophrenia, is nothing less than amazing (for concrete examples see next chapter).

(perceptual-experiential) factors -mainly the determinants- but without attempting to attain a full-fledged explicitly psychoanalytic conceptualization like the former; the key interest of Salomon's work, which is in our opinion the best contribution to Rorschach theory to date (and not only psychoanalytic) and the direct precursor of our own work, lies in the superior level of integration and systematization he reaches by comparison to the former two⁶⁹ (cf. Mélon 1976, pp. 67, 86) although its predominant focus on the Zulliger Test has no doubt charged a heavy toll on its diffusion, applicability, and ultimately its understandability by the regular Rorschacher. And similar comments can be reproduced about more recent contributions on this theoretical line.

One thing theory cannot do is to remain at the level of the *empiria* to fulfill its specific task, theory “must not be confused with reality” (Di Paola 1997, p. 15; comp. Klopfer & Spiegelman pp. 85-6 above) but, because of the immediate intuitive nature of the human subject's global presence- or being-in-the-world (*Dasein, in-der-Welt-sein*: Heidegger, Bins-wanger) on the one hand, and at the same time because of our human naturally limited objective sensory perception by means of which we apprehend/have only aspects of reality (and not the *Ding-an-sich*: Kant) on the other, in short because of this human dual ability of relationship with our environment to theory is assigned precisely the bridging or integrating function of building in our heads an abstract representation of ‘how things really are’ to be subsequently bound to demonstrate -and because of this irreducible dual nature of things that is all it can establish- a meaningful ‘isomorphism’, a structural correspondence or ‘logical homology’ (Bertalanffy 1968/1971, pp. xix-xxi, 48, 80-86; cf. Di Paola, p. 16), a ‘symmetry’ (Deri 1984, pp. 39-40, 49-52, 139-142) between concrete facts and their abstract conceptualization so one can stay reasonably confident that they do correspond to each other and in this sense the latter is thus ‘true’. The direct-intuitive (phenomenological) capacity for global knowledge is in principle a guarantee of the feasibility of this theoretical reconstructive process of reality from the objectively perceivable component-parts upward, to guide it and in this way avoid unwarranted speculation. The demonstration of this isomorphic correspondence is what truly constitutes *theoretical validation* (Holt 1954, pp. 502-504 particularly point 4), a mandatory and respectable kind of scientific validation in its own right but which tends to be overlooked in modern positivist science-making. In the Rorschach field no one has expressed it in a more relevant and convincing way than Schachtel (1966) whom we must quote *in extenso*:

Despite the wealth of stimulating thoughts and implications contained in his book, Rorschach felt that the results of his “experiment” were predominantly empirical observations and that its theoretical foundations were, “for the most part, still quite incomplete.” Of the extensive literature on the test, by far the greatest part has been devoted to adding to these empirical observations and to refinements of technique; relatively few attempts have been made to

⁶⁹ For starters just take a glimpse at the respective Tables of Contents from these three books: too much Psychoanalysis but too little Rorschach in Schafer's, exactly the reverse in Schachtel's, and just the right mix in Salomon's.

inquire into the rationale of the test and to contribute to its theoretical foundations... Thus the gap between empirical observations and theoretical understanding, though somewhat narrower than in 1921, when Rorschach's book was published, is quite large.

The attempt to increase our understanding of the foundations of the test seems important to me for several reasons. For the psychologist interested in theory, the phenomena occurring during a Rorschach test raise a wealth of questions... Any improvement of our understanding of the rationale of the test is likely to contribute to the relevant formulation of these questions and to their eventual solution. It is likely to contribute even more to the *clinician's* use of the test. One can achieve some competence in the use of the test with the mere knowledge of the empirical findings that certain scores or combinations of scores tend to indicate certain types of pathology, certain tendencies, and certain assets and limitations in the personality of the testee. But such competence and such use of the test remain blind in the sense that they do not derive from an understanding of *why* the scores mean or indicate what they are supposed to indicate. This situation resembles a diagnosis on the basis of symptoms without understanding the nature of the connection between the symptom and the condition it usually indicates. The word "usually" is important here; without understanding the connection between symptom and the condition empirically found with it, one cannot know when what seems on the surface to be the same symptom does *not* indicate the same condition.

The empirical "validation" of the symptomatic significance of certain Rorschach scores does not differ in principle from some of the validation on which much folk wisdom rests, namely, on recurrent experience of a relation between two factors, a score and a trait or tendency... The main difference is that we now have statistical methods that tell us when to accept such a relationship as valid but that do not exclude the possibility that in any particular case it may not be valid. *No amount of [empirical] validation of Rorschach-test-score meanings can substitute for the [theoretical] understanding of what goes on in the test and in its interpretation.* [italics added]

... To use the test without the serious attempt to understand as much as possible of its rationale is tempting as well as dangerous.

It is tempting especially to the beginner, but also to the expert, insofar as it may give one a spurious feeling of security to rely on a fixed meaning of a particular score or a particular symbol (as is done in much of content interpretation) he has learned from an authority - a teacher or a book. It is more difficult if one has always to examine anew whether such meaning really applies to the concrete response before him. This does not mean, of course, that a statistically valid relation between a particular score and a particular meaning is without value. It only means that it still requires judgment to decide whether the usual meaning applies in a particular case.

If blind dependence on learned meanings of scores and the like is one danger, the development of an esoteric Rorschach language and Rorschach psychology, not or insufficiently connected and integrated with our general knowledge of

the normal and abnormal psychology of personality and interpersonal relations, is another. The use of such an esoteric language and of a special Rorschach psychology entails the danger that it does not communicate meaningfully to other people, and not even to other psychologists and psychiatrists. Sometimes it does not even communicate to the person who uses it because his sense of understanding the meaning of this esoteric language is spurious even though it may be comforting and reassuring. Similarly, excessive refinements of “technique,” if not *founded on advances in theory and validated by empirical data and concrete understanding* [italics and boldface added], may foster a tendency to confuse the matter to be studied with the method used for the study and to mistake complicated and impressive scores and tabulations for better and more subtle understanding. (pp. 1-3)

How much this argument still retains its weight today is evident from the fact that the last phrase, as it was once fittingly applicable to Klopfer’s “system” (Schachtel 1942; Klopfer 1954, p. 561), can be equally applied word for word to Exner’s all-too contemporary contribution! We are thus brought back here to the “purely empirical” approach already critically assessed at the beginning of the previous chapter. If it is true that Rorschach findings can be usefully interpreted according to no matter which personality theory, in contrast to the opinion of some it must be stated that ‘anyone’ possible theory in the abstract is not the same thing than ‘at least one’ concretely chosen theory (Binswanger, Di Paola) we must commit to in our work if we want to call it ‘scientific’. In this sense we are of the opinion that the way in which H. Rorschach expressed his ideas in the Introduction to *Psychodiagnostics* (already quoted by Schachtel above) may have involuntarily fostered a biased tendency to favor this one-sided “empirical” approach to the method; let’s quote him in full:

Dans les pages qui suivent nous décrivons la méthode et les résultats en cours d’une expérience psychologique qui malgré sa simplicité, a fait, de plusieurs points de vue, la preuve de sa valeur, aussi bien comme test de recherche que comme test d’examen. Il faut dire d’abord que *tout ce travail offre un caractère éminemment empirique*. Les problèmes d’où sont parties les premières recherches de cet ordre (1911) étaient d’une tout autre nature que ceux qui se sont posés, peu à peu, au cours des recherches ultérieures. *Les conclusions auxquelles l’expérience a conduit doivent donc être considérées plutôt comme des données de fait que comme des déductions théoriques*. Les bases théoriques de ces recherches sont encore en grande partie embryonnaires. (1921/ 1967, p. XXI, italics added)

Following this statement and along the history of the test this latter theoretical task has then been on the whole sorely disregarded, a complaint which has been voiced almost identically from time to time by the few who have felt concerned about this state of affairs (Weiner, Leichtman).

But Rorschach did not mean by those introductory words -as some seem to have misunderstood- that the *nature* or *essence* of his method was predominantly empirical, that following his example the conclusions to be drawn with it were to be

considered from then on *exclusively* as empirical data rather than amenable to theoretical inquiry. To fixate an empirical approach in future Rorschach work was certainly not his intention, and the last phrase is important in this sense: those who knew him and who had direct access to the continuation of his work between the moment he wrote those words (boreal fall 1920) and his unexpected death (April 2nd 1922) tell us that “RORSCHACH was not only a practical and technical man, but also a scientific one, and the scientific-theoretical elaboration of his test occupied him as much as its practical aspects” (Binswanger 1923/1967 p. 231, our translation), that “he complained always anew about the fact that he had not yet succeeded in appropriately founding his work in a theoretical-scientific way” (Zulliger 1949a pp. 294-295, our translation), that “he wished to attain more certainty regarding his method, and, above all, to formulate for his procedure a better theoretical basis. He felt that he could not always continue to counter inquiries about rationale with the stereotyped comment: ‘Practically the method has proved itself, but the theory is nebulous’ ” (Roemer 1967, p. 196). Some passages in the same “*Psychodiagnostik*” (1921/1967) point to this yet incomplete theoretical task (‘etiological’, he also used to say), committed to but not led by him to a satisfactory conclusion: chap. IV.1 p. 47, the general statement; chaps. II.5.b p. 13 and IV.1/4 pp. 60 & 85, about movement responses; chaps. II.5.c pp. 21-22 and IV.11 p. 101, about color responses; chap. II.6.b pp. 30-31, about locations differences; and chap. VII.A (the posthumous case study, lecture delivered by him on Feb. 18th 1922) p. 206, about the unfinished state in which he left the task, but in the same chap. VII.A.3.d pp. 248-249 he enthusiastically points to some groundbreaking connections suggested by psychoanalytic theory in particular. But even more importantly, in his original text he explicitly avowed *how his method was born as a theoretical rather than as an empirical instrument, and as such maintains a relationship with Psychoanalysis* (chap. V.1&5 pp. 129, 135: see p. 239 below; cf. reference to 1911 in the Introduction above, see Kuhn 1944 p. 31, and Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 38-39, 57-59, 60). Let’s take Rorschach’s word for it and try to further clarify his largely implicit theo-retical position.

The same Binswanger, undisputably the first non-directly-involved but nevertheless personally acquainted colleague to have immediately recognized and openly defended the monumental importance of Rorschach’s method (op. cit., 1923) foreseeing in this way the place it has come to occupy today (in a brilliant example of the kind of clearheadedness that made of him one of the greatest Psychiatrists of the last century), and one of if not *the* first Rorschach theorist, in another hardly referenced paper (1922/1971) contemporary to the above quoted one gave a telling description of how psychological science in general *and Rorschach science in particular* (reference to the latter on p. 90) can and must go -phenomenologically, a theory Ellenberger believes Rorschach’s early thinking was not only compatible with but precisely destined to (1954/1995, pp. 70, 74, 78)- beyond this empirically limited view of things:

SCIENCE NATURELLE ET PHENOMENOLOGIE. ...La seule perception sensorielle [in Bleuler’s, and consequently in Rorschach’s, sense]. La science naturelle ne connaît aucun autre mode de prise de connaissance directe ou primaire...

Il existe cependant des êtres qui savent qu'en dehors de la simple perception il existe un autre mode de prise de connaissance ou d'expérience directe... A ces êtres appartiennent les authentiques artistes... [which Rorschach also was: Ellenberger, pp. 50-51, 53, 57]

Quand Franz Marc, peintre génial, peint des chevaux [sic] bleus, il montre une particularité de cet animal qu'on ne retrouve jamais dans la nature, une particularité qui ne peut jamais être perçue et, malgré tout, il a vu quelque chose et l'a exprimé; il ne voulait justement pas représenter l'imitation la plus fidèle de la nature (qui tombe sous les sens) mais bien l' "essence" (*Wesen*) propre au cheval, la généralité, l'abstraction du cheval, le contraire de tel cheval particulier fait de telle ou telle façon. Marc n'a pas peint un certain cheval galopant dans la nature, mais il a représenté l'essence de ce qui ressemble au cheval... [pp. 80-81]

Nous avons montré ces exemples pris au domaine de l'art, en désirant donner un premier aperçu sur le vaste domaine que la phénoménologie est en train de conquérir. Non pas que nous défendions l'idée que la phénoménologie soit de l'art, que l'analyse phéno-ménologique soit une sorte d'intuition et d'activité artistique purement subjective... non, ce à quoi nous avons voulu rendre attentif et ce qui, une fois pour toutes, doit être reconnu avant que nous envisagions les questions de détail, c'est que notre prise de connaissance intuitive et directe s'étend infiniment au-delà de la fonction et du domaine de la perception sensorielle... Cette vue intuitive, si importante pour l'avenir de notre science, nous la devons au philosophe fribourgeois Edmund Husserl... Le terme technique de Husserl s'appelle, par opposition à l'évidence sensible, l'*intuition catégoriale* (*kategoriale Anschauung*), ou, mieux encore, *vue intuitive des essences* (*Wesenschau*)...

Si, par opposition à la perception sensorielle, nous voulions appeler ces intuitions supra-sensibles ou immatérielles, cela ne devrait s'étendre qu'au sens de l'intuition catégoriale qui *s'édifie*, comme le dit très bien l'expression "catégoriale", au-dessus de la sensibilité. De nos exemples pris dans le monde des arts, il ressort clairement que le peintre a besoin d'yeux pour voir chevaux... L'appareil photographique peut, cependant, tout autant y arriver. Ce qui fait qu'un artiste est un artiste, c'est la capacité d'élaborer, en se fondant sur ces contenus perceptifs sensibles, de nouveaux contenus perceptifs qui n'ont rien de sensible et de les élargir en se fondant sur des données sensibles et en utilisant celles-ci comme un instrument... [pp. 82-84]

Dans la dernière œuvre de Husserl: *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie pure et une philosophie phénoménologique* (1913) la phénoménologie est décrite également comme une science *eidétique*, pour la distinguer d'une part des sciences expérimentales ou positives et d'autre part de la théorie de la connaissance... Les sciences eidétiques sont celles, dans lesquelles - comme, par exemple, la géométrie et l'arithmétique pures - indépendamment de l'expérience et, donc, *a priori*, des déclarations sont faites, des concepts sont élaborés, des jugements, des conclusions sont portés. Des essences pures ou εἶδη (pluriel de εἶδος) sont aussi, par exemple, les concepts purement mathématiques de nombre, droite, triangle, cercle, etc... [which we may

compare, in our domain, with the purely essential or *formal* concepts of whole or detail responses, of movement, form or color determinants, etc.]

La phénoménologie affirme qu'il y a aussi une essence générale dans le domaine purement intellectuel ou théorique et, leur correspondant, des actes de la vue intuitive des essences, commune ou *purement* phénoménologique ou, en d'autres termes, une intuition purement intellectuelle. C'est avec *ces* actes seuls qu'opère la phénoménologie *scientifique*. [pp. 86-87]

This quotation immediately reminds us of another, conceptually very close one from another equally great figure, which fits like a glove Rorschach's Introduction (in the sense of complementing and making it more explicit from the point of view of subsequent development) and which will allow us to finally present our argument:

Une science d'observation se constitue en science théorique à partir du moment où elle consent à voir dans la réalité plus et autre chose que ce qu'en montrent les apparences sensibles. Autrement dit, une science ne devient vraiment une science que par l'acceptation d'une opération intellectuelle, dont le propre est de substituer à l'objet de réalité sensible, n'exigeant de l'esprit que la peine de le constater, un objet d'une réalité supérieure issue d'une opération constructive de l'esprit. Or cette substitution est chose virtuellement accomplie dès l'instant qu'on introduit dans la science... la notion de système!... Un système est un être abstrait, de pure relation, que l'intelligence voit par ses yeux propres, après en avoir fait la découverte en elle-même, au titre de son existence plus ou moins masquée sous les faits de réalité sensible. *L'observation directe nous met en présence des formes qui ont pris corps... mais l'observation directe ne nous livre pas le système issu de la relation réciproque de ces formes* [italics added]. (Guillaume 1948-49/1971b, pp. 10-11)

Our point, with which we take a stand similar to the above quoted authors and even more contemporary thinkers like Deri (1984, cf. ref. to Polanyi pp. 219-220), is that Rorschach with his truly original, *essential* intuition of a *perceptual-diagnostic schema of formal coding categories* –which go beyond mere sensory perception– as conceptual grid to sift his data⁷⁰ proceeded as he himself avowed from an *a priori systematic* theoretical conception –although implicit in its underpinnings– to arrive to his empirical results which followed naturally, and the latter would have retrospectively illuminated and made more coherently explicit his pre-existing theory were he given the lifetime to finish this task: as we will clearly demonstrate in section D.2 of the present chapter he *first* manufactured and tailored his working inkblot-plates according to this theoretical conception and *then* started to collect empirical findings with them. Deduction from theory to data always precedes induction from data back to theory (Deri, p. 218; cf. in the Rorschach domain: Schachtel 1942, Kuhn 1944 pp. 30-31, 39-40, Silberstein 1987 pp. 33-4) as the mere

⁷⁰ By contrast to his key predecessor Hens: Rorschach 1921/1967, Table p. XXIII, chaps. I.3, II.1, II.5 pp. 10-11, II. 6.a, III.4, IV.12 pp. 106-107, V.3, VI; Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 48, 60, 69; Binswanger 1923/1967, pp. 234 & 236; Beck 1963, pp. 12-13, 18-19; Pichot 1991.

existence of the typical 'ordered' sequence (from generalities to particularities) in universal Rorschach practice already demonstrates! (more later).

Rorschach's recently published "Correspondence" (2004) gives us key hints on this issue, particularly in his exchange with Roemer who at the beginning was very inquisitive about scoring matters. At a time (X/14/20) where the latter was trying to find his way in the method but Rorschach's manual and plates had not yet been published, the Master wrote to him detailed indications of how to proceed *based on reasonable 'rules of thumb'*: if the response would have been the same if the image were black; to compare with the surely scored responses of the same protocol; if the detailing of a whole combined figure took place before or after the G perception; if the selection of an interpretation was based on scientific knowledge or not; what is seemingly a 'secondary association' rather than a 'primary perception' (his main theoretical conviction); etc. Just after discussing these matters Rorschach adds:

...There is it also the dilemma that is unfortunately frequent in the whole experiment: either [empirical] arbitrariness, or else crude systematization. All my experiments how-ever have indicated me that the crude systematization is better than the arbitrariness, when the situation in itself is not clear enough... I believe that the experiment is also at least as tight as other differential-psychology methods. (pp. 255-6; our translation)

Later on (VI/18/21), suggested to him by his own, different test material Roemer began to add and propose -pretty much in the style of the future Klopfer (cf. below)-minute scoring sub-divisions towards which Rorschach initially manifested much tolerance⁷¹ (however without taking them up in his latter analyses) but at the same time voicing a prudent warning:

The differentiation in G, main-pieces ["H", cf. Roemer 1967 p. 194 footnote 5] and aside-pieces ["N"] and absurd details [Dd] I accept quite gladly. As you can see, I have diversely further divided the G. The main-pieces, which perhaps correspond to my D, have at the border towards the Dd certain intermediate forms [Zw]. There are people that throw themselves with predilection first over the small details that lie a little over the center of the middle line. That is why I had to count as D small details that lie there. But one should perhaps score them separately with time. Just as one should perhaps score again separately, i.e. subdivide, also the Dd. Completely absurd Dd I have recently named Ddd. I would not be much surprised if you also get to still further dividing by that with time. Although there is the danger there which is indicated in the Swiss proverb: "When one files too much, one is left with mere dirt remaining." It seems to me it would be probably the best that, if possible, we both first agree about the subdivisions. That can not be so difficult since we both do have always come across the same questions. (p. 349; our translation)

⁷¹ In a contemporary letter to his close friend Oberholzer he was much more categorical against Roemer's suggestions: "...against which I must unfortunately protest a little. He proposes there completely unnecessary modifications... I do not like the German imperial mentality pirating the thing even before it is built" (Rorschach 2004, p. 343).

Interestingly enough, all that further complicated scoring led in the case of Roemer to an unsatisfied abandonment of formal scoring altogether, turning Rorschach's fear into reality!

Anyway and to return to our defending the idea of Rorschach's initial systematization, the reverse, less logical position has been adopted by those authors who overtly or covertly deny any systematic character to Rorschach's thinking⁷² however without any scientific demonstration at all of this supposedly unsystematic character of the concrete *structure* Rorschach did give to his method with his formal scoring schema, which we don't feel just like discarding without a thorough analysis of its scientific foundations or lack thereof - as well as of others' differing ones and his by comparison to theirs. This since a significant group between the above mentioned authors (particularly in the U.S.A.: Exner 1969, cf. p. 38) have not simply remained there but have further committed themselves to "systematize" the Rorschach method in their own way, although as a rule without any serious attempt at theorization (the main exception being Rapaport: et al. 1945-46/1968, pp. 18-19): just to name the most renowned and influential ones, there are Klopfer (the first self-appointed Rorschach "systematizer"), Piotrowski, and most contemporarily Exner; but there have certainly been others since this attitude has developed into a fashionable trend in Rorschach work (cf. Passalacqua, 1983/1992). All of the latter have expressed at least their partial dissatisfaction with Rorschach's allegedly unsystematic original scoring schema and then proposed the development each of a personal, predominantly "empirical system" for the scoring of Rorschach responses. From our side however we see from the outset a clear contradiction in their contention, very simply stated in the *Dictionnaire Robert*: "Empirique: Qui s'appuie sur l'expérience. En philosophie, qui reste au niveau de l'expérience spontanée ou commune, n'a rien de rationnel ni de systématique". In our understanding of the matter (shared with other thinkers, cf. Guillaume's quotation above) 'system' and 'theory' are inseparable concepts. There do exist, to be sure, *empirical* systems (Di Paola 1997, pp. 15-16) but only in the sense that those are *natural* systems (organ systems and whole organisms, animal or human natural groups, ecosystems, astronomical and other physical systems), to be differentiated from organized, *constructed* systems of ideas in the mind of a scientist with the intention of capturing reality: these are by necessity of a theoretical nature. As Bertalanffy (1968/1971) -the promoter of 'system theory'- puts it:

What is to be defined and described as system is not a question with an obvious or trivial answer. It will be readily agreed that a galaxy, a dog, a cell and an atom are *real systems*; that is, entities perceived in or inferred from observation, and existing independently of an observer. On the other hand, there are *conceptual systems* such as logic, mathematics (but e.g. also including music) which essentially are symbolic constructs; with *abstracted*

⁷² Cf., surprisingly, another founder of phenomenological Psychiatry and his personal acquaintance too: Minkowski, 1950 p. 134; opinion equivalent to the trend that erroneously considers his inkblots as "unstructured" (cf. Klein & Arnheim, 1953; Schachtel, 1966 p. 20 & passim, 1967).

systems (science) as a subclass of the latter, i.e. conceptual systems corresponding with reality. (pp. xix-xx)

Let us examine in some detail the ideas commanding the work of the above mentioned Rorschach “systematizers” one by one, so as to be able to judge the results more fairly. Very early in his career after having emigrated to the U.S.A., at a time when well versed psycho-metrists like Vernon (1933) were beginning to document the shortcomings of the method from the measurement point of view, in what was probably his very first Rorschach paper Klopfer (& Sender, 1936a) rather hastily proposed...

a systematic refinement of the scoring method... What ground have we for the assumption that this systematic refinement of the scoring method is necessary? In reading the Rorschach articles appearing recently in more than a dozen psychological and psychiatric journals, one meets with the increasing demand for such an accomplishment. Several of these authors have been engaged in the refinement of some scoring points but they have admitted that this partial approach is not adequate and no one has attempted the systematic refinement of the whole scoring method as a new basis for the scientific evaluation of the Rorschach reactions. An accomplishment of this task will automatically do away with the 'uncertainties and subjectivity of the scoring' mentioned by Vernon as particular deficiencies of the test in its present state of development... With the improvement of the scoring method, we shall undoubtedly rid ourselves of another 'important deficiency', namely, the 'statistical unreliability.' How can statistics be reliable when data with different interpretative value are placed under one and the same symbol as has been the practice heretofore? This finer differentiation of reactions will lead to a purification of the factors involved and result in a more scientific procedure. (pp. 5-6)

As we can see his main initial justification for his “systematization” proposal was group pressure and an alleged consensus, i.e. an external motivation. In his very next paper (“A system of refined scoring symbols”) that follows the thread and where he repeats the group argument, he adds: “A common Rorschach language is a prerequisite for systematic research which shall be quantitative as well as qualitative. Such a language, i.e., a complete refined scoring system has emerged from the *experimental* [italics added] work of six research groups in New York City. This scoring system is herewith presented to the members of the Exchange with the proposal for its acceptance and use for a sufficiently long time to enable them to discover its possibilities and limitations” (Klopfer & Sender 1936b, p. 19); there he introduces subdivisions of Rorschach's Detail, Movement and Light-Dark (chiaroscuro or shading) categories, but the scoring schema was even further atomized later on (Exner 1969, pp. 58-71). And despite his voiced willingness to concentrate on theoretical matters (1937) the fact is that he chose to disregard them as avowed in his famous quotation: “The Problem of Personality Structure. There is no need for us to get entangled in the warring camps fighting for their particular theories of personality structure. The general psychological assumptions we have to make [in Rorschach interpretation] are *so few and simple* that nobody will have any compunction about accepting them.” (Klopfer & al. 1939, p. 161, italics added). All these ideas, particularly the last

one, were taken up again in his first book (Klopfer & Kelley 1942, p. 221) which was carefully reviewed and its theoretical shortcomings sharply demonstrated by Schachtel (1942) in a way very pertinent for our argument:

Since the publication of Hermann Rorschach's *Psychodiagnostik* in 1921 quite a few manuals, text books, and introductions to his method have been published in various countries. Although varying in scope and thoroughness they all refrain from examining the psychological foundations of the Rorschach method. Klopfer's book is no exception to this rule and it is for this reason chiefly that... it nowhere approaches the level of Rorschach's own presentation... [p. 604]

It is obvious that the concept of personality in the mind of any student of human nature and personality will be of considerable importance for his insight into people, regardless of whether such a concept be articulate and explicit or vague and even unconscious. When dealing with a diagnostic tool for the exploration of the individual mind and personality it is impossible to make even a single statement without explicit or implicit reference to personality concepts, of which the person making such a statement may be aware or unaware. Klopfer thinks it unnecessary, for purposes of the Rorschach test, to have any theory of personality except the assumption that people are prompted "from without and from within"-page 221-and that the "susceptibility to be stimulated from within, or to be stimulated from without is distributed in mankind according to a normal curve"-page 222. But he constantly uses such concepts as spontaneity, inhibition, control, pseudocontrol, repression, sublimation, some of which seem to stem from the psychoanalytic theory of personality which has influenced Rorschach's personality concept. Especially the term *control* is used freely throughout the book, a term which makes little sense unless at least two agencies are assumed within the human personality one of which controls the other, as they are assumed in Freud's theory of the ego and the id. Klopfer, then, makes many more assumptions concerning the human personality that he seems to be aware of-as most people do. But unfortunately in addition to that, he abrogates in one place even those concepts and assumptions which he uses quite explicitly in many other places... [p. 605]

Klopfer succumbs to the same danger to which so many Rorschach workers before him have succumbed, namely of constructing a kind of immanent "Rorschach psychology" which uses the categories of scoring implicitly as categories of human behavior and human psychology, without obtaining at first the necessary insight into their relation to the basic concepts of psychiatric and psychological theory and to the totality of human experience. It was the merit of Rorschach never to lose sight of these relations.

A comparison of the one sample analysis of a Rorschach record in Klopfer's book with... Rorschach's own practical work shows that the elaboration of scoring categories in Klopfer's manner does not seem to yield as plastic and accurate diagnostic pictures as Rorschach achieved with less such elaboration, but with greater awareness of the relation between his-fewer-scoring categories and the general psychiatric and psychological categories on which his concept of the human personality was based. [p. 606]

Probably as a positive reaction to those criticisms this unsatisfactory conceptual situation was confronted by the author *a posteriori* (1954, cf. p. 561) with a specifically Jungian commitment as already seen but, expectedly, his scoring “system” remained unchanged and rather distant from his theory, i.e. the connection between the two (cf. his fig. of p. 569) remained rather obscure leaving much to be wished for concerning the detailed, explicit confrontation in search for a coherent correspondence: they lacked ‘isomorphism’ (Bertalanffy) or ‘symmetry’ (Deri) between themselves as explained at the beginning of this chapter. However, it must be said in all fairness that Klopfer’s attempts at a retrospective theorization is much more than what can be said of the following two authors.

Piotrowski -as his disciple- was on Klopfer’s side when the latter first proposed the “refinement” of Rorschach’s scoring system, in fact it was him who first published a detailed paper about the *FM* and *m* “categories” (1937a, 1937/1960) introduced by his teacher to supplement the movement determinant *M* (Rorschach’s *B*). His own personal case is interesting since despite a thorough (including psychoanalytic: Exner 1969, p. 10) theoretical formation he simply forbid himself from applying it openly to the Rorschach and this explicit and sincere atheoretical confession, together with a clear-headed and sharp mind, makes of his writings the best means there is to demonstrate the shortcomings and theoretical inconsistencies to which this “empirical” approach leads, fact that does not diminish in the least way the high accuracy and validity of many of his other empirical Rorschach contributions as we shall see repeatedly in this same Thesis. And so, not entirely convinced of the merits of Klopfer’s too minute schema (1942 pp. 30-31, 33; 1947 p. 95; 1950 pp. 579-580; 1957 p. 72) he reassigned to himself the task of empirically “systematizing” Rorschach’s method (1957, pp. ix, xv-xvi, 474): as his own disciple DeCato (1993) tells us from a personal communication with his mentor towards the end of the latter’s life, “Piotrowski’s objective [consisted] of developing a system that was empirically based and could be validated independent of any theoretical system” (p. 593). This peculiar position he maintained throughout his scientific life (1936 & 1937b; 1947, pp. 100-101; 1950, p. 549; 1957, see below; 1970, pp. 997-passim; 1971b, pp. 2, 8-9, 11) and should be examined in detail.

In what was probably also his first Rorschach paper (1936, part A) he struggled with the issue exposed by us above:

It is difficult to formulate a uniform view of all characteristic features of the Rorschach method because there is no underlying theory of this method. Rorschach regretted the lack of theoretical foundation. I propose to suggest a manner of looking at the Rorschach method which is not a theoretical explanation of the method but which may aid to clarify its problems and their logical interrelationship... Every theory of personality is an attempt to explain the origin and causal interrelations of the personality factors. What interests a theoretician is the personality in the making and not the personality made. *Now a system of projection like the Rorschach method allows comparison of relations, not in the making, but after they are made [italics added].*

Consequently, on our view, the Rorschach method contains no theory of personality, nor does it assume any such theory. Indeed, the Rorschach method does not pertain to the structure of personality but to the manner in which personality reveals itself in the environment [i.e. the concrete inkblots]. The purpose of the method is description and not theoretical explanation. Everything that is original and essential in the Rorschach seems to refer merely to the manner in which personality is projected into the inkblot interpretations. It is a method, not a theory. We can now understand Rorschach's claim that the basis of his method is purely empirical. It is so thanks to Rorschach's empirical discovery that the inkblot interpretations contain the projection of the total personality (pp. 23, 24-25; also in 1937b, pp. 5, 7-8).

Here we have a clear example of the misinterpretation of Rorschach's Introduction we alluded to above.

Unfortunately this view is contradicted by facts, particularly the facts reported by Rorschach himself in chap. II.6.a of his book when explaining his not-so-empirical discovery of the 'normal', i.e. *logical* sequence of locations:

Le sujet normal procède, dans l'expérience, de la manière suivante: il cherche d'abord à interpréter la planche qui lui est remise comme un tout... S'il y réussit, il donne alors une <<réponse globale>> que nous désignerons à l'avenir par G. Il passe ensuite aux parties séparées de l'image... il en résulte une ou plusieurs <<réponses détail>> (D). Quand le sujet en a fini avec les détails qui frappent le plus facilement le regard, il passe aux plus petits détails de l'image et donne éventuellement une ou plusieurs interprétations de détails très petits de l'image (<<réponses petit-détail>>, Dd). A l'image suivante, le sujet fait la même chose et, d'un bout à l'autre de la série, il recommence à suivre l'ordre G-D-Dd avec la plus grande régularité possible. Un sujet normal qui interpréterait les planches d'une manière exactement conforme à cette *description schématique* [italics added from this point on], devrait donner 10 G, environ 20 D et environ 30 Dd, soit en tout une soixantaine d'interprétations, et il devrait appréhender chaque image dans l'ordre de succession G-D-Dd. Mais un sujet qui agirait de cette façon serait d'une normalité tellement outre mesure que, pratiquement, il ne pourrait plus être longtemps considéré comme normal! Parmi les nombreux sujets que j'ai examinés *pas un n'a donné ce <<résultat normal>>... En réalité*, la chose est plus compliquée. Une foule de moments associatifs et affectifs intervient pour modifier ce type normal *fictif*. (1921/1967, pp. 26-27)

There Rorschach demonstrates by *reductio ad absurdum* (in perfect accordance with Guillaume's view, cf. quotation above) that it's not at all a matter of an already-made, empirical system of relations what the tester obtains from the subject as Piotrowski would have us believe, but of a formal system of relations theoretically constructed by the researcher's intelligence (his logical power) *on the basis* of the subject's concrete percepts (comp. Dworetzki's entirely germane, illuminating developmental location insights, 1939 pp. 271-275, 343): further proof is the fact that from similar inkblots and experience Hens didn't see -beyond the content of his subjects'

responses- this *G-D-Dd* triadic locations system of Rorschach at all (Kuhn 1944, pp. 30-31, 39-40), and on the other hand the fact that Klopfer saw in his population not only three but a scale with several additional intermediate location "categories"!

Anyway, from then on Piotrowski stuck to his "two theories" (one "etiological" for personality, another "ahistorical" for the Rorschach: funny since the former term was used by Rorschach himself to refer to his own theoretical approach) peculiar proposal but with the aggravating fact that he nevertheless neglected the latter due to his avowed primarily empirical emphasis. In his main work '*Perceptanalysis*' (1957) as a justifying argument he developed a view of what he ultimately called the "basic system of all sciences":

The chief effort in this volume has gone into clarifying the fundamental *concepts* used in the interpretation of the raw perceptanalytic data... The difficult and time-consuming detailed *validation* of the redefined meanings of the concepts, i.e., the checkup as to whether the presumed personality traits are closely associated with their respective perceptanalytic aspects or components, is beyond the scope of this work [p. x]... If by 'theory' is meant an attempt to explain how something happened to become what it is, two distinct theoretical problems must be kept apart. One is an explanation of how the perceptanalytic components, the formal aspects of the percepts prompted by the nonspecific and ambiguous visual stimuli, happen to reflect significant personality traits. We have some good beginnings of *what eventually will constitute the theory of percept-analysis*. The second problem concerns the development of human personality and its etiology... Contrary to a widespread present impression the validity of the Rorschach method does not depend on any theory of personality [p. xiii]... Perhaps a discussion of what science is and what the different elements of scientific endeavor are will help to clarify the purpose of this and other publications on perceptanalysis [p. 12]... There are then four distinct divisions in every empirical science: (1) concepts, (2) general principles [theories] or logical relations among concepts, (3) empirical referents of concepts, or diagnostic definitions of concepts in terms of direct or sensory experience, and (4) the process of verification or measurement of the degree to which the relations among the empirical referents of concepts correspond to the relations among the concepts as stated in the general principles... Defects in one of the four parts of a science cannot be compensated for by improvements in another part. This has serious implications for the development of empirical sciences. No amount of experimentation and fact gathering can ever lead to decisive experiments if the concepts underlying the experimental design are confused or loose, or if they lack adequate empirical referents. When this occurs, only a critical analysis of the concepts and of the adequacy of the empirical referents can give meaning to facts and experiments. *Clear definitions open the way for crucial experimental investigations. Clarification of concepts and of their perceptanalytic empirical referents is the main objective of this book* [pp. 14-15]... The theory of perceptanalysis aims to answer questions like these: Why are human-movement responses signs of a basic and not easily modifiable

conception of role in life; why are positive interpretations of the black color or dark shadings associated with intermittent depressive moods; why do responses covering whole blots measure readiness for a prolonged and difficult personal achievement? These and similar questions are largely unanswered. *Many of the concepts appearing in them need to be defined more exactly before adequate empirical referents can be found for them.* The large number of concepts involved, the difficulty in finding adequate empirical referents for complex personality traits, and the process of validation *will make the construction of a comprehensive, consistent, and satisfactorily verified theory of perceptanalysis a very long and arduous task* [pp. 36-37] (italics added).

Several things are implied by this elaborate argument, precisely about issues already critically assessed by Schachtel at the beginning of this chapter. First of all, that Piotrowski makes an undue resistance (which explains much of his failure on this score) to commit himself to any personality theory to further Rorschach theory - the only one he is supposedly interested in. But instead of concentrating immediately on this limited, latter *ad hoc* version of theory he postpones its specific development for later on *as the last task to be fulfilled*, after his avowed preferential attention to concept definition (1) and their empirical referents (3), and eventual validation (4): an internal contradiction becomes self-evident since, in his own ordinal numbering of steps, theorization (corresponding to the formulation of principles or 'logical relations' among concepts: compare his figures in 1957 p. 19, 1966 p. 190, and 1971b p. 3) should have come as the 2nd stage in science development. Actually, theory should be the very first step (Deri 1984, p. 79: "Clamoring for precise definitions *before* any theorizing is scientifi-cally sterile") and according to our view 'concepts' and 'principles' should exchange places in his illustrated scheme of science. Later in this chapter we from our side will do give primordial attention to this *theoretical system of logical relations* (cf. Guillaume supra) between perceptanalytic concepts as our fundamental contribution to Rorschach theory, "a most important problem" as qualified by Piotrowski himself from the beginning (1939 p. 114), and we will do that precisely to realize this wish of his remained as unfulfilled:

The perceptanalytic components qualify one another... This logical relationship constitutes the principle of the interdependence of components... Theoretically, every component qualifies in some manner and to some extent all the other components appearing with it in the same record, and in turn is qualified by them. However, a complete, systematic, and valid synthesis that gives proper consideration to every component in a record is most difficult. At present, we have no tried-out formal rules for this kind of comprehensive synthesis... Our knowledge of the correlations among the components is fragmentary and insufficient. We have only the beginnings of statistical correlations among components and almost no knowledge of the meaning of such correlations. (1957 pp. 390, 410)

We will also soon address and demonstrate the narrowness of his conviction of a fundamental incompatibility between the 'formal' (descriptive, supposedly more empirical) and the 'historical' (theoretical) approaches, or respectively between Rorschach and personality theories.

Exner, the last and most comprehensively-focused of our “systematizers” and the one who popularized the use of the term in our field, put in this way his conception of ‘system’ in the Introduction to the work that announced his own endeavor (1969):

In that the principal author of the Rorschach technique died prematurely, it seemed only natural that a variety of new investigators soon would come on the scene and, in turn, attempt to extend his basic work. Surely, this has been the case and has led to the [sic] development of a variety of Rorschach Systems. *The word Systems is used here as contrasted with theories*, in that each System represents an approach to the Rorschach. Each System has its own underpinnings *in some other general or specific theoretical approach* [italics added]. (p. 7)

So, as with the previous two authors, we reencounter our familiar contradictory definition of the non-theoretical or empirical “system” (cf. Piotrowski 1971b, p. 2) applied to the Rorschach. In his case this assertion is all the more surprising since just some lines above (pp. 4-7) Exner -marking a sharp difference from the former- had given a detailed and fair assessment of the nature and importance of Rorschach’s theoretical background, demonstrating in this way that he did not let himself be misguided by Rorschach’s ambiguous wording of his own Introduction to *Psychodiagnostics* (cf. Piotrowski 1936, our quotation above). But unfortunately, more impressed by the atomization of Rorschach practice into diverse and partially opposing schools, and being more concerned by the need of putting together a synthetic approach acceptable by all to counter the growing fragmentation, he decided to compose his own “Comprehensive System” by the questionable method of taking pieces from each and everyone of them adding them up in a new combination thus lacking a more cohesive principle (as would have been for ex. some measure of psychoanalytic theorization, having recognized this as a common feature of Rorschach as well as of his five chosen “systematizers”: pp. 5-6, 8, 12) as exposed in the Preface to the first edition of his first volume (1974):

The systematizers of the test have not reconciled.... A[n]...element, in the decision to develop the Comprehensive System, is the fact that most “Rorschachers” solve the dilemma of several systems privately, by intuitively *adding* [italics added] a “little Klopfer,” a “dash of Beck,” a few “grains” of Hertz, and a “smidgen” of Piotrowski, to their own experience, and call it *The Rorschach*. This personalized approach frequently is very useful. In fact, *when the work presented here, based largely on empirical data, is compared with the judgements of those who “personalize,” a significant congruence is noted* [italics added].... The goal of this work is to present, in a single format, the “best of the Rorschach.” This system draws from each of the systems, incorporating those features which, under careful scrutiny, offer the greatest yield, and *adds* to them other components based on more recent work with the test... *It is not based on any particular theoretical position* [italics added], and hopefully, can be useful to both the behaviorist and the phenomenologist. (pp. x-xi)

These conceptions demand to be confronted with those of Bertalanffy (1968/1971), the author who has struggled the most with the 'system' concept in science, to show their short-comings in the way of constituting a true system:

If someone were to analyse current notions and fashionable catchwords, he would find 'systems' high on the list. The concept has pervaded all fields of science and penetrated into popular thinking, jargon and mass media [p. 1]... It is necessary to study not only parts and processes in isolation, but also to solve the decisive problems found in the organization and order unifying them, resulting from dynamic interaction of parts, and making the behaviour of parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole... While classical association psychology attempted to resolve mental phenomena into elementary units - psychological atoms as it were - such as elementary sensations and the like, gestalt psychology showed the existence and primacy of psychological wholes which are not a summation of elementary units and are governed by dynamic laws [p. 30]... A system can be defined as a set of elements standing in interrelations [p. 55]... [In contrast] we may define summativity by saying that a complex can be built up, step by step, by putting together the first separate elements; conversely, the characteristics of the complex can be analysed completely into those of the separate elements. This is true for those complexes which we may call 'heaps', such as a heap of bricks or odds and ends... It does not apply to those systems which were called *Gestalten* in German... It is still necessary to emphasize the non-summative character of... systems... *You cannot sum up the behaviour of the whole from the isolated parts, and you have to take into account the relations between the various subordinated systems and the systems which are super-ordinated to them in order to understand the behaviour of the parts* [pp. 67-68, italics added]... 'System' is a new 'paradigm' in science in comparison to the elementalistic approach and conceptions predominating in scientific thinking [p. 90].

In other words and according to our view, using an almost exclusive "empirical" criterion there is absolutely no guarantee that the isolated formal factors separated - substracted- by Exner from the subordinated systems (Klopfer's, Beck's, Piotrowski's, Hertz's, and Rapaport's own scoring "systems") and added into his new superordinated "Comprehensive System" will now make the same sense they did in their original contexts, determined by the specific and often subtle *interrelations* they carried and assured and on which both Bertalanffy and Piotrowski have rightly insisted. Furthermore, the "cookbook" or "piecemeal" method Exner literally describes in the genesis of his "system" is exactly the kind of approach that no less a figure than Immanuel Kant (1781/1973), the conceptualizer and founder of the true *SYSTEM of CATEGORIES* (cf. Husserl, cited by Binswanger above pp. 208-9) from the philosophical perspective, criticizes as "rhapsodical" assembly by simple juxtaposition of more or less disparate elements (Schotte 1963/1990, pp. 55-56) in a global "mosaic" where the details, due to their heterogeneous origin (Exner's own opinion: 1974, pp. 7,

10-13, vs. 16, 17), cannot hold together or make sense with the same power of meaning⁷³: to quote him on this...

So there are precisely as many pure concepts of understanding that refer *a priori* to the objects of intuition in general as there are logical functions in all possible judgments according to the preceding table. Because understanding finds itself completely exhausted and all of its faculty totally recognized and measured in those [four] functions. We will call those concepts *categories*, following Aristotle, for our goal is the same, despite the fact that there were a sizable difference in the execution. This is, then, the classification of all of the originally pure concepts of Synthesis, that understanding contains in itself *a priori* and only due to which is it a pure understanding; only through them can it comprehend something in the diversity of intuition, that is, can it think the object. This division is systematically deduced from a common principle, e.g.: from the faculty of *judgment*, which is the same thing than the faculty of thinking; this division, then, is not a rhapsody proceeding from a fortuitous inquiry and without order of the pure concepts of whose entirety one cannot be certain, due to having been formed by induction, without thinking that operating in this way one never knows why these [four] concepts and not others, are inherent to pure understanding. The purpose of Aristotle while searching these fundamental concepts, was worthy of such a shrewd man. But since he did not have a principle, he picked them up as they presented themselves to him and he first assembled ten, which he called *Categories* (predicaments). Afterwards he thought to have found still another five and he added them to the preceding ones naming them post-predicaments. But his table continued to be imperfect... He also counted the derivatives between the primary concepts, missing in return some of the primary concepts (I Theory, 2nd part, 1st division, book I, chap. 1, 3rd section, pp. 223-224; our translation).

To assure that in contrast to newer “refinements” the classical Rorschach *system of categories* -in the strong meaning of those words- forms a coherent self-sufficient whole like this one of Kant⁷⁴ is our own objective in this Thesis, and to demonstrate that this working principle is far away from Exner’s empirical “systematizing” method⁷⁵ we will resort to a single example: in the early heated

⁷³ Compare with Holt 1954: "Finally (and in the end, most importantly), *theory* enables our science of human behavior to grow in an orderly and efficient manner. It provides a *structure* within which individual contributions fit together and produce a comprehensible and intelligible totality instead of a disjointed heap" (p. 503 point 4, italics added). Arnheim 1954/1974, chap. IX 'Dynamic Composition' pp. 432-434, with the example of the picture of a human body from one of the minor artists of the XIXth century gives also a superb demonstration of the systematic "shortcomings of the piecemeal approach".

⁷⁴ There remains little doubt about the compatibility of thinking between the two men when one reads the latter's insistence on the *formal* over content nature of his original philosophical contribution: cf. Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. IV.15 p. 115, to compare with Schachtel 1966 pp. 76-77; consider also the fact that, just as Da Vinci, Kant was a precursor of Rorschach in the consideration of pareidolias! (Weber 1956, Bohm 1951/1972 chap. 1).

⁷⁵ To which, conversely, fittingly apply both Klopfer's (1939 p. 45) implicit “experimentalist” criticism to Beck (see p. # below) and Bertalanffy's (1968/1971 p. 44) misplaced –see below– criticism to Kant.

discussion between experts documented in the first volumes of the *Rorschach Research Exchange* Exner (1969, chap. 2) often mentions, Beck (1937b, p. 17) criticized Binder's conceptions behind the latter's light-dark scoring saying that "my dissatisfaction with Binder's work is that the findings are based on overlapping variables. His mass shading response amounts to being a W, or nearly such; just as his peripheral shading response is most likely to be a D or a Dr. The beauty of the Rorschach experiment lies in the independent variables into which the result can be broken up, and the different psychological processes so filtered out. W, D, and Dr refer to one set of variables; color, shading, and their nuances to another. Experimental work with the test needs to keep these separate"; Binder's thoughtful reply (1937b) speaks by itself...

In conclusion..., just a few comments on Dr. Beck's objections to my view of the light-dark interpretations... Beck asserts that my *Hd* responses are almost always whole-interpretations... The fact is, that even in the *Hd* detail responses the shadings of the part selected were experienced only as a whole impression because this approach (Ein-stellung) to the shadings perseverated from the initial glance over the whole card... Finally, Beck dislikes the inner relationship between my *Hd* interpretations and the selection of a larger portion of the blot; between my *F(C)* interpretations and the selection of smaller sections. He objects to this inner correlation and asserts that the beauty of the Rorschach experiment lies actually in the fact that the experimental results may be broken up into factors which vary independently. This, according to my conception of the matter, is essentially a misunderstanding of the experiment. The painstaking correlations of Löpfe, Behn-Eschenburg and others, based on a large amount of material, have shown beyond a doubt that the whole experiment is interwoven with such inner correlations, for it has often been proved statistically that the variation of one factor has a certain influence on the variation of another. The factors of the experiment are only relatively independent, but on the other hand they are only relatively dependent on one another. On general psychological grounds it could not be otherwise; for the individual factors of the experiment represent different areas of the personality, which on the one hand possess relative independence, and on the other hand are steered and brought into inner relationship by the superordinated whole of the personality. Only from the viewpoint of the old "atomistic psychology" (Elementenpsychologie) can one assume that the factors of the experiment vary in complete independence of one another. We make use of the relative independence of the factors when for every factor of the experiment we try to determine the psychic processes related to it. And when we find that the color interpretations are related to the general character of the peripheral emotional life, the *F(C)* responses to particular traits of the latter, the *Hd* responses to the character of the central emotional life, this finding is in harmony with what Rorschach himself has found regarding the significance of the other factors of the experiment... It has been possible to relate the generally accepted factors of the Rorschach experiment to the primary peculiarities of the subject; one should not abandon this in the psychological interpretation of the light-dark responses... *Of course, this*

procedure presupposes that one has a psychological understanding of the way in which, within the personality, all is more or less intimately related [italics added]. And if anything regarding these dependencies is reflected in our interpretations of the light-dark responses, we believe that it speaks in favor of our interpretation rather than against it. This correlative viewpoint is probably the only essential point in which we disagree with Beck. (pp. 43-44)

Despite this sensible rebuttal Exner on his side expressed preference for the "atomistic" views of Beck over Binder concerning shading and specifically chose to use his scoring symbols in the C.S. (1974, p. 88): We on the contrary feel compelled by this solid argument to make the reverse choice clearly in favor of Binder's views.⁷⁶

Another key element in Kant's conception is the *finite* character of the number of categories to be included with the intention of rounding up a complete system, i.e. the question of whether by definition a true system should remain always *open* or rather must be definitively *closed* to any new addition in accordance with the logic of the whole. Sharing and elaborating to their ultimate consequences the 'conservative' or 'restrained' opinions on the scoring schema of some Rorschachers -particularly members of the original Swiss tradition- like Oberholzer (1968, p. 505), Bohm (1951/1972, Prefaces), Salomon (1959b pp. 236, 246-247, 1962 pp. 12, 26-27; quoting Zulliger), Schachtel (1942, p. 606), and Pichot (1991)⁷⁷, we will decidedly commit with the Kantian principle that a successful Rorschach system -or any other for that matter- must be a closed one and that allegedly "open" systems are just a manifestation of the imperfection of their theoretical constitution (comp. Gammon pp. 201-2 above). From this particular standpoint it becomes understandable why we are so critical of those theoretically blind successive "systematizers" of Rorschach's perceptanalytic schema who have attempted to amend and extend it, because with them one is never sure if this or the next one will be the final and "best" version of the method, or if there still is a new scoring "category" to be added. There has been much controversy on this issue and we expect critical attacks precisely on this point (just to mention exs. of Rorschach authors see Kuhn 1944/1992, p. 177, Minkowski 1950, pp. 131-2, 134, 140, and Allen 1970), for instance despite being one of the authors we often cite in defense of our arguments Bertalanffy (1950, 1968/1971) takes here a position diametrically opposed to ours, and he directs no small criticism to Kant (1955/1962, 1968/1971 pp. 44, 239-240, 242, 245, 253); furthermore in our own field different authors have interpreted him differently (Boreham 1970, vs. Di Paola 1997 p. 15). But to contradict him using his same arguments, we must call attention to the overlooked fact that precisely the need for *closure* is one of the main *Gestalt* principles. The fact is when Bertalanffy proclaims the primacy of open

⁷⁶ Cf. Bohm 1959/1977, where its merits are clearly presented; his opinion is shared by many other top experts: Rapaport et al., 1945-46/1968 pp. 394-395; Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1960/1977; Salomon, 1962 p. 43; Schachtel, 1966 pp. 243-244; and Mélon, 1976 pp. 106-107. Also of the highest interest is the fact that with time Beck (1955, p. 368), to his merit, entirely if implicitly changed his position fully endorsing Bertalanffy's 'system' concept!

⁷⁷ We don't include Beck here since despite his initial and well-grounded conservatism (1933a, pp. 371-372) he finished by giving up and taking an 'open to additions' position similar to the above "systematizers" precisely on the shading issue, cf. his critical quotation towards Binder above and: Exner 1969, pp. 9, 15, 21, 38-39, 41, 94-97.

systems he confuses *form* closure with *content* closure: *Gestalts* or systems are closed formal or structural units by principle (cf. Ricœur 1971, p. 11), but as he rightly points out living and particularly human beings or creations simultaneously function as 'open' entities that allow the exchange of their content with the exterior, i.e. they maintain their integrity thanks to 'permeable boundaries' that paradoxically close and open them at the same time⁷⁸; and assertions like "the system remains constant as a whole and in its phases, though there is a continuous flow of the component materials" or "the constancy of composition in the change of components" (Bertalanffy, 1950 p. 23, 1968/1971 pp. 130, 132, 167), are principles of his still perfectly compatible with our more subtle conception. This profoundly and meaningfully paradoxical nature of human reality pre-cludes the need to fear that a finite schema will reduce the possibilities of capturing the infinite possibilities of our world: on the contrary as Di Paola puts it (1997)...

No theory has yet been able to explain all phenomena under observation. There can only be explained some aspects of empirical reality since this, being concrete, is of a different nature in respect to abstract concepts: it is in motion, mutable, complex, contingent. A limitation of theory is that of never being equal to the concrete reality it wants to comprehend: theory must not be confused with reality. Each concept is just expression of the attempt to regroup many elements of empirical reality in a few categories. In this way the system of concepts of theory helps to understand the phenomena of the empirical reality considered... A single conceptual system can be applied to several empirical systems... The conceptual system remains identical, but is coordinated, in its concrete application, to empirical systems totally different between themselves... This conceptual schema, besides being abstract, must also be as simple as possible, since its function is to facilitate the understanding of reality... Function of theory is to help the researcher, to offer references to orientate him in the maze of experience, to furnish him ideas to attempt to understand the connections between things... The result of the use of theory is a clarification about forces from which little is known, is an understanding of things that happen in the world of facts, is an order to impose on phenomenal chaos. (pp. 15-18, our translation)

And Schotte (1963/1990), referring to another closely related "projective" method -the Szondi- which we will specifically consider in section C.2 of this chapter, adds some profound thoughts equally applicable to our closed-system view of the Rorschach formal scoring schema...

Nosographie psychiatrique classique et aperçu de structure: ou des classes aux catégories... Son cas propre [du Szondi, parmi les autres tests "de personnalité"] n'en reste pas moins singulier, par le redoublement ici des notions de *classes* diagnostiques usuelles, ou du moins d'une partie dès lors privilégiée [*sic*] d'entre elles, en 8 *catégories* désormais imbriquées, dont le

⁷⁸ For more about these philosophical/psychological dynamics, in general and as specifically related to the Szondi and Rorschach Tests, cf. Deri 1984, pp. 13-15, 29-60, 61-62, 68-69, 145-146, 298-299, 313; Deri 1949, chap. 10; Schotte 1963/1990, pp. 54-55 (see below), 165-166; Schachtel 1966, pp. 100-104 .

système fait le test... Tentons de marquer le sens de cette transformation à la fois radicale et d'abord non apparente: c'est que désormais chacun des facteurs en question... *ne se définit plus que par rapport aux autres... en vertu de la loi que connote une structure... c'est l'ensemble, le plan, qui conditionne les détails.* Plus rien n'a d'existence autonome, tout est reconstitué en et par des réseaux de relations *significatives*: nous venons de quitter le régime dans lequel les maladies mentales [ou les catégories de cotation de Rorschach] sont considérées *partes extra partes*, pour découvrir l'articulation d'une structure unique dont l'ensemble les recoupe au lieu de simplement les regrouper... C'est en termes logiques stricts, que nous n'en sommes plus aux *classes*, à nos "groupes" ou aux types, mais aux *catégories* et à leurs propriétés tout à fait différentes, leur tout autre "puissance", et ce que le philosophe appelle leur pouvoir interne de réflexivité... Il faut... faire appel bien plutôt à des concepts tout autres...: ainsi celui de *sens*... Or, qui dit sens, dit à la fois *structure*, c'est-à-dire condition formelle de signification... Le génie de Szondi, c'est d'avoir... réalisé cette fois le passage de *l'ensemble des syndromes à la structure d'ensemble qui s'articule en eux*... [pp. 30-31, 34]

...A tout prendre, il n'y a pas que le simple empiriste à être rebuté par une question comme celle que nous avons posée: pourquoi donc 8 facteurs [au Rorschach, en principe ⁷⁹], - comment même justifier une telle limite, un système à ce point à jamais défini? C'est une certaine idée de l'humanité de l'homme qui sera souvent en jeu dans pareille objection, humanité, dit-on, qui s'opposera toujours à de telles réductions, voire de telles formalisations... Il faut rencontrer l'objection, et si en fin de compte cette idée avancée dans le contexte szondien méconnaît avant tout la distinction des classes et des catégories, déjà faite plus haut, ce qui prive l'objection de toute vraie portée, on peut cependant aussi enrichir cette rencontre à partir d'autres bases. N'y a-t-il pas, au fait, de *nombreuses séries de phénomènes humains* dont la *mise en système* ne semble pas d'abord soulever les mêmes questions, ou dont le nombre au moins, dans chacune des séries, n'inspira jamais de doute quant à son caractère foncièrement *limité*? [et lui de citer par ex. le fait universel du langage des trois, et seulement trois, 'personnes' grammaticales] [pp. 38-39]... *Quel est donc le sens propre de cette fermeture, et justement de celle-ci?* Cette question, en fin de compte, revient à se poser celle même de la *structure, dans sa nécessité*, - puisque c'est bien de structure qu'il s'est toujours agi, et non pas, disions-nous, d'une autre classification... Mais encore faut-il voir finalement surtout que cette nécessité n'est pas en quelque sorte purement "théorique", voire "opérationnelle", mais véritablement *elle-même tout existentielle*: soit tenant, pour mieux dire, à ces *opérations par lesquelles se constitue la seule réalité humaine* dans la variété de *formes*, proprement

⁷⁹ Originally, '3' was the number that predominated in an ubiquitous way in Rorschach's book, system, or creation; to begin with just note the repetitive *triadic schema* of his scoring categories (in their exact order each time): the locations *G - D - Dd* (*Zw* and *Do* were originally considered to be just subtypes of the latter: Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. II.6.b) on the one hand, and the determinants *B - F - Fb* (chap. II.5; he introduced Light-Dark only later – posthumous article i.e. chap. VII.A– being baptized since as *Hd* by Binder: Schachtel 1966 pp. 75-77) on the other (for more see section D.2 below p. #).

infinie, de ses *réalisations*, - qui néanmoins, toujours, viennent ainsi au *réel* à travers un même jeu de *structures* essentielles. [pp. 54-55; comp. Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. IV.5 pp. 87-88]

In the final section of this chapter we will more definitely prove Bertalanffy wrong on this specific open/close issue. His scathing albeit -it seems to us- clearly biased criticisms of Kant on the other hand (compare for ex. 1968/1971 p. 44, with Schotte above and further pp. 54-57 where the latter specifically quotes the philosopher), to the degree they concern us here, we will confront indirectly (chap. IV) by demonstrating the superiority of our Rorschach system based on the Kantian model by contrast to more “open” ones like those we have reviewed above.

2. The hermeneutical validation

"The projective techniques have no objective criteria by which artefacts can be distinguished from genuine records. I am quite convinced that if I were presented with a Rorschach record composed of responses of different subjects mixed at random I would in its interpretation arrive at a picture of a (nonexistent) personality and I can not conceive of an objective criterion by which I could avoid doing so... But though wholly subjective the concept of personality is a necessity we can not forego... Human mind demands meaning. Science is never just an accumulation of disconnected facts but looks for the meaning inherent in the facts. Meaning emerges out of the relation of single facts to an entity which unifies them by its encompassing quality. In psychology 'personality' has the function of the same encompassing entity... This understanding of the patient's personality is based on a measure of identification... By it - by the medium of the clinician's personality - the record of test responses comes alive and instead of an agglomeration of test responses a living person is created. Here indeed is a criterion - though quite a subjective one - which might distinguish between an artefact and a genuine test record."

David Kadinsky (1970, pp. 43-4, 46).

The word 'system' derives from the Greek 'sustêma' which means 'to stand upright, hold together' (German 'Zusammenstand', French 'tenir debout': Schotte 1963/1990, p. 31), thus implying a necessary cohesive force, a *structure* able to sustain the respective ensemble of elements as a tight, firm body. This concept cannot but remind us of Lacan's or Dolto's theory of the libidinally integrated image of one's own body against its disjointed experience in the psychoanalytical field, as well as of H. Rorschach's kinesthetic prerequisite to be able to 'fill-in the gap' and see plate III as a *G B M V* in our inkblot field (1921/1967, chaps. II.5.b. pp. 13-14,

VII.A.1 p. 210 Note 1)⁸⁰. As explained by Schotte above it is **sense** or **meaning** which does this for systems (cf. the expression in French: "ça ne tient pas debout, ça n'a pas de sens...")⁸¹ and the immediate correlate the understanding of the Rorschach coding and interpretation tasks as of an essential *hermeneutical* nature.

As defined by Ricœur (1971), "le problème herméneutique concerne la nature de l'acte de **comprendre** en rapport à l'interprétation des textes... L'idée clé reste: rendre **compréhensible** un langage, soit étranger, soit obscur ou difficile, par le moyen de reformulations, de transpositions, l'acte de traduire étant une partie de cette activité de transposition" (p. 2, boldface added). We are thus talking about retrieving or reconstructing a cohesive sense, a meaning.

The hermeneutical principle in perceptanalytic work, touched upon briefly by Rorschach in "*Psychodiagnostik*" with his instructions about the sometimes necessary scoring choice of difficult responses (*B* or *F?* *FFb* or *FbF?*) based on 'subjective analogy' i.e. by comparison with similar, straightforward ones or 'the rest of the protocol' (1921/1967, chaps. II.5.b pp. 14-15, II.5.c p. 19), was clearly established by him -with another terminology- in 1923 in the posthumously published case study of Oberholzer's patient:

Tous ces chiffres qui résultent du dépouillement des résultats ne doivent cependant en aucun cas être pris trop absolument, *il faut toujours avoir devant les yeux un aperçu du résultat d'ensemble pour ne pas s'accrocher au chiffre d'un facteur singulier comme à un écueil*. Par ailleurs les chiffres ainsi obtenus offrent une base à l'interprétation que j'ai appelée dans sa totalité <<Psychogramme>>, et je tiens pour tout à fait exclu qu'on parvienne même avec la pratique et l'expérience les plus grandes, à atteindre une interprétation sûre et certaine par la seule inspection du protocole, sans passer par le dépouillement.

L'INTERPRÉTATION. Devant l'extraordinaire variabilité des résultats, on ne peut pas donner une indication ferme sur le facteur par lequel il est mieux et plus facile de commencer. Cependant la voie généralement la plus sûre est de commencer par les réponses couleur qui, comme l'expérience l'a montré, représentent l'affectivité. Toutefois on peut rencontrer un chemin encore plus sûr en retenant d'abord *l'allure insolite d'un facteur particulier quelconque de l'épreuve et surtout des corrélations insolites entre les facteurs*, et là il y a beaucoup de possibilités d'arriver rapidement à une conclusion sûre... Il y a ainsi un grand nombre de corrélations qui peuvent être saisies rapidement et qui permettent d'établir avec relativement peu d'effort quelques lignes fondamentales du psychogramme. (chap. VII.A.1&2, pp. 218-219, italics added; see also his comments on resps. I-3 and X-1 of the protocol on pp. 208 & 213)

⁸⁰ Cf. the reverse body metaphor in some of our references above while criticizing Exner: Klopfer 1939, p. 45 (see below); and Arnheim 1974, chap. IX 'Dynamic Composition' pp. 432-434. Characteristically, Beck's narrow-mindedness led him to be the only expert of his generation to refuse conceding a *G* score to this *Gestalt*ing accomplishment, of course followed again by Exner.

⁸¹ Cf. also Dolto's insistence on the fact that "le corps est langage", and Kadinsky 1970 pp. 43-44.

Since then this all-important principle has been endorsed -at least in appearance- by practically every self-respecting Rorschach expert, particularly the so-called "systematizers": having studied their respective works extensively Exner reaches the conclusion that...

There is complete agreement between the Systems that Rorschach data is interpreted adequately *only* if a 'global' approach is employed. The fundamental requirement to the 'global' interpretation is that all Rorschach data be considered, and more specifically, that each bit of Rorschach data be evaluated with respect to all other Rorschach data... All of the Systems do require the scoring and summarization of all responses, usually as the beginning step interpretation. All of the Systems are also specific concerning the requirement of a qualitative evaluation of the protocol. None of the Systems endorse, neither explicitly nor implicitly, a 'cookbook' approach with regard to either quantitative or qualitative data which would, in any manner, circumvent the global methodology which always has as its object the idiographic features of the personality. (1969, pp. 229, 231-232)

Personally we are not so sure of such degree of commitment to this principle in all of them (cf. the quotations by Holt and Brosin & Fromm, pp. 12-3 & 135 above), and in our opinion this outspoken endorsement has been offered oftentimes only superficially, not always with all desired coherency, as explained below.

One expert who was immediately struck and fully understood from the get-go the far reaching, philosophical-methodological implications of this scientific position was again Binswanger (1923/1967) whom with his keen eye called particular attention to these words of Rorschach in his early review of '*Psychodiagnostik*':

The relations between the various factors of the test and the various psychological and clinical types are, to begin with, purely statistical-quantitative. There resides one of the great advantages and innovations of RORSCHACH's doctrine since, although it is true that both series, between which relations are searched, do not represent objectively fixed factors, but subjectively "tinged" by the author's medical orientation and his individual points of view and conceptions and which are to a certain point fluid, and even when, besides that, the numerical relations discovered between them do not imply the character of a mathematical necessity but, in any case, that of an empirical regularity, we have to be content about having been able to obtain in this area a provisional orientation through some figures. These constitute, as RORSCHACH repeatedly asserts, the basis of the interpretation of the test results, and he considers completely excluded "to obtain a definite and reliable interpretation from the records, even after a great deal of experience and practice, unless the calculations are made". On the other hand, RORSCHACH's work shows precisely with all clarity that numbers in psychology are something different than in physics. The author has demonstrated his sharp psychological vision by never considering as absolute the quantitative results of the calculation of responses. He even constantly advises against the mistake that it supposes and he recommends with insistence that "a general view of the total

findings must be retained so as to avoid being tripped up by the figure for a particular factor". From this can be deduced how difficult it is to teach and learn the use of the test. The technician, even the most experienced individual in the calculation of probabilities, for example, won't go beyond being a mere apprentice if he does not have ability for psychological penetration and experience in the sphere of human knowledge, and will require, furthermore, of that intuitive "general view of the total findings", qualities all of them that the author possessed in such a high degree and that are necessary to turn the test into a scientifically valid instrument. Is mistaken he who believes himself forced to talk in this respect of an "artistic" intuition and of the "artistic" nature of the test. Science, in general, and psychology, in particular, are in need of intuition, and willing to deprive them from it equals to wishing to suppress a vital road for them. (pp. 235-236, our translation)

As we can see, Binswanger -following Rorschach- is marking a sharp contrast between the purely statistical and the contextual or 'hermeneutical' (term to appear as such later on: see below) approach, point condensed in his quotation of the famous dictum by Schopenhauer "when counting begins, understanding [*Verstehen*] ceases" (p. 229): or as we like to say, we have to go beyond the exact world of *numbers* into the meaningful world of *words*, distinct domains but which can also enrich and complement each other. Precisely in another closely following paper ("*Erfahren, Verstehen, Deuten in der Psychoanalyse*", 1926/1970) Binswanger explicitly ties the psychoanalytic method of *understanding* -and so implicitly the perceptanalytic method (comp. Binswanger pp. 62-3 above, and the entirely shared conception of Minkowska 1956/1978 p. 6)- with Hermeneutics⁸²: "...Ainsi se constitue ce qu'on a reproché à tort à Freud, parce que c'est inhérent à *toute* explication-commentaire *en tant que telle*, je veux dire le '*cercle herméneutique*': de manière générale, nous interprétons le détail sur la base d'un tout déjà présupposé, un tout qui n'est à son tour acquis que sur la base des détails. (De là les corrélations entre analyse et synthèse, et entre induction et déduction dans toute interprétation [*Deutung*] ou explication-commentaire [*Auslegung*])" (p. 167) which is precisely Rorschach's argument in his quotation above.

Binswanger's words seem to have been chosen on purpose to contradict -for an example between the "systematizers"- Beck's arguments a decade later, which were not free themselves from ambivalence: despite his considering himself a "close follower" of the Master, ignoring its implications Beck explicitly opposed in his first articles to this intuitive principle of Rorschach's precisely -but pejoratively- calling it "artistic" (1935 pp. 100-102, 106; 1936 p. 83; 1937b pp. 21-22), decidedly favoring the "objective" but insufficient statistical approach; but later on he makes a 180° turn and endorsed this view of Binswanger (Beck 1963, pp. 12-13, 18-19, ref. to Dilthey's '*Verstehen*') correction maybe due to Binder's (1937b pp. 43-44) already seen sound criticism: according to this critic then his supposed endorsement of Rorschach's 'global'

⁸² The deservedly widely respected work of Ricœur (1965) further developed this idea to its full implications. Both Ellenberger (1966/1995) and Bogaert (1992) have published comments on it, works all of them that we will be reviewing below.

vision as asserted by Exner has to be taken with a grain of salt due to his predominantly "atomistic" viewpoint. Klopfer on his side, criticizing also this initial position of Beck's, did have the right insights and made some very good points from a contextual point of view; for instance:

Orthodox "experimentalists" demand that the Rorschach method be free from all "subjective" elements. To reduce that point of view ad absurdum, we could say that they want to establish standardized tables where the scoring and interpretive value of every single Rorschach response could be looked up. They want to reduce the scoring and interpretation to a seemingly foolproof, mechanical, and, therefore, "objective" procedure. Even these extremists would concede that this procedure would be like an attempt to study the functioning of the human body by first cutting it into pieces in order to find out afterwards how the pieces may have functioned together; (1939, p. 45)

or by introducing his own "refined" scoring system (& Sender, 1936b p. 19) presenting it as an eventually common 'language' (Beck mockingly called it an "idiom") whose 'grammar' has to be understood; but as we saw above he was unable to explain himself the theoretical basis for many of his assertions. We have also seen, for another example, the paramount importance given from the beginning by Piotrowski to the "principle of interdependence of components" (1957, chap. 12), which is how he called Rorschach's 'global' approach, but also his difficulty to successfully tackle this issue from a restricted "empirical" point of view. And the failure of Exner himself, following in the footsteps of the former authors, to develop a structure able to hold together his comprehensive but dispersed, extremely scattered scoring puzzle has also been already demons-trated.

In contrast stands the profound consideration given to this principle by representatives of the Classical Swiss tradition, specially Bohm (1951/1972). In chap. 7.1 of his Textbook ('The Psychogram') he considers it the decidedly superior feature of the Rorschach, compares the method of interpretation with oriental philology (a classical area for Hermeneutics) and describes three particular successive phases in the evaluation: an intuitive global impression of the proto-col, the scientific control of the individual components, and a final critical, renewed intuitive perception of the whole; without making himself the connection this is exactly nothing else than the complete circuit of Binswanger's 'hermeneutical circle' which we will more fully exploit in section D.2 below. But to our knowledge not until Starobinsky (1970) did any theorist openly spoke of the Rorschach as an essentially hermeneutical procedure, elaborating his ideas in this direction to their full extent precisely over those of Bohm (quoting him from chap. 4.A.II):

L'effacement de l'observateur derrière l'automatisme impersonnel du test serait donc une duperie, ou un refuge de la mauvaise foi. Les meilleurs spécialistes du Rorschach sont les premiers à insister sur la part d'interprétation et d'*art* que comporte le psychodiagnostic. Le test ne parle pas tout seul; le diagnostic ne se produit pas tout seul. Le psychologue ne peut éviter de s'y engager personnellement: il n'a pas le droit de prendre le protocole du test pour un *signifiant* qui correspondrait rigoureusement à un *signifié* clair et distinct. Cette précision ne serait que fausse précision. Voici les remarques très justes

par les-quelles Ewald Bohm met en garde l'apprenti psychologue contre le fétichisme du test: "Le test de Rorschach... n'est rien moins qu'une méthode mécanique. On ne saurait traduire les différents éléments formels... comme les mots clé du 'livre des songes égyptien' (et dans la science objective des rêves il n'existe pas non plus de telles 'traductions')... Chaque élément assurément a sa valeur symptomatique dans chaque cas particulier. Mais cette valeur n'est pas une grandeur rigide, établie une fois pour toutes, elle varie au contraire d'un cas à l'autre selon la relation qu'elle soutient avec le tableau d'ensemble. Plusieurs auteurs [Kuhn 1944, p. 41; Bochner & Halpern 1942] ont eu raison d'attirer l'attention sur le fait qu'un protocole de Rorschach constitue lui aussi, comme 'tout', une *Gestalt* dont on ne saurait isoler les éléments particuliers pour les considérer séparément en dehors de leur contexte. Aussi des psychologues de tendance mécaniciste, pour lesquels l'analyse laborieuse d'une structure d'ensemble est trop difficile, qualifient-ils parfois le test de 'non scientifique'; ils sous-entendent par là que n'est scientifique que ce que l'on peut établir une fois pour toutes avec la rigueur de la physique mathématique. Mais en psychologie on ne saurait penser en termes de physique... ."

Nous voici ramenés au "cercle herméneutique"...: chaque détail observé doit être confronté au tout, et le tout doit être réinterprété à la lumière de chaque nouvelle acquisition partielle: tâche infinie (puisque le cercle herméneutique ne se clôt jamais), mais aussi infiniment féconde. Loin donc de s'effacer, le rôle de l'interprète - faillible, armé d'expérience, mais menacé intérieurement par ses faiblesses et ses incertitudes - ne fait que se renforcer et se confirmer davantage. Il ne doit pas méconnaître que son travail a quelque chose d'une création, mais d'une création qui n'est pas libre d'inventer ce qui lui plaît: il s'agit d'éclairer les significations implicites contenues dans cette *donnée* indépendante qu'est la réponse du sujet interrogé, et, à partir de ces significations, tenter d'en inférer les structures plus ou moins permanentes qui définissent un psychisme particulier. Bien que le test recoure à l'immédiat de la perception, cet immédiat est aussitôt perdu et compromis [cf. Freud], d'abord parce que le sujet doit *dire* ce qu'il perçoit, et interpréter dans le "langage de la tribu" ce qu'il a senti; ensuite, parce que le psychologue doit commenter, dans le langage de la science, le discours "naïf" que le sujet lui a tenu. Par conséquent, le diagnostic est une *œuvre* seconde, construite sur cette première œuvre qu'est la réponse du sujet. Voilà qui n'est pas très éloigné de ce que poursuit, dans un autre domaine, l'activité critique (je parle de cette critique inquisitive, qui cherche à rendre manifeste, dans les textes qu'elle étudie, un sens latent qui a échappé à la connaissance claire de l'écrivain). Mais ajoutons aussitôt que les modes et les variations sémantiques du langage "savant" de la psychologie ne sont pas moins surprenantes que celles du langage critique. Les concepts synthétiques, qui servent à l'énoncé du diagnostic, sont des créations spéculatives. Depuis que le test de Rorschach existe, le matériel conceptuel qu'on lui a associé a passablement varié... [and he cites for ex. Jung's, Freud's, and Kretschmer's characterological types]. Parions que si nous revenions aux types classiques (sanguin, bilieux, etc.), le test de Rorschach s'y plierait complaisamment. Le reproche ne s'adresse pas ici au test de Rorschach,

qui manifeste notre vérité comme fait chacun de nos gestes, chacune de nos paroles: il concerne cette *œuvre* incertaine qu'est l'explicitation de cette vérité.

Voilà de quoi rassurer ceux qui auraient pu s'effrayer d'être pénétrés, déchiffrés, dépouillés de tous leurs secrets. Le test les trahit comme les trahit chacun de leurs mouvements: mais encore faut-il que cette évidence, entièrement offerte aux témoins, soit recueillie et interprétée par ceux-ci, pour devenir un véritable savoir. Or la connaissance du témoin, parce qu'elle procède selon des catégories formelles préétablies, implique toujours violence et distorsion. A chaque instant, nous livrons tous nos secrets, mais à chaque instant renaissent aussi les malentendus. (La vie quotidienne, en dehors de toute prétention scientifique, comporte à tout moment cette compréhension faillible, cette divination tâtonnante - mais dans le domaine de l'occasionnel et du particulier.) Aurions-nous résolu de nous protéger et de nous masquer, nos secrets seront mieux gardés par la partialité des systèmes trop cohérents qui prétendent nous juger, que par nos manœuvres de dissimulation, assez ridicules à l'ordinaire... (pp. 247-250; the last words sounding like an echo of Minkowski's, 1950 p. 134)

This clear-headed, rather recent understanding of the true nature of the Rorschach method⁸³ in our opinion has not yet been exploited to full profit. We have found only two other ulterior, contemporary authors (Smith 1994, Te'eni 1998) who develop similar ideas in the hermeneutical vein (but cf. also Schwartz & Lazar, 1979). The particular advantage of the hermeneutical view of the Rorschach method is that it contributes -as it does for Psychoanalysis- a better understanding of perceptanalysis as human science, somewhat different in nature from natural science, and consequently new and more akin scientific validation criteria. Starobinsky, as Binswanger before him, has explained above that we are not dealing with a wholly subjective procedure but that there are objective hermeneutical rules to respect. As explained by Bogaert (1992):

Science, as critical knowledge, has at its disposal the required methods to constitute in a systematic way the area of its wisdom, exerting a vigilant control over its procedures and establishing precise validation criteria. However, it is not convenient to talk about "the science", since the domain of scientific knowledge brakes into subdomains which possess their specificity. To avoid an extremely formal speech it should be spoken of types of science and of modes of validation. Formal sciences -logic, mathematics- accept as valid knowledge which is demonstrable. Non-contradiction operates as validity criterion of the formal system... Is scientifically acceptable that which is demonstrable; and to demonstrate a proposition is to articulate it -in accordance with known rules- with one or several initial propositions whose validity is previously accepted... In the empirico-formal sciences there is a theoretical, formal component, and an empirical component, which constitute

⁸³ Cf. the final parenthetical reference to everyday life, to the incidental, key concepts also for Freud as well as for Rorschach behind his '*Zufalls-*' -accidental or chance- forms: see next section.

a language that includes terms relative to observable and non-observable aspects of reality... Physics, since Galileo, offers the model of the empirico-formal science in the modern sense of the term: a science which approaches things through the experimental way, with the purpose of establishing the laws which rule their functioning. It is about realizing a -systematic and controlled-dismounting labor of the variables at work, with the object of knowing, dominating and transforming nature.. In contrast to the records of clinical psychology, inspired by the experimental model, the case histories presented by Freud refer more to the historical dimension of the patients than to collected informations. One does not try anymore to register experience, but to find the immanent sense of words; and, consequently, the method which imposes itself is essentially hermeneutic. The patient's speech is considered as a text which needs to be deciphered and which refers to a hidden speech of which the text constitutes a codified transposition. *In that context, hermeneutics constitutes an interpretative theory, a type of science, whose validation criterion is given by the measure according to which the interpretation succeeds in integrating in a coherent totality the ensemble of available texts...* Psychoanalysis is not, like psychology, a science of observation which is concerned about behavior facts, but a hermeneutical science which is concerned about sense relations. Consequently, it is necessary to acknowledge the proper nature of psychoanalytic language and its true epistemological status. (pp. 7-8, 11, our translation, italics added; for more details about hermeneutical validity criteria, see Schwartz & Lazar, 1979)

On the other hand Hermeneutics can offer us a service not only as an interpretative procedure to better understand our subjects through their reactions to the inkblots, but also as a method for the much needed clarification of the theoretical implications of H. Rorschach's own and main work, "Psychodiagnostics". Since in accordance with Ricoeur (1971)...

...la relation écrire-lire s'exclut du dialogue, compris comme échange de la question et de la réponse. L'écrivain ne répond pas à son lecteur. C'est pourquoi son texte doit être interprété. L'écrivain ne porte plus son texte; le texte lui-même supporte la lecture. La substitution de la lecture à la place où un dialogue n'a pas eu lieu est si évidente... écrire un livre, c'est se rendre absent à son propre texte [particularly when the author dies almost immediately!]. C'est pourquoi un livre est une chose muette qui doit être déchiffrée. (p. 27)

Two papers by Ellenberger, his well-known Rorschach biography and an almost unknown article about Hermeneutics apparently unrelated to one another, are of special interest in this respect. In particular and following his classification, with this Thesis we have assigned ourselves the task of making a thorough exegetic-hermeneutical analysis of "*Psychodiagnostik*" in line with the following quotations, not without mentioning that the archaeological metaphor was also one of the most favored ones by Freud (1909/1972, chap. 1.d; 1937/1975) when explaining the nature of his method:

En raison des circonstances dans lesquelles il a été écrit, le *Psychodiagnostik* est un livre très difficile, qui donne une représentation extrêmement

incomplète des conceptions fondamentales sous-jacentes au test des taches d'encre de Rorschach. La méthode de diagnostic qui avait été esquissée dans son livre s'émancipa des conceptions qui lui avaient donné vie après la mort de son créateur. C'est pourquoi on oublie souvent que Rorschach ne fut pas seulement l'inventeur d'une méthode pratique de test psychologique, mais aussi un penseur profond et un explorateur de la nature humaine... nous sommes convaincus qu'un regard approfondi sur le sens originel du *Psychodiagnostik* pourrait inspirer un nouveau développement du test et se montrer également fructueux dans plusieurs domaines de la psychologie [pp. 27-28]... Le *Psychodiagnostik*, livre écrit (comme me l'a dit Morgenthaler) "en un temps incroyablement court", n'était pas bien construit et manquait de clarté [p. 71]... Malheureusement, le *Psychodiagnostik* est pour nous l'esquisse d'un chef-d'œuvre inachevé, et des autres œuvres de Rorschach nous ne possédons que des fragments de fragments. Ils sont ce que Paul Valéry dit des œuvres de Léonard de Vinci, "les débris d'on ne sait quels grands jeux". Recouverts et masqués par des constructions ultérieures, ils sont comme ces ruines majestueuses dont l'archéologue essaie de reconstituer le plan originel, déployant ses efforts pour découvrir leur sens véritable et élever auprès d'elles un mémorial qui dirait son admiration. (1954/1995, p. 79)

Remarquons ici que la notion d'herméneutique englobe beaucoup de choses... Presque toute l'activité humaine est exercice d'interprétation... L'archéologue interprète des vestiges, le philologue les obscurités d'un manuscrit... Le paranoïaque interprète, et son délire, le "délire d'interprétation", mériterait d'être nommé "délire herméneutique"... L'astrologue interprète un horoscope, le graphologue une écriture, l'oniromancien et le psychanalyste freudien ou jungien les rêves de leurs clients... Et ainsi de suite... L'*herméneutique-exégèse* est celle qui se propose de rendre intelligible un texte obscur ou devenu tel. Il faut en distinguer deux variétés. L'une cherche à restituer un sens primitif oublié ou mal compris, en complétant les lacunes, corrigeant les altérations, expliquant par le contexte ou par des données historiques ou autres: telle est l'herméneutique philologique ou archéologique. (1966/1995, pp. 420-421)

"Comprendre l'auteur mieux qu'il ne s'est compris lui-même" (Schleiermacher, cited according to Ricœur 1971, pp. 74, 225) or better than his ulterior "systematizers" have interpreted and understood him, that's our objective - avowedly ambitious. And so we pass immediately to tackle the issue.

B) Hermann Rorschach on theory

1. His originality and its relationship to Psychoanalysis

"W types stand out for their unconscious desire to be record-breakers. Considered from the *psychoanalytical* viewpoint, they show 'oral' traits. The D types are

people with 'genital characters.' The Dd types stand out for their 'anal' personality traits, the S types for their aggressiveness."

Hans Zulliger (1941/1956, p. 98)

"The similarity and difference between psychoanalytic theory and Rorschach theory makes a fascinating study. Both emphasize the difference between conscious or intellectual functioning (F corresponding to ego functioning) and unconscious or spontaneous functioning (color and movement corresponding to id and superego functioning.) Both consider the need of harmony between the unconscious and volitional factors of the personality (FC rather than CF corresponding to ego control of id)..."

Max Apfeldorf (1944, p. 189)

Strictly speaking, Hermann Rorschach was not *the* discoverer of the formal approach in the analysis of subjects' interpretation of inkblots. Beginning with Binet & Henri in 1895 several psychologists before him had experimented with inkblots as a test of imagination and its contents: i.e. number and type of associations (much like Rorschach's later content classification categories), and influence of experience, occupation, interests, etc., on them. And even if they concentrated mainly on content analysis some of them did collect observations on the significance of certain level of formal analysis of their subjects' responses (cf. Dworetzki 1939, pp. 236-237; Tulchin 1940; Baumgarten-Tramer 1943; Piotrowski 1957, pp. 31-33; Zubin, Eron & Schumer 1965, pp. 168-171), particularly the mode of apperception: already in 1899 Sharp was the first to distinguish between global and analytical modes of interpretation, followed by Kirkpatrick (1900), Whipple (1910), Bartlett (1916), De Sousa (1916), and Parsons (1917); even Hens (1917; cf. Ellenberger 1954/1995 p. 69) mentioned in passing the whole vs. the detail approaches wondering about their significance. But besides those allusions none of them developed the formal analysis on its own into a truly *systematic* procedure with a finished and well-rounded formal scoring schema -with location *and* determinant dimensions in a coherent interrelationship- which was Rorschach's greatest and most original contribution (Piotrowski, pp. 33-34), being furthermore the first to shift the emphasis clearly insisting on the psychological predominance of form over content in revealing power at the same time widening the capabilities of the inkblot test as one of personality and psychopathological diagnosis rather than simply one of imagination.

Since then and up until today several authors have criticized from time to time this supposedly erroneous choice of Rorschach's, some even overinterpreting towards this bias his heightened respect for content in his last posthumously published case study (Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. VII.A) and in other contemporary unpublished ones (for a correct appraisal of them see Zulliger 1949a), promoting in return on their side the reverse content-over-form choice to bring us back to the pre-Rorschach era so to speak. Roemer (1938, 1967), his direct disciple (Ellenberger 1954/1995 p. 45) and

reproducing in a very similar way the Freud-Stekel contro-versy (Jones 1955 pp. 134-137), was the first to sustain such a radically subverting, "betraying" or self-serving position being more or less relayed in this role by authors like Lindner (1950) and Brown (1953), concluding both on a dream-key or dictionary-type kind of Rorschach inter-pretation, Zubin 1956 pp. 188 & 191, and contemporarily Aronow (& Reznikoff, 1976, 1983) who goes as far as denying the existence of a "perceptual-idiographic" approach in Rorschach (& al. 1995 p. 214), actually his whole discovery! (Cf. Rorschach, chap. II.5 pp. 10-11: "LES MOMENTS DE FORME, KINESTHESIE, COULEUR ET LEUR ALLURE DANS LE PRO-CESsus PERCEPTIF... La fréquence de ces trois manières de percevoir et *surtout leur rapport mutuel* présentent, aussi bien chez les sujets bien portants que chez les malades, des *différences caractéristiques, typiques.*") This has understandably motivated the sharp criticism of those respectful of the classical tradition, outstanding among them Morgenthaler (1943), Piotrowski (1957 pp. xiv-xv, 2-3, 34, 323-325, 327-332, 381-382, 387-389), Salomon (1959b pp. 258-263, 265-273; 1962 chaps. XII & XIII; 1963b), and Schachtel (1966 chap. 11). With the development of our argument below will become explicit our own criticism to this content-adhering trend.

One thing is for sure: if the locations had a more or less self-evident psychological mean-ing already recognized by his predecessors (receptive global view vs. active analysis of percep-tual data; cf. Silberstein 1987), the determinant categories -form, color, movement, and eventually light-dark- all proceed from painting theory (Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. IV.15/16 and Table XVIII) as developed afterwards by representatives of the 'aesthetic' approach (Arnheim 1951, 1954/1974; Gibson 1956; Schachtel 1966 pp. 4 & 25-30, 1967) and thus from Rorschach's particular artistic gifts and personality (Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 50-51, 53, 57; 68). The creation of his set of inkblots for scientific purposes was no doubt simultaneously a plastic or visual work of art⁸⁴, and the anecdote Ellenberger (pp. 51 & 57, quoting von Wyss) with full reason recalls of Rorschach's wondering while visiting an art exhibit in which ways particular paintings may affect one or the other acquaintance of his

⁸⁴ Recently this issue has received a strong boost from revelations made by Exner: the confirmation that Rorschach did actually hand-enhance or deliberately delineate his spilled-ink "chance forms" (Exner 1974/2003 pp. 8-9). We have seen at the new Rorschach Archives/Museum in Bern some of the recovered, unaltered original 1st version of his inkblots (see the front cover of Exner 2000a for the original plate IX) and their working-through becomes undeniable by comparison to the standard set of published plates widely known from their 1st edition on: although recognizable the former very much retain the character of "simple inkblots" described by Rorschach (1921/1967 chap. I.1) as requiring some composition to fulfill necessary spatial-rythm conditions before becoming really inter-pretable. We cannot but agree with Wood & al. (2003 p. 27) in that "it seems that the final versions, although based on real blots, were conscious works of art" or "quasi-blots" (comp. also Kuhn 1949? pp. 8-9). Nevertheless his plastic genius also expressed here in the way he just offered paradoxically ambiguous (Arnheim 1951 pp. 278-281, Klein & Arnheim 1953, Schachtel 1966 chap. 3), true *transitional* objects (Chabert 1983 pp. 14-16 was the 1st to exploit this important concept, followed by Smith 1991, Willock 1992, Handler 1999) by only suggesting mere possibilities, letting the subject playfully half-create himself by personal choices his own percepts (very much in the spirit of Winnicott's 'squiggle-game', cf. Deri 1984 pp. 339-340 to compare with Rorschach chap. IV.4&12 pp. 78-79, 108; game just a step forward from Pfister's 'cryptography', cf. Ellenberger 1954/1995 pp. 58-59 and below): so we maintain that even after willful if intuitive '*Gestaltung*' his '*Zufallsformen*' were not altered in their essence and did indeed retain their most important quasi-accidental character, the one that so annoyed Roemer (1938 pp. 27 & 34, 1967 pp. 185-186) who pretentiously and erroneously looked for a better artistic inspiration in statistics!

clearly shows where his inspiration came from (cf. also 1921/1967, chap. IV.16 and Table XVIII; comp. Deri 1984 pp. 226-227, Binswanger 1947 pp. 227 & 231, and Arnheim 1954/1974 pp. 436-437). Nevertheless, based on Rorschach's multitalented spirit we sustain that overdetermination (condensation) was at work here, and that there was another decisive source for his seminal discovery of the predominant role of form over content: we mean psychoanalytic theory.

Despite his being a very active member of the Swiss psychoanalytic movement (an early interested reader and eventual Vicepresident of its society, contributing many writings and lectures to the group: Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 34-35, 39-40, 47-48; Rorschach 1965/1967) even after the leaving of Jung, the influence of Psychoanalysis on Rorschach's scientific choices has been a very controversial issue - as almost everything that concerns that doctrine- at two levels we may add. Worth of attention is first the attitude of those Rorschach experts that due to some significant personal reason generally and vehemently *deny* or *disavow* -in the psychoanalytical sense-, against accurate reality-testing, the largely Freudian character of Rorschach's attempts to explain theoretically the existing rationale between the scoring categories that constitute the formal frame of analysis of his psychodiagnostic method and their 'symptomatic significance', even if it is clear that he does not make an exclusive use of this theoretical reference; actually, he demonstrates being more open-minded and integrationist, and his ideas on the subject consequently more up-to-date, than those of these "newer" writers. Maybe some of these authors (Minkowska 1950/1978, cf. pp. 219-220; Mucchielli 1968, cf. p. 1; Allen 1970) were trying to present an original and valid approach to the method and perhaps found that disqualifying an existing one, by way of contrast, was the best way to do it; maybe others (Stauder, cited in Collins 1944; Van Riemsdijk 1967, cf. pp. 106-111, 335), much more subjectively, were either personally analysis-sensitive or simply trying to claim for them a notorious place on the Rorschach scene through some shocking criticism and apparently bold (anti-)theoretical commitment. As every psychoanalyst knows, their final emotionally-toned judgment arrived at through overemphatic one-sided assertions actually confirms what is trying to be refused, and should be generally associated with the anti-Freudian attitude of those times.

A second, more specific and subtle, nowadays very widespread distortion of scientific facts in this sense has been the restrictive identification of the psychoanalytic contribution to the Rorschach with the exclusive application of symbolic *content* analysis in interpretation (fallacy present all along the history of the method, beginning -incredibly- with Binswanger!: 1923/1967, p. 234; followed by Roemer 1938; Abt 1950, pp. 39-40; Minkowski 1950, pp. 132-3, 136, 154-5, and Minkowska 1950/1978, pp. 214-215; Zubin, Eron & Schumer 1965, pp. 177-8, 238; Mucchielli 1968, pp. 1-6; Erdberg 1993, pp. 139-140; and Aronow et al. 1995, between others; see Lagache 1944/1957 p. 410, and Smith 1994 for a closely related criticism to this trend), isolating as a result -either by ignorance or prejudice- this particular theory from the formal core where resides the

originality and specificity of Rorschach analysis. Nothing more far removed from truth though: a careful reading of "*Psychodiagnostik*" shows an unmistakable - implicit or explicit- reference to psychoanalytical concepts whenever Rorschach tries to reasonably explain the empirical findings associated with each of the most important *formal* factors (see Table 1). So run his linking, respectively, between *response process* and the mechanisms -formal aspects- of perception over and above ('manifest') content or "imagination": sensation, memory, visual imaging, association, 'assimilation-work' (*Angleichungsarbeit*) and interpretation (Freud 1900 specially chap. VI, also chaps. IV & VII; Schafer 1954/1982, chap. 3; Salomon 1963b, pp. 167-169); *F+* and the '*fonction du réel*' (Janet's term: cf. Ellenberger 1970 chap. 7 "Freud's Sources" p. 539) -accurate reality-testing and adaptation- and conscious will (Beck 1942, 1952 p. 16); *B* and -psychoanalytical, not Jungian- introversion (Salomon 1962, chap. V.1; Fierens 1970) i.e. predominance of thinking over acting-out⁸⁵ (Furrer 1925/ 1960; Rapaport 1945-46/1968, pp. 355-361; Schachtel 1950; Mélon 1975a, 1976 pp. 56 & 83-88), dream work (Furrer; Schachtel), creativity (Furrer; Schachtel; Kuhn 1953/1977, 1969; Mélon 1976, pp. 85-86), kinesthetic imitation of other human beings (identification: Kuhn 1948/1958, Pt. 8; Schachtel; Bohm 1951/1972, chap. 4.A.I.2.b; Dworetzki 1952/1953; Rausch de Traubenberg 1970, & Boizou 1977), and subjective attribution from oneself to others (projection: Furrer; Schachtel); *Fb/FbF/FFb* and affect and motor discharge through environmental objects (impulsive acting-out vs. normal cathexis: Schachtel 1943; Mélon 1975a, 1976 pp. 104-106); *Fb-shock* and neurotic repression (Salomon 1959b, 1962 chap. III.1); *Orig.* and unconscious contents and complexes (Zulliger 1949a, 1949b, 1949/1953, 1950ab;

⁸⁵ This specific issue comes in point, because of the central place it occupies in Rorschach's theorization. Piotrowski (1957, pp. 172-179), in a more subtle analysis, acknowledges the psychoanalytic orientation of Rorschach's 'percept-analytic' - i.e. formal - theory of the *B*, but like the writers cited above he also discards it, on only partially different grounds: he also considers both in general somehow incompatible (pp. xiii-xv; 1958) defending an independent theorization for Rorschach than for personality as if they were totally segregated domains, an assertion we cannot accept (cf. Schachtel 1942) (about the place of genetic/historical personality-oriented analysis in Rorschach interpretation we will commit later on). In particular, he refuses the thought-tending or "repressive" -as he puts it, not quite appropriately- implications of the *B* by comparison to their undeniable representation in overt behavior, a classical misunderstanding in which he's not alone (Bohm 1951/1972, chap. 4.A.II.2.b Note 51 bis): there is a big difference between plain suppression of overt behavior and the strictly psychoanalytical concept of inhibiting -'checking', 'taming'- acting-out behavior (mature people, as the saying goes, "think *before* they act", not *instead*; Rapaport's 'delay') which does not necessarily block overt expression but attempts to make conduct more goal-directed and meaningful, to give it sense; in metapsychological terms, this is achieved by divesting the energy for the motor actions -libido- toward the investment of internal objects that represent the 'real' ones -introversion-, and by manipulating them in fantasy in preparation for action until the opportunity offers itself in reality (Freud 1911). The correct way to look at this matter, as Mélon (1975a, 1976 p. 56) has proposed and Chabert (1983, p. 4) independently supported, is to consider the central place occupied by the Experience Type in Rorschach's thinking as equivalent to the one assigned to the presentation/affect dualism in Psychoanalysis, specific instance that demonstrates the importance of considering Rorschach's ideas in their full and strictly pertinent psychoanalytical implications to avoid misunderstandings. For another compelling example in a closely related domain (figurative art), and coming from a thinker who believing he was refuting Rorschach actually supported him, refer to Arnheim's illuminating reflections about the phenomenon of visual 'dynamics' (1951, 1954/1974 chap. 9; compare with Kuhn 1953/1977, and Maldiney 1976 p. 65).

Piotrowski 1957, pp. 327-332); etc.⁸⁶ These references, in our opinion, remained incomplete and fragmentary due primarily to the difficult delivery of his *Opus Magnum* (Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 48-49, 68-70; Morgenthaler 1954/1967) and eventually to his untimely death.

Table 1
 Rorschach's (Implicit/Explicit) Theoretical References
 Linking Formal Factors and Psychoanalytical Concepts

Factor	H. Rorschach	Psychoanalysis
<i>Response process</i> (de)formation interpretation;	Perception rather than Imagination (<i>form over content</i>); "Formdeutung", "Angleichungsarbeit".	Mechanisms of dream over manifest <i>content</i> in "Traumdeutung", "Traumarbeit".
<i>F+</i>	"Fonction du réel"; conscious will.	Reality-testing; adaptation.
<i>B</i>	Introversion; dreaming; creativity; kinesthetic imitation; subjective idealization.	Thinking delaying acting; idem; idem; identification; projection.
<i>Fb/</i> <i>FFb</i>	Impulsiveness; affect adaptability.	Acting-out; normal object-cathexis.
<i>Fb-shock</i>	Neurotic repression.	Idem.
<i>Orig.</i>	Unconscious contents/complexes.	Idem.

Note. Symbols of the Classical Swiss Tradition (abbrev. from German).

⁸⁶ In his contributions to the development of this psychoanalytic formal trend already present in the original Rorschach system, as we saw above, Zulliger extended this kind of consideration to the components of the Apperceptive Type (1941/1956, chap. 9; cf. Rorschach 1921/1967, chap. V.5).

To demonstrate our point with further detail we need to quote two important Rorschach authors that sustain the above distorted view against the correct (formal) psychoanalytic approach to the method:

Rorschach's early works largely stand under the banner of the psychoanalytic train of thought. *Rorschach's* central interests coincide with *Freud's* considerations, his dream theory... *Rorschach* has certainly received varied stimulations from *Freud's* writings as well as from the practice of the analytical work itself. Without Psychoanalysis the whole creation of the blots would have been unthinkable.

In "Psychodiagnostics" however *Freud* draws backwards completely. Not even once is he quoted... With the course of time a change is openly introduced in his psychological orientation. This can be established in the works themselves, if we compare his first publications with the later appeared "Psychodiagnostics". Corresponding to their psycho-analytical orientation, content generally takes in the former a particular place. In "Psy-chodiagnostics" the thing is almost exclusively about formal problems. This also represents a change in the psychological orientation... the turning away from *Freud*, the step from content to form, ...as we find them in "Psychodiagnostics", all that points in the same direction... (Kuhn 1944, pp. 36-37; our translation)

The consideration of the relationship between Rorschach's perceptanalysis and Freud's psychoanalysis might fittingly begin with a recollection of what Rorschach himself said about it. The first publication about Rorschach's method is Rorschach's book, the *Psy-chodiagnostics*... Perhaps one of the reasons for the neglect of the *Psychodiagnostics* is the present-day tendency to treat the content of the Rorschach test responses in a manner similar to the current interpretation of manifest dream content... In his book Rorschach plainly stressed the formal aspects of the responses... The reason for this is understandable... It is not surprising that an author should stress, in his first publication about his method, those features which originated with him, that were new, so easy to identify objectively and so penetrating psychologically. Rorschach created perceptanalysis, i.e., a method of personality investigation based on an analysis of percepts, or images evoked by ambiguous forms... Moreover, the psychoanalysts, including Freud, had nothing to offer between 1917 and 1921 on the formal aspects of perception and imagination... [And after quoting Rorschach's own words about the psychoanalytical shortcomings of his test (1921/1967 chap. V.4/5) he concludes:] It cannot be said, therefore, that Rorschach's perceptanalysis developed from Freud's psychoanalysis. The roots of each are different. Their aims were so dissimilar that there was no need for a synthesis of the two scientific movements... In the articles published on this [religious sects] and other topics... Rorschach also made great and skillful use of psychoanalytic concepts and principles. In fact, in these publications his use of psychoanalysis is much more intensive and determines his approach to problems far more than it ever influenced his most famous contribution. (Piotrowski 1958, pp. 36-37, 40)

Before entering into our response to those opinions let us also share with you the interesting letter exchange between -respectively- Pfister and Freud in 1922 motivated by the passing-away of our main character:

J'avais espéré vous ménager une petite joie en vous envoyant un nouveau livre. Et voici qu'un grand chagrin l'emporte sur cette joie. Nous avons perdu hier notre meilleur analyste: le Dr. Rorschach^[87]. Il a succombé à une péritonite et laisse une veuve (médecin diplômé) et deux petits enfants sans aucune ressource. C'était un esprit merveilleusement clair, créateur et ardemment dévoué à l'analyse. Libre de toutes les envies négativistes, il adhérait à vos idées jusque dans les plus petits détails. Il a magistralement développé son 'Psychodiagnostic', auquel on donne aussi le nom mieux approprié d'analyse de l'inter-prétation des formes. Je lui avais envoyé tout dernièrement trois séries d'associations inspirées par ses taches en ne lui donnant que l'âge et le sexe de la personne observée. Ses diagnostics se sont avérés extraordinaires, bien que ce fussent des cas terriblement compliqués. Dans un des cas, il s'agissait d'une jeune fille qui, depuis des années, veut constamment mourir et pleure sans cesse, ce qui la rend complètement incapable de travailler. De ses associations, Rorschach a conclu tout de suite à une névrose obses-sionnelle, avec envies sadiques et confabulatoires, ce qui s'est entièrement confirmé par la suite, comme aussi une foule d'autres traits reconnus par Rorschach. Ces dernières semaines encore il faisait à la Société de psychanalyse une conférence sur l'exploitation du test d'interprétation des formes au service de la psychanalyse. (J'espère que ce travail sera imprimé.) Son intention était d'obtenir les titres pour passer dans l'enseignement supérieur. Sa vie durant, il a été pauvre, mais avec fierté, droiture et une grande bonté de coeur. C'est une lourde perte pour nous. Tout récemment, le professeur Schneider, de Riga, m'écrivait pour me signaler les magnifiques résultats que donne chez lui le procédé de Rorschach. Ne pourriez-vous pas, vous aussi, faire quelque chose pour la vérification de ce procédé vraiment remarquable et qui rendra certainement les plus grands services à la psychanalyse? Je suis heureux d'avoir en son temps déterminé Bircher à faire imprimer l'oeuvre capitale de Rorschach. Sa veuve habite à l'Asile psychiatrique Herisau (canton d'Appenzell).

Response: La mort de Rorschach est très regrettable. J'adresse aujourd'hui même quelques mots à sa veuve. J'ai l'impression que vous le surestimez peut-être comme analyste[!]; par vos lignes, j'apprends avec satisfaction la haute estime en laquelle vous le teniez sur le plan humain. Bien entendu, aucun autre que vous n'écrira, pour notre revue, son éloge funèbre et, s'il vous plaît, le plus vite possible. (Pfister & Freud 1966)

Those 3 quotations contain all three gross -although partial- judgment errors, in different directions. After study, practice and reflection our opinion on this question coincides more largely with the one of Salomon (1962) whom on his side defends the following position in the Preface of his own main work:

⁸⁷ This was also Jones' opinion: Rorschach 2004, pp. 152 footnote 1, 399-400 footnote 3.

The psychoanalytic theory has always served us as auxiliary means, or as foundation of the definitive certainty, to understand most of our observations as well as the hypothetical prerequisites. Therefore it appears to us as an indispensable requirement for the deepening of the diagnostic possibilities of the form-interpretation test, since RORSCHACH could not have created at all his epoch-making working instrument without its thorough knowledge. One only has to take a look at the terminology used by him to realize it. Above all let's just not forget that during his time the psychoanalytic mode of expression was used *only* by the then still narrow circle of the direct supporters of FREUD. The genius-like progress made by RORSCHACH by contrast to his predecessors consisted in the fact that he supported himself above all on the *formal factors*, having been able to understand their connection with Psychoanalysis and the psychoanalytic characterology. In our researches and in the practical work with the test we have seen no cause to alter anything of its formal structure, enriched by BINDER in the sense of its creator through the light-dark responses. Since we stick to the Swiss tradition, like it is best advocated today in the publications of ZULLIGER and BOHM, we support ourselves above all on *the pure formal factors and their interplay* for our expanded and, as we believe it to be, deeper diagnosis. At the same time we hope to have contributed something to *the clarification of the theoretical foundation* of the form-interpretation test in general through the leaning on classical Psychoanalysis. (pp. 11-12; our translation)

Going back to the first 3 quotations, to assert that Freud is not quoted in "Psycho-diagnostics" is obviously an exaggeration: his name and ideas sure are mentioned more than once, certainly in the chapter referenced by Piotrowski which is moreover *the only one* dedicated by Rorschach to any psychological theory in his book, **suggesting furthermore in the text that one as just the way that had led to the creation of his instrument** (cf. Kuhn, Salomon above) and that perhaps one should continue to follow to arrive to its definitive theoretical foundation: piece together these two sentences (1921/1967 chap. V.1&5)...

Notre méthode d'étude s'est primitivement attachée à des problèmes théoriques. C'est *empiriquement*, sans qu'on l'ait cherché, que les résultats de l'épreuve se sont trouvés applicables au diagnostic. Alors seulement ce "test de recherche" est devenu un *test d'examen*... (p. 129)

...l'intérêt du test pour l'analyse sera probablement plutôt d'ordre théorique que d'ordre pratique. Il serait possible, par exemple, pour ne parler que d'un problème, que certaines relations existent entre le type de résonance intime et *les régressions à d'anciennes fixations, admises par Freud*; (p. 135; words that certainly inspired someone like Salomon -cf. 1959b, title- and to which we will return)

according to us, there you have precisely in this quotation the reason why Psychoanalysis is not fully exploited in his text (as in his earlier writings: Kuhn, Piotrowski above; comp. Foissin chap. II.B.4 above), since besides his logical desire for doing that the author was not yet prepared to make explicit the theoretical relations in connection with **his original creation in the highest degree** in all of its

details -notwithstanding their close interdependence- on the grounds of the unexpected empirical data which began to accumulate. In the posthumous article -his last lecture, written almost two years after the book manuscript- in contrast, that one is the straight-forward way he takes for deepening the theoretical foundations of his method; and precisely in this last text there is a citation of paramount importance that no one seems to have noticed, which contradicts Kuhn as well as Piotrowski and all of those who mistakingly see a Rorschach-Freud incompatibility based on the form-content dialectics which is supposed to represent their respective contrasting positions: “Sans doute ce qui intervient ici n’est pas tellement l’objet interprété lui-même [le contenu] - **aussi peu que dans l’interprétation du contenu manifeste du rêve l’image rêvée intervient** - c’est l’allure déterminée des kinesthésies [le formel]” (chap. VII.A.3 p. 237, boldface added)⁸⁸. That one is the position that we share entirely Salomon and us, and to paraphrase Piotrowski then to treat the content of Rorschach responses in a manner similar to the interpretation of manifest dream content (as unessential, i.e. as eventually mis-leading and a source of distraction from the true way: the syntax, the dream mechanism and its *form* - if one refers to the procedure of Freud in any case and not of someone like Stekel for ex., cf. below) *that’s exactly what Rorschach proposes* and does not necessarily lead to neglect the “Psychodiagnostics”, just the reverse.

To become convinced one only has to refer to chap. VI of “The Interpretation of Dreams” -‘*Die Traumarbeit*’ = the dream work, term to which we will return later- where the genius of Freud (1900) bestows the same preferential attention to the dream formation over its manifest content, and which furthermore particularly features numerous observations that closely concern Rorschach’s method up to a point that it is astonishing that, to our knowledge, no one previously (including Schafer 1954/1982, chap. 3) had yet drawn all the theoretical benefit for our practice. We can enumerate (after the exposition of A-condensation and B-displacement): references to painting or the representation in visual images by plastic-figurative means (sections C & D), clarity/darkness as a meaningful formal datum (section C), kinesthetic feelings and will -to move- which hinder each other (section C: cf. Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. IV.2), the role of ‘symbolism’ which is the equivalent of considering also secondarily the content to complement the formal interpretation (section E), the predominance of the global context to give their exact sense to the multivalent dream symbols in interpretation (section E), reference to Pfister’s ‘cryptography’ (section E: cf. Ellenberger 1954/1995, pp. 58-59), the role of the body image (Schachtel 1966, p. 28; Chabert 1983, p. 66) and particularly of images of the genital organs (even the ‘winged phallus’ = plate VI upper *D!*, with reference to Mourly Vold: section E), the right-left bilateral symmetry (section E: Stekel; and section G: ex. #6 ‘my son, the myop’), the secondary elaboration (section I: dreaming awareness = interpretation awareness, object criticism)...; chapter where Freud coincidentally

⁸⁸ However, in this same paper Kuhn (1944 p. 45) offers a very similar consideration: “Precisely the contents of the movement interpretations still offers however many riddles; as little as from dream contents, one should not draw any conclusions from *Rorschach* interpretations alone and particularly from those of movement responses”; in a subsequent but still contemporary essay (1947? p. 62) he even does precisely quote Rorschach’s important passage, although without reaching out of it the same interpretation that we do.

also makes his only reference to an article by Rorschach!: section E, tie/snake symbolism (footnote), cf. Rorschach 1965/1967, 2nd part chap. I.5 (P. 4). We do not maintain however that Rorschach made all these connections consciously and directly, but their surprising level of identity in nature do prove the degree to which he was unwittingly inspired by the spirit of Freud's work for his own original creation (cf. Rorschach 2004, p. 256). We conclude by quoting a very demonstrative example (section C, which makes us think about some responses to plate I) where Freud explicitly asserts:

If we wish to pursue our study of the relations between dream-content and dream-thoughts further, the best plan will be to take dreams themselves as our point of departure and consider what certain *formal* characteristics of the method of representation in dreams signify in relation to the thoughts underlying them... *The form of a dream or the form in which it is dreamt is used with quite surprising frequency for representing its concealed subject-matter...* A young man had a very clear dream which reminded him of some phantasies of his boyhood that had remained conscious. He dreamt that it was evening and that he was in a hotel at a summer resort. He mistook the number of his room and went into one in which an elderly lady and her two daughters were undressing and going to bed. He proceeded: '*Here there are some gaps in the dream; there's something missing.* Finally there was a man in the room who tried to throw me out, and I had to have a struggle with him.' He made vain endeavours to recall the gist and drift of the boyish phantasy to which the dream was evidently alluding; until at last the truth emerged that what he was in search of was already in his possession in his remark about the obscure part of the dream. The 'gaps' were the genital apertures of the women who were going to bed; and 'there's something missing' described the principal feature of the female genitalia. When he was young he had had a consuming curiosity to see a woman's genitals and had been inclined to hold to the infantile sexual theory according to which women have male organs. (1900/1953 pp. 329, 332-3)

Here fits like a glove the unbeatable formula of our colleague Fernando Silberstein in the sense that "the shape of an object ist narrative and can be deployed into a story". That is precisely the essence of Freud's as well as of Rorschach's discovery, working over different material, and allows to deduce a direct influence as explicitly avowed by the latter in the quotation taken above from Oberholzer's case - sentence that does not touch "whatever" as subject but the 'fundamental rule' of the method of interpretation of *forms*.

Piotrowski then was entirely mistaken when he asserted that Freud "had nothing to offer" on the formal aspects of perception and imagination, since just that and nothing else is the issue in "The Interpretation of Dreams" whose chap. VII already constitutes a detailed psychoanalytic theory of perception, as Salomon points out (1963b p. 167) and from where he draws great benefit for his own theorization of the Rorschach response process. According to this latter author the choice of words, the terminology used by Rorschach is an implicit (conscious or unconscious? - we are not

sure) but undeniable testimony of the influence of this work in particular over him⁸⁹ but also of other related ones by Freud: original terms like '*Angleichungsarbeit*' follow the model of '*Traumarbeit*' (recognized already by Kuhn himself!: 1944 p. 31), '*Formdeutung*' of '*Traumdeutung*', his insistence on contrasting 'content' (that Freud would call 'manifest') vs. form (mechanisms of dream deformation, or rather *formation*: Deri 1984), his repeated direct references to dreams and to concomitant kinesthetic sensations (Bohm, 1951/1972 chap. 4.A.1.2.b, has found the best explanation of the latter responses in the book on 'Wit'), his reference to '*Zufall*' (chance) as an essential element in his blots and which is an important subject of "Psychopathology of Everyday Life" (from which we draw more profit than Pécoux & Defayolle 1952, see below), etc. In the same vein but in a more radical sense than the one intended by its creator, this is the reason why -paradoxically- we have been definitively gained by the term 'Perceptanalysis'! (Piotrowski, 1957 pp. vii-viii, 1-4; 1958). But in fact Piotrowski and Kuhn are not alone in this erroneous interpretation of the implications of Freud's method and theory concerning dream interpretation: in the very last footnote (added in 1925) of chap. VI of "*Die Traumdeutung*" the author complains that ...

I used at one time to find it extraordinarily difficult to accustom readers to the distinction between the manifest *content* of dreams and the latent dream-thoughts. Again and again arguments and objections would be brought up based upon some uninterpreted dream in the form in which it had been retained in the memory, and the need to interpret it would be ignored. But now that analysts at least have become reconciled to replacing the manifest dream by the meaning revealed by its interpretation, many of them have become guilty of falling into another confusion which they cling to with equal obstinacy. They seek to find the essence of dreams in their latent *content* and in so doing they overlook the distinction between the latent dream-thoughts and the dream-work. At bottom, dreams are nothing other than a particular *form* of thinking, made possible by the conditions of the state of sleep. It is the *dream-work* which creates that *form*, and it alone is the essence of dreaming-the explanation of its peculiar nature. (pp. 506-7, italics added)⁹⁰

So, there were even some psychoanalysts (as for ex. Stekel: cf. Freud 1900 chap. VI.E pp. 350, 357s) that couldn't find their way in this matter and whose privileged attention to the symbolic content (position in this sense identical to the one of the

⁸⁹ In a curious attitude characteristic of him when tackling theoretical matters, Piotrowski contradicts himself anew first openly and thoroughly denying the affinity between dream images and Rorschach percepts (particularly *B*: 1957 pp. 126-127, 133-136, 146-147, 174-175) to later, following the reverse road, unexpectedly derive and propose an identical interpretive approach from the latter to the former (p. 2! Cf. 1971, & Biele 1986).

⁹⁰ Thus, '*Traumdeutung*' is absolutely also '*Formdeutung*' (cf. p. 9 footnote #4 above, and next section). The following quotation from a VI/18/1921 letter by Rorschach not only directly contradicts Piotrowski's and others' contention that perceptanalysis did not develop at all from psychoanalysis, but also shows his largely coincidental thinking with Freud's: "The work ['Psychodiagnostics'] has originated within two schools of psychological thought: analytical and professional. In consequence the professional psychologists find the work too analytical and the analysts for the most part simply do not comprehend it. This lack of comprehension is due to the fact that they cling to the content of interpretations and have no feel for the formal, quantitative aspects. Only the combination assures success, providing a diagnosis so accurate that it strikes one with amazement" (Roemer, 1967 pp. 195-196, 1948 p. 533; Rorschach 2004, p. 351).

ulterior content-privileged Rorschachers: Roemer, Lindner, Brown, Zubin, Aronow...; see beginning of this section) produced theoretical splits, which is a subject treated in depth particularly in French-speaking psycho-analysis. On this matter we would like to quote at length here the small but remarkable biographical study by O. Mannoni (1968) simply titled "Freud":

Il n'y a pas de doute que Freud, pour s'orienter dans les difficultés de la vie, a d'abord compté sur les formes de sagesse les plus traditionnelles... Freud n'est pas artiste. L'art littéraire vaut, pour lui, par son contenu dramatique et moral, et s'il sait, en excellent styliste, en apprécier la forme, c'est pour la façon dont elle exprime et met en valeur le contenu [see Freud 1914, first paragraph]: fait d'autant plus étonnant qu'il a été le premier, en 1905 [in 'The Wit'], à donner une théorie correcte du rôle prépondérant de la forme! Ici encore, le traditionalisme de son goût contredit le côté révolutionnaire de ses théories. (pp. 32-33)

Le texte du rêve, tel comme le rêveur le donne, a souvent été comparé, et la comparaison a été faite d'abord par Freud, à un texte à traduire. *Les pensées (latentes) du rêve et son contenu (manifeste) se présentent à nous comme deux versions du même sujet en deux langues différentes.* Mais, plus loin, il fait cette restriction: *Ou plus exactement le contenu du rêve ressemble à la transcription de la pensée du rêve dans un autre mode d'expression, dont les caractéristiques et les lois syntaxiques sont à découvrir par nous, en comparant l'original et la traduction.* Faisons tout de suite cette remarque, évidente, mais souvent négligée: la 'pensée' du rêve est en elle-même claire et 'logique', elle n'est pas l'Inconscient, bien qu'elle soit inconsciente; c'est le texte du rêve qui est marqué par le travail de l'Inconscient. En analysant le rêve, nous obtenons bien la pensée inconsciente qui nous était cachée, à la façon dont nous retrouverions un souvenir oublié; mais c'est le texte, ce sont ses distortions qui vont nous renseigner sur la 'syntaxe' de l'Inconscient. Toute la théorie du *Mot d'esprit* (1905) est déjà en germe dans cette prise de position... Il est vrai qu'il n'a pas encore pris la précaution de distinguer les sens divers du mot inconscient et s'expose ainsi aux confusions... Mais les mécanismes du rêve, d'après Freud, sont beaucoup plus compliqués qu'une reconstitution du texte. Un désir inconscient, remontant à l'enfance et réveillé par un désir actuel, se 'transfère' sur une pensée 'normale' et l'entraîne, la 'plonge' dans le monde de l'Inconscient où elle est soumise aux lois de la syntaxe qui y règnent (les lois du *processus primaire*). En même temps, cette pensée suit un chemin qui la conduit à l'extrémité de l'appareil psychique (fictif et non neurologique) chargée de la perception. De ce fait, la pensée devient perception, c'est-à-dire *hallucination* d'une scène qui représente, plus ou moins ouvertement, la satisfaction du désir... Mais on ne peut négliger le rôle que joue le langage dans ce processus: la pensée du rêve a une forme verbale. Freud a été obligé de supposer l'existence d'un *préconscient* qui a la charge des mots. Le processus primaire traduit ces mots en images, comme un faiseur de rébus, et il arrive que le rêve ne doive pas être interprété comme la

peinture de quelque chose, mais comme, pour ainsi dire, la représentation imagée des mots eux-mêmes... L'erreur si répandue que la pensée du rêve, son interprétation viennent des 'profondeurs' de l'Inconscient est due à la persistance d'un reste de scolastique (les pensées viennent de l'âme et cherchent un langage pour s'exprimer) et aussi d'une orientation mystique (il doit y avoir au fond de nous un mystère qui est une sorte de révélation). C'est sur ce point précisément que Jung se séparera de Freud; il fera de l'analyse une herméneutique pour lire les grandes révélations de l'Inconscient - alors que Freud ne cherche dans celui-ci qu'une 'pensée normale' refoulée et transformée par le 'travail' du processus primaire... L'étude du rêve a donc une portée considérable. Elle pose des questions décisives sur le discours en général, et ce sont les questions qu'une conception unilinéaire du discours ne permet pas de poser. L'Inconscient apparaît trop facilement comme une chose dont on parle [un contenu], alors qu'il parle à sa façon, avec sa syntaxe particulière. Il est, a dit Lacan, "structuré comme un langage" [une forme]⁹¹... Avec la théorie du rêve, les fondements de la psychanalyse sont solidement posés, et un grand nombre de travaux ultérieurs vont découler directement de celui-ci. La *Psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne*, le *Mot d'esprit dans ses rapports avec l'inconscient*,... sont des applications, ou des corollaires (à peine des scolies), de *l'Interprétation des rêves*. (pp. 68-72, 79)

La *Psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne* fait partie des livres que Freud a enrichis au cours des éditions successives. La date de 1907, qui est celle de la deuxième édition, avait pour Freud une signification particulière: une crainte superstitieuse, fondée, on l'a vu, sur les calculs numériques de Fliess, lui avait fait désigner cette date comme celle de sa mort. Or, c'est de 1907 que datent beaucoup des adjonctions qui concernent les superstitions... Elles s'expliquent, en 1907, par la projection sur le monde extérieur de tendances hostiles méconnues. Ce que la personne superstitieuse interprète naïvement comme appartenant à l'ordre des événements extérieurs [l'équivalent de justifier ses propres interprétations uniquement sur la base des formes de la tâche en excluant la projection personnelle: le "best fit" de Exner (1989); voir plus loin], s'explique par une motivation inconsciente... En 1901, la conclusion qu'il présente dans le chapitre théorique qui termine la *Psychopathologie*, c'est que tous les exemples analysés impliquent un déterminisme qui régit absolument la vie consciente et inconsciente. L'inconscient, par exemple, fait preuve d'une 'certitude somnambuliste' dans les calculs qu'il effectue sans le secours de la conscience, si bien qu'il est impossible de choisir un nombre [une forme] 'au hasard': l'analyse montre que le choix n'était pas libre, mais inconsciemment

⁹¹ Lacan's saying (cf. the same metaphor in Klopfer!, & Sender 1936b p. 19: "A common Rorschach language...i.e., a complete refined scoring system... Three basic principles or rules determine the simple grammar of this new language"; comp. Silberstein 1987, pp. 31-2) expresses also exactly what we claim for the Rorschach method: that formal schema which -like a true system- is structured from the beginning allowing it then to reflect the completely analogous structure of personality or of the Unconscious (see below; cf. again Klopfer & Kelley 1942, p. 4: "The interplay between the structural characteristics of the stimulus material and the personality structure of the subject is reflected in certain formal categories"; also Schotte 1990, pp. 154-155).

déterminé. Cette théorie du déterminisme n'est pas très élaborée. Il suffit à Freud qu'on puisse montrer que les actes que nous attribuons au hasard ou au libre arbitre obéissent en fait à des mécanismes inconscients. Il esquivé les difficultés métaphysiques, qui ne l'intéressent pas. Croire au déterminisme, c'est croire au fond que tout a droit à une interprétation ["*Deutenlassen...*"]. Comme règle à appliquer dans une *praxis*, un tel principe est évidemment indispensable... Le hasard existe dans le monde matériel ["... *von Zufallsformen*"]: on peut jouer à pile ou face. Mais il n'existe pas dans le monde psychique: on ne peut pas jouer à pile ou face en rêve [au Rorschach]. Ce serait un jeu truqué, et les coups seraient déterminés par l'inconscient. (pp. 93-97)

By means of historical research and reconstruction we have been able to discover one particularly demonstrative instance of this direct influence of Psychoanalysis on Rorschach's creation, to our knowledge until now only briefly mentioned by Ellenberger (1954/1995, "Le cheminement inconscient" pp. 58-59) when commenting the impression made on him by Pfister's 1913 book "*Cryptography, Cryptolalia and Unconscious Riddle-Image ('Vexierbild') in Normal Subjects*". As Ellenberger tells us, in his corresponding book-review Rorschach (1965/1967, 2nd part chap. II.25 [1.1.3.25]) spontaneously adds a dream image from one of his patients, but other parts of his comment merit also to be quoted:

The author... has shown how repressed wishes break through and manifest themselves by means of automatic and absurd speeches and writings. He investigates as well analogous formations, but wilfully produced, sound-links devoid of meaning, **graphic signs and absurd figures** from the point of view of the possibility of analyzing them, in a way similar to how FREUD did with numbers and given names that came to mind. The exploration method is exactly the same that we employ concerning neurotic manifestations and dreams... It is fair to analyze in this manner melodies, **gestures, pantomimes executed in a deliberate way** [i.e. kinesthesias] devoid of meaning... "The unconscious knows how to introduce in a secret way its manifestations, even inside the most perfect and finished artistic production." PFISTER illustrates this in a convincing way in Leonardo's picture *Saint Ann, the Virgin and the Child*, already known through FREUD's work. PFISTER's points as "unconscious riddle-image [*'Vexierbild'*]" in this painting the figure of the vulture, the mother-symbol of the "child memory" (FREUD)... The author of these lines allows himself to mention an example in a certain sense similar to the former: **a riddle-image [*'Vexierbild'*] from a dream...: "They showed me a picture that represented a wonderfully beautiful landscape. I followed with my hand the contours of the drawing and then realized that the outlines of the trees formed the face of my beloved brother".** (pp. 300-301, our translation, boldface added)

As already recognized by Ellenberger, the similarity in nature of these observations with the Rorschach test situation is obvious (as well as the suggestion to consider any '*Zufalls*'-production as amenable to valid interpretation, on the model of symptomatic acts and dreams), particularly if as suggested by us one considers the plates as art

pictures or paintings where several 'readings' or simultaneous interpretations are possible and acceptable. But we can go beyond this simple connection, dated several years before the creation of the test by the way, in search for a more immediate link. Pfister and Rorschach are referring above to Freud's (1910) well-known essay on Leonardo where its author explicitly recommends as one of the few good assessments of the Renaissance genius' personality the novel by Dimitri Merejkovski, exactly the same that Ellenberger mentions just a few lines below (pp. 59-60) as having profoundly inspired Rorschach particularly the passage where Leonardo ecstatically and creatively interprets some humidity stains in a wall (making of him a double source of inspiration for Rorschach: the unconscious riddle-image in his painting and his creative interpretation of fortuitous stains). In 1919 (while Rorschach was very busy precisely developing his inkblots and projecting his book) Freud included in a long footnote to the new edition of his essay on Leonardo a comment on Pfister's controversial observation of the hidden riddle-image ('*Vexierbild*'); Rorschach, who since the beginning of that same year had been very involved working in the new Swiss Psychoanalytic Society (together with Pfister and others: Ellenberger pp. 47-49, Rorschach 2004) in all probability read it and was recalled of his above-mentioned previous ideas. Finally, the last link in this complicated story is a revelation made by Roemer (1948 p. 523, 1967 pp. 185-186) who worked with him as junior Physician in Herisau during the same 1919 and was the closest thing we have to an actual witness of the composition of the famous inkblots by his mentor: in his unfairly very critical but nevertheless historically invaluable text (1938) he asserts...

If one takes this decisive step, this shift from the functional to the symbolical, it would be absolutely the most important thing to shape anew the test series. For if one had already seen in the symbol-content the essence of the diagnostic result then the series must have been obviously the best suited that, like a soft wax, offered a basis for all even just possible apprehension processes.⁹² Precisely this demand was not met in the preceding Rorschach test images. Or would still then be usable perhaps an image that, like the Rorschach test image 5, as statistically demonstrable gave rise to the response bat or at most still the variation butterfly in 90-95% of the cases? But were not the other test images full of similar unilateralities? So the Rorschach test image 3 with its human figures, the test image 6 with its hide, the test image 7 with its heads, the test image 8 with its animals, all of which hardly allowed any other variation besides this unique apprehension of the respective part of the image. **Yet Rorschach had originally selected these 10 images virtually in such a way that they were supposed to contain such easily interpretable portions in the manner of riddle-images ['*vexierbildartig*']**. But the other test images in which no such conspicuous incentives for interpretation were available had so indefinite forms that, like test image 4 and 9, they just caused all too easily an inhibition of the entire production therefore being also unable to be regarded on their side as suitable. (pp. 23-24, our translation, boldface added)

⁹² Cf. Mélon's criticism to this "tabula rasa" conviction: Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 pp. 44-45 (compare also to preceding note).

One final and no less interesting comment to reinforce the probable key influence of Pfister's riddle-images on Rorschach's test: in German the term '*Vexierbild*' equally applies to reversed mirror images, just like both sides of Rorschach's symmetric inkblots!

The direct, *systematic* correspondence between both -the perceptanalytic and the psycho-analytic- formal structures, made explicit first by Zulliger (1941/1956, chap. 9) concerning the apperceptive type (*G* = orality, *D* = genitality, *Dd* = anality, *Zw* = aggressivity⁹³) and exploited in depth by Salomon (1963b) following his example, had been unquestionably pointed out by Rorschach (1921/1967) in the following quotation - if one keeps in mind in accordance with Schachtel that the concept of the "experience type" covers all the determinants, in the last resort the whole of the formal perceptanalytic system (cf. the locations-determinants interrelationships):

En outre, il est particulièrement intéressant de comparer *le résultat de l'épreuve avant l'analyse et le résultat après l'analyse...* Dans plusieurs cas...l'analyse a provoqué un déplacement considérable du type de résonance intime... Dans ces cas se manifeste une transformation très nette de l'affectivité, un véritable renversement de la personnalité, un compromis entre les moments introversifs et les moments extratensifs. Un cas qui, avant l'analyse, comportait à peine une trace de réponse-couleur, après une analyse de plusieurs mois en présentait plusieurs, ce qui signifie que l'affectivité refoulée se mobilisait de nouveau plus librement, que le type était devenu plus dilaté. D'autres cas où les CF l'emportaient de loin sur les FC ont montré, après l'analyse, plus de FC que de CF, c'est-à-dire une transformation de l'affectivité égocentrique en une affectivité adaptable. Un matériel de comparaison plus abondant permettra de tirer des conclusions d'ensemble. Cependant les cas que nous connaissons permettent déjà d'établir expérimentalement l'action libératrice, ordonnatrice, équilibrante d'une analyse prolongée. Le type d'intelligence peut aussi changer sous l'effet de l'analyse. En particulier certaines contractions du type de résonance intime [*sic*: d'appréhension] peuvent se relâcher. Ainsi les névrotiques qui, en partant de leur sentiment d'insuffisance, versent dans les ambitions les plus démesurées perdent le type G; les ergoteurs et les faiseurs de subtilités dont le type d'appréhension s'égaré jusqu'à de nombreux Dd et Do, peuvent offrir, après l'analyse, un tableau plus normal... Il serait possible...que certaines relations existent entre le type de résonance intime et *les régressions à d'anciennes fixations, admises par Freud*. (chap. V.5, pp. 134-5; comp. with Zulliger's and Apfeldorf's quotations p. 231 above!)

⁹³ Entirely contradicting Piotrowski (1957, pp. 173-174): "The way in which psychoanalysis divides the human personality to make it describable and comprehensible is very different from the perceptanalytic scheme of personality structure". Zulliger's systematic conclusions have been unwittingly endorsed from a partial viewpoint by prestigious Rorschachers such as Schachtel (1951 p. 159) and Piotrowski himself (same book, p. 381)!

All those are the reasons that drive us to defend the omnipresence of Psychoanalysis behind all of Rorschach's system - even if unbeknownst to him⁹⁴. As Binswanger asserts then (even if he -Kuhn's Master- insists on the legend of Freud's supposed inclination for content!⁹⁵) he has been *the first* to concretely and experimentally demonstrate the affective and characterological transformation that can be obtained by means of Psychoanalysis as reflected in his formal scores, impossible thing had not his method have an identity of nature with this doctrine. And finally despite Pfister's, who was a first-hand connoisseur, well grounded assertions Freud on his side did misjudge in his letter the analytic value of Rorschach's work which was not "overestimated" at all by the former! It's left to us only to imagine what would have happened if the father of Psychoanalysis had agreed to try and to openly endorse the "*Psychodiagnostics*", to dedicate to it if only one article (like he did with Jung's association experiment in "The diagnosis of facts in judicial procedures").

2. Nature of his test

"...The *form-interpretation test* - so have I finally renamed it, in order to replace the hateful [Kerner's name] 'blotography'⁹⁶ - ... The 'Psychodiagnostics' - so I had to name my book under the pressure of the editor [Morgenthaler], although the title sounds plenty arrogant to me - ..."

Hermann Rorschach (2004 p. 287; our transl., italics added)

The nature of Rorschach's test is determined by the psychological processes set in motion in the subject by the confrontation with the successive test plates and the permanent test task (to tell us in each case "what might this be?"). In the author's presentation (1921/1948 & 1921/1967, chap. I.3) several concepts -often italicized- stand out as fundamental which are (in a more or less rational order): the Rorschach-made '**chance-forms**' (*Zufallsformen*) we feed the subject's eyes with, their

⁹⁴ The whole preceding argument serves three purposes: first and generally, it fulfills the scientific requirement exposed at the beginning of the present chapter of the obligation to choose a concrete theory (Psychoanalysis) as reference point for our work; more specifically, it also allows us to disprove the erroneous scientific opinions voiced by the abundant anti-psychoanalytic Rorschach authors cited above (content over form); and finally and most particularly, even if in the final section of this chapter we will demonstrate the ('isomorphic', 'symmetric') compatibility of Rorschach's system with several psychological theories, to be more penetratingly convincing the systematization we will uncover will focus predominantly on psychoanalytic theory.

⁹⁵ In a 1/5/22 letter in reaction to his reading of "*Psychodiagnostik*" however, and in total agreement with the above argument, Binswanger makes the following thoughtful formal connection with Psychoanalysis (Rorschach 2004, p. 392): "From a general-psychological point of view it seems to me to be the most important one above all the problem of the representation (as you so cautiously say with reason) of the kind of the Experience Type by the movement and color sensations [cf. Rorschach 1921/1967, end of chap. IV.4 p. 86]. Maybe you have already noticed yourself that we already have in Psychoanalysis an example of this, namely in the anal-erotic character, where precisely certain sensations act not only as concomitant phenomena but as representations of characterological traits".

⁹⁶ '*Klexographie*' in German.

'comprehension' (*Auffassung*) and 'perception' (*Wahrnehmung*) on his side which trigger an energy consuming 'assimilation-work' (*Angleichungsarbeit*) between the resulting sensory complex and previous memory images, whose effects finally transform what began as a perception into an 'interpretation' (*Deutung*); in short, the whole process becomes 'form-interpretation' (*Formdeutung*). We will add some comments concerning each one of them.

Even if Rorschach aesthetically shaped his inkblots to some degree to make them interpretatively more appealing and hence suitable as a standard test apparatus, as stressed by us above following Roemer's first-hand depositions (and against the distant assumptions of Exner, 1974/2003 pp. 8-9) he nevertheless took care to safeguard their *accidental* character⁹⁷ disagreeing with the latter's proposals to eliminate it:

He [Rorschach] had simply picked up as a Test the images which appeared to him personally as the best in his accidental [*zufälligen*] blot experiments [p. 27]; about that I had early, in February 1919, already made the proposal to RORSCHACH to replace the old test series by a better one, but I bumped into an understandable refusal from him [p. 24]; *while the RORSCHACH series still shows considerable support on simple blot images in JUSTINUS KERNER's sense, in the Deep Test series (and in an increased measure in the subsequent Symbol Test series) [both developed by Roemer himself] only the symmetry is retained as formal principle on the grounds of scientific symptomatics, however the blot character is given up as fully as possible... Therefore in the Deep resp. Symbol Test it is a question of the application of a new test principle.* (1938 p. 34, our translation)

...Would not such plates provide a more tangible point of departure for content analysis than Rorschach's *fortuitous* ink blots, which evoke far too often such responses as butterflies, bats, pelvic girdles, and animal skins? (1967 p. 186, italics added; see also Zulliger 1949a)

In our opinion the reason for this safeguarding just layed in the fact that by principle, in parallel correspondence with his 'chance forms', he wanted precisely to generate seemingly unin-tentional, easily expressed, supposedly arbitrarily determined "*chance ideas*" in the test subjects (which would "solve the riddle", as when one voices a "random" number for a quick informal raffle to see if one "guesses right": comp. Baumgarten-Tramer 1944/46 p. 31) so as to be able to interpret them in accordance with Freud's concepts in the "Psychopathology of Everyday Life" (1901, particularly chaps. IX and XII.A): it is well known that this work inspired the development of some

⁹⁷ Here's another confirmation: "The best demonstration that plasticity is the essential feature of Rorschach cards can be seen in a *fortuitous accident* [italics added] that had a profound influence on the nature of the test. Although Rorschach's research was done with solid blots, Ellenberger (1954) notes that when *Psychodiagnostics* was published, 'the printing of the cards was more than unsatisfactory. The cards were reduced in size, the colors changed and the original uniformity of the black areas was reproduced in a variety of shades, delineating all kinds of vague forms. The printer probably did not expect congratulations for his slovenly work, but as soon as Rorschach had seen the proofs he was seized by a renewed enthusiasm, and understood at once the new [shading-as-determinant] possibilities the prints offered [p. 206].' Far from being outraged that the integrity of his experiment was violated, Rorschach appreciated immediately that shading enriched the test by further increasing the creative possibilities the cards afforded" (Leichtman 1996, pp. 172-173; comp. Kuhn 1949?, pp. 8-9).

psychodynamic tests between Freud's followers, some as popular as Jung's word-association experiment⁹⁸ (the 1st "projective technique" and model for the rest including Rorschach's: Freud chap. XII.B footnote, Ellenberger 1954/1995 p. 68, Anzieu & Chabert 1961/1983 chap. I pp. 20-1, chap. III pp. 48-9), others short-lived like Pfister's 'cryptergon' (see above); and the Rorschach was no exception. Some authors have sensed this particular task proposal of Rorschach's, clearly followed by certain type of subjects:

...The kind of factors which are present in puzzle-pictures and hidden figures may also be present to some degree in [Rorschach's] inkblots. There are incongruent border conditions in them which constitute incongruent stimuli for edges and yield incongruent impressions of different solid objects. These combinations would then be expected to evoke fluctuating object-perceptions rather than stable ones... (Gibson 1956 pp. 205-6)

Certains sujets, les jeunes enfants surtout, pensent que l'interprétation des taches d'encre qu'on leur aura présentée comme un jeu amusant est une sorte de jeu de devinette en ce sens que la tache renferme une image truquée qu'il faut découvrir, tandis que les sujets plus évolués sont conscients du caractère subjectif de leurs projections. Les premiers n'ont pas la "conscience interprétative", tandis que les autres la possèdent. Toutefois, les expérimentateurs ont souvent l'occasion d'observer sa perte momentanée, même chez des adultes normaux. Les "on dirait... ", les "presque comme... " cèdent la place à l'affirmation "c'est... " ce qui indique sans équivoque une nette régression... (Loosli-Usteri 1958/1965 chap. VII p. 140)

In these records the exposure of the first card to the testee establishes a set which effectively shuts out a personally meaningful encounter with the Rorschach cards. The inkblots may be transformed, for example, into a kind of puzzle and the testee may try to fit the right pieces together, that is, try to find "good" responses without really entering the world of the inkblots. It is a reaction to the whole microcosm of the inkblots, to their quality, which does not fit into the world of this kind of testee and against which he therefore has to shut his eyes. (Schachtel 1966 p. 49)

In contrast to the restrictive, one-sided intent of this particular reaction of some subjects identified by Schachtel we think however that Rorschach consciously delineated in certain portions of his original accidental inkblots a few "popular" images -already suggested by them to his eyes- as a sort of enticement for the subjects so as to motivate them in general to go farther, to make them feel they were up to the task of finding resemblances in them, and not to abandon the procedure too soon or too easily although that still is the subject's choice: as Arnheim asserted so

⁹⁸ Ellenberger (1970, p. 742 endnote 111) asserts that "it is therefore erroneous when certain authors contend that the word association test was 'an application of psychoanalysis to the test method.' The test itself and the notion of 'complex' preceded the foundation of psychoanalysis". However, even if this theory should not claim priority he also asserts on p. 694 that "...in his writings on the word association test Jung refers to Freud as an authority... Jung studied Freud's work with passionate interest. In it he found the confirmation of his own findings with the word association test, but his own findings also acquired a new meaning in the light of Freud's ideas": so the above phrase stands correct ('...inspired the *development*...').

pointedly "Rorschach selected the ten figures intuitively according to criteria of simplicity and rhythm. They had to be ambiguous enough to allow for a multiplicity of interpretations, but on the other hand articulate enough to elicit some kind of reaction. They could not be 'unstructured' since people do not offer much comment on nothing" (1951 p. 279). In true transitional way Rorschach knew exactly how to maintain in his stimulus cards a balance or dialectics between two extremes, the stereotyped quasi-reproductions Roemer (above) and Exner (below) made them out to be on the one hand, and the formless nothingness valued by Stern (1937, cf. Ellenberger 1954/1995 p. 72,) on the other. Klein & Arnheim (1953) demonstrated further in their analysis:

...The perceptual characteristics of the blots as visual stimuli could and also should be explored in their own right... Why has no such systematic analysis been undertaken? Perhaps because the Rorschach blots were considered "unstructured" and their interpretations "purely subjective." But these terms betray a[nother] one-sided conception. A visual stimulus should be called unstructured or amorphous only when it is impossible to find an organized perceptual pattern in it. This may happen when the given forms are so vague that the eye cannot take hold of definite shape and color characteristics (as, for instance, in certain cloud [Stern!] or ground formations) or when a random distribution of items does not add up to any over-all structure (as, for instance, a heap of old tools in a junk shop). It is true that in some of their details the ink blots can be called unstructured. "Shaded" areas are vague in texture, and portions of the blot contours are successions of unrelatable small shapes. But an outstanding perceptual feature of the 10 standardized cards is that—due, mainly, to their symmetry—they offer to the first glance a striking total picture, which is far from being unstructured. The ink blots are suitable for projective work because they are ambiguous. Ambiguous patterns are not unstructured. They are combinations of different structures which are mutually exclusive... Rorschach chose his cards, with admirable sensitivity, in such a way that perceptual ambiguities are created throughout by the balance of different, mutually exclusive conceptions. (pp. 60-63)

In another place of his book however Schachtel (1966 chap. 3) also stressed this dual-nature of the Rorschach blots:

The most important quality of the inkblots is their *unfamiliar structure*. They are not unstructured, as is sometimes assumed in the literature. But their structure is unfamiliar; it does not correspond closely and accurately to any familiar object. They are, as Rorschach puts it, "accidental forms"—neither purposive, as most manmade objects are, nor part of nature, organic or inorganic. They are different, thus, from the vast majority of objects in man's environment that are either made to serve a purpose or have developed as part of the natural world. There are no ready clichés for them [Adding in a footnote: "Some blots or parts of blots, however, more closely approach a representational, pictorial quality than others, especially blot V and the lateral 'animal' figure on blot VIII. They stimulate the 'popular' responses (P)[V]."]. Their unfamiliar structure makes it possible to see (structure) them in many

different ways, by emphasizing some, ignoring or de-emphasizing other aspects of their structural Gestalt and their coloration or shading. (p. 20)

To demonstrate the implications of this connection to "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" we can call in our help here a contrast between our conception of this 'accidental' element of the response process and Schafer's (1954/1982 chap. 3) who gives a somewhat different explanation: while comparing the 'level of psychic functioning' in dreams and Rorschach responses he resorts to the following example...

...An important, if only relative, difference between the dream and the Rorschach response is that the dream is not at all committed to being realistic while the Rorschach response that takes into account its external reference point and the test instructions is so committed. However, closer scrutiny of this proposition will indicate that the difference is in some important respects less than this.

Although required implicitly to be realistic by the test instructions and external stimulus, the patient in the Rorschach situation is deprived to a significant extent of means by which he may assess the safeness or conventionality of the content of his responses. He has no idea what others usually see in the blots. More than that-and here we come to one of the most crucial aspects of the Rorschach response-*the patient is to a significant extent relieved of responsibility for being realistic as to content, even though not as to form.* The tester relieves the patient of responsibility for the lack of content-congruence between his responses and the usual details of the real objects to which they refer. After all, the whole test is his idea, not the patient's. If, for example, the patient sees a figure with breasts *and* penis on Card III, he is in a sense entitled to feel and often does feel that he did not put them *both* there; the tester did. It's just a sad commentary on the psychologist. Significant relief from anxiety and threat of superego punishment appears to result for the patient... We must agree. The breast-penis combination, for example, is not simply a spontaneous image, and the patient may claim with justice that he has found *external resemblances of accurate form.* But we agree only in part, because we also know that not all patients see this *content*, and we therefore safely reassign a good part of the responsibility for the response to the patient. (pp. 102-103)

Personally, we agree only in part with Schafer who adopts a statistical criterion of "conventionality" of the response content in the above reasoning. In our more radical conception if one truly believes in Rorschach's inkblots as '*Zufallsformen*' (as he explicitly qualified them), in the fact that even if one can find in certain details of the plates very close resemblances with real objects that is nothing more than pure

chance⁹⁹, then we can repeat with Freud (1901 chap. XII.C, cf. Anzieu & Chabert 1961/1983 chap. I pp. 20-1; and against erroneous conceptions like Baumgarten-Tramer's "chance-responses", 1944/46 p. 31) what may be called *the Rorschach creed*:
 ...Ich glaube zwar an äußeren (realen) Zufall, aber nicht an innere (psychische) Zufälligkeit. Der Abergläubische umgekehrt: er weiß nichts von der Motivierung seiner zufälligen Handlungen und Fehlleistungen, er glaubt, daß es psychische Zufälligkeiten gibt; dafür ist er geneigt, dem äußeren Zufall eine Bedeutung zuzuschreiben, ...im Zufall ein Ausdrucksmittel für etwas draußen ihm Verborgenes zu sehen. Die Unterschiede zwischen mir und dem Abergläubischen sind zwei: erstens *projiziert* er eine Motivierung nach außen, die ich innen suche; zweitens deutet er den Zufall durch ein Geschehen, den ich auf einen Gedanken zurückführe. Aber das Verborgene bei ihm entspricht dem Unbewußten bei mir, und der Zwang, **den Zufall nicht als Zufall gelten zu lassen, sondern ihn zu deuten**, ist uns beiden gemeinsam¹⁰⁰. (italics and boldface added: note the remarkable similarity in appearance and meaning of the last sentence with Rorschach's book subtitle '*Deutenlassen von Zufallsformen!*')

⁹⁹ Cf. Rorschach 1921/1948, chap. I.3 p. 18: "...details in the figures *that happen to have* [*geraten sind* = by chance] distinct counterparts in nature" (our translation, italics added). Despite this fact confirmed by all accounts, we should still leave partially open the question concerning how Rorschach had such a truly remarkable artistic intuition – maybe with deep roots in the Unconscious which spoke through him: precisely plate III for instance, which nicely evaluates higher levels of Ego psychological development (Dworetzki 1939 pp. 257-8, Salomon 1959a p. 287, 1962 pp. 13-14; cf. section 5 below), suggests in its plastic composition an extraordinary coincidence with concepts and theories of eminent –although subsequent and non-Rorschach– psychoanalysts that have concentrated on this process, as is the case with Lacan's and Dolto's conception of the 'mirror stage' characterized by a paranoid identification-with or recognition-in the other of the integrated and moving image of the own whole, perfect, bisexually complete (Jung, Szondi) human body: uncanny!

¹⁰⁰ Our translation: "...Je crois volontiers au hasard extérieur (réel), mais non au hasard intérieur (psychique). Chez le superstitieux [the above Rorschach test subject, for the sake of the argument] c'est le contraire: il ne sait rien de la motivation de ses actes involontaires et manqués [his "chance" Rorschach responses which just "occur" to him, even if unrealistic and incongruent], et croit qu'il y a hasard psychique; à cause de cela il est incliné à attribuer une signification au hasard extérieur [the plates], ...à voir dans le hasard un moyen d'expression d'une chose extérieure qui lui serait cachée [the tester's intentions]. La différence entre moi et le superstitieux est double: d'abord il **projette** une motivation vers l'extérieur que je cherche à l'intérieur; ensuite il interprète le hasard à travers un événement [the deliberate "distortion" of the blots], que je renvoie à une pensée [his bisexual components in this case]. Mais l'occulte chez lui correspond à l'Inconscient chez moi, et la compulsion à ne pas laisser passer le hasard comme un hasard, mais à l'interpréter, est commune à nous deux" (boldface added). Comp. Kuhn 1953 pp. 320-1.

In other words the principle of confronting the subject with that which is accidental (like in true life), with the pure -sometimes amazing, uncanny, strangely disturbing¹⁰¹- coincidences between Rorschach's chance-forms and forms from real objects, promotes in him the expression via *projection* (like in normal superstitious persons, or in an extreme way in paranoiacs) of his true, unconscious motivations since -and this seems essential for our argument- in his enlarged discussion Freud believes to have found scientific proof of this elusive, non-conscious motivation of parapraxes in general thanks to this particular defense mechanism, indirectly connecting it then with the Rorschach experience as a "projective technique". This all important subject will be dealt with in the next section although not without allowing us here to take a further step with our argument.

In one of his several papers on the response process Exner (1989) addresses precisely this point, but in a frustrating way his search for projection in the Rorschach leaves us almost empty-handed. Although we agree with several of his conclusions: that despite appearances and in contrast to the stimulus "no Rorschach answer is random or accidental" (p. 520), that Freud's concept of defensive 'projection' may be fairly widened in its general connection with this procedure (pp. 520-521) but that in its strict sense it is however more specifically related to movement responses (p. 530; cf. Schachtel 1942, 1950); in contrast others seem to us as too narrow, for example his diminishing the essentially ambiguous nature of the Rorschach blots and hence their quality as a projective means¹⁰², or his partial limitation of projective expression to minus responses:

The first type of projection that may occur in Rorschach answers is similar in some ways to Bellak's (1950) notion of apperceptive distortion and Cattell's (1957) concept of misperception... Although the potent stimulus elements within each blot tend to facilitate the formation of certain responses or classes of response, restrictions created by their characteristics also tend to reduce

¹⁰¹ Freud picks up again the '*Zufall*' subject and its unconscious connections in 1919 in "The Uncanny" (part II) involuntarily describing in a very precise way this important general characteristic of Rorschach's inkblots, which by the way explain many 'shock' reactions to them (cf. Schachtel 1966 pp. 47-48); following Jentsch he designates the writer E. T. A. Hoffmann as the unrivalled master of the uncanny in Literature, author known also to Rorschach and even cited in "Psychodiagnostics" (chap. IV.12). One of the subjects he identifies as capable of generating an uncanny effect, that of the confrontation with the 'double', is exemplified by chance precisely again in plate III as paranoid cases often demonstrate! (see for ex. Schafer 1954/1982 pp. 302 & 322-323, and below; Freud also describes this phenomenon in a more general way as "the constant recurrence of the same thing", reappearing in Bohm 1951/1972 chap. 6.63 under the name "illusion of similarity" as typical again of paranoid cases. Comp. also Jonte-Pace 1986 pp. 188-197). Let's add finally that, without making this mandatory reference citation concerning Freud, so sensitive a person and Rorschacher as Schachtel (op. cit. chap. 3, 1967) could not let pass him by this intrinsic experiential quality of the blots, calling them precisely 'unfamiliar' (*unheimlich*) as we saw above (compare also Tosquelles 1945).

¹⁰² Surprisingly enough, this position of Exner makes of him the complementary sidekick of Roemer (compare the following with his earlier quotations above) the anti-Rorschach prototype who proposed to discard the cards altogether!: "Unfortunately, the Rorschach has been erroneously mislabeled as a *projective test* for far too long, and that label has often encouraged interpreters to attempt to derive some meaning from the content of every answer. Many answers are simply the result of classifying the blot areas in ways that are compatible with the stimulus field. They are not projections. In fact, it is possible for a subject to give a reliable, valid protocol without including any projected material in the responses" (Exner 1989 p. 527, compare also p. 534).

the likelihood that projection will occur... Nonetheless, classifications of blots or blot areas in ways that violate or ignore these prevelant [*sic*] features do occur. Technically, they are minus answers, and if they are not the product of some neurophysiologically related dysfunction in perceptual operations, it is logical to postulate that they are the result of some form of cognitive mediation in which internal psychological sets or operations have superceded a reality-oriented translation of the field. In other words, some form of projection may be involved. (pp. 527-528)

We doubt anyone with a fair knowledge of Psychoanalysis will question the perfect example of the mechanism of projection in action exemplified by Schafer's patient quoted above¹⁰³, however his response in question was not only of good but of very accurate form (and also a *B* by the way) as the author himself stressed to the point of adding that "most of the responses are not that exact a copy of nature or that compelling" (1954/1982 p. 103). There is an explanation for this perspicacity, which Freud (1901 chap. XII.C.a) addresses some lines above explicitly contra-dicting Exner in the process:

A striking and generally observed feature of the behaviour of paranoids is that they attach the greatest significance to the minor details [Dd27&26 in plate III] of other people's behaviour which we ordinarily neglect, interpret them and make them the basis of far-reaching conclusions... The category of what is accidental and requires no motivation, in which the normal person includes a part of his own psychical performances and parapraxes, is thus rejected by the paranoid as far as the psychical manifestations of other people are concerned. Everything he observes in other people is full of significance, everything can be interpreted. How does he reach this position? Probably here as in so many similar cases he *projects* on to the mental life of other people what is unconsciously present in his own. In paranoia many sorts of things [the psychologically meaningful, mythical or archetypical image of the hermaphrodite is but one example] force their way through to consciousness whose presence in the unconscious of normal and neurotic people we can demonstrate only through psycho-analysis. In a certain sense, therefore, the paranoid is justified in this, for *he recognizes something that escapes the normal person: he sees more clearly than someone of normal intellectual capacity, but the displacement on to other people of the state of affairs which he recognizes renders his knowledge worthless.* (S.E. VI p. 255, italics added;

¹⁰³ Schafer, who called this action "externalization of responsibility" which is just another way of saying 'projection' (cf. pp. 48-9, comp. Holt 1954 p. 542), has chosen it with admirable sensitivity as demonstrated for instance by the subjectively unacceptable theme to be projected: interestingly enough, in his clinical-theoretical as well as statistical-research using Szondi's and Rorschach's tests, Mélon (1976 p. 119) has found precisely in this plate III "... la réponse... 'une personne avec les deux sexes, un hermaphrodite ou un androgyne'... évidemment symptomatique d'une composante bisexuelle et comme telle, quasi spécifique des sujets inflatifs (p+)"; in Szondi's system *p+* means that these subjects systematically identify themselves with *paranoids* and choose their photographs as sympathetic, or in Deri's (1949 pp. 171-172) words "the interpretation of the *p* factor is projection in the widest sense of the concept... This is projection in the sense we use the term when we talk about 'projective technics'." We must add however that we don't agree with all aspects of Deri's position on this issue, as she seems sometimes to incline towards Exner's opinion above (cf. 1984 pp. 306-307, which contradicts what she asserted earlier on pp. 54-55).

comp. also Freud 1922 part B, and Laplanche & Pontalis 1968 "Projection" part II.3)

This observation, in Rorschach terminology the outstanding 'Dd' and the 'good F+%' observed in them by Freud, is generally confirmed by the Rorschach research with paranoids (Rorschach 1921/1967, Table I p. 276; Rapaport & al. 1945-46/1968 pp. 348-349; Schafer 1948 pp. 81-82, 92, 94, 1954/1982 pp. 282-4; Bohm 1951/1972 chap. 14.A.III; Salomon 1962 pp. 281, 308). So what we really have with Exner's article is an example of the epistemological difficulties of assessing a psychoanalytical concept from a narrow cognitive perspective not suited for the job, since the subject of projection seems to be a little more complicated than the way he presents it (compare with Willock 1992 and Smith 1994): to express it in a more sophisticated way, the unconscious strivings we're diagnostically interested in are always there, affecting between others the Rorschach response process but not always as 'projections' (in the strict meaning of the term), they are not always "objectively" visible in the actual communicated response i.e. within the direct reach of our senses (which is in fact the definition of an *unconscious* content) except when we have the chance to assist to the effects of a real projection at work which actually facilitates our job allowing us to observe those strivings unaltered in the outside world, only that then the subject doesn't recognize them as his own; on the other hand, even when strictly speaking there is no 'projection' that doesn't mean that there are no such unconscious strivings affecting the response or that we are unable to get to know them, actually we can even induce or interpret them through their behavioral *absence* according to strict contextual or hermeneutical principles (see preceding A.2 section). Schafer (1954/1982, chap. 9 on 'Projection') gives us another useful example here with his paranoid Case 1 (p. 293) for whom this plate III (again!) provokes such an intense shock (he assumes that "perhaps he saw the popular human figures with mixed sex characteristics", in our opinion the most probable hypothesis) that the result is a total failure in producing a response: whether one takes an "empirical" (Piotrowski 1957 pp. 171-2, 305-6) or a psychoanalytical (Salomon 1959a p. 287, 1959b pp. 265-81, 1962 chaps. V.3 & XIII.1) perspective the contextual conclusion is the same, the repression -instead of projection- of a strong homosexual component¹⁰⁴ which is an expression of his essential bisexuality as in the former example. And Exner himself seems to agree with us here (Exner, Armbruster & Mittman 1978, p. 37).

The next step in Rorschach's conception of the response process is the 'comprehension' and 'perception' of these chance-forms. Although he treats these two terms almost as synonyms (Rorschach 1921/1948 chap. I.3 p. 17, Furrer 1930 p. 44) in his expanded use of this terminology it becomes obvious that these designations refer basically to both dimensions of the formal analysis of the responses, location and

¹⁰⁴ Besides the paranoid diagnosis clinically, the context is given by the presence in the protocol of a very definite Salomon's homo/bisexuality syndrom, 1959b p. 269, 1962 p. 201: brown! (R IX-3) and red! (R II-1), indeterminate F-resps. ("design of some sort", "animal", "island"), approach G// //D, B!! = failure in III resulting an EB = 0:11.5 with 0FFb < 4FbF + 5Fb, inverted sequence particularly in IX & X, 3HdF + 1Hd, 4 G Fb + 2 G FbF, not noticing the symmetry (last comment in IX), 2 Anat., and possible sexual connotations of R II-3 "a big hole" together with plate VI!

determination respectively (Rorschach chaps. II.1 p. 19, II.5 pp. 22-23). The **comprehension** (*Auffassung*) in particular, i.e. the 'grasp' or apprehension (in the literal and figurative senses alike) of the blots in general is condensed in the concept of the '*Erfassungstypus*' which relates the frequency of the different location modes between themselves (Furrer p. 3). This process (the "*Auffassungsvorgang*" in Furrer's term) has not received from Rorschach theorists as much attention as the parallel one concerning the determinants (the "*Wahrnehmungsvorgang*" in Rorschach's own term, chap. II.5 title; cf. Loosli-Usteri 1958/1969 chap. III.A.I p. 31, Schachtel 1966 Preface pp. v-vi). We will just comment on the most important contributions.

A direct disciple of Rorschach's, Furrer (1930 p. 3) initiated an early critical assessment and eventually far-reaching discussion concerning the improved understanding of his Master's whole (G) apprehension in particular¹⁰⁵. His experience made him ask himself "do perhaps several value levels of the G let themselves be distinguished corresponding to the developmental stages of human psychic life?" (p. 7, our translation). At the end he did differentiate a 'primitive' from a 'normal' level describing furthermore several subdivisions (p. 51), but very rightly warn-ing that "if the value levels of the G set by me will prove of worth in practice, must first be indicated by a still wider test work with the Rorschach blot series. It is to be observed then if these G-levels are produced in other blot material" (p. 52 footnote, our translation; this because he did not work with the standard series but developed himself 4 *ad hoc* figures for his research, certainly limiting somewhat the scope of his findings). Several contemporary authors (between others Beck 1933a, leading him to the development of his alternate quantitative Z score) pointed towards the same unresolved issue, until a brilliant and decisive response to his questionings was given soon enough by Dworetzki (1939): accepting to undertake the complicated task of researching the apprehension in all age levels (all of Furrer's -and Beck's- subjects were intellectually superior adults) with the original Rorschach plates, and with a keen theoretical understanding of the different contradicting conceptions different genetic-psychology authors had behind the same term of "global perception" (pp. 266-270), she was able to distinctly differentiate two levels of it...

Ce qui frappe à première vue dans la classification des interprétations globales, c'est la diversité des phénomènes, si bien que l'unité "G" apparaît comme une notion purement pratique, sans signification psychologique univoque... Ainsi, Rickers-Ovsiankina a proposé de ne pas compter dans les G de bonne forme celles qui sont trop faciles (banales) ou trop vagues ("images") (G v). Furrer et Beck ont analysé les différents processus qui conduisent à la globalisation... Malgré ces distinctions, la plupart des publications ne tiennent pas compte de la diversité des processus globalisants. [p.240]

...L'application schématique des catégories formulée par Rorschach nous aurait menée à des erreurs psychologiques... on risque d'englober dans un cadre artificiel des phénomènes psychiques très différents. C'est avant tout frappant

¹⁰⁵ Much like Binder (1932/1979) did almost simultaneously with Light-Dark (*Hd*) perception, resulting in both cases the clarification of the existence of an originally unforeseen 4th scoring category, probably not by coincidence interrelated between themselves and actually primordial to the other three (see section D.2 below for explanation).

dans la catégorie des réponses globales: il suffit de penser aux notions de syncrétisme et de synthèse pour se rappeler quels processus différents peuvent être à l'origine d'une perception globale. [p. 256]

...Remarquons que les G du premier niveau sont très primitifs, peu formés, alors que les G du dernier sont beaucoup plus élaborés, et en grande partie des combinaisons... Bien qu'irrégulier dans les détails, le développement peut être ramené à 4 étapes: 1) G, 2) Dd, 3) D, 4) G.

I. Globalisation primitive. Dans une étude sur la perception enfantine, M. Claparède introduit dans la psychologie le terme de *syncrétisme*, caractérisant la perception diffuse et globale de l'enfant (ce terme est pris chez Renan qui désignait ainsi la forme primitive de l'esprit humain). [pp. 274-275]

IV. Globalisations supérieures. Les globalisations supérieures... reposent sur des formes bien articulées et sur un processus d'interprétation complexe... certaines réponses d'enfants très jeunes ressemblent à celles d'adultes, bien que les processus de perception et d'interprétation diffèrent de l'un à l'autre (voir G primitifs). La perception [synthétique] des adultes est basée sur une vision analytique alors que celle des enfants provient justement de l'absence d'analyse et d'une adaptation très superficielle. [p. 305]

In our opinion Dworetzki's illuminating work remains unsurpassed, or better said it constitutes a classic that clarified important factors and in so doing established itself as an indispensable complement to Rorschach's own original work. At this point we will only recall in addition, in general accordance with Furrer's and Dworetzki's genetic interpretation of the type of apprehension, the clinical connection established by Zulliger between the diverse preferred locations and the stages of psychosexual development according to Psychoanalysis (conception already present in Rorschach: cf. above).

With the concept of **perception** (*Wahrnehmung*) we arrive to one of the cornerstones of Rorschach's theorization, stressed all along his text beginning by the book's very title¹⁰⁶. With all his authority Binswanger (1923/1967 p. 230) has questioned from the beginning if Rorschach's test is really a psychodiagnostic experiment based mainly on -particularly Bleuler's positivist idea of- perception¹⁰⁷ but another respectable phenomenologist (Schachtel, 1945 p. 420, 1950 pp. 70-71) has argued in response that of the many types of factors that certainly intervene in the method the *determinants* in particular (his most original formal discovery) do refer primarily to perception - e.g. *visual* perception through the sense of sight of light-dark, form, color, and dynamic qualities of the respective blots. In fact the latter has dealt in his subsequent book (1966, cf. pp. 3-5, 12-18 & chap. 6) with the subject of

¹⁰⁶ The short and catchy title "*Psychodiagnostics*" was in fact suggested to Rorschach by his friend and Editor, Walter Morgenthaler, for marketing reasons; the present subtitle ('Method and Results of a Perceptual-Diagnostic Experiment') was the actual title chosen by the author.

¹⁰⁷ In explicit contradiction with Rorschach (1921/1967 chap. IV.12) and basing himself on the standard instructions ("What *might* this be?") Binswanger gave preference to the concept of 'fantasy' (or 'imagination'), which for the former was equivalent to a misguided attention to content over form; following the latter's example several other theorists have endorsed this opinion (Lagache, Tosquelles). Our own position in this respect will be developed below.

perception with such detail and pertinence that metonymical amplification from our part becomes practically unnecessary. We would like however to insist on the special, vantage place of perception in human psychology since this would rightly be the beginning of a response to the enigma of why a perceptual instrument like the Rorschach Test in particular has established itself as one of the most truly revealing psychological tools as 80-plus years of universal practice have amply demonstrated. We feel Deri (1984), while arguing about a more general psychological subject than the Rorschach, did hit the nail right on the head when she expressed:

I characterized symbols with the metaphor of a bridge connecting two qualitatively different realms. This bridge is built by the process of symbolization, which transposes or translates phenomena from one realm into another. Perception and memory-image formation, in particular, carry out a transforming function of symbolization. They re-present the three-dimensional, concrete terrain of the outer world in the non-material, abstract realm of our inner world. Ordinarily we take this process for granted; we don't stop to wonder at how this almost magical transformation takes place. Yet the "mysterious" symbolizing power of perception is *the* basic problem of epistemology, the systematic search for the grounds of human knowledge, for the basis of its validity and its limits. In order to understand epistemology, we need to study the laws governing perceptual symbol transformation. (p. 70)

This perceptual *exchanging* process (to resort to Freud's currency metaphor) is then a key one which touches precisely on the essence of human nature, on the irreducible duality of human existence in general and of human knowledge in particular struggling to attain *inside* (in the mind) a fair representation of *outside* reality - that nevertheless will always remain foreign from each other. The (perceptual) symbol is the paradoxical solution us humans have resorted to in face of this conundrum, symbol which when adequately developed truly constitutes "la présence d'une absence" able to heal our intrinsic and constitutive separation from our objects (Deri 1984 pp. 45-48). Between Rorschach theorists already Lagache (1944/1957 p. 404) and Starobinsky (1970) have sharply pointed to this state of affairs, which also happens to be one of the fundamental contributions of Psychoanalysis ("l'objet est, comme le fait magistralement remarquer Freud, *perdu* au moment même où il est *perçu*", in Mélon's formula: & Lekeuche 1982/1989 pp. 23, 75, 104-5, 136-8).

In other words and following Deri's lead -who also talks above about memory images-, Rorschach's very perceptive recognition (prior to Piaget! Cf. Lagache 1944/1957 p. 411) of an energy consuming **assimilation-work** (*Angleichungsarbeit*) between the visual sensory-complex (produced by the apprehension of his *outer*, cardboard-printed chance forms) and previous *inner* memory images (German "*Erinnerungsbilder*") is nothing else than the reflection of this very struggle for inside-outside realistic correspondence and *it amounts therefore to an integral part of the perceptual act itself*. Whenever one talks about *assimilating* something to something (the object to its symbol, signified to signifier, or the Rorschach blot to the subject's inner percept) that means the one ought to be *similar* (*gleich*) or alike to the other,

although they cannot be entirely or perfectly so (Rorschach 1921/1948 chap. I.3 p. 17: "unvollkommenen Gleichheit") just as it is the case with the symbolization process (Deri 1984 pp. 39-40, 48-52). Some authors have eventually corrected the view that, despite appearances, the *unfamiliarity* of Rorschach's chance-forms in general (by contrast to the visual recognition of a readily identifiable object such as a dog or a tree in a picture) just makes this assimilative-work more evident but that it remains nevertheless always active in *every* perceptual act, even the simplest one (Rorschach chap. I.3, Rapaport 1945-46/1968 pp. 272-273, Schachtel 1966 pp. 15-17 & 20-21).

More important seem to us to confront the opinion of other contemporary Rorschach theorists like Blatt (1986, 1990) and Leichtman (1988, 1996) who, based on this same process of symbolization, choose to qualify the procedure as a test of *representation* rather than to resort to the narrower or objectionable -in their view- concept of *perception*:

... Although perception and cognition (or mental representation) are interrelated, there is a fundamental distinction between them. Perception involves the relatively clear-cut recognition and relatively immediate reading of primarily figurative aspects of available stimuli, whereas cognition and representation involves the construction of meaning and the establishment of operations and transformations of objects in ways that are different from how they appear in the perceptual field (Piaget, 1937/1954). Perception provides the basic information for the development of cognition, but cognition (or representation) goes beyond perception... (Blatt 1990, p. 398)

In our view this is essentially a terminological issue, since we have no grudge against the important and undeniable concepts, precisions and clarifications about the actual complete process advanced by these colleagues and with which in the main we agree. Note that exactly the above distinction, for instance, has been referred to earlier as the one existing between 'sensation' and 'perception' respectively (which is for us the correct terminology, with *perception* as the second more psychological term by the way), or in a more complicated version of the issue as the one between 'perception' and 'apperception' (cf. Rapaport et al. 1945-46/1968, p. 272). But Blatt goes on...

...Utilization of Rorschach's (1921, 1942) remarkably creative method for assessing personality was limited by the scientific zeitgeist and theoretical models dominant in the first half of the 20th century. Rorschach's method was developed within a scientific tradition that emphasized perceptual processes and behavioral response, and so Hermann Rorschach naturally considered his method as "a test of perception" from which one could infer behavioral tendencies (e.g., extra- or intratensive proclivities)...

This new [cognitive] theoretical emphasis in psychology, a view of psychology as a science of the construction of meaning as well as a behavioral science, has begun to be reflected in personality assessment. The Rorschach has begun to be viewed not so much as a perceptual test but rather as an experimental procedure that systematically presents an individual with ambiguity and allows us to observe and study how the individual constructs meaning from relative ambiguity... Rorschach's inkblots have now become an experimental procedure that can be used to study the processes of cognitive construction and the

relationships of cognitive structures and mental representations to a host of other dimensions, including personality organization.

Certainly the earlier perceptual approach to the Rorschach has been productive. It has been useful, for example, to differentiate an individual's tendency to respond to small details versus global or well-differentiated large details, to perceive the stimuli accurately or inaccurately, or to respond to certain perceptual determinants (e.g., form, color, or shading) and to explore the relationships of these dimensions to aspects of personality organization. But if one were to identify the single most important dimension of the Rorschach, most clinicians and clinical researchers would agree that the movement response is probably the most informative determinant. It is important to note that the movement response is not a perceptual variable - the stimulus is not moving¹⁰⁸. Rather, the movement response is a mental representation - it is the result of a construction of meaning imposed on or created out of perceptual experiences. The movement response is often so remarkably informative precisely because it is primarily a representational variable. Likewise, research (e.g., Aronow & Reznikoff, 1976; Schafer, 1954) consistently indicates that the content of Rorschach responses can express a great deal about an individual's interests and preoccupations. Content is also primarily a representational variable - it reflects the meaning systems an individual attributes to relatively ambiguous perceptual experiences.

As discussed by Piaget (1937/1954, 1945/1962), perception and representation are interrelated. Representation is based on perception, but it also goes beyond perception. And the same is true for the Rorschach. Interpretations of a Rorschach protocol as a perceptual test are still valid, but they are insufficient. The use of the Rorschach as a method of personality assessment can be greatly enhanced if we also consider responses not just as a perceptual experience but rather as indicating cognitive-representational processes that allow us to observe how individuals construct meaning in response to relatively ambiguous stimuli.

...We have developed quite fully ways of analyzing the more perceptual dimensions of the Rorschach, but we now have to move beyond the ratios and percentages of various perceptual dimensions and develop ways to capture the more cognitive or representational dimensions of a protocol. (pp. 400-402)

The problem with this view -as Rorschach himself foresaw- is that in the process of making the already mentioned conceptual distinction it produces a confusing shift in the dimensions clearly set up by him without a proportionally sufficient scientific demonstration of the need to do that. Not only does the content become in contrast the main center of attention -despite Blatt's confessed affinity between cognitive theory and Psychoanalysis, cf. p. 400- but simultaneously it

¹⁰⁸ Note that Leichtman himself (1996) disagrees here siding with a more sophisticated conception: "Rorschach's scoring system assumes that each 'determinant' is based on an emphasis on some aspect of perception. In the case of form, color, and shading, these roots are evident, although Rorschach contends, and most of his followers concur, that even movement responses have their origins in kinesthetic sensations stimulated by the inkblots" (p. 143; see below).

kidnaps the movement response ("the most informative determinant", "the single most important dimension of the Rorschach") stranding it from its proper dimension as if alien from its sibling determinants, which great perceptual theorists like Arnheim (1951 p. 277: "The dynamic components of vision are as much a part of the percept as form or color... they are no more 'subjective' than shape or size") would never accept. Blatt (cf. 1st quotation above) makes himself worth of the same criticism than Piotrowski (pp. 214-5 above) when he contends that perception in general or the Rorschach-created perceptual dimensions in particular can give us a clear-cut or immediate, i.e. *empirical* descriptive reading of the stimulus without an already implicit construction or organization of the perceptual field: as we argued then Rorschach himself (1921 chap. II.6.a pp. 27-28) contradicted this view already talking about a -per force *cognitive*- "schema" elaborated by him, a "fictitious" triadic structure which guided the construction of his grid of formal categories that from then on "modifies" (sifts) and gives meaning to what the subject actually saw in reality.

Leichtman's work constitutes a case to be studied more carefully. Not only is he -deservedly- one of the foremost contemporary Rorschach theorists, but his approach and ours contain important similarities: for instance, although with differing emphases, we both take significant ground on Werner's developmental theory, and we both give much credit to (Meili) Dworetzki's Rorschach contribution; even his III-stage Rorschach mastery model resembles our III-level reading of Rorschach's perceptanalytic system. But there are inevitable distinctions and even disagreements in our views on which we need (rather one-sidedly and unfairly) to focus in what follows, not to disparage the many merits of his responsible theoretical effort that must be verified first-hand in his original text.

As with the former author, precisely on the perceptual issue Leichtman and us belong to clearly opposing camps. He dedicates significant space in his book (1996 Part IV) to criticize genetic-perceptual theories of the Rorschach (as those of Dworetzki and Hemmendinger: cf. chap. II.4 above) but in our view the main flaw with this opposing position is that he bases it on only one extreme of the perceptual development universe -pre- or early-schoolers- leaving thus out of consideration important Rorschach phenomena only apparent in later stages of the genetic journey. If one considers for instance the paramount issue of the movement responses which as a sign of maturity only appear towards the 8th year of life and set down by adolescence (Dworetzki, Kuhn), how does Leichtman hope to present a general theory about the nature of the procedure simultaneously capable of explaining this key component of it? Let's quote some of his arguments:

There have been few systematic efforts to apply principles of perceptual development to children's Rorschachs. The most noteworthy are those of Meili-Dworetzki (1956)... and Hemmendinger (1953)... The two offer similar accounts of "the development of perception in the Rorschach" (Meili-Dworetzki, 1956). Both propose stages organized chiefly around the handling of location and form, *although Meili-Dworetzki makes interesting observations about other Rorschach determinants as well*. Both postulate a developmental progression

from an initial stage of global, syncretistic modes of perception to later stages involving progressively more differentiated, flexible, and integrated ones. And both advance roughly the same timetable.

There are some differences between their stages and those proposed here. They begin with this second stage and carry their analyses beyond the third through later childhood and adolescence. Nonetheless, the degree of overlap is substantial and a perceptual explanation of stages in the mastery of the test can be extracted from their work with relative ease. (p. 121, italics added)

There is no reason to believe that developmental changes in the manner in which the Rorschach is handled cease with the elementary school years. For example, Hemmendinger (1953) suggests that as children mature they handle the symbolic medium in more differentiated and integrated ways... Nonetheless, the early school years is an appropriate point to end this narrative. Prior to this time, children are still in the process of mastering the Rorschach, and their often curious performance on the test reflects stages in that process. Now they understand and accept the rules that define the standard form of the Rorschach at all subsequent ages... Hence, although further developmental changes occur after Stage III is reached, they are changes that can be measured and understood by typical modes of administering and analyzing the test. (pp. 203-204)

In a way Leichtman is almost recognizing there this shortcoming of his choice of approach and hence of population. One thing we do agree on however is the way in which he seems to give above special credit to Dworetzki's contribution, to which however he did not refer in its original French, much more completely detailed version (1939): had he done that, he would have been in a better position to recognize the truly *systematic* character of her work which comprehends the entire variety of locations *and determinants* - in the same way we do following her example. On this particular point there are some other passages worthy of quote:

...Our procedure consists of three steps. First, subjects are presented with the Rorschach stimuli and asked what the inkblots might be. Second, if "determinants" of "percepts" cannot be inferred from the initial responses, one or two brief, nondirective questions are asked to elicit them. Third, using the information obtained in this manner, we code responses according to location, content, and a few determinant categories (notably, form, color, shading, and "movement"), tabulate these scores, and compare various sums and ratios with normative data... (p. 133; note the sarcastic quotation marks)

...Given the richness of perceptual stimuli... Rorschach scoring categories are surprisingly limited. Location and content scores are good enough, but can a handful of determinant scores suffice? (p. 135)

Most Rorschach practitioners base their interpretations of protocols not only on the premise that the way in which subjects perceive the world reflects critical aspects of their personality, but also on assumptions that an emphasis on specific aspects of perception-form, color, shading, movement-is associated

with distinctive personality characteristics and types of pathology. Such assumptions are, however, more articles of faith than principles with solid theoretical grounding or empirical support. Indeed, when they are examined closely, it is surprising how little attention has been given to articulating their theoretical foundations.

In his initial monograph, Rorschach (1921) does not spell out the conceptual underpinnings of his scoring system, but rather justifies it on the basis of its capacity to differentiate clinical populations. Following this pattern, later scoring systems are, for the most part, elaborations of Rorschach's categories, and research supporting them consists chiefly of efforts to demonstrate how scores and patterns of scores can be used to predict differences in groups of subjects. To be sure, a rationale for Rorschach scores is, at least, implicit in Rorschach's monograph and is elaborated in a few subsequent works by others. Yet these publications are only a minuscule fraction of the Rorschach literature. Only a handful of works are devoted to examining the theoretical basis for most categories, and the two books that give the most sustained attention to the issue did not appear until forty years after Rorschach proposed his system (Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1960; E. Schachtel, 1966). (p. 142)

In evaluating the viability of perception hypotheses and whether they are necessary to Rorschach interpretation, a number of points should be highlighted. First, as has been seen, Rorschach categories were not derived from well-recognized principles in the psychology of perception. Rather, they were proposed initially on intuitive grounds and defended on the basis of their capacity to distinguish diagnostic groups. Efforts to explain the meaning of particular determinants in terms of theories involving perceptual processes have been confined to a handful of publications, and these usually seek to offer justifications of scoring procedures that are already presupposed. More often, principles of interpretation rest simply on claims about their clinical utility. As a consequence, Zubin et al. (1965) contend, "With few major exceptions, this theory has little implication beyond the clinic or Rorschach interpretation, and fails to interact or mesh with non-Rorschach research or theory"... (p. 146)

This is precisely the point where we intervene since our theory does attack these questions directly, the explicitation of Rorschach's original conceptual basis, the rationale of his closed system of -eventually- 4 limited determinants (categories) as well as their sound grounding on several extra-Rorschach theories (cf. section D.2 below). We are most surprised by the resort by Leichtman to the latter critical argument in the case of Schachtel since this was one of the points more heavily stressed by the latter all along his work, i.e. the need to go beyond an "esoteric" or "immanent" Rorschach psychology as he called it which he most certainly did as demonstrated by his other non-Rorschach book "*Metamorphosis*" (1959). Leichtman seems also to resort above to the reverse but equally insufficient quantitative argument than Klopfer (cf. p. 212 above) when he tries to underscore perceptual theories compatible with ours due to being too few or isolated in time - isn't it

scientifically enough if they succeed in being soundly grounded? The minority may well be right.

His arguments to discard the essentially perceptual nature of the Rorschach are numerous but not unassailable. At one point for instance he (1996 p. 125) resorts to the "devastating... testimony from preeminent Rorschach authorities. For example, Exner (1986), following the lead of Cattell (1951), would acknowledge that the Rorschach is, in fact, based on 'misperception.' When children insist that a Rorschach card is 'a bunch of ink,' they are absolutely right. 'In reality,' he observes, 'those children gave the only truly correct answer. The stimulus is only an inkblot!'; his star witness however would prove to function as a double-edged sword since, maybe more than anyone else, Exner now knows this to be incorrect (1974/2003 p. 8: "Rorschach... decided against using simple inkblots. He did not write much about that decision... [which] caused many to assume that the figures of the test are largely ambiguous inkblots. But that is not true."). With the same goal in mind he also (chap. 18, and resorting to artistic analogies much in the spirit of Binswanger) rejects the task as being one of simple visual recognition to conclude: "the Rorschach can be seen as a test that explores the creation of a particular type of artistic representation. The inkblot is a medium and the task facing the subject is to make it into something (Willock, 1992). Like sculptors carving designs out of marble using eye, hand, and chisel, Rorschach subjects engage in a similar process using the eye as their tool"; let us make absolutely clear that in fact we agree completely with this view of Leichtman and other representatives of the aesthetic approach, what we want to make is a subtle distinction concerning the implications of this conviction. In our case we identify absolutely with Deri's (1984; whom is not included in Leichtman's references about the symbolization subject, cf. p. 159) conception of these matters:

...Creativity is an organismic urge, reflected in the development of form both in and around us. We are apt to forget this overriding drive toward creativity, without which life in any *form* would be inconceivable. We tend to assign to the word "creativity" the narrow meaning of human beings' conscious effort to shape raw material into expressive, communicative form.

In contrast, I use the concept of creativity in its widest sense, as form creation of any kind... In this sense, creativity refers to the innumerable ongoing actions, reactions, decisions, and choices-unconscious, preconscious, and conscious-which give form and texture to an individual life. Within this continuous life-shaping activity, we find the better-known specific creative act, when a person purposefully shapes raw material-be it words, sounds, clay, wood, or lines and colors-to express and communicate through some artistic work. (pp. 3-4)

This one-sidedness of Leichtman's view can be verified in one last quotation (to be compared with Deri's one p. 255 above) where he concludes:

In contrast to other alternate interpretations of the Rorschach, a representational one accords as well as or better than perceptual theories with the assumptions upon which Rorschach scoring is based... A conception of the

Rorschach as a representational task thus requires no alteration in standard scoring categories, because each is related to one or another aspect of the representational act. In fact, this conception of the test provides a stronger foundation for scoring practices than do perception theories... Because perception is a private, internal process, serious questions can be raised about how faithfully subjects' verbal descriptions of their "percepts" convey what they actually perceive and about whether they are truly aware of the processes underlying their perception of inkblots. When treated as a representation, however, a Rorschach response is not a description of an internal process at all but, rather, an explicit, shared symbol. (p. 177)

We're sorry but we don't see this representational theory of Leichtman providing precisely a stronger foundation than ours (refer to section D.2 below) to a *system of categories* of scoring as the true backbone of Rorschach practice from the very beginning, particularly when on scoring issues that overflow his restricted approach he finishes by leaning on "typical modes of administering and analyzing the test" (1996 p. 204) despite his previous complaint in the sense that "Rorschach scoring categories are surprisingly limited" (p. 135) but requiring in response "no alteration in standard scoring categories" (above)!

Leaving differences aside and on a more appreciative note we cannot but agree with most of Leichtman's concluding assertions (1996 pp. 180-181) that could be equally applied to the above discussion, particularly his belief that "a theory of the Rorschach as a form of representation embodies what Rorschach meant to convey about his test when he insisted that it dealt with 'perception as *interpretation*' [italics added]." Here we must refer to the always pertinent words of Deri (1984) as a general response to the entire former discussion:

Perception Is Already Symbolic Representation. The gestalt-forming, organizing function of symbolization is built right into human perception... Perception selectively organizes what we see; it is *not* simply a passive, point-by-point registration of external stimuli. Experiments by Gestalt psychologists have clearly demonstrated this fact... Why do we see delineated, meaningful things instead of a chaos of intermingling lines and surfaces?... In any case, what Gestalt psychology experiments do prove is that human perception cannot be separated from organizational processes and cognition and, in the broad sense of the term, *interpretation* [italics added]. (p. 69)

In this point resides one of the main contributions of the cognitive approach, the needed insistence on the nature of the Rorschach task as one of *construction of meaning* (Blatt) and of *interpretation* (*Deutung*: Leichtman) by contrast to other more "empirical" approaches predominant in the same U.S.A. There is no contradiction between their and our approach here, these are key concepts also for us that we have already discussed in section A (2nd part on Hermeneutics) above. Where we do disagree is on their contention (entirely equivalent to the one concerning the supposed opposition Rorschach/Psychoanalysis maintained by the authors mentioned on the first part of the present section) that meaning resides in the *content* (representational) rather than in the *formal* (perceptual) aspect of the

Rorschach response process, or as Blatt puts it: "Content is also primarily a representational variable - it reflects the meaning systems an individual attributes to relatively ambiguous perceptual experiences". As Schotte remarked so pointedly talking precisely about *meaning systems*, "Or, qui dit sens, dit à la fois *structure*, c'est-à-dire condition formelle de signification". Here, to reiterate, is where we join sides with a particular tradition deriving directly from Rorschach's teaching (Zulliger, Salomon cf. 1963b title).

With this last comment we have covered all of the concepts advanced by Rorschach as essential components of the response process. However some authors (at first Schafer 1954, chap. 3; then Salomon 1963b, p. 168; Schachtel 1966, p. 13 & chap. 11; Mélon 1975a pp. 254-255, 1976 chap. 3.1; Starobinsky 1970) have keenly pointed to an obvious albeit important oversight in his theoretical enumeration of the respective steps: e.g. the **communication** or verbalization of the end-product of the entire process, that is the overt response to the task-question in the form of "it might be a bat" or "two people dancing" or "an anatomical chart" etc. This is not an insignificant or time-wasting consideration since as every Rorschach practitioner knows some weighty dynamic factors can affect or even make useless at this very last point the internal form-interpretation work already done, factors such as an excess of productivity coupled with pressing-time considerations, lack of adequate vocabulary, or censorship judgments. And exactly what we have said above about the effortful but inevitable 'translating' or 'exchanging' (symbolizing) aspect of perception applies now to the reverse process of choosing and articulating verbal symbols as a means to communicate to the outside interlocutor or tester the subject's inner percepts and images with all of their qualities. The elaboration of psychic material following this two-way process has been particularly analyzed by Deri (1984 chaps. 5-6) who termed both movements perceptual or 'centripetal' and internal or 'centrifugal' symbolizations (pp. 75-78, 150-151) respectively, and in the Rorschach field by Salomon (p. 168; in the last analysis these are nothing else than the processes of 'introversion' and 'extraversion' in Rorschach's sense: Jonte-Pace 1986 pp. 185-188)

Besides those above discussed, some other writers have contributed - particularly from a psychoanalytical point of view- fresh perspectives on secondary aspects of the just seen essential steps of the Rorschach response process, such as the implicit appeal of the stimulus inkblots to the unconscious body image (Schachtel 1966 p. 28, Chabert 1983 pp. 14-16 & 66; cf. Dolto 1981), the arousal of anxiety in the subject as a key motivational factor when facing this unfamiliar structure of the blots (cf. Baer, Salomon, Schachtel, Drey-Fuchs), or the pertinency of Winnicott's 'transitional' and play concepts for the interpretive process (Deri 1984 chap. 8; cf. Smith 1994 pp. 68-70). That said, we must go on with our own view of the whole method.

C) Pathoanalytic points of reference

1. A "projective" technique

"The category of what is accidental and requires no motivation, in which the normal person includes a part of his own psychical performances and parapraxes, is thus rejected by the paranoid as far as the psychical manifestations of other people are concerned. Everything he observes in other people is full of significance, everything can be interpreted. How does he reach this position? Probably here as in so many similar cases he **projects** on to the mental life of other people what is unconsciously present in his own. In paranoia many sorts of things force their way through to consciousness whose presence in the unconscious of normal and neurotic people we can demonstrate only through psycho-analysis. In a certain sense, therefore, the paranoid is justified in this, for he recognizes something that escapes the normal person: he sees more clearly than someone of normal intellectual capacity, but the displacement on to other people of the state of affairs which he recognizes renders his knowledge worthless."

Sigmund Freud (1901, chap. XII.C; boldface added)

Up to this point the argument of our referenced literature has led us to mention the particular psychopathological entity of *paranoia* a fair number of times (pp. 230, 249-53, including notes 98, 100, 102 & 103), and this is no meaningless coincidence. Logically the first question that comes to mind is if this fact may be connected with the common designation of the Rorschach as a "projective method" in the sense the expression was coined by Frank (1939)¹⁰⁹, and if so this will subsequently force us to consider the particular role of this psychoanalytical mechanism also in other techniques like the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) or handwriting included by this author in his original argument. So let us begin by quoting the strict Freudian conception of the term *projection*:

Dans le sens proprement psychanalytique, opération par laquelle le sujet expulse de soi et localise dans l'autre, personne ou chose, des qualités, des sentiments, des désirs, voire des "objets", qu'il méconnaît ou refuse en lui. Il s'agit là d'une défense d'origine très archaïque et qu'on retrouve à l'œuvre particulièrement dans la paranoïa mais aussi dans des modes de pensée "normaux" comme la superstition. (Laplanche & Pontalis # p. 344)

Obviously, from our previous discussion on the response process we cannot but conclude that the qualification of '*projective*' is a very pertinent one when applied to the Rorschach, despite the fact that Frank (1939, 1948) didn't have precisely these

¹⁰⁹ Prioritywise, the first published use of the expression corresponded in fact to the title of an article by Horowitz & Murphy (1938), but Frank (1948 p. 68) explained later how these two authors were inspired by a previous personal communication with him. Cattell (1944, 1951) and Piotrowski (1957 pp. 4-6) have also pointed to a more or less general resort to the term "projection" in the earlier literature (including by Rorschach! See below) when referring to one or the other of these methods, but no one before Frank developed such a comprehensive conceptualization of the diverse techniques under one sole designation.

arguments in mind when he established it: he didn't reference Freud at all (in the sense we just did) or even give any specific definition of the sense in which he used the term (comp. Silberstein 1987, p. 38 endnote 6). Since "l'Inconscient", as Mannoni (1968) puts it, "parle à sa façon", we adopt the term as our own in its precise psychoanalytical meaning even if that wasn't the locutor's original and conscious intention - exactly as we did with 'Perceptanalysis'. Furthermore, as keenly observed by Loosli-Usteri, Rorschach himself did also make use of it in the posthumous case study (1921/1967 chap. VII.A.2; note that we disregard in passing a tangential reference to the psychoanalytical mechanism in chap. IV.12 p. 109):

Celui qui a des interprétations clair-obscur frappantes cache dans les contenus de ces interprétations des indices importants de complexes, et cela sous la forme de corrections, autant dire sous la forme de réalisations des désirs. Ici ce sont des paysages, mais des paysages pour ainsi dire architecturaux, chez d'autres ce sont des châteaux et des tours, des temples et des portiques, etc. Là où de telles interprétations se présentent, on peut tranquillement conclure: ce sujet se sent intérieurement disloqué, désarticulé, impuissant et inharmonique, et il *projette* ces sentiments sous des formes qui réalisent ses désirs, dans ses édifications, c'est-à-dire dans ses interprétations d'édifices, de rues, de temples et de portiques. Les sentiments d'insuffisance d'un sujet qui se sent lui-même bâti de travers, trahis dans le cas de l'introversivité par les figures intermédiaires, et le taux d'affectivité qui s'emploie à une prudence dépressive servile, révélé par les interprétations clair-obscur, paraissent constituer la base inconsciente des édifices interprétés qui représentent l'œuvre de correction. (pp. 230-231, italics added)

The issue is not so simple to settle however and requires a detailed discussion, as demonstrated by the comparison of the following quotations from equally reputed experts on the field:

...This frequent psychic dynamism [projection] plays an important rôle in the movement responses to the Rorschach ink blots and in some dynamic form responses, but it is quite insufficient as an explanation of the entire range of reactions to the Rorschach test, since the great majority of all responses do not show any such projection at all. (Schachtel 1942, p. 605)

A l'extrême, il peut paraître abusif de chercher à distinguer les uns des autres les différents facteurs kinesthésiques K, kan et kob, dans leur signification de "projection" tellement la projection balaie toute la gamme des modes d'expression, autrement dit des déterminants, du formel pur au sensoriel, au kinesthésique et peut-être plus, pour certains, le formel que le kinesthésique. (Rausch de Traubenberg & Boizou 1977, p. 31)

To avoid the above evident, disorienting kind of terminological confusion we are thus forced to clarify our specific adoption of the 'projective' designation of *the Rorschach method in particular* as compared with the position of the colleagues that have preceded us. After Frank's "liberal" use of the adjective in question in his seminal article (1939) a thorough survey of the successive comments on his work and on his conceptual proposal leads us to a classification of the literature in 3 distinct groups:

a) Those few authors who reject his argument in general as wrong and consequently discard the term. A good example of this group is Zubin (1956; cf. & al. 1965 p. 6 footnote 2, where he repeats himself) who argues and concludes his point in this way:

...The projective techniques attempt to "project" the material which in ordinary life experience never becomes projected externally, and remains enclosed in the personal life of the individual. Just how projective techniques attain this end is not demonstrated, and whether they accomplish this end is debatable... (p. 182)

...The underlying factors of personality... can be studied more directly than through the Rorschach technique... We must bide our time and turn elsewhere for a scientific evaluation of present day Rorschach protocols... suggesting a more appropriate model... [p. 188] As a tentative model for the evaluation of the Rorschach technique, the interview technique has been proposed. [i.e.] The application of the content analysis method to Rorschach protocols... This approach removed the projective aspects of the Rorschach completely, by eliminating the perceptual factors on which Rorschach based his theory. (p. 191)

Obviously this is nothing else than a complete rejection of Rorschach's specific scientific contribution and won't retain us long here, just a moment to wonder if Zubin is right why alternate techniques that spouse this approach (like those of Rorschach's predecessors, or afterwards Stern's "Cloud Pictures Test" or Roemer's "Symbol Test") have never become but an insignificant choice of assessment experts? That said, we must mention as another representative of this anti-projective group Exner (1989) whose argument we have already commented in the previous B.2 section.

b) Completely opposed to the former there is another larger group of authors who, seduced by the descriptive and in appearance transparent term of Frank, make an effortful attempt -sometimes to the point of "juggling with concepts"- to complete his insufficient theoretical elaboration of it thus becoming partially responsible for its confirmation and popularity, even if recognizing a relation of "imperfect identity" with psychoanalytical 'projection': between them experts on the field of the stature of Rapaport (1942, 1946) and Anzieu (1961/1983), and others like Sargent (1945), Meili (1951) and Ombredane (1953). The first one for instance insisted on how he adopted the term in a particular sense somewhat different from Freud's: "...the term 'projection' in connection with projective tests is not identical with the psychoanalytic concept of projection as a defense mechanism central to the nosological picture of paranoid disorders... The concept of projection as used in projective procedures is one formed on the pattern of projector and screen... The subject matter used in the procedure serves as a lens of projection, and the recorded material of elicited behavior is the screen with the picture projected on it" (1946 pp. 6-7, 1945-6/68 pp. 224-5; this conceptualization becomes by the way implicitly concrete in the several projective techniques that use *inter alia* a blank card as stimulus, such as the TAT's card 16, the Hand Test card X, or Simón's appended cosmDRAMATIC Rorschach card

XII); Schachtel, for one, pertinently points here to a theoretical objection to such usage:

Whether the classification of Rorschach's test as projective is based on such an explicit definition of the concept of projection or whether, as is sometimes the case, "projective" is used merely as a convenient label with more or less vague connotations, the mere fact that it is thus classified tends, as does any classification or labeling, to influence and bend the articulate or inarticulate ideas of those who use such a label in a certain direction. It is especially important to examine the direction of such bends when they are not made explicit. An implicit or even unconscious assumption often influences in an obscure way what we do and think more than does an articulate and explicit one. The projection hypothesis made explicit by Rapaport, and probably implicit in the use of the term by many others, may lead to the faulty assumption that the testee, rather than *encountering* something [the complex test plates] and somebody [the tester] in the world and experiencing and interacting with what he encounters, is faced with a blank screen on which he projects only his own subjectivity. Such a view is approximated by those who believe that the Rorschach inkblots are "unstructured". (1966 pp. 11-12; comp. Draguns, Haley & Phillips 1968, p. 17)

As Schachtel we maintain, as we will finally demonstrate in section D.2 below, that far from it these inkblots contain a definite structure of which their symmetry is a major feature, *in exact correspondence with Rorschach's systematically structured formal scoring schema which preceded and presided their composition* giving belated reason to Klopfer's contention that "the interplay between the structural characteristics of the stimulus material and the personality structure of the subject is reflected in certain formal categories" (& Kelley 1942, p. 4; cf. Binswanger 1947/1970, Schachtel p. 28, and Chabert 1983 pp. 14-16 & 66).

This conceptualization of Rapaport can be found again in Ombredane who explicitly ties this kind of projection (which he calls "transpositive") with the Rorschach while reserving the expression of Freud's original ("psychodynamic") conception to other, more content-oriented tests:

Parmi les tests de personnalité dits projectifs, ceux qui se prêtent le mieux à refléter cette activité d'imputation de caractères qui est au cœur de la projection psychodynamique sont ceux dont les données significatives sont principalement les contenus: jeux, dramatic tests, dessins, productions littéraires, récits ou phrases à compléter, interprétation d'images ou de séquences cinématographiques, etc.... Si nous nous tournons maintenant vers des épreuves dites projectives où les données significatives sont de nature formelle, on se demandera dans quelle mesure on peut leur appliquer le terme de projection ou plutôt on constatera que ce terme se trouve ici employé dans un autre sens, dans le sens où l'on dit qu'un objet se projette sur un écran ou qu'une mappemonde est une projection du globe terrestre. L'essentiel de la notion paraît le fait d'une *transposition* du système des dispositions comportementales, dépouillées de leurs motivations spécifiques et de leurs objets particuliers, dans un système de traces opérationnelles où certaines

particularités de structure prennent valeur d'indice... Le sujet n'est plus sollicité de définir et de situer l'image qu'il s'approprie en regard de celles qu'il se rend étrangères dans un contexte thématique. Ce ne sont plus des contenus, mais des formes de la personnalité qui se révèlent. Nous appelons *transpositif* le sens où est pris ici le terme de projection...

Si [par contraste avec Cattell, cf. infra] l'on tient à garder les termes *projection* et *projectif* dans leur acception la plus générale, il suffira de distinguer les tests de *projection structurale* et les tests de *projection thématique*, mais en ayant à l'esprit que les données d'un test de projection structurale peuvent n'impliquer aucune projection au sens où ce terme désigne un mécanisme d'ajustement particulier du Moi... Le Rorschach semble atteindre à sa plus grande utilité en tant qu'épreuve de projection structurale et le T.A.T. en tant qu'épreuve de projection thématique. (1953 pp. 300-304)

This resembles too much the erroneous and contrasting identification of form-Rorschach / content-Psychoanalysis discussed in the previous section to be a mere coincidence, and we couldn't disagree more with Ombredane (and Rapaport) on this point. Furthermore, the identity in nature between a backbone *structural* Rorschach component like the kinesthetic response and strict psychoanalytic projection¹¹⁰ as it has been revealed by Schachtel (see below) goes in a direction entirely opposed to Ombredane's conclusions. Actually, he begins to recognize these facts in a key paragraph of his article (p. 302) and he should have exploited at length the intuitions expressed there, where he asks himself if the symmetry of Rorschach's inkblots does not favor the manifestation of a 'mirroring projection' between 'me and not-me' (and we couldn't agree more on this point, cf. Salomon 1962 chap. VI) and even asserts that "la perception des formes comporte toujours ou presque toujours un contenu, un contenu qu'on n'exploite pas mais où l'on peut parfaitement voir l'amorce d'une histoire continuée où l'ajustement dynamique du Moi, comme dirait Cattell, s'apprête à se manifester. La chose est particulièrement sensible au niveau des kinesthésies...": just remember Silberstein's entirely identical formula that "the shape of an object is narrative and can be deployed into a story" resorted to by us and in this sense we see no essential contrast between the Rorschach and TAT procedures. Finally, the former are basically the same arguments presented by Anzieu & Chabert (1961/1983 chap. I) in favor of the "projective" concept, but despite our high respect for their work we cannot follow them here: the quotation by Rausch de Traubenberg above, who belongs to the same school of projective thought, constitutes a transparent example of the complications this position may well bring about with it by contrast to the one explained below - the one we endorse.

c) Last but not least, there are those authors who justly criticize Frank's choice of the term "projection" due *specifically* to its vague, insufficient identity and thus

¹¹⁰ "...Celui qui a 10 K ne pourra non plus sympathiser convenablement avec quelqu'un qui n'en a que 2; il est toujours incliné à prêter à l'autre plus d'introversivité, de richesse intérieure, qu'il n'en a; il 'idéalisera' " (Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. IV.11 p. 103). Besides, Rorschach's results in those conditions characterized –at least theoretically– by a predominance of projective mechanisms are well known: introversive Experience Type in paranoid schizophrenia (chap. IV.4&19 pp. 72, 123 and Table X), and introversive without extratension (x B : 0 Fb) in paranoia (chap. IV.4 p. 85).

confusion with the strict psychoanalytic concept (in a similar way as it happened with the "introversion-extraversion" Jungian terminology adopted by Rorschach), even if they do recognize and defend the dynamic character of these procedures as initially and correctly described by him: the clear leader of this group is Schachtel (1942, 1950, 1966) who shares position with others like Murray (1937, 1951), Bellak (1944, 1950), Cattell (1944, 1951), Holt (1954, pp. 541-2), Piotrowski (1957, 1966), Kadinsky (1970), and Silberstein (1987). Some of them have even proposed alternate formulas like Bellak's "apperceptive distortion" and Cattell's "misperception" to describe the process in question, but without much success in the sense of overturning the label of "projective methods" which has nevertheless become definitive even if misleading. Their common argument is more or less the following...

...In the American literature it has become customary to classify Rorschach's diagnostic method as one of the so-called projective techniques... Such classification, of course, always implies a statement about the nature of the method so classified. The concept of projection, as originally developed by Freud, plays no important role in any of the "projective" techniques. Freud used the term as meaning the mistaken attribution of a quality or trait of which one is not aware in himself onto others, thereby distorting reality... But even when one uses the term "projection," as I do, in the wider sense of the *attribution of qualities, feelings, attitudes, experiences, and strivings of one's own to objects (people or things) of the environment*, regardless of whether one is aware of them in himself and regardless of whether the projection leads to a distortion of reality or not, projection in this wider sense of the word plays no role at all in most of the so-called projective techniques ([In a footnote:] For instance, in word association, Bender Visual-Motor Gestalt Test, Finger Painting, Mosaic Test, Mira's Myokinetic psychodiagnosis, graphology, the study of expressive movements.). In Rorschach's test it plays a role mainly in the kinesthetic responses and in some dynamic form responses, but not in the majority of responses, nor is it the only significant aspect of the kinesthetic and dynamic form responses. In other words, only a small fraction of the many processes underlying Rorschach responses are of a projective nature... To equate individually characteristic behavior with projection and call methods aimed at eliciting relatively free samples of such behavior projective widens the term "projection" to a point where it loses all of its specific meaning and invites misunderstanding by using the same word in two or more different meanings. (Schachtel 1966, pp. 9-11)

We from our side just want to stress a key point, of far-reaching consequence. Only a fraction of the Rorschach response process may be of a projective nature, conceded, but this fraction refers specifically to no less than the universally recognized core of Rorschach's formal discovery: *the movement determinant*. Authorities agree: "...precisely what RORSCHACH asserts about the movement responses and their connections with the whole of the 'Ego', with the whole of the person and furthermore with intelligence, affectivity, motility, etc., is the most interesting and attractive of his work" (Binswanger 1923/1967 p. 233, our translation); "of all the perceptanalytic components, the human-movement response is easily the

most important. It constitutes Rorschach's most original contribution to the experimental study of personality, and it expresses the most developed aspects of personality from the standpoint of both the human race and the individual... this unusual care which the *M* received from Rorschach was justified by the significance which human-movement responses have for the understanding of the subject's motivation and his unconsciously as well as consciously determined, preferred modes of handling interpersonal relationships. The *M* reflects what is most humane and human" (Piotrowski 1957, p. 120). So, in *this* restricted sense, we do feel entitled to speak of the Rorschach as an essentially, medullarily *projective* procedure; and by the way we are not so sure about validly extending this restricted consideration to most other "projective" techniques.

To progress one step forward let us reproduce here the essence of Schachtel's rationale about the movement responses' truly projective character. In order to attain the understanding of the processes that underlie *B* responses he develops a phenomenological analysis of their production, "of the experience and attitude characteristic of *kinesthetic* perception of the Rorschach ink blots" (1950¹¹¹ p. 71, italics added) i.e. of that particular type of perceptual subject-world relatedness by contrast to the perception of light-dark, form, or color qualities. Rorschach himself had already stressed the fact that the movement had to be *felt* by the subject, not just named, that there must have been an actual kinesthetic sensation on his part, which represents an experience similar to kinesthetic empathy when one looks at somebody in movement. This kinesthetic experience is related to the core of the personality (Wolff's experiences). In those situations the subject does not remain detached in an "objective" perception but he commits himself, there is a simultaneous perception of the other (visual) and of himself (kinesthetic) i.e. of his own body, trying to understand the movement he perceives in the other in terms of his own internal experience of that movement, on the basis of his own personal constitution and personal history; therefore there is an element of projection at play, of (con)fusion of his own's and the other's experience¹¹². Then the author insists on the need to define projection in a way slightly different from Freud's, more largely (see his quotation above): not only as a *defense*, not necessarily as an *ignorance* in oneself of the traits subject to projection; his own definition points rather in the sense of an anthropomorphic (generally human) and *auto-morphic* (individual) view of the world. For him there is no pejorative connotation of the mechanism, the attitude in question having the possibility of being as much a legitimate component of an understanding of others as much as a source of distortion of reality: projection is thus compatible with an exact perception of reality (cf. Freud vs. Exner in section B.2 above), with normality, its defensive-pathological character (anxiety avoidance, refusal of psychic reality) becoming operative only by an exaggeration of its nature. Having resort to

¹¹¹ We refer to this his original paper rather than to his 1966 book (chap. 9) because in the latter there were no significant new developments (cf. Preface pp. v-vi), but otherwise the omission of an extraordinarily important reference to Szondi: see below.

¹¹² Following Bohm's (1951/1972) suggestion, compare with the analysis of the same experience by Freud in "Jokes" who also insists on this same will to *understand*.

Szondi's conceptual schema he shows how so-to-speak more strictly "defensive" projection (*p*-) derives in fact from a more general need (undivided *p* factor, of "Egodiastole", of Ego expansion) present in all individuals. We may add here that Szondi's instrument (but also Rorschach's one: 1921/ 1967 chap. V.1, cf. Binswanger 1923/1967 p. 239) is particularly suited to show in a very concrete and transparent way what Schachtel is very perceptively pointing to, what Schotte (1990 pp. 144-146) has called Freud's "nosological option"¹¹³ i.e. the fact that mental illness is alien to no one and even reveals in a sharper way what we all have in common: our human condition. Here is the integral quotation of that capital passage absent from his book:

Distorting projection is different in degree rather than in kind from non-distorting projection—that is, from that factor in understanding by which man relates himself to another person through recognizing and filling with the life of his own experience the feeling or attitude of the other person. This fact furnishes not only a basis for the better understanding of the significance of the M [B] responses, but also finds an interesting corroboration in the significance of the so-called *p*-factor in Szondi's test. The number of choices of pictures by paranoid schizophrenics is the basis for determining the strength and quality of the *p*-factor. The meaning of this factor is described by Deri as follows: It refers "to a need for communication between the own need systems and the outer world.... The drive inherent in the *p* is to break down the wall between subject and environment. The interpretation of the *p* factor is projection in the widest sense of the word." [1949 p. 171] The paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by delusional projections and, in Rorschach's test, among other factors usually by the presence of several M responses and the absence of color responses. Both in Rorschach's and Szondi's tests we find that the mechanism of projection characteristic of paranoid thinking is at the same time also operative in "normal" projective thinking, in a different setting and to a different degree. (1950 p. 76)

This fundamental connection of ideas concerning both tests recalls to our mind Ellen-berger's already quoted words: "Presque toute l'activité humaine est exercice d'interprétation... Le paranoïaque interprète, et son délire, le 'délire d'interprétation', mériterait d'être nommé 'délire herméneutique'... L'astrologue interprète un horoscope, le graphologue une écriture, l'oniromancien et le psychanalyste freudien ou jungien les rêves de leurs clients... Et ainsi de suite..." (section A.2 above). In this sense, again, Rorschach's experiment ("the *interpretation* of accidental forms") is an essentially hermeneutic, interpretive, projective method. And since projection implies a *shared* self-other experience we must stress that we are faced with a *double* interpretation (cf. Baumgarten-Tramer 1946): the subject's (of the stimulus inkblots), but also the tester's (of the subject's recorded responses) who occupies the place of the other and tries to genuinely understand his subject. In a bold, very illuminating article Kadinsky (1970) focuses on the nature, sometimes distorting (as with the previous group B authors), sometimes

¹¹³ And behind it also his "pathoanalytical option" exemplified in the "crystal principle": pp. 15-7 above.

genuinely understanding, of this second, complementary aspect of projection now from the psychologist's or clinician's side:

It is a rather peculiar fact that the concept of "Projective Techniques" gained such popularity though any closer scrutiny of this concept can not but reveal its scientific meaninglessness. The original and meaningful use of the term "Projection" is related to a dynamic process in which certain contents of the unconscious are dissociated from the ego and appear as part of the outer world... The same character of self evident truth accompagnies an other phenomenon which might be conceived as indicative of projection: where the bounderies of the ego are not clearly delineated ego-alien parts of the world are liable to be conceived as participating in the ego's modes of experiencing life. Such an identifactory projection appears for instance in one's assuming others to be frightened when oneself is afraid... Obviously this form of projection has nothing what ever to do with what is meant by the use of this expression in the projective techniques... What other forms of projection do exist then? - Obviously we might call any subjective factor contributing to apperception by this name. But by so doing we would abandon all specific meaning of this terminology... This [above quoted: p. 265] definition of RAPPAPORT is quite typical for the definitions of the "Projective Hypothesis" and is obviously unscientific: it uses a simile instead of defining psychological processes... When in the course of our work as psychologists we encounter such persistence in disregarding facts, we consider ourselves entitled to assume that the subject has some strong emotional reasons to stick to his idea; apparently this idea satisfies some inner need. It would therefore seem possible that there is really a dynamic projection involved in the concept of "Projective Techniques". But now we would have to look for the psychologist's projection instead of projections of the testee. Once we start looking in this direction everything we observed just now fits together: the act of projecting is projected by the psychologist on the subject. This projection has just that quality of self evidence which is characteristic of the true dynamic projection... But we have still to discover the inner need of the psychologist that this projection satisfies. It seems likely that the answer to this question may be found in connection with an other expression which appears regularly in every definition of projective techniques: this expression is "Personality"... [pp. 40-41]

This subject which is the core of personality remains beyond sensorial experience. It can only be reached by psychic functions which are adequate to it - and these are not objective in the sense this term is being generally used... the subjective element which is inherent in the experience of personality... can in no way be excluded or "objectified"... This understanding of the patient's personality is based on a measure of identification. Nothing could demonstrate this essential [paranoid] quality which characterises the work of the Rorschach clinician better than a description of the work of BRUNO KLOPFER, "the way in which he is able to understand the private world od[sic] the person whose responses he is studying because he enters into it and it enters into him. At

times it is difficult to ascertain whose associations are being expressed, unless one is following the protocol visually! It is as if he tried to think the way the subject does, to anticipate what the next response will be." And in the course of an interpretation KLOPFER says verbatim: "Each time I say something, the next response in the record illustrates it!... He never gives me a chance to stay with my own associations! He steals my thoughts" [Hooker 1960, pp. 241-2]. This quality of understanding is something quite different from an objective "personality assessment". By it - by the medium of the clinician's personality - the record of test responses comes alive and instead of an agglomeration of test responses a living person is created. (pp. 44-46)

2. The Louvain School and structure in *Schicksalsanalysis*¹¹⁴

"Un système pulsionnel doit nous donner une vue synthétique de tout l'ensemble de la vie pulsionnelle, comparable à l'impression globale que nous donne la lumière blanche. Mais il doit également permettre d'étaler le 'spectre' des pulsions tout comme la lumière est décomposable en ses couleurs."

Leopold Szondi (1947/1952, p. 1)

"RORSCHACH'S test resolves thus the dilemma of either breaking up the personality or not subjecting it to methodical scrutiny. We can both measure the whole person, and have him too. The test permits a *Verstehen* of the personality with-out a *Zergliedern*. It is like the prism through which a ray of light is passed: we are enabled to view the spectrum hues which compose the ray, while the ray remains its integrated self."

Samuel J. Beck (1963, p. 24)¹¹⁵

According to these two quotations in perspective with Schachtel's one two pages above, Rorschach's "*Psychodiagnostik*" and Szondi's "*Triebdiagnostik*" must be very closely related and entirely compatible procedures in nature¹¹⁶. However, from this premise, it is surprising to realize that their fate has led them over the years in

¹¹⁴ That is, 'Fate-analysis' (Szondi's doctrine).

¹¹⁵ This quotation was an excellent response to Klopfer's harsh criticism (cf. pp. 226-7 above), but one must still question Beck's previous atomistic position (cf. p. 219 above).

¹¹⁶ With the only possible exception of Klijnhout's (1951), all published clinical and research studies using both methods thoroughly collected by us have provided convergent empirical supporting data in this sense: Rapaport 1941, p. 37; Calabresi 1948; Bell 1949ab; Mercer & Wright 1950; Fromm & Elonen 1951; Bohm 1951/1972 chaps. 2.1.4 & 7.1, 1953/1963; Ellenberger 1953; Krimsky 1954; Kohlmann & Stepan 1954, 1955; Piotrowski 1957 chap. 13 Case One, cf. pp. 440-441; Bohm & Moser 1962; Ringger 1962; Leder 1967; Otsuka 1968; Chamorro Gundin 1973; **above all Mélon's works, of a particular importance** (see below): 1975a, 1976, 1978, & Lekeuche 1982/1989 pp. 81-82 & 194-204; and his disciples' Dubois 1993, Grégoire 1993, Poelmans & Stassart 1993, Stassart 1994, and Peralta 1995 & 1999; finally Kinable 2002.

completely opposing directions. Mélon, who better than anyone else has studied and compared both methods in an in-depth way, offers a brief historical overview and a beginning of an explanation of the facts as a good starting point for us:

...[Le] talent propre à RORSCHACH de saisir les phénomènes dans une perspective holistique - structurale, disons-nous aujourd'hui - rend compte du succès extraordinaire de sa méthode... Szondi fut moins heureux. Son test et les développements théoriques qu'il en a tirés ont reçu un accueil généralement froid ou hostile qui contraste avec la faveur enthousiaste dont le Rorschach a toujours bénéficié... Le style de la pensée de SZONDI est tel qu'on rencontre à l'explicitier et à la transmettre, la même difficulté qu'à enseigner FREUD. Il y a là toute la différence entre un processus d'assimilation, ici indispensable, et la simple accommodation, ailleurs suffisante... Le test de Szondi n'offre à l'interpréteur aucune donnée qui parle aux sens; il ne donne qu'un ensemble de signes incompréhensibles pour qui se situe en dehors du mode d'interprétation structurale prônée par SZONDI. Autrement dit, il n'y a pas moyen d'utiliser le test si on n'a pas d'abord assimilé la pensée de son auteur. La différence est grande avec le Rorschach: ici, le foisonnement des données sensibles est tel qu'une explication psychologisante (trop) simple est presque toujours possible. Ainsi comprend-on facilement qu'une réponse Dbl [Zw], parce qu'elle implique une inversion de la manière habituelle de percevoir, puisse être le signe d'une tendance oppositionnelle. Par contre, on saisit mal **a priori** pourquoi p+ connote un processus inflatif de redoublement de l'image du moi; et d'ailleurs, que veulent bien dire ces vocables ésotériques? Y a-t-il plus là-dedans qu'une logomachie solipsiste? La question doit être posée. Le danger est grand pour chacun des tests de glisser rapidement vers l'ornière où les entraînent leurs pentes naturelles: trop de signifiant chez les disciples de SZONDI, trop de signifié chez les adeptes du Rorschach... La permanence de ces dangers est un élément qui milite en faveur de l'usage conjugué des deux tests, bon moyen de limiter leurs insuffisances respectives... Les deux tests opèrent donc à des niveaux sensiblement différents mais ils partagent la qualité rare - il n'y a pas à notre connaissance d'autre méthode projective qui puisse leur disputer ce privilège - d'appréhender le fonctionnement de l'appareil psychique dans un mouvement de saisie globale. (1975a pp. 252-255)

So furthermore, according to him (also Rapaport's opinion by the way: 1942/1967 p. 95) the two procedures form a separate, superior class in between the projective methods; we will come back to this idea later on. Anyway, the thing is after an initially enthusiastic and open reception in the Rorschach and projective techniques circle (*Rorschach Research Exchange & Journal of Projective Techniques*, Vols. 11 & 18) the Szondi has been consistently questioned and criticized, and

eventually literally banned particularly from U.S.A.'s scientific community.¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, the list of eminent Rorschachers -European as well as American- that kept being serious individual supporters of Szondi practice is nothing short of impressive, and to begin with should question by itself the serious student of personality about the advisability of abandoning too hastily the resort to this procedure before a thorough analysis of the grounds for this rejection: Morgenthaler, Rapaport (1941), Ellenberger (1948, 1951a, 1953), Harrower (1949, 1952, 1970), Schneider (1952), Bohm (1953/1963), Piotrowski (1957 pp. 440-441), Schachtel (cf. Peterson 1992). Our own opinion is that the "empirical" view predominant in the American psychological scientific culture, which we examined at the beginning of the previous chapter in its popular association with (or "acommodation" to) the Rorschach, is the clear reason why the Szondi could not be accepted so easily since it is much less compatible with that approach than the former test - as suggested by Mélon above: in this sense he adds some illuminating thoughts in his Doctoral Thesis...

...La pratique du Rorschach nous a donné l'intuition que le système d'interprétation élaboré par Rorschach entrainé en résonance avec celui de Szondi, ou, pour exploiter la métaphore du prisme, que les spectres rorschachien et szondien se confondaient à différents niveaux, encore que nous ignorions d'abord totalement sur quels points précis les interférences se produiraient. Après avoir rassemblé un matériel clinique et testologique abondant, nous avons choisi, en vue d'un premier déblaiement, un critère sélectif très simple: le profil du moi dominant dans le test de Szondi... A notre heureuse surprise, le critère retenu s'est révélé doté d'un remarquable pouvoir discriminatif, de telle sorte que les indices Rorschach s'agglutinaient électivement autour de certaines configurations du moi comme de la limaille autour d'un aimant. Notre recherche en a été grandement facilitée et encouragée; dès le départ, nous obtenions la confirmation du bien-fondé d'un grand nombre d'intuitions szondiennes à propos du moi. ***Nous avons trouvé dans le vecteur du moi (Sch) une manière de boussole pour explorer les domaines du Rorschach et en dresser comme une carte de géographie nouvelle.*** (p. III)

...Par bonheur, Rorschach n'était pas obsédé par la préoccupation de produire au plus vite une synthèse théorique achevée. Il était davantage soucieux de vérifier expérimentalement ses premières hypothèses. Nul ne contestera qu'il fut un chercheur exemplaire, alliant l'empirisme scrupuleux à l'intuition géniale. L'état d'inachèvement où sont restés ses travaux est moins imputable à une mort prématurée qu'à sa méfiance innée à l'endroit de l'esprit de système.

¹¹⁷ Rapaport was just the man in the position to have entirely reversed this part of the history of projective techniques (cf. Lerner 1998, pp. xi-xiii): not only was he before emigrating to the U.S.A. a direct disciple of Szondi in Hungary's important psychoanalytic circle, but very few know that he was also preparing a Szondi volume before his death (Mélon, personal communication). Alas, fate decided otherwise and we were just left to regret his retrospectively disastrous decision not to include a detailed exposition of the procedure in his main work (1945-46). Even worse, despite this high respect of his for the procedure his disciple and heir R. Schafer (1950) surprisingly became one of the main Szondi executioners. For history's sake see also the equally interesting and unfair case of Delay in France, cf. Stassart 1994 p. 96 note 3.

C'est pourquoi il bénéficie de l'estime du monde scientifique et, singulièrement, des esprits positifs. Szondi fut incontestablement moins heureux... Il est vrai que le style de SZONDI a de quoi rebuter les empiristes; là où Rorschach n'avance qu'à tâtons, produisant des hypothèses prudentes, SZONDI affirme avec un aplomb imperturbable tout un chapelet de thèses qui peuvent paraître gratuites au premier abord. Ce qui, chez SZONDI, est donné d'entrée de jeu, ne peut, chez RORSCHACH, apparaître qu'au terme. Le premier pratique la méthode déductive, le second adopte une démarche inductive...

Les charpentes théoriques du système szondien existaient en germe dans son intuition inaugurale d'un schéma pulsionnel quadridimensionnel... Rorschach et Szondi pensaient en termes de structure; et puisqu'ils se sont occupés du même objet, on peut attendre qu'il existe entre eux certaines convergences... Les réflexions qui précèdent expliquent pourquoi nous croyons possible une réflexion conjointe sur le Rorschach et le Szondi, essentiellement articulée au niveau de leurs noyaux matriciels, l'Erlebnistypus (TRI) et le profil du moi, car chacune des deux formules reflète à sa manière une position fondamentale du moi en face des pulsions. (Mélon 1976, pp. 46, 48, 51, 56, italics and boldface added)

In essence we agree with the preceding assessment, with the precision that we believe this shared structural train of thought logically *implies also* in Rorschach a virtual deductive, systematic -albeit implicit- theoretical structure of his work from the very beginning (his "intuition géniale"), even if superficially he seemed to follow a purely empirical path; or to paraphrase Mélon: 'les charpentes théoriques du système Rorschachien existaient aussi *en germe* dans son intuition inaugurale d'un schéma percepto-formel tridimensionnel de cotation'; it is our contention that it has fallen upon us, "au terme", to substitute this theoretically implicit "état d'inachèvement" of his work now by an explicit "synthèse théorique achevée" .

A rarely cited work of Ellenberger (1951b) -one of the few true researchers and connoisseurs of Rorschach's theoretical commitments- comes totally in point here, and his words acquire even more eloquence when one realizes that Mélon did not reference him:

Il importe de rappeler ici un fait essentiel, souvent méconnu: RORSCHACH n'est pas seulement l'inventeur d'un test, mais l'auteur de théories psychologiques très originales en dehors desquelles le test perd toute signification. Malheureusement, les conceptions psychologiques de RORSCHACH nous sont imparfaitement connues: nous ignorons presque tout du développement intérieur de ses idées, de ses sources réelles, de la façon dont il est arrivé à son test. D'autre part, son "Psychodiagnostik" ne donne qu'une esquisse très incomplète de ses idées et de sa méthode, qui, dans son esprit, étaient l'objet de développements importants et rapides au moment de sa mort.

La notion la plus importante et la plus nouvelle introduite par RORSCHACH est celle de l'*Erlebnistypus* (type de résonance intime)... Dans le test, comme on sait, l'*Erlebnistypus* se reconnaît par le nombre et la proportion des "kinesthésies", et des "réponses-couleur". Mais il y a là bien autre chose qu'un rapport algébrique quelconque. Il ne s'agit pas de mesurer une "fonction" ou un

"facteur" isolé, non plus que d'un diagnostic caractéro-logique, mais de la *projection* d'un élément fondamental de la personnalité, dans ses oscillations fonctionnelles et sa courbe évolutive. Quel est cet élément? Bien que ROR-SCHACH n'ait pas prononcé le mot, on peut le dire: C'est le *Moi* au sens psychanalytique, au moins dans un de ses aspects essentiels. (Notons en passant que les facteurs *k* et *p* de SZONDI peuvent être assimilés à la coartation et à la dilatation, avec cette différence qu'il ne s'agit plus d'une fonction unique de coartation-dilatation, mais d'un système de deux fonctions antagonistes, comparable, si l'on veut, au système antagoniste vago-sympathique.) Bref, le test de RORSCHACH réfléchit un aspect fondamental de la personnalité: le "type de résonance intime", et en outre il donne de nombreux et précieux renseignements sur le caractère, la psychologie profonde et les troubles psychopathologiques du sujet. (pp. 329-330)

To concentrate now on Szondi's 'quadridimensional drive schema', sort of a blueprint that guided the construction of his entire work, it was created around 1935 (Schotte 1990 p. 13; refer also to Avant-propos and pp. 143s for what follows) not only with the modest intention of developing a test but with the infinitely more ambitious goal of providing what Freud himself confessed it lacked to Psychoanalysis and what Binswanger (1920/1970 pp. 139-142, 152-153) claimed for scientific Psychiatry in his theoretical studies: a *drive system (Triebsystem)*, i.e. an exhaustive catalogue of the totality of the diverse drives that motivate or confront the human being. In total coherence with his motto that "*Geisteskranke sind Triebkranke*" (his rejoinder to Griesinger's "*Geisteskranke sind Hirnkranke*") Szondi considered that certain mental illnesses would be the ideal representatives of the diverse drives, following also here another of Freud's fundamental conceptions who considered psychopathology, due to the exaggerated effect with which express in it the common mental mechanisms, as a revealer of the hidden structure of normality (what has been currently termed by Schotte the "crystal principle"):

...pathology, by making things larger and coarser, can draw to our attention normal conditions which would otherwise have escaped us. Where it points to a breach or a rent, there may normally be an articulation present. If we throw a crystal to the floor, it breaks; but not into haphazard pieces. It comes apart along its lines of cleavage into fragments whose boundaries, though they were invisible, were predetermined by the crystal's structure. Mental patients are split and broken structures of this same kind. Even we cannot withhold from them something of the reverential awe which peoples of the past felt for the insane. They have turned away from external reality, but for that very reason they know more about internal, psychical reality and can reveal a number of things to us that would otherwise be inaccessible to us. (1933/1964, pp. 58-9)

Leaning on his enormous practical experience in the study of psychiatric genetics, he finally selected 8 particular entities organized by pairs in 4 groups or 'vectors' (the "hereditary circles" from which they proceed), which would correspond respectively to the 4 fundamental drives each one composed by 2 complementary drive factors ('needs') according to the following schema (Figure 1: the initials

proceed from the German language). We would have then represented from left to right:

- the perverted Sexual states of *h*(omosexuality) and *s*(adism)
- the Paroxysmal *e*(pileptic) and *hy*(sterical) neuropathic crises
- the Schizophrenic *k*(atatonic) and *p*(aranoid) psychotic processes
- and the Cyclothymic *d*(epressive) and *m*(anic) circular disorders;

each representing respectively the generally human problematic (implying each time its own internal dialectics) of:

- the Sexual drive (female/male poles)
- the drive towards Law (ethics/moral poles)
- the Ego drive (contracting/expanding poles)
- and the Contact drive (search/attachment poles).

The system becomes complete when one considers that the particular individual, facing each one of those 8 drive factors, may adopt the position of accepting (+) or rejecting (-) the respective need.




Figure 1. Szondi's drive-schema.

Note that in itself the schema constitutes a synthesis of, on the one (left) hand, the typically Freudian psychoanalytic problematic (perversions and neuroses, the conflict inside the individual, the opposition between sex and law), and on the other (right) the privileged Bleulerian/Kraepelinian psychiatric territory (the great psychoses, which touch the essence of the individual and his contact with reality, either transforming him entirely into another or leaving him exactly the same after the crisis). But in between an imperceptible change has taken place in the view of those mental illnesses, and in the conception of the diagnostic art itself, which will become evident when one considers the fact that from this Szondian schema what is attempted *is not anymore* to locate the individual in any one of the categories (to label him) with the exception of all of the rest, since the entirety of the system of drives is supposed to be biologically present -although in different proportions- in every individual, *but rather* to successively confront him to the whole range of possibilities of extreme psychopathological (drive) destinies for him to become able to express how he articulates in his own life the limited fundamental human dialectics

they represent. Strictly speaking, with this system the decisive step has been taken in psychopathology from the infinite "classes" (in Sydenham's sense, the same as Linneus' "species" in Botany, whose latest expression we find in the U.S.A.'s "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders") to the limited number of "categories" (in Kant's and Schotte's sense) that underlie and organize the former giving them sense: exactly as height, width and depth constitute the exhaustive list of categories that compose the tridimensional system with which can be determined the volume of bodies in space and analyzed their form, be them individually of spherical, cylindrical, conical, pyramidal, truncated, parallelepiped, cubic, pentahedric class, or other more or less capricious forms *ad infinitum*.

In other words, at the same time that Szondi assumes as his starting point the hereditary character of those psychiatric disorders, being organized in this way they acquire (due to the law that rules a global structure) a *metaphorical value*, they are not defined anymore by themselves in isolation but by the place they occupy in the global system, and in a *pathoanalytic* sense (Schotte's term, cf. Freud's crystal principle quotation) what they represent are in fact the elementary psychoanalytical mechanisms characteristic for each and everyone of them at work in their own psychodynamics, intimately interrelated the ones with the others (forming a unitary and coherent whole) through which can then be analyzed the personality of any individual either mentally sane or ill: pushing to the background the specific diagnosis, here takes precedence the confrontation of the individual with the "sadismality", the "hystericality", the "catatonycity", the "maniacality", etc., of all human beings, in the widest possible sense of those terms that includes their attenuated (in character), adapted (in profession), or sublimated expression (in the creativity specific to each of those 8 forms). This doctrine of individual drive Fate-analysis according to Szondian rules presupposes thus the total solidarity between the particular genetic endowment (the hereditary, somatogenesis) and the reaction to the specific events experienced during development (the acquired, psychogenesis), what Schotte calls the close bond between the *bio-logical and bio-graphical* aspects in this original anthropopsychiatric scientific synthesis that according to him has been one of the greatest achievements of human knowledge in the past century (1990 p. 13s; Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 pp. 17-18).

As sustained by Binswanger (basing himself on Kant: 1920/1970 p. 153), such a psychiatric -anthropological- system cannot but only be theoretically "constructed" (exactly what Szondi has done) and its hermeneutical validity would be given by the coherency of the whole more than -although also- by its practical utility (cf. Vernon pp. 9-10 above, Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 p. 17). In this sense Ellenberger (1970) makes a pertinent point when he asserts that...

From the beginning, Szondi's *Analysis of Destiny* met with enthusiastic admiration and sharp criticism. His genetic suppositions were questioned, particularly his system of eight factors grouped in four vectors. Actually, it seems that in Szondi's mind this system is more a fictitious model, comparable to the resonators devised by Helmholtz with which physicists analyze the constitutive elements of a tone. The choice of the resonators is necessarily

arbitrary, but no physicist will deny their usefulness in analyzing a sound. (p. 867; see also 1963/1995 pp. 166-167: it is interesting to note that Ellenberger talks here about "projection of intellectual schemas" as a possible psychiatric classificatory illusion in Szondi, when one considers that *projection* could be both a source of distortion of reality or of its genuine understanding as we have already discussed above -comp. also Klopfer & Spiegelman chap. II.C above)

In agreement with Binswanger and in contrast to Ellenberger, Schotte (head of the Szondian "Louvain School") has assigned to himself the task of demonstrating with sound psycho-pathological, anthropological and philosophical arguments the absolutely perfect inner formal logic of Szondi's system, whose properties coincide with the teachings both of Psychoanalysis as much as of Phenomenology, discarding in this way that in its composition may have intervened any "arbitrariness". The culmination has been the discovery of the true meaning-giving *structure in Fate-Analysis (Schicksalsanalyse: Schotte 1963/1990)*, i.e. the systematic and theoretical validity of Szondi's drive-schema - and beyond of Szondi's Test.

Very briefly stated¹¹⁸, the first thing he notes is that Szondi's series of drives is not homogeneous, i.e. that they do not find themselves at the same level but can be organized from the more primitive (*C*) to the more developed (*Sch*) through the intermediate ones (*S-P*): the latter two - that are always intimately tied to one another - represent as already said the typically psychoanalytic perverse-neurotic conflict about the relation to the *object* (remember Freud's formula that "neurosis is, as it were, the negative of perversion", i.e. both represent the two Janus-like diverging faces of the same problem), which is preceded by a fusional *pre-object* stage in which have insisted above all the phenomenologists (E. Strauss: the existential dimension of "sentient participation", of immanence) and the modern post-Freudians (heirs of the British School of object-relations theory), and which is only overcome by a development of the *Ego* i.e. of the subject (A. Deese: the "historical-dialogical" transcendent dimension of existence; from the psychoanalytic viewpoint refer to Lacan's or the same Szondi's work). From this basic finding he then discovers, on the basis of the formal properties of the system, a meaningful homology between the just mentioned *intervectorial* dialectics (the extremes touching on one side, the intermediate stage on the other) and an *intravectorial* one which concerns the different '+' and '-' positions: for each drive one of the twin factors, the *essential* one, contains in one side the psychologically most primitive and the most developed vectorial positions and the progress from the first to the last is accomplished through the complementary factor which serves as a *mediator*. Contained in all of this development is discovered *a perfect formal symmetry* which runs through the whole system, as shown in Figure 2.

¹¹⁸ Obviously, we can only give here a very general and superficial idea of this paramount scientific discovery product of decades of effortful clinical experience and thought-work: for the details of the arguments and proofs involved refer to Schotte 1990 (particularly the *Avant-propos* and chaps. 2, 6 & 9) and to Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 (particularly chaps. 1, 3 & 8).




Figure 2. Schotte's drive circuits.

This "drive-circuits theory" of Schotte, *which adds a temporal-dynamic dimension to Szondi's until then purely spatial-static representation of the system* (Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989 p. 21), assumes then that inside each drive vector we have an initial position (or mental mechanism) of contactual character, to which follow successively the sexual and legalistic positions (just the reverse one of the other, with an inversion of sign), to culminate in the final Egoic posture at the other end of the point of departure. Organizing the positions according to the new discoveries (which by the way coincide with a fair number of empirical validation experiences: cf. Mélon & Lekeuche) results the final Figure 3 where each vertical column corresponds to a vectorial "series" of growing complexity, and each horizontal line to a positional "period" of structurally homologous elements although of different level, constituting in fact the *Periodic Table of Elements* of drive life in frank analogy to Mendelejev's table in Chemistry. The perfection of the composition is such that the group of positions of the 1st period ($m+$, $h+$, $e-$, $p-$) maintains a close relationship with the genetically primordial thymopathic vectorial level (C, as confirmed experimentally in clinical thymopathies like toxicomania when the Szondi Test is administered) and successively the same happens with the 2nd (perversions-S) and 3rd (neuroses-P) which repeat profiles characteristic of those pathologies (again, one the reverse of the other), in such a way that in the 4th period -to take it as an example- we find grouped, product of no coincidence, the prototypical psychotic (or schizoid, Sch) drive positions of total disconnection from or loss of contact with reality ($m-$), of refusal of the need to be loved ($h-$) with the subsequent indifference towards objects, and of identification with God the Father ($e+$) in the maximum Ego-expansion ($p+$) of the delusion of grandeur.

Schotte's work, what he has accomplished for the theoretical validation of Szondi's instrument by making explicit the formal perfection of his seminal pathoanalytic intuitive schema, constitutes a model-to-follow for us while facing our chosen task of theoretically validating Rorschach's test by thoroughly pondering the

formal merits inherent in his own intuitively created perceptanalytic schema, at the same time making our own Mélon's purpose of "trouve[r] dans le vecteur du moi (Sch) une manière de boussole pour explorer les domaines du Rorschach et en dresser comme une carte de géographie nouvelle". The pertinence of this contention of ours is subsumed in the fact that, as already sharply noted by Schachtel above, *both procedures are entirely compatible being in their essence truly 'projective' methods*: if -just as Rorschach's *Erlebnistypus*- Szondi's Ego (Sch) vector is the matrix core of the whole experiment

	C	S	P	Sch
1	m+	li+	e-	p-
2	d-	s-	hy+	k+
3	d+	s+	hy-	k-
4	m-	li-	e+	p+

Figure 3. Schotte's periodical table of drives.

(cf. Mélon and Ellenberger above), according to Schotte's (1981 p. 76) drive-circuit theory the *p*(aranoid) factor is again its essential one constituting the *alpha* and *omega* of Ego development and beyond of the entire personality structure, its most *originary* need from the ontological point of view - just as Rorschach's *B*. We do not know about other "projective techniques", somebody still has to demonstrate that, but concerning the Rorschach and the Szondi it is a fact that in essence both are of a truly *projective* nature according to the paranoid pathoanalytic prototype. We just have to build a last connecting bridge between the two of them by introducing a rather neglected author from the point of view of his paramount importance for Rorschach theory.

D) Our original contribution

1. Zulliger the intuitive heir

"En dehors de la thèse de MELON [1976], aucune recherche n'a jamais été entreprise qui permettrait de jeter des ponts entre Szondi et Rorschach. Certes la

pratique assidue des deux tests suggère de multiples rapprochements possibles voire plausibles mais faute de vérification statistique valable et de réflexion sérieuse, toutes ces impressions fugaces se réduisent en idées inconsistantes qui finissent par s'évanouir.."

Martine Stassart (1994, p. 112)

In his 1969 book "The Rorschach Systems", trying to find an explanation for the division in the Rorschach ranks into partially opposing schools, Exner finds unfortunate that "...none of the authors of the five [U.S.] Systems... had any direct experience with Hermann Rorschach" (p. 7), adding that "it is arduous to predict the extent to which any of these Systems might have developed had Rorschach lived longer or had [his personal associates] Oberholzer, Morgen-thaler, or Roemer assumed a more active leadership in Rorschach research" (p. 12). The importance of Hans Zulliger¹¹⁹ (whom he does not mention) as Rorschach's main scientific heir resides precisely in the fact that he is the *only* author to have fulfilled both conditions, being consequently able to make a fundamental contribution in the sense of attaining the systematization originally aimed at by his Master: not only did he undergo his training analysis with Rorschach (and not with M. Oberholzer: Rorschach 2004 p. 401 footnote 2, comp. Kuhn -one of the former's disciples- in press Pt. Ia) and learn the method from the man himself (see below), but his works and influence amount to a "System" in Exner's sense pretty much comparable to the Rapaport-Schafer one (Zulliger-Salomon System: Peralta 1995b). His own disciple Salomon makes some key points in his "Biographical Remarks" about our author:

...Soon after the publication of the above-mentioned work, Zulliger [1921/1930, 1921/ 1940-41; and precisely due to its merits] became a member of the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society [Rorschach 2004, p. 401 footnote 2]; he held the post of secretary for many years. Through his friend, Dr. Emil Oberholzer, Zulliger met Dr. Hermann Rorschach at the Swiss Psychoanalytic Society. He soon became his student and friend. He was probably Rorschach's only surviving immediate disciple and friend, to the end of his life engaged in further elaborating on the latter's test and developing it... In the entire international Rorschach literature, there is hardly any writer who contributed more than did Zulliger to the further development and deepening of this excellent psychodiagnostic instrument. Remaining to the end of his life faithful to the creator of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, in the application of his theories to the analysis of children and to the general problems of mental

¹¹⁹ About the man personally let us just say that Zulliger was, no doubt, a multitalented spirit with touches of genius. He began his career as a "simple" schoolteacher, profession he maintained for almost 50 years until his retirement despite his other increasing responsibilities. But soon enough his other gifts became apparent in his practice: he was –alongside with M. Klein and A. Freud– one of the pioneers in the at that time virgin field of child psychotherapy and child psychoanalysis (play technique; see his 1st book: 1921/1930, 1921/1940-41), and excelled also in literature (prized several times by the Swiss Schiller Foundation) besides the profound mark he left in Rorschach research; as he put it himself in true fairy-tale fashion in his sincere and brief autobiography included in the Spanish translation of one of his books (1962), "at my cradle seem to have been present several protective deities for whose favors I should feel grateful" (pp. 5-9, our translation). For more detailed biographical data see also: Kasser 1963, Salomon 1969, and Anzieu 1972.

hygiene, he behaved in the same way toward his teacher, Rorschach. The formal psychogram remained for him the basis of the test evaluation... Starting very early, Zulliger has continued the work that Rorschach, who unfortunately died quite young, had begun-namely, to integrate successfully psychoanalytic insights into test theory and practice. Some of the special circumstances of his own psychoanalytic and psychological work served him particularly well in this endeavor. After 1912, he lived in Ittigen, a suburb of Bern, and was thus able to observe, often for several decades, the further development of subjects whom he had once tested [and followed year by year as pupils, as well as eventually their own children and grandchildren (1962 p. 8)]. In addition, he himself treated, psychoanalytically or psychotherapeutically, many children and adolescents whom he had previously tested. There is hardly any psychologist who worked with the form-interpretation test under such exceptionally favorable conditions... There is probably no single area in the utilization of the form-interpretation test to which Zulliger did not make his own personal contribution. (1969, pp. 4-5)

Such a close teacher-disciple personal relationship makes a strong identification with the Master's original concepts and work understandable, and makes of Zulliger's own life-long work the most suitable way, the 'Via Regia' to reach (by deduction or reconstructive induction) some key, seminal concepts remained obscure or fragmentary in the former's sparse written legacy.

One important extra, mutually shared trait seems to have played a key role in this presumed identification: just as Rorschach, Zulliger was a highly talented artistic personality; as he avowed himself...

Actually I would have liked to become a painter or a musician. But as a son of a modest family I clearly saw that I could not undertake any profession that would not provide immediate earnings... *Already during my high school times my drawing professor, who had noticed my inclination, thought that I had talent for the plastic arts and that I should become a painter.* In Teachers College I played the violin passionately, dreaming about becoming a musician. According to my mood, I dedicated myself alternatively to both arts. During the time of military service at the frontiers I discovered in me, unexpectedly, another disposition. A young female school teacher, whom I had met at the time of my formation, asked me on the occasion of a weekend leave to search in the Bern bookstores for some good Christmas verses. I was disappointed at only finding a few in a very childish language. Then, some morning of inspiration I wrote several verses, little legends-half a dozen-. I sent them to the teacher. Afterwards, my school inspector found the copies on my table; he considered them worthy of publication and they appeared in the "Berner Schulblatt" [Bernese School Bulletin]. So began my literary career... (1962, pp. 6-7; our translation, italics added)

In our opinion precisely because of this plastic-artistic talent, besides other emphases in his wide-covering Rorschach practice Zulliger is particularly known by his persistent researches on the perceptual-formal, psychologically meaningful features

of the matter itself on which this method is based -the *inkblots*- as demonstrated not only in the fact of having been the scientific supervisor of the printing process of successive editions of Rorschach's original plates (Friedemann 1956, Huber 1956), but also in his publications about Behn-Eschenburg's parallel series ("BeRo": Zulliger 1941/1956) as well as about his most important scientific contribution: his own personal inkblot series or "Z-Test" (1948-54/1969 pp. 15-21). Let us look at some quotations from him that reflect his experiences in this domain:

Since the need of a parallel series quickly obtrudes on any form interpretation tester, many of them have wanted to make one themselves. They were then disappointed because entirely different factor relationships resulted from the series made by them than from the first experiment with the Ro-series [like with Roemer]. Many then turned away completely from the form interpretation test because they believed it was unreliable. The trouble with the individual parallel series lay in their lack of standardization. It is not simply a matter of making ten agreeable black and colored pictures. This is not to say that it is impossible to create a parallel series - only that to do so requires considerable work. We know that Behn and Rorschach chose the ten cards of the Bero-series from a very great number of ink blots. They sought pictures which, in their characteristics, corresponded as nearly as possible to those of the Ro-series. These were later partly replaced by others because it had been shown that they were not suitable. The Bero-series was of course - to test its usability - given to a great number of persons for whom there already were Ro-protocols, in order to compare the results. From such very carefully carried out comparisons the new (Bero-) series finally resulted. The following table shows how very important the *standardization* of a parallel series is. I prepared a parallel series whose individual cards corresponded in my eyes to those of the Ro-series in size, arrangement of the blot, distribution of color, etc. Then I tested the series... The comparison shows that there is a rather far-reaching agreement between the factors of the Bero- and Ro-tests, in contrast to which the unstandardized test produced "false" results in many respects, that is results which could not be directly compared to the values found in the other two tests... Tested against reality, the findings from the Bero-test and the Ro-test are in much better agreement. (1941/1956, pp. 85-87)

The Zulliger Group Test was originally created in 1942 for the Swiss Army Psycho-logical Service... At first, the Army Psychological Service had intended to use the existing form-interpretation tests, such as the Rorschach and Behn-Rorschach card series... This would have required too much time... Therefore, the attempt was made to test simultaneously entire groups of officer candidates, etc. The possibility was discussed of projecting a card series upon a screen and also of a method that would permit the recording of the answers. However, the cards proved to be too complicated for such an undertaking. The objection was further raised that the methods prescribed by the creators of the tests could not be changed without leading to serious errors. Therefore, the plan to project some of the cards in the existing picture series was abandoned. We were in need of a form-interpretation test which, while not drawn from the

existing series, would lend itself to the testing of groups consisting of as many as 30-60 subjects. For this purpose, I selected four ink blots from among 600 ink blots that I myself had made. They were tried out on a large number of subjects, and compared with the corresponding individual tests (Rorschach or Behn-Rorschach Tests) for the respective subjects. Certain flaws were then discovered in the series. Thereupon, from some 400 additional ink blots, two more were selected that stimulated the kinesthetic responses particularly well. This series of six was again tried out on a significant number of subjects, just as the series of four had been. The series of six proved to be usable. The attempt could be made to reduce it to three pictures; and in its practical application the reduced series also proved to be usable. Thus, at present, the final test apparatus consists of three pictures. They have been standardized with a large sample (800 subjects) and they have proven to be reliable. (1948-54/1969, pp. 8-9)

Before examining it in detail for our purposes, let us begin by locating this Zulliger-created set in its due place in history. The quality and universality of Rorschach's contribution sharply divided the history of the scientific use of inkblots in two moments: pre- and post-Rorschach. His forerunners, already discussed (pp. 231s), are of less interest to us here. After him however, no one could publish a new inkblot series without reference to and without taking a stand towards his work. Conversely, there has prevailed along the years in traditional Rorschach practice a strong skepticism against the new inkblot series inspired by H. Rorschach's one (1921/1967 chap. I, and despite his assertion on p. 52 that "...I do not mean to claim that this series is a 'non plus ultra' "; see for ex. Simón H. 1993, pp. 86-87), perhaps since the very beginnings with the opportunistic contentions of Stern's series (1937, 1938; cf. Ellenberger, 1954/1995 p. 72) or with the reserves generated by Römer's misleading method (1938; cf. Morgenthaler 1943, O. Rorschach 1944/1967). If it is true that this almost instinctive refusal has become eventually justified in more modern times (Holtzman & al. 1961/1971, Dubey & Cassell 1993), in other instances it has treated in an entirely unfair way very valuable contributions which integrate themselves organically with the original project explicitly sketched by Rorschach (1921/1967 chap. III) as it has happened with the BeRo parallel series and as it continues to happen with Zulliger's test.

Actually, all the new blot series must not be lumped together and confused with each other since they are not equal. They belong to three distinct types (see Table 2) and, curiously enough, each one is represented by a direct disciple of Rorschach who each time provided the

Table 2

Classification According to the Goal Pursued of the Inkblot Series Inspired by H. Rorschach's

Year ^a	Author(s) ^b	Name (number of images)

<u>Alternate</u>		
1921/1938	Römer	Symboltest (8)
1932/1938	Struve (& Stern)	Cloud-Images Test (3)
1953	Howard	Howard Ink Blot Test (12)
1958/1961	Holtzman et al.	Holtzman Inkblot Technique (HIT: 45 × 2)
1980/1990	Cassell	Somatic Inkblot Series (SIS: I=20; II=31×2)

<u>Parallel</u>		
1921/1941	Behn-Eschenburg (& Zulliger)	Behn-Rorschach Test (BeRo: 10)
1945	Harrower-Erickson & Steiner	Psychodiagnostic Inkblots (10)
1938/1958	Drey-Fuchs	Fuchs-Rorschach Test (FuRo: 10)
1963/1970	Kataguchi	Kataguchi-Rorschach Test (KaRo: 10)
1990	Parisi & Pes	Tavole Parallele (10)

<u>Complementary</u>		
1930	Furrer	Klecksbildern (4)
194?/1948	Levy (& Rust)	Finger Paintings (7)
1948/1954	Zulliger (& Salomon)	Zulliger Test (3)
1984/1990-1	Rodrigues I. (& Jiménez G.)	Láminas Proyectivas (3)

a = Year of publication: original (oral or written) / definitive (written).

b = The parentheses indicate a separate publication.

prototype¹²⁰: we should call *alternates* those inkblots whose creators contend, like Römer, that they can replace the classical 10 having surpassed them in one way or another (cf. the ones mentioned above) and that vary enormously in the number of images that compose the respective sets; others, like the Behn-Rorschach test (in whose elaboration intervened Rorschach himself: 1919/1967; Zulliger 1941/1956 pp. 7, 85, 200; Ellenberger 1954/1995 p. 70; Behn-Eschenburg 1955), that only present themselves as *parallel* to the original ones (therefore composed in principle by 10 plates) and that must be judged each by their own merits in this sense (see Parisi 1993); and finally there is a separate class, the *complementary* blots, that basing on Rorschachian principles are elaborated having in mind specific applications (generally towards research) that would help in exploring and clarifying particular areas of the method, class this one to which belongs Zulliger's material.

Truth be told, Zulliger's series in particular has deserved -although with a very unequal geographical share- acceptance in general from projective psychologists (the inclusion of a session dedicated exclusively to its study in every International Rorschach Congress so demonstrates), in any case more than any other inkblot series directly or indirectly derived from H. Rorschach's one. The problem is general opinion today still holds it for *nothing more than* an insignificant brief technique, superficial but valid, to choose in certain circumstances for a mere orientation assessment previous to a deeper evaluation (Eble, Fernald & Graziano 1963, and Lefkowitz 1968, the only two articles on the subject appeared in the influential *Journal of Personality Assessment* of U.S.A. where the Z-Test continues to be entirely disregarded; in French-speaking Europe: Anzieu & Chabert 1983, chap. III.7 p. 124); such certainly seem to have been the modest contentions of its creator (Zulliger 1948-1954/1969, pp. 9-12, 485-487), but just as it originally happened with H. Rorschach the results obtained reached farther beyond the initial expectations, demonstrating once again that intuition has no substitute in Human Sciences (Binswanger 1923/1967, p. 236). Gradually, isolated authors that bothered to try it have recognized that, on the contrary, Zulliger's series is *particularly sensitive* (Zulliger 1953, 1969 Pt. I chap. 10; Salomon 1959ab, 1962 pp. 11-15, 1963b; Vogel 1959; Bohm 1975/1978 chap. 2 Table 2; Hiltmann 1971/1973; and Simón H. 1973ab), in a way maybe even more so than Rorschach's: this because "*the less in quantity is brilliantly compensated through the more in quality*" (Salomon 1962 p. 13, our translation). Let us give an illustrative comparison of the idea we want to pass through, for as the saying goes 'an image is worth a thousand words': with the development of computers, that very useful contemporary electronic instrument, the variety of equipments has appeared and an user can justifiably choose today between an ample and comfortable *desktop* machine or a compact and practical *laptop* equipment, each one with its own particular distinctive features (advantages and disadvantages); the former, following a natural evolution, has legitimately given origin and place to the latter which came along to

¹²⁰ It is a scarcely known fact that Rorschach used to administer his test to his disciples (G. Behn-Eschenburg, 1955 p. 3) and motivated them, following his example, to elaborate their own set of plates since "les taches d'encre devaient contenir quelque chose d'intimement personnel aux yeux de celui qui était invité à y réagir" (Ellenberger 1954/1995 pp. 38-39, 58-59). So steered in this way, Georg A. Römer, Hans Behn-Eschenburg and Hans Zulliger (cf. Ellenberger pp. 45, 48), each at their own time, all developed their own prototypical inkblot series.

stay, without implying that it is going to replace the original since comparatively both have their particular applications. Pushing our metaphor a little farther, since technological research in this domain tends progressively more towards miniaturization and towards the inverse relationship volume/efficiency, it has resulted at present that advances are often transferred *in reversed sense* from the laptop to the desktop, fact that is already also a possibility only partially realized in the relation between Zulliger's abbreviated series and H. Rorschach's original one (cf. above all Hiltmann 1971/1973, pp. 327-328; and Salomon, 1959a pp. 286-287 & 293-294, 1962 pp. 11 & 13-14).

We have just mentioned *intuition*. Before passing to our thorough analysis of Zulliger's series and reveal what it can brilliantly contribute to the theoretical systematization and validation of Rorschach's method, let us quote some passages from his disciple Salomon's recollections (1963b) on the former's conception of intuition that we will come back to in the next and final section:

...One of his pieces of advice in-between given to me...: "When in your psychological work and even in life you meet with unusual things and you simply have no time to think about them but react directly in an intuitive way, afterwards you must unconditionally try to make the process theoretically clear to yourself. In case they are things that happen to yourself, it will become a question of a piece of self-analysis. We all need that anyway from time to time. If you have acted intuitively in a psychopedagogical situation, then it is of quite special importance that you try to clarify your intuition with the help of the psychoanalytic theory. In this sense intuition is a gift that one possesses or not. As positive possession it becomes dangerous however if it is not seriously supervised and controlled for a long while, let us say for two years approximately. Somehow it is about a shortened thought process on the basis however of all possible experiences, scientific knowledge and practical professional experiences." (p. 54)

So many a reader of his publications about psychoanalytical problems might have perhaps asked himself the question of why so few purely theoretical disquisitions are to be found among these. I myself have often asked him this question and this above all because he has so often explained to me psychological connections in purely theoretical form with wonderful clarity. His answer practically always amounts to the same: "When one presents people the issue in too abstract a form, maybe they know it this way but then cannot apply it practically because they don't understand it simultaneously with feeling. I am no man of theory, and I have really acquired and somehow newly formulated much of my scientific knowledge through practice only, basing mostly on Freud's work. I believe my experiences are supposed to offer so much more only the more rarely they happen in the psychoanalytic literature according to my view and the best they correspond to my nature." I do not believe that this is the whole truth. If one reads through carefully his books and essays, one becomes astonished by the fact of how he succeeds again and again in presenting the most complicated theoretical connections in a simple and

picture-like language, so that one could easily compare it with the creations of a writer. It is seemingly his great artistic disposition that unconsciously has prevented him from making use himself more often of a purely abstract form of communication. (pp. 62-3)

2. Systematization: a definitive breakthrough in Rorschach theory¹²¹

"Lier, c'est bien;
Déliier, c'est mieux;
Relier, c'est parfait!"

Gaston Bachelard (cited in Mélon 1976, p. IV)

" 'Having' and 'being' in children. Children like expressing an object-relation by an identification: 'I *am* the object.' '*Having*' is the later of the two; after loss of the object it relapses into '*being*'. Example: the breast. 'The breast is a part of me, I am the breast.' Only later: 'I have it'-that is, 'I am not it' ..."

Sigmund Freud (1941/1964 p. 299; italics added)

Our main position, as gradually explicated above in the previous parts of this chapter, is that by a mainly atheoretical or "empirical" attempt to amend and complete the avowedly inconclusive work of the Master mainly in the sense of the revision of the formal (structural) grid of analysis of his method (while the most urgent, concluding task for him was precisely its theoretical foundation), the so-called "systematizers" have overlooked the seminal *theoretical and systematic* aspects certainly already present in Rorschach's original scoring schema and consequently each in turn has arrived to scientifically questionable and most of the time unlasting results. On our side we do believe there is a close relation between true systematization and theorization (cf. Guillaume p. 204 above, compare Di Paola 1997 Introduction), and -as surprising and anachronistic as it may sound- that there actually was from the beginning an intuitive (implicit) *systematic* conception behind Rorschach's original establishment of the schematic (formal) aspect of his method, that the latter already contains in its original version the germ of its own global structural foundation with no need of external additions or corrections: in his case (as we have demonstrated elsewhere: Peralta, 1995b), psychoanalytic theory prepared the soil for the creation of a specific -although incipient- perceptanalytic Rorschach *theory*. It is all this core aspect of Rorschach's original thought that we will make explicit in what follows.

As we have already hinted at, Rorschach (1921/1967) indeed postulated a number of definite formal categories which, curiously enough, always organize into a

¹²¹ This part of the work was originally delivered at the Zulliger Workshop of the XIVth International Rorschach Congress (Lisboa, July 1993), to honor Hans Zulliger in his birth centenary.

triadic schema (purposely leaving content aside) that allows the psychological analysis of the responses to his plates: these were *-in their exact order each time-* the locations **G - D - Dd**¹²² (*Zw* and *Do* were originally considered to be just subtypes of the latter: chap. II.6.b) on the one hand, and the determinants **B - F - Fb** (chap. II.5; he introduced Light-Dark only later -posthumous case-study i.e. chap. VII.A- being baptized since as *Hd* by Binder: Schachtel 1966, pp. 75-77) on the other; and, more importantly, as expected of a true system he clearly established the existence of particular interrelationships between them (for ex.: *G-B, D-Fb, B:Fb*). In our opinion these schematic (formal) intuitions of his were nothing less than *essential* in the unfolding of Rorschach's thought, particularly this latter (determinants) crucial triadic series which he decidedly favored as the perfectly *symmetrical, spatial* structure of his whole work over the former temporal (locations) series that we will reevaluate later on. Two psychiatrists personal acquaintances of Rorschach at his time, both phenomenologists (cf. Ellenberger, 1954/1995 p. 78), can help us to introduce the subject: first Minkowski (1936) on *space*...

La classification des phénomènes psychiques a été toujours une source d'étonnement pour moi... En d'autres termes quel est l'instrument, si l'on peut dire, à l'aide duquel nous effectuons ce découpage et cette classification?... Le même état de choses se traduit par cette sorte de malaise que je ressens en présence de la triade psychologique habituelle, que nous nous servions des termes: **intelligence, affectivité, volonté** [gras ajouté], pour la désigner, ou que nous options pour d'autres expressions proposées dans ce but. Ce malaise vient de la divergence qui se manifeste entre les prétendus éléments de la vie psychique et cette vie elle-même, prise dans son ensemble. Nous n'arrivons pas à reconstituer celle-ci avec ceux-là... Pourtant les notions auxquelles fait appel la triade psychologique paraissent intelligibles. Nous parlons couramment de perceptions, de sentiments et de volitions. Il ne suffit donc point de dire que ces notions n'épuisent point la vie mentale dans son ensemble ou qu'il existe un désaccord foncier entre elles et cette vie. Il faut en outre tenir compte de ce qu'elles ont une certaine raison d'être et expliquer, par la suite, comment elles ont pu surgir dans notre esprit... Il est donc indispensable de rechercher une corrélation plus étroite entre les éléments de la triade psychologique, admise en surface, et des particularités plus essentielles de la vie qui formeraient alors comme une triade en profondeur. Mais où pareil essai peut-il nous mener?

Il est question de "triade", et ce nombre de trois nous choque tout d'abord par ce qu'il a de contingent en lui. Pourquoi justement trois, pourquoi ni plus ni moins?... De là l'étonnement en présence de la triade psychologique, le "trois" étant considéré, par habitude, tout naturellement, comme un élément de la série numérique. Mais ne peut-il être considéré que de cette façon? La triade, à y regarder de plus près, a quelque chose de plausible en elle, elle paraît même, à la réflexion, inhérente à la réalité psychique. On dirait qu'elle exprime un côté essentiel de celle-ci. Certes, on a essayé de ramener les uns aux autres les éléments de cette triade. Ces tentatives, cependant, n'ont

¹²² In the case of this triad, it concerns the locations *sequence* (proto)type –so implying a certain *temporal* order– called “normal” by him (chap. II.6.a): whole, detail, and small (rare) detail responses respectively.

qu'une portée toute secondaire en regard du caractère compréhensif de la triade admise couramment. C'est dire qu'elle a certainement plus qu'une valeur purement conventionnelle et empirique, qu'elle a sûrement quelque chose de nécessaire et d'absolu en elle. Mais cela n'est possible que si le "trois" de la triade n'est point appliqué du dehors aux phénomènes psychiques, que si, en d'autres termes, il n'est pas le résultat d'une numération, mais, au contraire, émane d'une façon beaucoup plus immédiate de la vie psychique, c'est-à-dire que celle-ci donne elle-même le sens de «l'être au nombre de trois», fournissant ainsi spontanément la base première et profonde de la classification des phénomènes psychiques [cf. Schotte p. # above, where he resorts to the ex. of the 3 grammatical 'persons']... Le besoin de souligner le caractère profond de la triade ne s'en fait sentir que plus vivement. C'est là que notre regard s'arrête à un phénomène qui semble renfermer une triade essentielle en lui. Ce phénomène est **l'espace avec ses trois dimensions** [gras ajouté]...

L'idée de s'adresser à l'espace pour y rechercher le fondement de la triade psychologique surprend tout d'abord. Elle va à l'encontre de la conception usuelle qui voit justement dans l'espace la forme propre uniquement à la réalité matérielle et qui lui oppose la vie psychique avec ses caractères spécifiques, en insistant plus particulièrement sur sa nature aspatiale. Mais, d'une part, l'espace géométrique n'est peut-être pas, comme nous avons eu l'occasion de le dire, la forme primitive de la spatialité et, d'autre part, il reste ce fait incontestable et digne vraiment d'intérêt que nous nous servons couramment et le plus naturellement du monde, sans la moindre appréhension de commettre ainsi une grave erreur logique, de prétendus qualificatifs de nature spatiale pour désigner certains côtés propres aux phénomènes psychiques. C'est ainsi que nous parlons de la *grandeur* ou de *l'élévation* d'une action, de la *profondeur* d'un sentiment ou d'une pensée, de *l'étendue* de nos connaissances ou de la *largeur* ou de *l'étroitesse* de nos idées. Nous pouvons dire aussi que la volonté sert à nous élever, que les sentiments servent à approfondir et les connaissances à élargir notre vie. C'est ici que se pose la question de savoir comment nous arrivons à transposer ainsi des données empruntées à l'espace dans un domaine qui paraît être entièrement opposé à celui-ci, ou, pour poser de suite le problème de la façon dont il doit être posé à notre avis, comment, après avoir pénétré le sens primitif de ces qualités primordiales, arrivons-nous à leur donner aussi bien un sens spatial qu'un sens spirituel. Nous n'examinerons pas ici en détail la question que nous venons de poser. Pour l'instant, il nous suffit d'avoir dégagé quelques points essentiels susceptibles d'orienter dans une nouvelle voie une étude de cet ordre, c'est-à-dire d'avoir indiqué une base plus profonde de la triade psychologique. Si, comme nous le disions plus haut, la classification courante des faits psychiques en pensées, sentiments et volitions, n'est qu'un reflet superficiel d'une plus profonde organisation tripartite de la réalité psychique (de même que de l'espace vécu), c'est vers cette organisation que devront nous mener nos études, la tridimensionalité traversant maintenant le cosmos tout entier; (Chap. 4)

then his colleague Binswanger (1947/1971, comp. Verdeaux 1972) on *symmetry*:

Nous commencerons par étudier la pensée: "fondée aussi sur la figure de l'homme". L'auteur paraphrase ainsi ce fondement de la symétrie: "Nous la voulons surtout en largeur, parce que c'est le sens où les hommes eux-mêmes sont symétriques" [cf. Rorschach 2004 p. 316, re pl. VI]... "L'image de notre présence corporelle" n'est donc pas, en effet, quelque chose de seulement immobile, mais bien quelque chose de mobile, d'animé à gauche et à droite [vers l'introversivité et vers l'extratensivité, *B* et *Fb* respectivement], vers le haut et vers le bas [vers la dilatation et vers la coartation, c-à-d. selon la force des *F*: comparer Schachtel 1966 pp. 75-77]. Cela, cependant, est une des raisons principales pour laquelle l'image corporelle de notre présence est, au plein sens du terme, décisive, c'est-à-dire déterminant la norme de notre présence dans sa *totalité* pour ce qu'elle a "de mobile et d'animé", de psychique et de spirituel... Cela, Eugène Minkowski l'a déjà reconnu dans son ouvrage *Vers une Cosmologie* (1936, voir "La triade psychologique")... Que non seulement l'étendue et l'étroitesse [la symétrie], mais encore la hauteur et la largeur appartiennent à la nature de l'homme cela, il le doit bien, au premier chef, à la marche et à la "station" debout. De plus, il faut ajouter qu'il ne tient pas les deux choses de naissance mais qu'il doit les apprendre... La verticale, "le psychisme ascensionnel", comme dit Bachelard, est et demeure pour l'homme la dimension significative de l'effort, **de la volonté** [gras ajouté]... Une telle "psychologie" appelée aujourd'hui anthropologie ne tombera pas non plus dans le travers consistant à considérer empiriquement "l'image de notre présence corporelle" comme la *cause* de l'image de notre présence au monde psychique et spirituel, elle reconnaîtra bien plutôt qu'ici il ne peut s'agir de cause ni d'effet et surtout pas d'un *prius* ni d'un *posterius* temporel, mais seulement d'un *a priori* du "plan de construction" de la structure totale de l'être-homme [ou du *Formdeutversuch* qui doit justement la refléter]... Nous le voyons: la symétrie n'est pas quelque chose qui est, ou doit être, agréable à l'œil ou à l'oreille grâce à la simple correspondance des "termes" évidents, mais qui doit son propre être à la conformité avec un **troisième terme** [gras ajouté] motivant ou "portant" la correspondance des parties [pp. 227-230]... Hermann Rorschach a fait à ce propos la démonstration de son génie visionnaire en choisissant pour ses "formes fortuites" des images symétriques et cela en prenant en considération la réalisation de certaines conditions de la rythmique **spatiale**... [p. 233 note en bas 15, gras ajouté].

So, even if unaware of it Rorschach was obviously inspired by this triadic classification originary from Heinroth in Germany a century earlier (Ellenberger

1963/1995, pp. 167-8, 177-8¹²³) of the main mental faculties: intellect (or thought, represented by the *B* and located by him to the left), affectivity (represented by the *Fb* and located in an opposing position to the right), and will (corresponding to the *F* and placed in the axial, central position just as Binswanger did)¹²⁴; according to Silberstein (1987 pp. 33-4) this tridimensional classification reached Rorschach through his revered teacher E. Bleuler¹²⁵, and according to Ellenberger its left-right, spatial organizing principle through Jung. On a very careful reading it becomes evident that this symmetric, triadic spatial structure played a crucial and ubiquitous role in "*Psychodiagnostik*" (1921/1967¹²⁶) and, by inductive logic, in Rorschach's entire thinking process: we can trace it through the nuclear left-right (*B : Fb*) composition of *Erlebnistypus* described in chap. IV.4 (compare Schachtel 1966, pp. 76-77), through the presentation order of the determinants in the psychograms of all of his cases in chap. V (cf. Oberholzer 1958 p. 504), through his experience balance Tables in chap.

¹²³ Following precisely the thorough historical, source-tracking model of Ellenberger, here we are forced to moderate somewhat his own opinion (and also Kuhn's 1944, whom he quotes earlier on p. 55) –probably based on a measure of profound admiration– about the extreme originality of Rorschach's thought, just as we did with Piotrowski (section B.1 above): "*L'Erlebnistypus* (type de résonance intime) constitue le concept central du *Psychodiagnostik* tout entier. C'est un concept complètement nouveau, qui n'a pas d'équivalent dans la psychologie occidentale moderne" (1954/1995 p. 66).

¹²⁴ Minkowska (1956/1972) presents however a different partition: "...En partant des matériaux des planches, le sujet, pour reconstruire le monde perçu, fait intervenir d'une façon immédiate: 1° des facteurs intellectuels, représentés dans le test avant tout par les réponses de forme [*F*]; 2° l'élément affectif représenté par les réponses de couleur [*Fb*]; 3° l'élément volitionnel-créeur, en rapport étroit avec les kinesthésies [*B*], ces trois ordres de faits étant évidemment intimement liés entre eux et formant un tout" (p. 71). Sharing the obvious 2° correlation, we disagree on the 1° and 3° whose formal representers are interchanged in our view: on the one hand, if for her it is "la valeur conceptuelle de la pensée [=intellect], valeur qui préside à l'élaboration de la forme" (p. 210) many other experts have proved her wrong with a clearly established identification *B*-thought (particularly Mélon, cf. below); and on the other hand, Rorschach himself (1921/1967 chap. IV.1&2) found and explicitly reported a more direct correlation between will and *F* rather than *B*: "celui qui *veut* consciemment donner des réponses-mouvement fournit des interprétations qui ne sont pas nettes" (p. 58).

¹²⁵ With the following comment Ellenberger (1958, pp. 93-4) seems to give complete reason to Silberstein: "New developments as well as new problems arose from the progress of psychology in the eighteenth century. The psychological frame of reference which is generally used today dates from this time. Psychological manifestations were divided [by Heinroth: see his previous reference] into three major groups or 'faculties'—intellect, affectivity, and will... This psychological frame of reference gradually superseded that of the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages and was adopted by the psychiatrists of the beginning of the nineteenth century. They soon began systematically to investigate mental conditions with this new instrument, which facilitated the definition of certain elementary mental disturbances... Even Bleuler's concept of schizophrenia is a late offspring of eighteenth-century psychology".

¹²⁶ The Editors of Rorschach's "Correspondence" (2004) have this to say about the last of the three manuscripts on which the book was based: "In the lecture of November 1919 is dealt with the new mutual proportion of movement and color responses. Obviously H.R[orschach]. shows based on a schema the distribution of findings with reference to movement and color responses in various mental disturbances and in normal test subjects. It can be assumed that this schema largely corresponds to the one used later in the *Psychodiagnostik*" (p. 183, our translation).

VIII (from *Table IX* on¹²⁷), and finally through the interpretive table -visually very symmetrical- of the posthumously published Oberholzer's case (chap. VII.A.3 p. 236¹²⁸) that Klopfer eventually popularized as the determinants bar-graph in his tabulation sheet.

Even more, and to our knowledge this discovery finds itself nowhere else in the literature, beyond the book this symmetric-triadic organizing principle of Rorschach dictated also *a priori* the spatial structure of the test material itself visible not only in the construction of each inkblot (*Raumrhythmik*: Binswanger above) but found again in an equivalent, obviously purposeful *general symmetry* (*Zeitrhythmik*: cf. Simmel p. 75 above) of the plate series as a whole (here we disagree with Beck, 1945 p. 37, and Klijnhout, 1951 pp. 669-70; cf. Schotte 1963/1990, p. 35) which immediately explains the for a long time remained very enigmatic presenting order of his blots (1921/1967 chap. I.1, cf. also 2004 p. 339): 'reading' the plates *from left to right* (see Fig. 4), we have first I to III respectively as the *B* plates (Rorschach chap. II.5.b, examples; Bohm, 1951/1958 p. 32, 1951/1972 chap. 4.A.1.2.b; Piotrowski 1957, pp. 151-2; Loosli-Usteri 1958/1969, chap. III.B.3; Rapaport et al., 1945-6/68 p. 360), then IV to VII as the predominantly *F*-suggesting (Rorschach, chap. III.1), finally VIII to X obviously as the *Fb* ones (Rorschach chap. II.5.c, examples; cf. about the whole mutual interplay also chap. VII.A.2 pp. 219-21, Piotrowski pp. 318-9 & 465, and Silberstein 1991 pp. 50-51). We know now that Rorschach was from the beginning concerned about the ideal number of images (and their mutual, internal balance from the point of view of the 3 original determinants they suggested) which would compose his practical test: originally there were 15 (3×5) plates (Ellenberger 1954/1995, p. 70; Exner 1974/2003, p. 9), but apparently in an attempt to attain a more manageable set for routine clinical practice -and *not* due to a publisher's demand as Ellenberger had assumed- he spontaneously reduced their number first to 12 (3×4, no coincidence: Exner, 1999 p. 7, 2000 p. 8, 1974/2003 p. 9; Oberholzer, 1968 p. 506) until he finally reached the

¹²⁷ Consider this eloquent portion of a IV/18/21 letter of Rorschach to Morgenthaler (1919-21/1999) on editorial issues concerning his book: "...With Table IX, pg. 65, I have placed the heading under the Table, not above (like the previous four tables), *to draw attention to the structure of the table and not directly to the contents of the table*. I would prefer if it would stay this way even if the issue is of no great importance to me" (p. 44, italics and boldface added; for obvious reasons we disagree with the last sentence); this paragraph was deleted in the more recent volume of "Correspondence" (Rorschach 2004, p. 323).

¹²⁸ In our opinion Rorschach was progressively gaining conscience of the key theoretical importance of his symmetric structure and used this schema more frequently towards the end of his life, just as this his last case-study lecture of II/18/22 demonstrates (cf. Rorschach 2004, letter 217 p. 414 and note 3 p. 419; and Zulliger 1949, pp. 293 & 307-8). On the other hand this schema poses already implicitly an important unresolved theoretical issue, the *asymmetrical* location of the 4th and last discovered determinant (after the appearance of the book, 1921/1942 p. 208 our translation): "The fourth column, between the last mentioned [color] and the form column, contains... the light-dark [*Helldunkel*: *Hd*] interpretations, those in which a form interpretation tends in the direction of a color response", i.e. *B : F : Hd - Fb*; it is interesting to note how Klopfer tried to remedy this symmetric imperfection by placing different types of it on both sides of the central, *F* axis. This already points to a need of further elaborating the schema, issue which we will directly confront below.

round and present number of 10 (i.e. $3 + 4 + 3 = B : F : Fb$) (2004, pp. 146 & note 2, 229-30 point 4 & note 1, 434-5)¹²⁹. To



Figure 4. The 10 plates of the Rorschach Test, organized from left to right according to the spatial symmetric-triadic principle of the determinants: B - F - Fb. Copyright by Hans Huber Publishers. Reprinted by permission.

¹²⁹ What little we know about the issue of the 15-, 12-, or 10-plate series and furthermore about the reordering of these plates during this process of cutting-off tends to confirm our inductive assumption: for ex. the present plate V, which initially included two additional strongly *B*-suggesting separate upper details ("two divers making a jack-knife dive": see reproductions in Rorschach 1965/67 p. 244 and in Exner 1995 p. 2), as card III was originally part of the 1st *B*-third of the 15-plate series (Exner 1999, pp. 7-8) but when these details became deleted leaving it as an almost exclusively *F*-card it shifted its position to the corresponding middle-third of the series, i.e. card V of 10. In an enlightening personal conversation with Exner during the 1999 Amsterdam Intl. Rorschach Congress I asked him how was it known about the original card-ordering changes and he explained to me that thanks to the older 15- and 12-plate protocols still existing in the Rorschach Archives in which one could recognize usual responses from most of the cards; without giving away my own reconstruction of the facts I asked for his opinion about the principle behind this careful Rorschach ordering, and he was convinced that it had something to do with a series going from more "compact" to more "broken" blots: in our own opinion this is just a byproduct of the *Fb*-cards coming last and, paraphrasing Schotte's (1990 pp. 168-9) assessment of Szondi's original Ego-progression, we cannot accept that breaking-up "soit le *telos* du système".

Roemer, who always insisted on the shortcomings of the classical series by comparison to his own supposedly "improved" one, Rorschach in return repeatedly pointed to the latter's lack of precisely this symmetric, balanced quality¹³⁰: he asserted about his own plates...

...The test with new [i.e. different, parallel] plates perhaps will need again very much work; the [balanced] proportion between movement and color reactions, like the present series contains, is obviously particularly convenient and not so easy to put together again [p. 156]; (our translation)

prediction absolutely confirmed in Roemer's words:

Through the comparison of the impression, which the test subject makes in life, and the one he shows in the protocol, it seems quite clear to me that my own series might tend less to Bs and at the same time somewhat more to Fbs than yours. A common establishing of the shift still has not been possible to me until now. I have been able to record particular comparative findings and will record still more... [p. 380]; (our transl.)

findings on which Rorschach insisted from then on:

As certain as I feel that also many a finding comes out with your plates, I feel myself anyway just as uncertain with them and particularly intro[versivity] and extra[tensivity] turn out to be only uncertain due to the unequal conditions of both series for Fb and B [p. 398]... It simply isn't o.k. at all that one assumes the B-possibilities of my plates as twice as of yours etc. There are still so many nuances, and from there it's anyway quite difficult to estimate the introversive and the extratensive moments in their mutual proportion... It wouldn't make any difference if the experience were made first with mine [images]. Then one would obtain a quite more certain basis for the Experience Type and the number of B and Fb... [pp. 407 & 410] ...With the real B in my series however quite certainly go the FbF parallel... There should lay certainly differences between your and my series [p. 417] ...The differentiation modalities of extratensivity can be gathered rather sooner out of your series, are easier to gather than out of mine [p. 435]. (Our translation)

That said and to pass on to a more legitimate disciple, what about Zulliger's reaction to this his teacher's crucial albeit largely implicit *triadic* structural schema? Intuitively, he indeed seems to have assimilated it as reflected in the fact that while developing his own test he first arrived to 6 (3×2) usable pictures until he finally decided to select his condensed *three*-plate inkblot set (see Fig. 5). If we concentrate now on his own series keeping in mind the former discussion on the clearly established triad of determinants, there is one feature which immediately and intriguingly catches our eye as it has done with those of all the experts that have studied his test since its publication: the fully colored blot was positioned by him in the middle as plate II, instead than at the end like in Rorschach's original series; questioned on that point Zulliger, who was an intuitively enormously gifted practitioner rather than an

¹³⁰ Roemer even went as far as qualifying Rorschach's images as "grotesque" by contrast to his' (Rorschach 2004, pp. 433-4), something incomprehensible and rather plausible the other way around according to Binswanger's well-grounded view (1947/1971 p. 231: asymmetry = grotesque) and which Rorschach sternly and justifiedly refused.

explicit theoretician, answered with the very valid reason that otherwise it would be very difficult with his material to diagnose a color shock (1948-54/1969, chap. 1). If in quest for answers we shift now our attention to the complementary formal dimension (locations and their sequence) somewhat left aside by Rorschach, we will realize the above mentioned feature has as direct result that on administering the Z-Test, while it is indeed very easy on plate I with its multiple simple *G* possibilities, the impact of the different colors makes it very difficult if not impossible to obtain a good *G* to this middle plate II, finally resulting relatively less so on plate III requiring however some combinatory efforts (Zulliger, chap. 1; Simón H. 1973, pp. 139-141; cf. Piotrowski 1957, pp. 73-74): it just happens that, inadvertently (he made no reference to any previous author or theoretical consideration, besides the above mentioned practical reason), Zulliger has unfailingly reproduced in the sequence order of his plates the course in three acts of the development of human perception (“1° vue générale et confuse du tout; 2° vue distincte et analytique des parties; 3° recomposition synthétique du tout avec la connaissance que l’on a des parties”, in the words of Renan 1890 p. 301) that Dworetzki (1939, pp. 258-275; 1939/1956, pp. 108-119) had first so masterfully established in Switzerland *with Rorschach’s original plates!*¹³¹



Figure 5. Zulliger's three-plate inkblot series (Z-Test): Copyright 1951 by Hans Huber Publishers. Reprinted by permission.

¹³¹ Which already indicates an inner compatibility –to be further explicated– between both series not found with Roemer's. Note that we are leaving aside for the time being the rare details *Dd* replacing them with the higher-level *G* originally isolated by Furrer and Dworetzki. The latter's results were by the way completely and independently replicated in America by Hemmendinger (1953); curiously, as Bohm (1951/1972, chap. 15.II.1 Footnote 17) elaborating on Holt (1954, pp. 518-519, 531-534) points out, the existence of this three-stage developmental law has been independently established, rediscovered and reported many times since the XIXth century by several philosophers and psychologists in different countries, which is very eloquent concerning its universal validity: Spencer, Renan, Claparède, Lewin, Werner, Murphy, etc. (see Table 3 below). Despite the *utmost importance* of these findings for a systematic Rorschach theory (Holt, p. 503 point 3; Bohm, loc. cit., ref. to “evaluation” i.e. chap. 7.I, 1951/1958 pp. 139-141; Salomon, 1959a pp. 286-287, 1962 pp. 11-12, 13-14 –see next paragraph–; Hemmendinger & Schultz, 1960/1977, pp. 83, 90 Footnote 6, 102, 103, 108) it is only now that the contributions of those few Rorschach researchers seem to have been developed to their full implications (compare the present work with Leichtman's, 1988, 1996b).

Salomon, the best Z-Test expert after Zulliger and more inclined into theorization than his mentor, without establishing however the mandatory references to the existing literature just mentioned had already felt previously to us that there were more powerful theoretical reasons behind his overturning decision (1959a, pp. 286-287; 1963b, case study p. 173; see below), designating his new series -in a very pertinent way- as “a genetic-structural Rorschach technique” (1962, subtitle) i.e. one in which a *temporal schema* does take now precedence. Conversely, one of the byproducts of our research is the disproving of the frequently endorsed hypothesis (Monod, 1963; Anzieu, 1967; McCully 1971; Morali-Daninos & Cerf, 1972; Simón H., 1993, pp. 274, 287-288 Note 80), by lack of a better one, that Rorschach somehow symbolized in the sequence order of his plates from I to X the course of human ontogenetic development (as already said on the contrary -also against Beck, 1945 p. 37, and Klijnhout, 1951 pp. 669-70-, by all accounts there it is rather about a still *spatial* than about a *temporal* order for him), supposition in favor of which we cannot find the slightest hint (1921/1942, chaps. I.1 & III.1; comp. Dworetzki 1939, pp. 255-258, and Chabert 1983, pp. 53-58, 63-64). With the intent of further contradicting those authors we may paraphrase here an argument by Arnheim (1951) while discussing another topic:

Under certain conditions, however, the time sequence inherent in the act of perception will produce an animation ["short-story"] effect. If one looks rapidly through a series of Muybridge's snapshots, the scanning movement of the eye produces a motion picture-like succession of phases. As the eye shifts along the series of twelve pictures [ten inkblots], one sees a man leap or catch a ball. This animation ["short-story"] effect can also be found in works of art. In Peter Bruegel's painting of the blind men guiding each other to disaster, the row of six figures represents progressive phases of the same action. The eye of the observer, by scanning the picture from left to right, transforms space into time and records successively the acts of walking, stumbling, and falling into the brook...

However, ...attempts to explain **visual dynamics** [corresponding to Rorschach's true *B* as an essentially/immanently historical, biographic experience: cf. Kuhn p. 77 above, and discussion below] by actual or potential eye movements will only confuse the issue. When the moving glance connects a spatial sequence of phases into a temporal sequence [as Beck, Monod, etc. have done with Rorschach's series], the resulting ["short-story"] motion-like experience is quite different from the perception of directed tension within a pattern [as in Zulliger's series]... The photographic recordings of eye movements have shown that the trace of the scanning glance is quite erratic and that it follows the compositional lines of the picture[s] only occasionally.. Also, most pictorial patterns consist of so many divergent movements that an attempt to scan them separately, even if successful, would never lead to a unified grasp of the whole. (pp. 271-2, boldface added)

Table 3Implicit Psycho-genetic Correlations in Zulliger's Inkblot Series (Z-Test)

	Plates		
Point of view	I	II	III
Mode of combinatory Apprehension	primitive <i>G</i>	delimited <i>D</i>	<i>G (& D)</i>
Determinants	<i>Hd</i>	<i>Fb</i>	<i>B</i>
Genetic Psychology (Dworetzki, 1939) globalization	Primitive globalization	Primitive (<i>Dd F</i>) & superior analysis	Superior
Psychoanalysis (Subject): (Salomon, 1962) identification	Pre-object: first stages	Object: libidinal organization	<i>E g o</i>

Note. Symbols of the Classical Swiss Tradition (abbrev. from German).

But, there is more. Due to their respective formal features each one of Zulliger's plates is in practice not only characterized by a particular *mode of apprehension* as we have seen, but simultaneously also by a specific *determinant*: I= *Hd*, II= *Fb*, III= *B* (Zulliger, 1948-54/1969 chap. 1; Vogel, 1959; Simón H., 1973 pp. 139-141). Beyond the initial surprise caused by this 'new order' (and by the provisional absence of the classical *F* determinant) we realize it is a well-known fact to experts that these two dimensions of Rorschach formal analysis (as Rorschach himself had already taught) entertain with each other intimate relationships in such a way that one or the other of their respective components always reveal to be secretly related; well then, with an accuracy that gives testimony of the solid intuition which presided their composition, in their material crystallization these three inkblots spontaneously reproduce the findings and learned elaborations on these elective

correlations of some of the most eminent Rorschachers: primitive *G* and light-dark -plate I- form a totally integrated duo (maintained from the beginning by Binder, 1932/1979 pp. 30-31, 1937 pp. 37-38, 43-44, against Beck; corroborated by Dworetzki, 1939 pp. 275-278, 286-287, 1939/1956 pp. 119-122, 129-130, 154; by Holt, 1954 pp. 531-532; and by Salomon, 1962 p. 44), so as do *D* and color -plate II- on their own (already stated by Furrer, 1930 pp. 7, 20, 50-51, 53, and by Dworetzki, 1939 p. 299, 1939/1956 pp. 117, 135; and analyzed by Bohm, 1959/1977 pp. 308-311), and finally also combinatory *G* and movement -plate III- mutually demonstrate to each other this elective affinity (about which H. Rorschach himself was already plainly aware: 1921/1967 chap. IV.1, the explicit assertion, and chap. VII.A.1 plate III + Footnote, the explanatory intuition; verified by Dworetzki, 1939 pp. 305-306 and 333, 1939/1956 pp. 139-140, and by Piotrowski et al., 1963 p. 65; and reasoned by Kuhn, 1953/1977 pp. 505-509).

By the same token, relating both data clusters the determinant series ends by acquiring, by logical necessity, a genetic sequence order never before attained in its entirety although suggested in isolated observations (compare with Sherman, 1955; with Hemmendinger & Schultz, 1960/1977 pp. 90 Footnote 6 & 102; and with Schachtel, 1966 chap. 6): it was already more or less known matter the primitive character of the usually undifferentiated reaction to light-dark, to which follows as intermediate stage the specific response -gradually implying each time a greater formal elaboration- to the different colors (exactly as in human development: Dworetzki 1939, p. 317; Salomon 1962, p. 49; Schachtel 1959, chap. 7; Arnheim also, 1974 chap. VII "From light to color" pp. 331-332); and the degree of maturity implied by movement, above all by contrast to color (Dworetzki, 1939 p. 394, 1939/1956 pp. 172-173; Rapaport et al., 1945-46/1968 pp. 357-359, to be compared with Salomon, 1962 chap. V.1; Piotrowski, 1957 p. 120), has become commonplace knowledge. But until now there was still missing an overview (a *theôria*, in the original Greek meaning of the word) of all of this developmental sequence of the determinants, unless we consider as sufficient the induction implicit in Dworetzki (follow the sequence of her references in the previous paragraph, concerning the original French version; comp. Hemmendinger & Schultz, loc. cit.) or afterwards the even very explicit one in Mélon (see below). It is precisely this feature which characterizes Zulliger's contribution: without theorizing it and without voluntarily aiming at taking benefit from the progressive discoveries *with the original series* of other experts of his own stature, the quintessence of Rorschach practice and its successive theoretical acquisitions is nevertheless caught in the careful composition of this incomparable three-blot series.

Mélon is not only "sans doute aujourd'hui le meilleur connaisseur et praticien du test de Szondi" (Schotte 1990, p. 154) but based on their inner kinship he has made simultaneously key contributions to the Rorschach: as we have mentioned in the preceding section, he serves himself of the former instrument to explore the latter with a sounder theoretical basis (1975a, 1976), making profit from Schotte's (op. cit., pp. 5-11) "drive circuits theory" which approaches from an advantageous genetic perspective Szondi's profound analysis of the elementary psycho-analytical mechanisms of the Ego (& Lekeuche 1982/1989, pp. 81-82 & 194-204); one of the

results of his continued research commented upon orally in a Szondi Seminar at Louvain-la-Neuve (personal communication, 1984-1988) was precisely the forementioned Ego-attuned developmental sequence of Rorschach's determinants: I= Hd, IIa= F / IIb= Fb, III= B (cf. Kinable 2002, p. 13). In other words, what Schotte's "circuits" have represented for the Szondi has its exact counterpart in what Zulliger's new "circuit" represents for the Rorschach, "conception nouvelle du schéma qui intègre une dimension temporelle à une représentation des choses jusqu'ici purement spatiale" (Mélon & Lekeuche 1989, p. 21). If in his Doctoral Dissertation Mélon was searching "...dans le vecteur du moi (Sch) une manière de boussole pour explorer les domaines du Rorschach et en dresser comme une carte de géographie nouvelle" (1976, p. III), we'll dare say that now that's already accomplished matter! (see Table 3). Our own steps forward, obviously, owe a lot to our personal association with the Louvain School during the years indicated.

To follow our initial conviction -and Zulliger's advice- and connect then with the system of Psychoanalysis, as it has anew already been done by Salomon (1959b, 1962, 1963b; Peralta 1995b, pp. 667-668), all that has been said until now allows us to analyze psychodynamically in the Z-Test in a manner seemingly much more closer to the actual events the specific biography of the person being studied in the different stages of its unfolding (psychosexual and/or Ego development), as well as to establish in a more sound manner the respective formal correlations with the Rorschach system. To quote Bohm (1951/1972):

On sait qu'un praticien du Rorschach expérimenté et surtout versé dans la psychologie psychanalytique peut parfois déceler des circonstances importantes de la biographie affective du sujet testé. (Nous citons ici pour mémoire les analyses de cas de Hans Zulliger). La psychologie expérimentale n'avait pas encore proposé d'explication satisfaisante pour cet aspect particulier des découvertes faites à l'aide du Rorschach... Non seulement la personnalité mais aussi toute *perception est le résultat d'un processus évolutif*... Il existe donc un rapport 'micro-macro' de type parallélisme, d'abord entre les phases du développement des perceptions isolées et l'ontogenèse en général... Ce n'est que par ces rapports entre minigenèse de la perception et ontogenèse de la personnalité que l'on peut comprendre qu'une expérience de psychologie de la perception telle que le Rorschach reflète et rend accessible non seulement certaines attitudes de base (orientation spatiale, mode analytique ou global du vécu, etc.) mais aussi très largement la "pré-histoire" des modes de vécu et de conduite d'une personnalité. (chap. 16.V.3; comp. Hemmendinger & Schultz 1960/1977, pp. 93-5)

In that sense, the phases described by Renan and adopted by Dworetzki -"syncretism, analysis and synthesis"- can be translated into psychoanalytic language (Table 3): in plate I we can study the first stages of object relations, where pre-subject and (primary) "object" still tend in a large measure to be confused with each other during the long process of separation of the dual-union (symbolized by the "interpenetrating" character of chiaroscuro: Salomon 1962, pp. 43-53; corroborated by Schachtel 1966, chap. 10; see also those intuitions in Zulliger 1952); in plate II by contrast is represented the moment of emergence of specific (part) objects able to be

apprehended, and of specific affects concerning them, of partial drives each one by its own way (thanks to the selective “cathexing” quality of color: Salomon, 1959b pp. 243-257, 1962 chap. III; compare with Bohm 1959/1977, pp. 308-311, and with Murphy's phrasing of the 2nd stage, 1947 p. 66); finally on III, “after loss of the object” as Freud has it (castration acceptance, surpassing of Œdipus, genitality), turning his back on it the subject seizes himself again and his Ego is plainly constituted by way of identification with the absolute primary object as successfully demonstrated by the unified body image (“introversion” or narcissistic return of libido, classically represented by the movement response: Salomon 1962, pp. 84-90, 93-96, 109-110; corroborated by Piotrowski 1957, pp. 171-172, 305-306, and by Chabert 1983, pp. 4, 70-86, and chap. 5; compare with Dolto 1961/1981, pp. 73-74). In this global circuit of the Ego which repeats itself unendingly during the course of life, the 1st and the 3rd moments are the main ones (intuition already present in Binder, 1932/1979 pp. 46-60; and following his example in Salomon, 1962 pp. 63-70) since they face the subject with the crucial identification dilemma of “Who *am* I?” (poles Other / Self which concern total-object images, exactly as their representatives *Hd* / *B* show a close affinity with whole *G* responses), non-resolvable - or at least non-mobilizable- dilemma without the mediation through the in-between element that constitutes the (partial and invested: *D Fb*) object that one can *have* or loose (Mélon 1976, pp. 106-108 + 85, 38-44).

It is of the utmost interest that a phenomenologist like Kuhn (1944/1992), distrustful by principle of any preexisting theory (in his discussion he criticizes both Dworetzki's: pp. 34, 36; and psychoanalytic theory: pp. 48-9), without being aware of it arrived independently exactly to both the above formal and psychodynamic conclusions!: besides describing the same succession in the psychodynamic distinction between Ego and object (comp. p. 68 above), from the formal point of view his group I whole (*G*) mask responses he calls himself 'primitive' (p. 76), 'signe d'infantilisme' (p. 34) and representatives of 'magical thinking' (pp. 50-1, 54, 77) (comp. Salomon 1962 p. 52); the group II ones are only details (*D*) with which “s'écarte du champ visuel le monde primitif avec tout ce qu'il comporte d'interprétations significatives” (p. 63), “dans tous les cas... il existe dans le monde individuel du sujet des objets précis qui semblent être en rapport intime avec l'interprétation” (p. 64), “un trait fondamental de cette nouvelle forme de la pensée est la séparation et l'opposition du Moi percevant et de l'objet perçu. Un autre élément essentiel consiste en l'isolement d'un objet déterminé hors d'un ensemble plus important. Les deux opérations correspondent à la pensée qui procède par abstraction sur les plans logique et théorique, pensée que précisément l'on appelle objective ou objectivante. Cette pensée nous permet de tirer de la masse des impressions qui agissent sur nous, la perception d'objets isolés” (p. 65), and is intimately connected with repression (p. 66), anxiety (p. 68) and color shock (p. 69; comp. below); finally the group III masked figures are “interprétations de mouvements et surtout celles qui comportent deux figures dont l'expression s'affronte ou se complète” (p. 108) since “il nous semble que les interprétations de mouvement comportant un contenu expressif et des masques où ne figurent point deux personnages associés, mais un seul, ne devraient point être rangés parmi les interprétations habituelles de notre groupe III, et se rattacher plutôt

à des kinesthésies incomplètes" (p. 165), which has as a consequence that "la plupart des interpré-tations de mouvements sont des réponses globales, ont peut donc en tirer un rapport tout à fait général avec le groupe I, mais on ne doit pas oublier que les réponses globales dont il s'agit dans les groupes I et II [*sic*: III] sont très différentes" (p. 178). Kuhn (p. 210, comp. also p. 205) even comes close of recognizing the identity of his ideas with, in any case he explicitly endorses, Bohm's closely related 3-step Rorschach interpretation process.

It is time to avow that until now our exposition has been certainly simplified, in the sense that we have alluded only implicitly to the apperception of rare details *Dd* and to the pure formal determinant *F*, those fourth elements temporarily put aside but which by the way integrate also both into a last perceptanalytic unity: as perceptively grasped by Schachtel (1966, p. 60 footnote 9), "most *Dd* responses are *F* or *F*-dominated, that is, actively structured" by contrast to the initial passive global perception. In other words, it is this specific *Dd F* perceptual attitude the one which makes possible and in fact initiates *analysis* ('objectivation': Schachtel, 1959 chap. 6 particularly p. 108; Dworetzki, 1939 pp. 262-263, 270 conclusion 'a', 275 and 288-298, 1939/1956 pp. 112, 119, 130-135 and 172; cf. the sequence of determinants introduced by Mélon on p. 296 above) or, in more Szondian terms, the coming into play of the *systolic* function of the Ego (*k+*: Mélon, 1975a p. 268, 1976 pp. 76 & 68, & Lekeuche 198# p. 197) in accordance with Schotte's "circuit" theory (1990, pp. 168-169): based on an original "lecture triadique de la tétrade" the intermediate stage (where is faced the *having* issue, Szondi's *k* axis in his Ego dialectics) is to be conceptualized, as Freud already clearly recognized, as a double-faced one actually with two sub-stages dominated by opposing positions, as pathoanalytically very ably demonstrate the perverted (to have the object, no matter what: *k+*; partial object which stands out by its pregnant form: *Dd F*) and the neurotic (forbidden to have it, to renounce: *k-*; repression that liberates the partial affect attached to it: *D Fb*) pathologies, being both concerned with the same problem but regarding its solution the latter becomes "the negative" of the former (1905/1940, Essay 1 Pt. 4)¹³²; there is of course also the more paramount (or global: *G*) diastolic problem, as Shakespeare's Hamlet very well knows, of "*to be or not to be*" (Szondi's *p+* / *p-* axis) with which psychotics (whose productive paranoid prototype demonstrates a particular inclination for the *B*: Rorschach 1921/1942, chap. IV.4 and Table X; Schachtel 1950, p. 76) and psychopaths (whom according to Binder, the same to have introduced the *Hd* that often characterize them, are nothing but thymopaths: 1932/1979, pp. 34, 70-98, 118-122; Schotte, op. cit., pp. 10, 208 Footnote 33) are respectively concerned. All these problems are elaborated in the most illuminating way by Szondi (1956) and Schotte (op. cit.; see Table 2). **The complete perceptanalytic system would be then represented in the from now on definitive schema: I= *G Hd*, II= *Dd F* / IIb= *D Fb*, III= *G B*.**

¹³² Amazingly, Murphy's (1947/1966; just as Deese's, cf. below) entirely different conceptualization of the 2nd stage arrives to identical conclusions than Freud's: "At the second stage, the cognitive structure begins to move into the foreground, and objects are recognized but are *acceptable* [*k+*] or *unacceptable* [*k-*]..." (p. #).

A very interesting, conceptually close previous version of this formal synthesis - exclusively from the determinants point of view- was attempted by Sherman (1955) even with similar psychopathological references. This author entirely reverses Rorschach's initial spatial triad (thus ignoring light-dark) as a new *C-F-M* (Fb-F-B) temporal or developmental continuum theoretically locating the form *after* the color determinant despite his recognizing that "...in children's Rorschach there are usually more form than color responses..." (p. 70), exactly the same sequence proposed also by Schachtel despite his own assertion that:

The perception of color, by itself, does not permit objectification, while the perception of form does. Even when one is already familiar with a particular object, its color alone usually is insufficient to enable one to recognize it. To perceive an object with its distinguishing features for the first time as well as to recognize an already known object requires the perception of form. (1959 p. 108)

Similarly, in her experimental study with children Dworetzki very perceptively recognizes and demonstrates that there are the *forms* ("formes transitaires": see chap. II.D above) which attracts them out of the initial global diffuse (G Hd) mode of perception into the primitive, limited-focus analysis (Dd F), fact also confirmed by Mélon's empirico-theoretical researches of Schotte's 'Ego-circuit' in both the Szondi and Rorschach tests. Or following Zulliger's findings, it is anality which follows orality as so well articulated by Chiari (1961):

Even the apprehension modes don't escape the psychoanalytic point of view: *wholes*, in the measure they would correspond perceptually to the phase of "syncretism", typical of infancy, would be related to regressions or residues of the *oral stage*; *rare details*, due to their analogy to the "analytic" phase, genetically succeeding the syncretic one, would be related to the *anal* phase; *normal details*, finally, by their adherence to reality, would indicate an analogy to the *genital* phase of libidinal development. In other words, psychosexual evolution would reproduce the development of perceptual maturation. (p. 102)

We from our side will allow ourselves to correct Zulliger's view in one particular point: it makes much more theoretical sense to connect *D* responses rather with the *phallic* phase where the partial phallic organ obviously acquires and retains from then on a particular libidinal importance (as the obviously essential aspects of any situation the person faces), while superior *G* responses should be considered the true witnesses of the attainment of the *genital* stage by the subject where a global, integral body image is achieved and "all partial-zone drives are subjected to the primacy of genitality". In this way Dworetzki's and Zulliger's independent developmental conclusions finally and perfectly coincide and mutually convalidate each other.

In clear contrast to the so-called "systematizers", the apparent modification subtly introduced by Zulliger just concerning the dynamic 'reading' of Rorschach's original and simple (triadic, but also secretly tetradic) perceptual-diagnostic formal schema -his scoring and interpretation *categories*, respected all the way- has actually produced the unveiling of the secret of its infinite power as a mirror of the human reality, through the demonstration of its perfectly projected good-Gestalt quality, of the absolutely meaningful articulation of its elements: in short, it has achieved its

definitive systematization in the full meaning of this word (comp. Wyatt pp. 122-3 above). Repeating ourselves, in Kant's (1781/1926) philosophical conception the true SYSTEM is composed by definition of a complete or *finite* number of CATEGORIES (Schotte 1963/1990, p. 31, and Minkowski above) admitting no further additions, but significantly and intimately related to one another in such a way that the coherency and perfection of the whole assures its permanent validity and richness as meaningful organizer and truth revealer of empirical reality (compare Di Paola 1997, Introduction). We have already stated how from this point of view we fell free to criticize the unlasting, continuously revised character of the "empirical systems" of scoring that have succeeded one another after Rorschach, but -to concentrate on their last and most successful version- also from this (psychoanalytic) theoretical perspective, confronted with the Classical System (in the sense of the 'Great Classics', timeless: Rorschach 1921/1942, chap. VIII Table XVIII) Exner's comprehensive effort also falls short of attaining an improvement: let us quote him again...

The systematizers of the test have not reconciled.... A[n]...element, in the decision to develop the Comprehensive System, is the fact that most "Rorschachers" solve the dilemma of several systems privately, by intuitively adding a "little Klopfer," a "dash of Beck," a few "grains" of Hertz, and a "smidgen" of Piotrowski, to their own experience, and call it *The Rorschach*. This personalized approach frequently is very useful. In fact, *when the work presented here, based largely on empirical data, is compared with the judgements of those who "personalize," a significant congruence is noted [italics added]....* The goal of this work is to present, in a single format, the "best of the Rorschach." This system draws from each of the systems, incorporating those features which, under careful scrutiny, offer the greatest yield, and adds to them other components based on more recent work with the test... *It is not based on any particular theoretical position [italics added]*¹³³, and hopefully, can be useful to both the behaviorist and the phenomenologist. (1974, pp. x-xi)

The theoretical shortcoming of the C.S. was predetermined precisely by the heterogeneous origin of its elementary components (Exner's own opinion: pp. 7, 10-13, vs. 16, 17) which has prevented them from systematically holding together while on the contrary in Rorschach's case, beginning from a global conception including a limited number of factors but obviously meaningfully interrelated, the author has accomplished in his system sort of one of his own constructive and creative GB+ where *all* details are *dynamically* articulated with perfect coherence (cf. Bohm 1951/1972, chaps. 4.A.II and 7.I); as beautifully expressed by Kuhn (1953/1977) while developing Rorschach's intuition on this matter:

There is a close relationship, statistically as well as psychologically, between [superior] whole responses with dependent parts, on the one hand, and movement responses, on the other. Both of them are determined not so much

¹³³ How diametrically dissimilar this haphazard collection of pieces out of the work of different authors appears from the coherent unity of findings that emanates from Zulliger's accomplished synthesis! Holt (1954) has already found the explanation: "Finally (and in the end, most importantly), *theory* enables our science of human behavior to grow in an orderly and efficient manner. It provides a *structure* within which individual contributions fit together and produce a comprehensible and intelligible totality instead of a disjointed heap" (p. 503 point 4, italics added).

by the shape of the blot as by structuring from within. Animated movement does not consist of a piecing together nor of a linking of independent parts. In effect each movement response constitutes a sequence, and thus includes both the movement immediately preceding it, and the one which follows. Goethe, impressed by a dancer's pose in a picture, wrote: "The beautiful fluidity of movement in transition which we admire in such artists has here been arrested for one moment, permitting us to visualize past, present, and future simultaneously and by this very experience we transcend earthy limitations". Living motion, then, is also a whole, specifically one consisting of dependent parts, to the extent that its organization in time is experienced as the essential feature. *Rorschach's W M+ responses may thus be regarded as an intricately organized space-time entity, i.e., a whole consisting of interdependent parts.* By reacting with this type of response, the subject reveals a rather specific capacity of the human mind... man's experience of the temporal totality of human existence. (p. 506, italics added)

Besides Psychoanalysis and despite Exner's final wish, one of the main factors that gives *structure* to Rorschach's perceptanalytic schema (that is, the grid of his *formal* factors of location and determination, organized in the new way of -but implicit in- Zulliger: Table 3) is that in it is represented as well the "accomplished series" of originary phenomenological dimensions of the unfolding human existence (according to Deese -who may be called Heidegger's successor- , cited in Schotte, op. cit., pp. 21 Note 1, 53, 74 Note 4, and in Delion, 1999, p. 580: see below). In fact, one of the rich features of our Rorschach-Zulliger structural schema is that from it can be easily made multiple connections to the work of several important philosophers as well as psychologists from where to obtain a deeper theoretical foundation of our assertions (see Table 2): they concern the very close correspondence, already pointed at, between our developments and the "triads" that in the growing complexity of the concepts of which they are composed reflect the originary dimensions or structures of the development of human thinking according to several authors, besides -but particularly in- Deese (cited in Bohm 1951/1972, chap. 15.II.1 Footnote 17; in Mélon 1976, pp. IV & 29; and in Schotte 1990, pp. 35-37, 52-54, 106-107, 206 Footnote 28).

Table 4
 Philosophical/Psychological Concepts (Structural/Existential Triads)
 which Lay Foundation to Rorschach's Formal Schema through
 its Systematization in Zulliger's Inkblot Series (Z-Test)

	Plates		
Authors	I	II	III

Hegel	Thesis	Antithesis	Synthesis
Peirce	Firstness	Secondness	Thirdness
Spencer	Incoherent homogeneity	Incoherent heterogeneity	Coherent
heterogeneity			
Renan (Claparède)	Syncretism	Analysis	Synthesis
Murphy (Werner/Lewin)	Globality	Differentiation	Integration
Bachelard	Bind	Unbind	Rebind
Freud (Aulagnier)	Ordinary	Primary	Secondary
Lacan	Real	Imaginary	Symbolic
Szondi (Schotte):	Contact	Sex and Law	Ego
psychoses	thymo(psycho)pathies	perversions/neuroses	
inflation (p+)	projection (p-)	introject./negation (k+/-)	
Fink	Space	Time	
Movement			
Deese:	Base	Foundation	Origin
	strength	violence	power
	quantity	quality	measure
	similar	alike	
same			
members	pieces	parts	

So according to Bohm the English philosopher Herbert Spencer was in the XIXth century, through his work which bears the suggestive title of "A System of Synthetic Philosophy", the precursor of this triadic concept of *evolution* (the first principle in all areas of human thought for him) in biology, in psychology, as well as in all other domains of knowledge: according to this philosopher evolution occurs from a state of 'incoherent homogeneity', through transitional ones of a still 'incoherent heterogeneity', to a final mature state of 'coherent heterogeneity'. In the words of his exegete Thouverez (1913):

Spencer était bien préparé à sa nouvelle œuvre... un grand nombre d'articles de biologie et de sociologie préparaient le *Cours synthétique*, dont la composition paraissait être l'aboutissement naturel de toutes les pensées et de tous les travaux de l'auteur.

On se rappelle que, dès son enfance, Spencer avait été habitué à chercher, derrière tout événement et derrière toute réalité, la cause qui l'expliquait; son père avait développé en lui au plus haut degré le sentiment de la causalité naturelle, de la régularité des lois et des formes. L'évolutionnisme est

l'extension la plus large de ce sentiment du causal, appliqué à l'apparition successive des formes dans le temps, non moins qu'à leur coexistence dans l'espace. En 1851, ...il avait trouvé, dans les œuvres de l'embryologiste Von Baer, la formule que tout être vivant se développe par un passage régulier de l'homogène à l'hétérogène, et cette formule lui parut applicable aux organismes sociaux comme aux organismes biologiques. Vers la même époque, 1851, Spencer prend connaissance de la célèbre doctrine de Milne-Edwards sur la division du travail. A mesure que les êtres vivants croissent, le travail accompli par eux devient plus complexe, et se divise entre les diverses parties, devenues autants d'organes distincts, en sorte que la division du travail est le facteur physiologique qui correspond à la différenciation des formes anatomiques. Les conceptions géologiques de Lyell, sur la déformation progressive, et non pas brusque, de l'écorce terrestre; les vues de Huxley et celles de Darwin sur le devenir des espèces vivantes; corroboraient ces notions, et leur donnaient une signification sans cesse plus riche et plus profonde. Dans l'*Autobiographie* Spencer marque avec soin les étapes successives par lesquelles sa pensée, d'abord fugitive, se précisa et s'étendit peu à peu, pour aboutir en 1862 à la rédaction des *Premiers Principes*, qui en devaient constituer... l'expression la plus achevée...

Le domaine de la science est étudié dans la seconde partie: le Connaisable. Toutes les choses que nous connaissons participent d'un même devenir qui est l'évolution universelle. L'évolution est le passage du simple au complexe, de l'indéfini au défini, de l'homogène à l'hétérogène. Au début l'univers était constitué par une poussière cosmique, uniformément répandue à travers l'espace, homogène et vague [I G Hd]: elle s'est différenciée peu à peu en constellations hétérogènes et bien définies. Au début de la société humaine, chaque individu était à la fois soldat et laboureur, fabriquait son pain et ses outils; aujourd'hui le militaire et l'artisan, le forgeron et le boulanger constituent des classes distinctes. Ainsi, le passage de l'homogène à l'hétérogène est partout dans le monde physique et humain. Ce passage est caractérisé par une *intégration de matière* - poussière du monde qui se solidifie en étoiles, poussière humaine qui se solidifie en tribus et en cités [II partial D's] - et par une *dissipation du mouvement*, parce que les individus [ou membres] isolés perdent leurs mouvements spéciaux et incohérents, pour rentrer dans le mouvement général [III G B!].... Enfin, à mesure qu'un agrégat évolue, toutes les parties qui le composent se transforment parallèlement; ces transformations parallèles se correspondent les unes aux autres; l'adaptation des parties accompagne l'évolution de l'ensemble. Par exemple, à mesure que les idées religieuses se transforment dans une nation donnée, tous les autres domaines de la pensée et de l'action se transforment pour s'adapter au changement survenu. L'évolution se poursuit sans repos ni trêve jusqu'à ce qu'elle atteigne, dans l'hétérogénéité absolue, un état final d'équilibre et d'immobilité [III]. Mais tout est éternellement variable. Bientôt l'équilibre est rompu; la dissolution s'accomplit en sens inverse de l'évolution précédente, jusqu'à ce que, *l'homogène régnant de nouveau sur un monde monotone et*

monochrome [I G Hd!], l'évolution à son tour reparaisse; et ainsi de suite à l'infini, dans la succession éternelle des mondes.

...La différenciation et l'hétérogénéité [II D Fb's] ne sont pas l'élément primitif de l'évolution, mais l'élément secondaire; ce qui est primitif, c'est la formation et la destruction des agrégats de matière, tandis que les complications variées de leur structure, le dessin de leur forme [II Dd F] ne viennent qu'ultérieurement...

Cependant, de 1864 à 1866, Spencer faisait paraître les deux volumes de biologie; il est facile d'en comprendre la place et le rôle. Tout système de philosophie consiste à mettre de l'unité dans le monde, et par conséquent à concevoir le monde sur un type unique: Spencer le conçoit sur le modèle des êtres vivants et par là sa philosophie est tout entière une imitation de la biologie. (pp. 31-6)

A couple more of quotations from these works themselves would suffice to demonstrate the close relationship of the thinking that guided them with Zulliger's Rorschach-developmental conclusions:

Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation. (Spencer 1862, Part II chap. XVII "The law of evolution concluded", § 145 p. 396)

...to consider the law of Evolution, as exhibited among all order of existences, in general and in detail[:] The integration of Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion, was traced not in each whole only, but in the parts into which each whole divides... In each organism that general incorporation of dispersed materials which causes growth, is accompanied by local incorporations, forming what we call organs... And in all cases, along with these direct integrations there go the indirect integrations by which parts are made mutually dependent. From this primary re-distribution we were led on to consider the secondary re-distributions, by inquiring how there came to be a formation of parts during the formation of a whole. It turned out that there is habitually a passage from homogeneity to heterogeneity, along with the passage from diffusion to concentration... But we saw that these secondary re-distributions are not thus completely expressed. At the same time that the parts into which each whole is resolved become more unlike one another, they also become more sharply marked off. The result of the secondary re-distributions is therefore to change an indefinite homogeneity into a definite heterogeneity. This additional trait also we found to be traceable in evolving aggregates of all orders. Further consideration, however, made it apparent that the increasing definiteness which goes along with increasing heterogeneity, is not an independent trait; but that it results from the integration which progresses in each of the differentiating parts, while it progresses in the whole they form. Further, it was pointed out that in all evolutions, inorganic, organic, and super-organic, this change in the arrangement of Matter is accompanied by a parallel change in the arrangement of Motion: every increase in structural complexity involving a corresponding increase in functional complexity... The

transformation thus contemplated under separate aspects, being in itself but one transformation, it became needful to unite these separate aspects into a single conception-to regard the primary and secondary re-distributions as simultaneously working their various effects. Everywhere the change from a confused simplicity to a distinct complexity, in the distribution of both matter and motion, is incidental to the consolidation of the matter and the loss of its motion...

The law of Evolution has been thus far contemplated as holding true of each order of existences, considered as a separate order. But the induction as so presented, falls short of that completeness which it gains when we contemplate these several orders of existences as forming together one natural whole... We have repeatedly observed that while any whole is evolving, there is always going on an evolution of the parts into which it divides itself; but we have not observed that this equally holds of the totality of things, as made up of parts within parts from the greatest down to the smallest. We know that while a physically-cohering aggregate like the human body is getting larger and taking on its general shape, each of its organs is doing the same; that while each organ is growing and becoming unlike others, there is going on a differentiation and integration of its component tissues and vessels... But we have not duly remarked that, setting out with the human body as a minute part, and ascending from it to greater parts, this simultaneity of transformation is equally manifest... (Spencer 1862, Part II chap. XXIV "Summary and conclusion", § 187-8 pp. 543-6)

On voit tout de suite la nécessité de la loi générale du développement des organismes, puisque les états du début et de la fin du développement sont ce que nous les connaissons. Étant donné que chaque organisme est au début homogène [I] et qu'à son état complet il est hétérogène [III] relativement, il s'ensuit nécessairement que le développement est un changement de l'homogène à l'hétérogène, pendant lequel l'organisme a traversé tous les degrés infinitésimaux d'hétérogénéité [II] qui séparent les deux extrêmes... De plus, si les parties originellement incohérentes [II], ou sans lien de combinaison, se trouvent à la fin relativement cohérentes ou combinées [III], il faut qu'il y ait un accroissement continu de cohésion ou de combinaison. Il en résulte le principe général que le développement est un changement d'une homogénéité incohérente, indéfinie, à une hétérogénéité cohérente, définie, devient évident par lui-même, quand l'observation nous a montré l'état par où les organismes commencent et celui où ils aboutissent. (Spencer, H. (1893). *Principes de Biologie* [Principles of Biology] (M. E. Cazelles, Trans.) (4me éd.). Paris: Félix Alcan. (Orig. publ. in 1864) Tome I, 2me partie chap. II "Développement", § 54 p. 182)

Behind the different terminology can be recognized, still following Bohm, the complete identity with the French philosopher Ernest Renan's shortly following (albeit independently established) sequential concepts of 'syncretism, analysis and synthesis' already discussed (pp. 107-8 above), now more focused in this author towards human

knowledge and perception but also applied by the latter to general biology as 'la loi de tout ce qui vit'. The first of the two philosophers seems to have influenced in succession the German, U.S.A.-emigrated psychologists Heinz Werner and Kurt Lewin, and finally the American Gardner Murphy (who rephrases the law in the following terms, comp. loc. cit: "1. A level of global, undifferentiated mass activity; 2. A level of differentiated parts, each acting more or less autonomously; 3. A level of integrated action based upon interdependence of the parts") reaching through them the Rorschachers Charlotte Bühler (1950) but particularly Robert R. Holt (1954 pp. 518-9, 531-4) who immediately sees the usefulness of this conceptualization for understanding the psychological implications of some formal components (location, determinants) in interpretation. The second philosopher on his side influenced the Swiss psychologists Edouard Claparède and his disciple Gertrud Dworetzki who first successfully applied his law to the Rorschach as already discussed. Although not exclusively (see below) this whole philosophical-theoretical trend seems to be more immediately connected to the *location* dimension and its developmental sequence concretely represented in Zulliger's series, as readily understandable and as explained in detail by us above.

But in fact the recognition of the philosophical importance of this fundamental triad can be traced back to even earlier times: to begin with we must connect it to the famous dialectic or 'logical' method of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1807) who had already propounded a similar sequential view of thinking and psychological facts (and of the course of history, art, science etc., in general) through the successive steps of an initial Thesis, which inevitably begins to seem one-sided and spontaneously generates its equally sided opposite or Antithesis, until both unite in a successful Synthesis of the truly rational components of each. Note already that the last term¹³⁴ is the same one retained by Renan, but one may ask in what sense are our 1st and 2nd stages opposite? Well, that was just Dworetzki's (1939) observation in our domain to whom we let the explanation:

...la capacité de percevoir une figure (objet) de deux manières différentes et d'y saisir deux aspects divers, s'accroît en proportion directe avec l'âge. Ou autrement dit: *les structures perceptives deviennent de plus en plus plastiques avec l'âge... Pour saisir l'objet sous plusieurs aspects, l'enfant doit passer par trois stades, chaque stade représentant une adaptation de plus en plus complexe et de plus en plus objective*. Le premier stade est caractérisé par la *perception globale superficielle*; l'analyse du deuxième stade révèle déjà une

¹³⁴ The issue of this term is not insignificant and an important psychoanalytical author later on analyzed like Schotte totally rejects it: "...la forme la plus haute de la praxis, c'est la théorie. Cette formule, où Aristote condensa le génie du miracle grec, situe au mieux le parti de Freud... elle peut même renvoyer à son rejet de toute espèce de synthèse,— la synthèse, dit Proudhon, 'est toujours gouvernementale' " (1990, pp. 85-6); he means by that a vaguely "eclectic", summative enumeration "...où les choses sont mises en ensembles de manière plus ou moins lâche, se distingu[ant] radicalement de ce qui émerge avec le système... [où] l'énumération est présumée close, structurale, systématique" (1981 p. 89). We rather share the renowned physicist W. Heisenberg's notion of the term in the sense that "...synthesis need not be a mixture, a mere compromise between thesis and antithesis, it can prove extremely fruitful, but only when thesis and antithesis combine to produce something qualitatively new..." (quoted by Gammon 1974 p. 48, who adds: "Perhaps Heisenberg's description of the formation of 'something qualitatively new' can be related to the process of symbol formation"): see below.

pénétration plus profonde et comporte la *perception de plusieurs données à la fois*; mais cette nouvelle acquisition empêche l'enfant de saisir l'ensemble. C'est seulement après avoir passé par cette décomposition unilatérale que la perception atteint le degré le plus élevé, réalisant des structures variables... Nous devons donc nous demander pourquoi les enfants du deuxième stade ne reconnaissent pas l'image globale. Si pour l'enfant de 3 ans, la forme globale est "simple" [thèse], ne devrait-elle pas l'être d'autant plus pour l'enfant plus âgé? Pourquoi l'enfant, à l'âge de 7 ans, choisit-il, entre les deux conceptions objectivement possibles, la perception analytique [antithèse]?.. Comme nous l'avons déjà relevé, l'attitude joue un rôle primordial... Au deuxième niveau, l'enfant est poussé, par un intérêt très vif, vers l'analyse. Si donc une figure [globale] perd sa bonne forme, c'est parce que la tendance à pénétrer les données perceptives brise l'unité de l'ensemble. Il en résulte un plus grand nombre de visions et une élaboration détaillée du tout. Si, à ce niveau, il ne voit pas le "tout" comme le tout jeune enfant ou l'adulte, ce n'est pas parce que sa perception est plus faible, mais parce qu'elle n'est pas encore assez plastique pour saisir l'image globale en dépit de l'intérêt pour les détails. Ce n'est qu'à une troisième étape que cet intérêt devenu entièrement objectif et analytique, ne rétrécit plus le champ perceptif. La dernière étape est donc bien une synthèse - car elle combine l'orientation globale (réceptive) à l'attitude de recherche et d'intérêt pour les détails [Spencer: homogeneity vs. heterogeneity; Murphy: undifferentiated vs. differentiated; note also that Kuhn could not find group I and II opposite mask responses together in the same protocol: 1944/1992 pp. 71, 178]. (pp. 264, 266, 269-70)

Following the reverse path we can mention here one related example from Hegel's work: universality (thesis), singularity (antithesis), and individuality (synthesis); the first two concepts obviously correspond to our global and detailed perceptual approaches respectively, and the final resulting one is the one that most characterizes the original, everywhere-present view of the subject reflecting his personal identity i.e. his *Ego* (cf. Table 3 Salomon and Table 4 Szondi). This obvious inner relationship between Hegel's and Zulliger's respective triadic systematizations becomes less surprising when one considers the following shared developmental (temporal) point of view: "Hegel, on his side, adopted the historical method for philosophy. It is not only that Hegel considered events in their long-run development, but that he saw the world, comprehensively, like a process in eternal evolution. Such view erases the particularity of the here and now. All is under the shadow of historical perspective" (Strathern 2000, p. 45).

Connected to or inspired by the former is the important work of the U.S. philosopher and semiologist Charles Sanders Peirce (1978), unfortunately not widely known but maybe the most pertinent one from this perspective for our subject: that is why we will make a rather detailed exposition of it which will allow us to elaborate the systematic implications of our triadic Rorschach concepts in a deeper way. In true Kantian manner this author sustains:

...*L'idéoscopie* [sa phénoménologie] consiste à décrire et à classer les idées qui appartiennent à l'expérience ordinaire ou qui surgissent naturellement en

liaison avec la vie ordinaire, sans considération de leur validité ou de leur invalidité ou de leur psychologie. En poursuivant cette étude, je fus amené il y a longtemps (1867)... à répartir toutes les idées dans les trois classes de la Priméité, de la Secondéité et de la Tiercéité. Cette sorte de notion me déplâit autant qu'à n'importe qui; et des années durant j'ai essayé de ne pas la prendre au sérieux et de la réfuter; mais elle m'a depuis longtemps conquise entièrement. Aussi déplaisant qu'il soit d'attribuer des significations à des nombres et à une triade surtout, c'est aussi vrai que déplaisant... Les catégories... constituent évidemment un nouvel essai de caractérisation de ce que Hegel a essayé de caractériser par ses trois moments de la pensée. Elles correspondent aussi aux trois catégories de chacune des quatre triades de la table de Kant. Mais le fait que ces différentes tentatives furent faites indépendamment les unes des autres (je n'ai remarqué la ressemblance de ces catégories avec les moments de Hegel qu'après en avoir étudié la liste pendant de nombreuses années, tant était grande mon antipathie pour Hegel) n'aboutit qu'à montrer qu'il n'y a vraiment que ces trois éléments. (pp. 22-3)

Pourquoi trois catégories? Je pourrais peut-être commencer par faire remarquer que d'autres nombres que Trois ont trouvé leurs défenseurs... Quant à moi, je ne suis pas l'ennemi déclaré d'un nombre innocent; je respecte et estime tous les nombres pour ce qu'ils sont; mais je suis forcé d'avouer qu'en philosophie, j'ai un penchant marqué pour le nombre Trois. En fait, j'utilise si couramment la division trichotomique dans mes spéculations qu'il me semble préférable de commencer par une brève étude préliminaire des conceptions sur lesquelles ces divisions doivent reposer. Je n'entends rien de plus que les idées de premier, second, troisième - idées si vastes qu'on peut les regarder plutôt comme des dispositions ou des tons de la pensée que comme des notions définies, mais qui, de ce fait, ont une grande portée. Considérées comme nombres à appliquer aux objets qu'il nous plaît, ce sont effectivement de minces squelettes de pensée, sinon de simples mots. Si nous voulions seulement faire des énumérations, il serait déplacé de nous demander quelle est la signification des nombres que nous devrions utiliser; mais justement, les distinctions philosophiques sont supposées faire beaucoup plus que cela; elles doivent aller à l'essence même des choses, et ne devrait-on faire qu'une seule distinction philosophique trichotomique, il conviendrait de nous demander auparavant quels sont les genres d'objets qui sont premiers, seconds et troisièmes, non en tant que comptés, mais en soi... Mais, demandera-t-on, pourquoi s'arrêter à trois? Pourquoi ne pas continuer pour trouver une nouvelle conception dans quatre, cinq et ainsi de suite indéfiniment? La raison est que, alors qu'il est impossible de former un trois authentique par modification de la paire sans introduire quelque chose d'une nature différente de l'unité et de la paire, quatre, cinq et tout nombre supérieur peuvent se former par simple combinaison de trois... Ainsi on peut construire n'importe quel nombre, aussi grand soit-il, avec des triades; et par conséquent ce nombre ne peut impliquer aucune idée radicalement différente de l'idée de trois. Je n'entends pas nier que les nombres supérieurs peuvent présenter des configurations particulières intéressantes dont on puisse tirer des notions d'applicabilité plus ou moins

générale; mais celles-ci ne peuvent s'élever à la hauteur de catégories philosophiques aussi fondamentales que celles que nous avons examinées [cf. Minkowski above]. Qu'on ne suppose pas que je prétende à l'originalité en proclamant l'importance de la triade en philosophie. Depuis Hegel, presque tout penseur ayant un peu d'imagination a fait la même chose. L'originalité est la pire des recommandations pour des conceptions fondamentales. Au contraire, le fait que l'esprit des hommes a toujours été enclin aux divisions ternaires est une des considérations qui militent en leur faveur. D'autres nombres ont été l'objet de prédilection pour tel ou tel philosophe, mais trois a prédominé de tout temps et dans toutes les écoles [comp. Table 4 p. 301]. (pp. 71-2, 77, 79)

Cette méthode ressemble fort à celle de Hegel. Il serait historiquement faux de dire qu'elle est une modification de celle de Hegel. Elle est née de l'étude des catégories de Kant et non de celles de Hegel. (p. 118)

Beyond the coincidence in stopping the count on *three*, the systematic identity between the detailed results of this profound formal (abstract) analysis of the trichotomy by Peirce and the characteristics of Zulliger's and other's totally independent triads is nothing less than amazing. Let us begin by giving a brief **overview** choosing key, meaningful quotations from the former: "...la priméité et la tiercéité sont des catégories de la généralité, mais en des sens différents du terme 'général', par opposition à la secondéité qui est 'particulière' "¹³⁵ (p. 211), since "il y a deux types de généralité: la généralité de la possibilité qui est première et la généralité de la pensée qui est troisième" (p. 90 note en bas). **Step by step**: "l'idée de l'absolument premier... précède toute synthèse et toute différenciation; il n'a ni unité ni parties" (p. 72), "la première [catégorie] comprend les qualités des phénomènes..." (p. 80); "la seconde catégorie des éléments des phénomènes comprend les faits actuels. Les qualités, dans la mesure où elles sont générales, sont quelque peu vagues et potentielles. Mais un événement est parfaitement individuel. Il arrive ici et maintenant" (p. 81); finally "la troisième catégorie des éléments des phénomènes comprend ce que nous appelons lois... [ou] pensées. Les pensées ne sont ni des qualités ni des faits... Car une pensée est générale... parce qu'elle renvoie à toutes les choses possibles, et non pas simplement à celles qui se trouvent exister. Aucune collection de faits ne peut constituer une loi; car la loi dépasse tout fait accompli et détermine comment des faits qui *peuvent être*, mais qui n'ont pas pu *tous* arriver, doivent être caractérisés. On peut dire qu'une loi est un fait général, pourvu qu'on comprenne que le général contient une certaine dose de potentialité, de sorte qu'aucune accumulation d'actions ici et maintenant ne pourra jamais faire un fait général. En tant que *général*, le fait général ou loi se rapporte au monde potentiel de

¹³⁵ Peirce even insists on –which Hegel is said to have overlooked– "la division double ou dichotomie de la seconde-idée de la triade" (p. 79, cf. Dworetzki, Freud, Schotte & Murphy above, and Deese below)!

la qualité¹³⁶, alors qu'en tant que fait elle concerne le monde actuel de la réalité" (pp. 81-2). In synthesis then, "le troisième est ce qui jette un pont sur l'abîme entre le premier et le dernier [second] absolu et les met en relation" (p. 74).

Entering in a deeper way into the characteristics of each category: "L'impression totale inanalysée produite par toute multiplicité, non pensée comme fait réel, mais simplement comme une qualité [écarlate, ou dureté, ou...] comme la simple possibilité d'apparence, est une idée de Priméité" (p. 23); "LA PRIMÉITÉ EST LA CATÉGORIE DU SENTIMENT ^[137] ET DE LA QUALITÉ... de tout ce qui est dans l'esprit sous quelque mode de conscience que ce soit, il y a nécessairement une conscience immédiate et par conséquent un sentiment... un sentiment est absolument simple et sans parties - comme il l'est évidemment, puisqu'il est tout ce qu'il est sans considération de quoi que ce soit d'autre, et par conséquent de quelque partie que ce soit qui serait quelque chose d'autre que le tout -... le sentiment n'est rien qu'une qualité, et une qualité n'est pas consciente: elle est une pure possibilité... Toute opération de l'esprit, aussi complexe qu'elle soit, a son sentiment absolument simple, l'émotion du *tout ensemble*" (pp. 83, 86-8). This argument is obviously intimately related to Binder's reflections on moods and their representation in the light-dark (*Hd*) interpretations, as they occur in Zulliger's plate I:

The *central-total feelings*... Where an entire sensory area is experienced as total impression, a *sensory* total-feeling arises. A diffuse multiplicity is experienced, which through some common basic feature is merged into a whole. When a circumstance of broad implications combines a wide area of objects and events into a total situation, a *dispositional* total-feeling arises. Such sensory and dispositional total experiences may give rise to a 'feeling resonance' in the deeper layers of the personality, which will then diffuse into a broad total-feeling... The endogenous vitality-feelings blend to a great extent with the reactive^[138] total-feelings. Thus these central feeling tones together form the *moods*... (Bohm 1959/1977, pp. 306-7)

One may also take in the perceptual totality at a glance, without attending separately to its different sensory components. They are simply experienced as a diffuse multiplicity. Since the perceptual impression is a holistic one, awareness of its common undertone within the multiplicity is what primarily characterizes this experience and leads to sensory total-feelings or mood reactions [*sic*]. Any dispositional total-feelings arising at the same time will be fused with them... visual stimulus material containing indistinctly separated

¹³⁶ However with the following distinction on the other hand: "Une qualité est quelque chose susceptible de s'incarner complètement. Une loi ne peut jamais s'incarner en tant que loi, sauf en déterminant une habitude. Une qualité est la manière dont quelque chose a pu ou aurait pu être. Une loi est la manière dont un futur qui n'aura pas de fin doit continuer à être" (Peirce 1978 p. 115).

¹³⁷ Que Deledalle (1978 pp. 10, 22 footnote 3, 83 footnote 1, 205-6) rapproche de l' 'affection simple' de Maine de Biran, tout comme Schotte des 'troubles simples de l'humeur'.

¹³⁸ Peirce (1978 pp. 25, 81, 95, 208), and Schotte following him, will disagree with Binder on this specific point in the sense that "reaction" is an intrinsic feature of secondness and cannot be assigned to moods which belong to the dimension of firstness.

details that blur into each other and are similar to each other is likely to produce a total impression, especially where these details are "tuned to" a common keynote. Such visual impressions thus bring about reactive [*sic*] moods (central total-feelings)... Where the chiaroscuro values blur indistinctly into each other... "automatically" result in a total impression... The creation of diffuse total impressions is particularly facilitated by chiaroscuro stimuli, because they are more homogeneous than the greatly varied chromatic hues, and thus one of the two conditions for the appearance of total impressions (indistinct delineation and similarity among the given elements) is always fulfilled in the case of chiaroscuro material... The essence of these reflections by Binder culminates in a statement that is basic for his Rorschach theory: "Chiaroscuro values primarily affect the total-feelings, produce mood-reactions [*sic*]" (pp. 308-10)

...he applies the chiaroscuro symbol *Ch* [*Hd*] only to the group of genuine chiaroscuro responses. They are either *W* [*G*] responses or refer to large details of the blot... *Ch* responses have a high positive correlation with *W*, a clearly negative correlation with *D*, and a high negative correlation with *Dd*. In these responses, "no single shadings are selected;" rather the interpretations are based on a diffuse total impression of the chiaroscuro values... the *Ch* interpretations are always connected with central feeling tones, mostly of a dysphoric nature. (pp. 314-5)

Passing on now to the subject of Secondness, we choose an eloquent example from Peirce (1978):

Le type d'une idée de Secondité est l'expérience de l'effort... l'expérience de l'effort ne peut pas exister sans l'expérience de la résistance. L'effort n'est effort que parce qu'il rencontre une opposition... Notez que je parle de l'*expérience*, non du *sentiment* de l'effort. Imaginez-vous assise seule dans le panier d'un ballon loin au-dessus de la terre, jouissant calmement du calme et de la tranquillité absolue. Soudain le sifflet strident d'une machine à vapeur vous déchire le tympan et continue un bon moment. L'impression de tranquillité était une idée de Priméité, une qualité du sentiment. Le sifflet strident ne vous permet pas de penser ou de faire autre chose que souffrir... le déchirement du silence par le bruit était une expérience. La personne dans son inertie s'identifie avec l'état du sentiment précédent et le sentiment nouveau qui se produit malgré elle est le non-ego... Cette conscience de l'action d'un nouveau sentiment dans la destruction du sentiment ancien est ce que j'appelle une *expérience*. (p. 24)

...C'est le champ spécial de l'expérience qui nous informe sur les événements, sur les changements de perception. Or, ce qui caractérise en particulier de soudains changements de perception est un *choc*... Le long coup de sifflet de la locomotive qui approche, aussi désagréable... rencontre une certaine résistance. Ça doit être cela; parce que s'il n'y avait pas de résistance de cette sorte, il n'y aurait pas de choc quand le changement de note se produit. Or, ce choc est tout à fait net. C'est plus particulièrement aux changements et aux différences de perception que nous appliquons le mot "expérience". (p. 94)

Reading these lines one cannot but think on Zulliger's initially surprising decision to put his "noisy" (cf. Schachtel, 1943 p. 396 & footnote 10, 1959 p. 107), multicolored plate II just behind an entirely contrasting, perceptually homogeneous "calm" gray-black plate I (Hegel's thesis vs. antithesis) precisely to preserve the former's ability to provoke a color-*shock*! In a sense it must be something very similar what happens when the infant is forced to experience the rupture of the dual-union and his separation from the primary "object" which he just then begins to retrospectively perceive as part of the outer, opposing material world (Freud-Mélon: "perçu = perdu"). So it is not at all surprising that Rorschach immediately discovered this color-*shock reaction* in his subjects (visible precisely in a delayed *reaction* time) as a frequent part of the color -Secondness- experience, and still more interesting that the subsequently introduced dark-*shock* has demonstrated to be of a different, more automatic and dispositional (constitutional) nature: expression of an objectless, non-reactive, already existing pervasive anxiety that automatically attunes to the blot's global quality: (Bohm, Salomon; comp. Schachtel pp. 398, 407-9). We can see how Zulliger chose as his IInd plate precisely one which features perceptual-formal characteristics already described by Peirce as belonging to Secondness, for ex. "je considère l'idée de toute relation dyadique n'impliquant aucun troisième comme une idée de Secondité" (p. 26): while plate I has compact unity, plate II is full of distinct same-color (*D Fb*) couples in opposing relationships that tend to be interpreted independently (see fig. 5 p. 293 above); and when the latter adds that "LA SECONDITÉ EST LA CATÉGORIE DE L'EXPÉRIENCE, DE LA LUTTE ET DU FAIT... par lutte, je dois dire que j'entends l'action réciproque de deux choses sans considération de troisième ou moyen de quelque sorte..." (pp. 92, 95), that "la seconde est la catégorie de la force brutale: 'impassible théâtre' du jeu des forces de la nature et des violences aveugles des animaux et des hommes" (p. 205), we are tempted to remind the popular fighting animals often seen in the lower browns! Another example: "...l'actualité [ou Secondité] d'un événement... consiste dans le fait qu'il se produit *en tel lieu, à tel moment*" (Peirce p. 69); since most responses occur instantaneously including the whole blot in plate I those considerations are irrelevant there, but isn't that exactly what plate II forces the subject to do by making him respond to one or the other color detail separately (*location*), necessarily one after the other (*succession*)?

Following the same train of thought, again in contrast to the preceding plate II Zulliger's plate III includes still a new element: not only have we now both light-dark (*Hd*) and color (*Fb*) combined in the same plate making of it already in a superficial sense a synthesis of the former two, but unlike the IInd one here the visually separate details have an inner pull towards combination featuring a 3rd blot detail (the center red "butterfly": see fig. 5) in-between both sides (the two black human figures) and "un troisième est quelque chose qui met un Premier en relation avec un Second", "...c'est évidemment la représentation médiatrice entre les deux qui est prééminemment troisième" (Peirce pp. 30, 76); actually, there are in all 5 meaningful blots in this plate (including the outer red "children") but as explained by Peirce himself "l'analyse montrera que toute relation *tétradique, pentadique* ou de n'importe

quel nombre plus grand de corrélation n'est pas autre chose qu'un composé de relations triadiques" (p. 101). And the example Peirce often resorts to of an "A" giving a "B" to a "C" (pp. 28, 77-8, 100, 209-10) is in close relationship with this mediating feature, as many responses exclusive to this plate III demonstrate. On the other hand Piotrowski, whose name is almost synonymous with 'movement response', gives precisely the number 3 as the minimum of parts to interrelate to consider a response a different, superior kind of combinatory whole (i.e. corresponding to our third and final *G* stage: 1957 pp. 73-4) and found that this is in an intimate connection with the *B* experience: "The term 'constructive whole response' pertains to those in which at least three different blot areas are interpreted as separate objects or persons, and in which these separate objects are interrelated in one meaningful response comprising the entire plate. It is the process of analysis of the plate into parts and the adequate synthesis of these parts into one meaningful response that makes the answer constructive... Most of the good-quality constructive whole responses are human movement responses..." (1963 p. 65); it is not surprising that this author also found these response as indicators of preoccupation with the future (1957 pp. 78-9), an expression of Thirdness for Peirce too (pp. 25-6, 70-1, 98-9, 209-10). This is also entirely related to what we have said about Rorschach achieving with his system sort of a true *GB+* in the sense that the concept of 'system' is exactly what Peirce means by 'law' as opposed to a purely "empirical" scientific approach¹³⁹:

...l'inaptitude de la Secondéité à couvrir tout ce qui est dans nos esprits est si évidente... Pourtant, je constate que beaucoup de penseurs essayent de construire un système sans y mettre de tiercéité... Il convient de fouiller la Secondéité à fond. Ce n'est qu'alors que le caractère indispensable et irréductible de la Tiercéité apparaîtra... (p. 27)

Voyons maintenant la Tiercéité. Nous ne passons guère cinq minutes de notre vie consciente sans faire quelque prédiction d'une sorte ou d'une autre; et, dans la majorité des cas, ces prédictions s'accomplissent. Pourtant une prédiction est essentiellement de nature générale et ne peut jamais s'accomplir complètement. Dire qu'une prédiction a une tendance marquée à s'accomplir, c'est dire que les événements futurs sont dans une certaine mesure réellement gouvernés par une loi. Si une paire de dés amène le double six cinq fois de suite, c'est une simple uniformité. Le double six pourrait être amené fortuitement mille fois de suite. Mais cela ne permettrait pas de prédire avec la moindre certitude que le double six serait amené la fois suivante. Si la prédiction a une tendance à s'accomplir, ce doit être que les événements futurs ont une tendance à se conformer à une règle générale... Ce mode d'être qui *consiste*, et je dis bien; qui *consiste*, dans le fait que les faits futurs de la Secondéité revêtiront un caractère général déterminé, je l'appelle Tiercéité. (pp. 70-1)

¹³⁹ This thirdness term of 'law' (as in a scientific law: e.g. gravity) in Peirce's system is in our opinion not to be confused with the secondness, more ethico-moral concept of 'Law' in Szondi's one (cf. Table 4): the latter is to be understood more as originating in a dyadic relation, as when for ex. God gives his written 10 commandments to us conjugated precisely in the *second* person (comp. Peirce's example of the sheriff pp. 24-5, 69-70, and imagine the latter giving us what is called in the U.S.A. the 'Miranda warning': "*you* are under arrest, *you* have the right to remain silent, *you* have the right to an attorney, anything *you* say...").

Premier et second, agent et patient, oui et non, sont des catégories qui nous permettent de décrire en gros les faits de l'expérience, et l'esprit s'en est contenté pendant longtemps. Mais enfin on les a trouvées inadéquates et l'on a fait alors appel à une autre conception, au troisième. Le troisième est ce qui jette un pont sur l'abîme entre le premier et le dernier absolus et les met en relation... de sorte que la nouvelle doctrine a consisté dans l'introduction opportune de la conception de la tiercéité. Sur cette idée, toute la physique moderne est construite. La supériorité de la physique moderne est aussi certainement due pour l'essentiel à ce qu'elle a jeté un pont au-dessus des innombrables cas distincts dont la science ancienne était encombrée; et nous pouvons même aller jusqu'à dire que les grands pas en avant faits par la méthode scientifique dans tous les domaines ont consisté à mettre en relation des cas qui étaient antérieurement discrets. (pp. 74-5)

LA TIERCÉITÉ EST LA CATÉGORIE DE LA PENSÉE ET DE LA LOI. (p. 98)

La tiercéité est une catégorie générale comme la priméité, mais alors que la priméité est possibilité, la tiercéité est loi. Elle est la catégorie de la relation pensée, non dans l'abstrait cependant, mais par rapport à l'action future. C'est la catégorie de la prédiction scientifique. (p. 209; comp. also the quotation from pp. 81-2 reproduced on p. # above)

About the remaining important relation between *B* and *thought* we will comment shortly.

Another, more contemporary phenomenologist -that will lead us smoothly back into Psychoanalysis- merits to be mentioned here. Gaston Bachelard's contribution to our current argument may seem just tangential but he has the rare special advantage of being a philosopher very much interested in the Rorschach. As Kuhn (1984, pp. 236-7; see also 1944/1992, *Préface*) puts it "il va de soi qu'un auteur qui a suivi ainsi les intuitions poétiques inspirées par les 'formes amorphes' des nuages [dans *L'Air et les Songes*] a dû être fasciné par l'œuvre de Rorschach, avec sa psychologie, sa psychopathologie et son test. Il n'a pas manqué de faire l'expérience du test lui-même et il témoigne de son intérêt en 1948 dans *La Terre et les Rêveries du Repos* (p. 75 sq.)...". In that location this author gives some intuitive ideas suggested to him by the instrument, but we prefer to quote him indirectly through Simón Hernández's work (1993 *Introducción*, pp. 13-60) which is the most thorough analysis of this issue to be found in the literature where we can read:

...I was elaborating a paper on "Gaston Bachelard and the Rorschach". It was about an essay on the imaginary dimension of a weaved Rorschach, preceded by a study on the relations that Bachelard maintained with the Rorschach in his written work, since 1947, appearing date of "La Terre et les Rêveries du Repos"... Gaston Bachelard tried to went through the "door" that Hermann Rorschach left open. He felt an enormous admiration for the Rorschach, he "envied" the psychiatrists to which life offers each day new "cases", subjects that come to them with a **complete mind**. But despite his staying away from psychiatry he left us a work, of unfrequent depth, which by locating itself facing "the only problem of expression", allows multiple and fruitful applications in the subject that occupies us... From this time on Bachelard

formulates the purpose of "using" jointly the works of Roland Kuhn on "Rorschach analysis" and those of Ludwig Binswanger on "Daseinsanalyse"... Certain of the enormous research work realized on the imagination of the elements and with a sufficient knowledge of the possibilities of the Rorschach, Bachelard allows himself to indicate a promising path of exploration and investigation for all those "psychologists" that will accept to "*double the psychology of form with a psychology of imagination of matter*"... In Bachelard's project would be being able to continue his efforts to "examine, like an autonomous world, the universe of expression". And it's here where he reminds the "three worlds considered by Binswanger's Daseinsanalyse: Umwelt, Mitwelt, Eigenwelt - world of the non-human environment - interhuman world - personal world". He considers that to these three worlds would correspond another "three worlds of expression, three different classes of poetry". (pp. 16, 20, 23-5; our translation)

Of course we know these three worlds are conceptually related to the three grammatical persons, on their side intimately connected with our Z-Test developments, but not having the adequate *Daseinsanalytical* knowledge we prefer to leave the eventual connection there and refer to another *triad* much more intuitively offered by Bachelard. As mentioned by Kuhn above his fascination for the test was certain, to the point of having kindly and openly subjected himself to the experiment for the benefit of one of Binswanger's famous 'Rorschach Abende' in Kreuzlingen (Verdeaux 1972, p. 23). The ideas we want to mention were uttered precisely during one of those visits to Binswanger's clinic, specifically to the patients' binding (*'reliure'*) workshop¹⁴⁰: with his characteristic spontaneous creativity Bachelard voiced in that context his celebrated wit "lier, c'est bien; délier, c'est mieux; relier, c'est parfait!", words deservedly hanged from then on to the wall of the shop (Schotte, personal communication). He does not seem to have developed these concepts in his written work, but they obviously correspond to Spencer's or more likely Renan's developmental law which he seems to have eloquently rearticulated from his own poetic-creative world view.

We want to take advantage of the opportunity to make profit from another, much more largely exploited feature of Bachelard's work: his well-known dynamic imagination of the elements, but now concentrating exclusively on their pertinence regarding the characteristics of Zulliger's fully-chromatic plate II. From the time we learned about Salomon's (1959b, 1962) amazing discovery of the one-to-one symbolic relationship between the different colors in this card and Freud's partial drives (green-oral, brown-anal, red-phallic) we have been intrigued by this clinically quite convincing albeit insufficiently understood fact from the color-theoretical point of view. One place to look for confirmation is clinical experience, and Zulliger conve-

¹⁴⁰ Coincidentally, Rorschach went through a similar "illuminating" experience: "...It was more or less by accident that he discovered that such ink *blots* could be used for diagnostic purposes. One such fortuitous event related to an epileptic patient named Oswald, the book binder at the hospital who had the task of affixing the blots to stiff cardboards. The task provided him the opportunity to interpret the blots. These interpretations were quite different from the interpretations of other patients (e.g., schizophrenics, alcoholic psychotics and mental defectives), and Rorschach noted the fact" (Roemer 1967, p. 185).

niently offers us the response of a schizophrenic (psychopathological group that as is well known pathoanalytically has a more direct access to the Unconscious than normals) seeing in this plate "a toilet with excrements, bile and blood" (1948-54/1970 p. 60): the excrements(brown)-anal relationship requires no further comment, bile (green) is also an integral part of the oral-digestive functioning, and blood (red) is obviously associated with a direct offence to body integrity (phallic castration, in a wide sense). But theoretical understanding needs to go beyond these anecdotal connections and here is where Simón Hernández (1973b, p. 399) offers us a clever, illuminating piece of poetic-imaginary understanding: "...that green surface of the Z-Test/[plate]II, color that, although isolated, finds itself in intimate relationship with the center red and the base brown. It may be the fresh and restful element, sweetly aquatic, as Bachelard would say, and curiously maternal, of that image composed furthermore of 'earth' and 'fire' " (our translation). This clear insight from an accomplished expert on the Zulliger Test is to be related with Dolto's assertions in the sense of explaining the fascination of children for the *elements* by their symbolizing precisely the primal energy of the *partial drives* still predominantly active in them, and their genetic sequence-order assigned by Schotte (1990 p. 44) to the former through their symbolic relation to Szondi's schema corresponds exactly with Salomon's independent genetic findings concerning the latter: green, brown, red (i.e. water, earth, fire respectively, and finally air). But how to fit the last, absent 'air' element with Salomon's presentation? Reminding that there is actually still another, fourth and final stage in Freud's psychosexual development: 'genitality'; and our opinion is that, just as the plate II 'oral' green is genetically related to the previous light-dark plate/ stage I (*Hd*: Salomon 1962), by contrast the now ubiquitous white 'air gaps' in this plate that separate the partial individual blots is to be connected with the subsequent plate/stage III fuller kinesthetic experience of the *white space or void*. Precisely Bachelard's friend Kuhn offers us the needed assistance here:

On considère classiquement et à juste titre que la réponse K [B], pour autant qu'elle soit de bonne qualité, est un indice fiable de la capacité d'un sujet de créer, fantasmer, penser originalement et d'étendre son registre identificatoire. On a par ailleurs rapproché le procès de production kinesthésique du procès de production du rêve (Fur[r]er), en ce sens que le processus primaire est réintroduit dans la démarche de penser. L'argument de Rorschach, en évoquant la créativité, était qu'il y a dans la kinesthésie quelque chose de plus qu'une perception... Roland Kuhn^[141] s'est interrogé sur les conditions de possibilité de la production de réponses mouvement. Sa réflexion s'est focalisée sur trois thèmes: la symétrie, la mort, le vide... Mais la remarque la plus intéressante concerne la question du *blanc* et du *vide*. Kuhn a observé que les sujets qui ne donnent aucune réponse "détail blanc" (Dbl) [Zw], même quand ils sont sollicités dans ce sens, sont aussi ceux qui se remémorent simplement les événements du jour dans leurs rêves. Ils ne font pas de vrais rêves. Ils en restent à la perception au sens vulgaire et positiviste du terme. La "fantaisie" leur fait défaut. Kuhn en vient à considérer que la sensibilité au blanc est une des conditions de possibilité de la production de K. Nous pensons que la

¹⁴¹ In a conference delivered at Louvain-la-Neuve around 1980 (Mélou, personal communication, VIII/3/05).

sensibilité au blanc va de pair avec la préoccupation de la question du manque et du vide... De même que ceux qui sont sensibles à la symétrie, les producteurs de Dbl ne donnent généralement pas de K. Mais ils sont comme au seuil de la réussite. Ils livrent le combat qui devrait leur permettre de réussir le saut [en l'air] qui les autoriserait, en cas d'heureuse issue, à entrer dans les sentiers de la création. De quel combat s'agit-il? Il s'agit de *trionpher de l'objet*, plus exactement de la prégnance de la perception réductrice, au sens positif énoncé plus haut, d'une "gestalt" s'imposant de manière tyrannique... Pour créer - et rêver - il faut pouvoir *faire le vide*, c'est-à-dire, plus exactement, être à même d'interposer entre le sujet et l'objet - qu'il s'agisse de l'objet primaire donné dans l'hallucination ou de l'objet secondaire qu'impose l'entendement réclamant la "bonne forme" - un *écran*. De même, le rêve n'est possible que si préalablement s'est constitué ce que Lewin a appelé "l'écran blanc du rêve". De même aussi, l'artiste qui prend la plume ou le pinceau interpose entre le monde des perceptions déjà données et soi-même une page ou une toile blanche. On ne crée que si on fait table rase de tout le déjà connu-perçu, ce dont Malevitch a donné l'illustration la plus radicale à travers son fameux carré blanc sur fond blanc... Notons au passage que *l'écran s'oppose absolument au miroir*, au point qu'on peut affirmer qu'au plus est forte l'attraction spéculaire [symétrie], au plus est faible la propension à créer [B; cf. aussi Rapaport et al. 1945-6/68 p. 360]. Mais il ne s'agit pas non plus de nier l'objet, encore moins de le tuer. Nous dirions volontiers, utilisant dans un sens métaphorique un terme d'horticulture, qu'il s'agit de "*blanchir*" l'objet. Pour blanchir un légume, on provoque son étioilage en le mettant à l'ombre. Le bénéfice de cette opération est que sa forme change et qu'il perd son goût amer. Poussant plus loin la métaphore, nous pouvons dire que le "blanchiment" créateur est aux antipodes du processus mélancolique¹⁴². Dans la création, ce n'est plus "l'ombre de l'objet qui s'abat sur le moi", c'est le moi - au sens de sujet - qui "met l'objet à l'ombre" afin de lui permettre de changer de forme et de devenir comestible. Cette métaphore nous paraît utile dans la mesure notamment où elle nous éloigne des conceptions de l'acte créateur qui en font essentiellement un acte réparateur. La création est avant tout *transformatrice*. Elle trans-forme les êtres et les choses en arrêtant leur cours naturel afin de leur insuffler [encore de l'air!] un cours de développement nouveau qui est partiellement induit par le sujet. En définitive, toute démarche créatrice nécessite un double arrêt, dans le chef du sujet et dans celui de l'objet. L'objet doit être arrêté dans son mouvement par un sujet qui lui-même s'arrête. Le peintre s'immobilise devant sa toile, l'écrivain s'assied devant sa page blanche, le rêveur s'étend dans son lit et déroule pendant la phase profonde du sommeil l'écran blanc sur lequel, au cours de la phase dite paradoxale, il réalisera son film. Cette démarche créatrice est aussi celle de la

¹⁴² Pareillement dans la série de Zulliger, la planche III kinesthésique où prédomine centralement le blanc (Mélon 1976, p. 85: "Les planches III [presque la même que celle de Zulliger] et VII, par la place qu'elles font au vide, sont significativement celles qui suscitent le plus de réponses kinesthésiques...") se trouve aux antipodes d'une planche I compacte, sombre et mélancolique (Salomon 1962): see Fig. 5 p. 293.

pensée. Cogito, ergo sum. Coagitare, c'est faire en sorte en effet que le mouvement propre du sujet, infiltrant celui de l'objet, les transforme l'un et l'autre. (Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/1989, pp. 201-4)

With this last 'thought' in mind the right moment has come to turn back to Psychoanalysis. For so rich a theory the concepts we are going to give privilege to in our following argument do not exhaust the possibilities it offers for exemplifying and validating our 'new look' of Rorschach's perceptanalytic schema - or, viceversa, for applying the latter for the purposes of the former. Just to give a very brief parallel example, Schotte (1990 p. 54) proposes the technical psychotherapeutical triad of *material* - *resistance* - *transference* as another possible one to be exploited in our sense: obviously, free-association produces at first a global, syncretic, naïve, pre-analytical ensemble of raw material from where the valuable/useful 'metal' (Freud) is yet to be extracted; resistance ('shock') has already been characterized in full detail by Peirce as a feature of Secondness; and as for the *B*-transference specific relationship we will just refer to Bogaert's valuable book (1990). But our argument will focus on another aspect of the theory from the point of view of Rorschach's absolutely crucial 'Experience Type': while the last one of Dworetzki's (1939) main conclusions was to reject it giving precedence to her genetic-perceptual point of view...

Mais il nous semble que l'affinité des couleurs et la tendance kinesthésique ne représentent pas deux phénomènes opposés qui pourraient former les deux pôles d'une typologie, pas plus que l'excitabilité et la disposition dynamique (imagination, élan intérieur, productivité, etc.) ne sont deux tendances polaires. Il s'agit plutôt de deux phénomènes sur des plans différents... Les types que nous avons tenté d'établir d'après le mode de perception et d'après le point de vue génétique, forment un cadre plus restreint que celui désigné par les "types de réactivité" (C-K) [Fb-B: elle annonce involontairement ce que Zulliger fera bientôt en inversant l'ordre pour refléter la suite de leur développement, cf. conclusion précédente]: ils se rapportent tout d'abord à l'attitude du sujet vis-à-vis des données de l'expérience et des formes de perception qui en dépendent. Mais nous croyons que ces attitudes correspondent aux tendances plus générales que les sujets manifestent dans la vie. (pp. 394-6)

in spite of this and others' similar rejection of the concept of '*Erlebnistypus*' (Baer, Minkowska...), we believe what still makes the paramount importance of this couple of Rorschach is their representing as essential a concept as Sigmund Freud's dialectics between a *primary* and a *secondary* mental process. The corresponding identification of Rorschach's *Fb* determinant with predominance of affect and readiness for acting-out and *B* determinant with impulse delay, bound energy, representation and thought has been a definite finding of research since Rorschach himself (1921/1957 chaps. II. 5.b&c, IV.1/4/11), but particularly explicited in psychoanalytical terms between others by Rapaport et al. (1945-46/1968 pp. 355-61), Anzieu (& Chabert 1961/1983 pp. 55, 106, 320, 326-8), Salomon (1962 chap. V.1), and above all Mélon who makes an excellent summary of their converging views:

...Ces réflexions succinctes à propos du schéma de l'appareil psychique de FREUD et de la configuration szondienne du moi nous permettent de comprendre pourquoi et comment l'**Erlebnistypus** de Rorschach nous renseigne utilement sur un aspect essentiel du fonctionnement psychique. Le binôme introversion/extraversion hérité de la typologie jungienne peut être avantageusement remplacé par le couple représentations/affects. Un sujet extraverti est quelqu'un chez qui la résolution des tensions pulsionnelles intervient en mobilisant les soupapes affectivo-motrices (hystériques, psychopathes, psycho-somatiques), un sujet introverti se libère plutôt par la production de représentations, fantasmes (obsessionnels), délires (schizophréniques) ou pensées (sublimées) qui sont des produits dérivés, plus ou moins lointains, de l'hallucination... Rorschach avait noté que la production de kinesthésies, à la différence des réponses forme et plus encore des réponses couleur, impliquait un **moment créateur**... Il avait également remarqué que la production de kinesthésies postulait l'**inhibition de la décharge motrice**. A ce propos, il avait bien vu l'analogie avec le processus onirique. D'une manière générale, on peut dire que les réponses mouvement sont en rapport avec l'**activité de pensée** dans la mesure où celle-ci est créatrice et antagoniste du passage à l'acte immédiat... Les réponses couleur, à l'inverse, n'impliquent pas de moment créateur; elles sont le produit d'une réaction affective immédiate. Elles sont purement réactives; elles sont produites dans le moi mais le moi ne les produit pas: elles surviennent un peu malgré lui, soit qu'elles le débordent ou le surprennent, soit que - c'est souvent ce qui se passe dans un deuxième temps chez l'hystérique - il leur laisse la bride sur le cou et prend plaisir à se laisser porter par elle[s]. Autrement dit, la part du ça dans la production des réponses couleur est toujours plus importantes que celle du moi. (1975a pp. 258-9, 1976 p. 56)

...Toutes ces notations sont capitales et témoignent du génie observateur de Rorschach. Il est dommage qu'il ait eu recours au concept d'introversion promu par JUNG pour qualifier le sujet K [B]. En s'engageant dans la voie d'une typologie confuse, il s'est empêché de fournir une interprétation dynamique des K articulée autour de l'opposition dialectique entre la pensée, l'affect et la mise en acte, alors qu'il en avait manifestement l'intuition... Dans un article publié en 1925, soit trois ans après la mort de Rorschach, FURRER a remarquablement mis l'accent sur cette analogie, en notant que, comme la production onirique, la production kinesthésique implique à la fois inhibition motrice et activité créatrice... La relation entre la production kinesthésique et l'inhibition motrice a fait l'objet de nombreux travaux expérimentaux. On a montré que l'inhibition forcée, ou le confinement au lit imposé par la maladie, augmentait le nombre de K. Cependant il semble bien qu'une telle augmentation n'intervienne que chez les sujets qui produisent spontanément des K. Certains se sont étonnés de l'abondance des K chez les danseurs et les athlètes, c'est-à-dire chez des gens qui "bougent" beaucoup, et de leur absence chez les déprimés, qui ne "bougent" pas. Un pareil malentendu ne peut provenir que d'une incompréhension de la notion d'inhibition motrice, qui ne doit évidemment pas être considérée ici dans le sens platement réaliste d'une

réduction de la somme des comportements moteurs d'un individu. Il faut l'entendre dans le sens psychanalytique d'une inhibition du passage à l'acte (Agieren, acting out). Le passage à l'acte, comme FREUD l'a écrit, est au service de la compulsion de répétition (Wiederholungszwang) et s'oppose à la remémoration et à la perlaboration (Durcharbeiten). C'est pourquoi les sujets qui ne donnent pas de kinesthésies sont généralement inaptes à la psychanalyse. Cette notion d'inhibition de la décharge motrice a surtout été soulignée par David RAPAPORT [1945-46/1968, pp. 355-361] qui a beaucoup insisté sur la nécessité d'une suspension (delay) de la mise en acte pour que puisse s'amorcer le processus de pensée dont la kinesthésie est le témoin. Dans son effort de théorisation, RAPAPORT se réfère essentiellement aux conceptions que FREUD a énoncées au chapitre VII de la Traumdeutung. La pensée y est présentée comme un produit dérivé de l'hallucination, qui permet de métaboliser les pulsions sans dépense d'énergie excessive; l'acting, par contre, entraîne une déperdition énergétique considérable... F. SALOMON, dont nous avons déjà dit l'intérêt pour l'interprétation psychanalytique du Rorschach, pense que deux facteurs majeurs interviennent dans la genèse [des] kinesthésies: la régression anale et la prédilection accordée au plaisir de rétention (Retentionslust) d'une part, et d'autre part, une régression narcissique devant l'angoisse de castration, qui entraîne un reflux de la libido objectale et un retrait dans l'univers fantasmatique pré-oedipien où la mère n'était pas encore l'épouse du père. En ce sens, les kinesthésies correspondent assurément à un ensemble de mécanismes de défense typiquement obsessionnels, où opèrent notamment la régression anale, la suspension de l'acte et le détour par la pensée, le retournement de l'activité en passivité, l'isolation, la formation réactionnelle, le déni par le fantasme, la temporisation et l'introjection... Ces mécanismes s'opposent à la satisfaction directe des pulsions et sont donc antagonistes du passage à l'acte. "Je mehr die Farben die B überwiegen, um so grösser der Drang nach direkter Triebabführ, zur Motorik, um so grösser die Abhängigkeit vom Lustprinzip. Drucken die B eine Flucht nach innen, in die Phantasie aus, so die Fb, die Flucht nach aussen, in die Motorik [1962 p. 89]". (1976 pp. 83-7)¹⁴³

As pointed out by Laplanche & Pontalis (1968) Freud's 'primary' and 'secondary' concepts have temporal-genetic implications, but attention should be made not to

¹⁴³ Actually, the Jungian theorization (or at least its general orientation) could also be recovered *a posteriori* with these developmental considerations. In our opinion Zulliger's plate I would correspond to "man's dark [Hd], unconscious origins" from cave times on which McCully (chap. II.F above) has particularly insisted, equivalent to the earliest developmental stage; he adds following Jung's theory that "youth is the extraverted time of life [II Fb], and it is rather common to observe an extraverted youth become more contemplative and introverted in middle life [III B]. Nature often balances us against an introversive-extraversive axis" (1971 p. 102). Compare with Fox 1954 pp. 704-5 (who also makes a connection with Hegel's triadic philosophy), and with Deese/Schotte below. Later on McCully (pp. 152-3) makes an interesting equivalence between Jungian developmental theory and Hindu/Buddhist thought in which, in perfect coherence with the ideas developed all along this chapter, three levels are distinguished and related to: 1st. naïve self-gratification (autoerotism, in psychoanalytic terms); 2nd. instincts and desires leading to external objects but whose perception is distorted by illusions (wishful thinking); and 3rd. inner values, true perceptions (symbolization) and clear thinking; respectively.

confuse them by simple phonetic association with Peirce's already discussed 'firstness' and 'secondness' categories respectively (see Table 4 p. 301). Rather, and in perfect parallelism with the late discovery by Rorschach of the importance of an initially difficult-to-grasp, new light-dark (*Hd*) determinant which has significant implications concerning the Experience Type (Salomon 1962, chap. IV.9&11), is the fact of the subsequent introduction by Piera Castoriadis-Aulagnier (1975/1981) of a previous, additional *originary* process unforeseen by Freud in psychoanalytic metapsychology which is really the one corresponding to Peirce's 'Firstness': when she begins by defining its '*self-engendering postulate*' (p. 45, i.e. Freud's "the breast is a part of me, I am the breast" dual-union stage, cf. p. # above) she is just referring to this irreducible firstness quality. Let us quote from her some relevant passages which clearly demonstrate this:

...Notre modèle défend l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'activité psychique est constituée par l'ensemble de trois modes de fonctionnement, ou par trois processus de métabolisation: le processus originaire, le processus primaire, le processus secondaire... Les trois processus par nous postulés ne sont pas d'emblée présents dans l'activité psychique, ils se suivent temporellement et leur mise en action est provoquée par la nécessité qui s'impose à la psyché de prendre connaissance d'une propriété de l'objet à elle extérieure, propriété que le processus antérieur était dans l'obligation d'ignorer. Cette succession temporelle n'est pas mesurable... La mise en place d'un nouveau processus ne comporte jamais la mise au silence du précédent: en des espaces différents ayant entre eux des relations non homologues, se poursuit l'activité qui leur est propre. L'information que l'existence d'un hors-psyché impose à cette dernière continuera à être métabolisée en trois représentations homogènes à la structure de chaque processus. (pp. 26-7)

...La première représentation que la psyché se forge d'elle-même comme activité représentante se fera par la mise en relation des effets résultants de sa double rencontre avec le corps et avec les productions de la psyché maternelle. Si nous en restons à ce stade [de Priméité], nous dirons que la seule qualité, propre à ces deux espaces dont le processus originaire veuille et puisse être informé, concerne **la qualité plaisir et déplaisir de l'affect** présent lors de cette rencontre... La mise en activité du processus primaire et du processus secondaire résultera de la nécessité à laquelle va se trouver confrontée l'activité psychique d'avoir à reconnaître deux autres caractères particuliers de l'objet dont la présence est nécessaire à son plaisir: le caractère d'extra-territorialité, ce qui revient à reconnaître l'existence d'un espace séparé du sien propre [Secondéité], et c'est là une information qui ne pourra être métabolisée que par l'activité du processus primaire, et la propriété de signifier, ou de signification, que possède ce même objet, ce qui implique de reconnaître que la relation présente entre les éléments qui occupent l'espace extérieur est définie par la relation présente entre les significations que le discours donne de ces mêmes éléments [Tiercéité]. Cette information, non métabolisable par le processus primaire, exigera la mise en activité du processus secondaire grâce auquel pourra s'opérer une mise-en-sens du monde qui respectera un schéma relationnel identique au schéma constituant la

structure du représentant qui, dans ce dernier cas, n'est autre que le Je. (pp. 34-5, boldface added)

Concentrating from now on on the 'firstness' characteristics of this *originary process*:

Nous avons dit que la rencontre originaire, en droit, se joue au moment même de la naissance, mais que nous nous autorisons à déplacer ce moment, pour le situer lors d'une première et inaugurale expérience de plaisir: la *rencontre entre bouche et sein*. Quand nous parlons de moment originaire, ou de rencontre originaire, c'est à ce point de départ que nous nous référerons... Cette activité et cette excitation exigent la rencontre entre un organe sensoriel et un objet extérieur ayant un pouvoir de stimulation à son égard. C'est ce modèle sensoriel que le processus originaire reprend dans ses mises-en-forme. La représentation pictographique de cette rencontre a la particularité d'ignorer la dualité qui la compose. Le [sein] représenté se donne à la psyché [de l'enfant] comme présentation d'elle-même: l'agent représentant voit dans la représentation l'œuvre de son travail autonome, il y contemple l'engendrement de sa propre image. (pp. 45, 48)

...Les termes de modèle sensoriel ou corporel et d'emprunt réfèrent en effet aux matériaux présents dans la représentation pictographique, par laquelle **la psyché s'auto-informe d'un état affectif qui la concerne seule**. Il serait vain en ce registre de poser un ordre de préséance entre l'affect et sa représentation et aussi bien entre l'éprouvé et l'information que la psyché en a; de même serait-il asensé de faire de la représentation la source d'un affect que son surgissement déclencherait, ou de voir dans l'affect un état préexistant que l'activité de représentation mettrait en scène. **Il faut postuler la coalescence d'une représentation de l'affect qui est indivisible de l'affect de la représentation qui l'accompagne**. Ils ne sont pas plus séparables que ne l'est le regard du vu: voir c'est la rencontre d'un organe sensoriel avec un phénomène doué de visibilité, aucune hiérarchisation temporelle n'est possible. (pp. 55-6)

...Cette image est le pictogramme, en tant que mise en forme d'un schéma relationnel, dans lequel **le représentant se reflète comme totalité identique au monde**. Ce que l'activité psychique contemple et investit dans le pictogramme, c'est ce reflet d'elle-même qui l'assure que, entre l'espace psychique et l'espace du hors-psyché, existe une relation d'identité et de spécularisation réciproques... il faut dès maintenant souligner que dès l'origine de l'expérience de plaisir, **tout plaisir d'une zone est conjointement, et doit l'être, plaisir global de l'ensemble des zones** [comp. Murphy's quotation chap. II.D]. L'expérience de l'allaitement s'accompagne d'une série de perceptions touchant les différents organes sensoriels: **le plaisir, dès sa première apparition, va paradoxale-ment anticiper sur cette expérience d'une totalité indicible de l'éprouvé que, dans un lointain après-coup, on appellera jouissance**... A partir de ces constatations on peut définir comme suit ce qui spécifie la représentation pictographique: **la mise-en-forme d'un perçu par laquelle se présentent, dans l'originaire et pour l'originaire, les affects dont il est successivement siège, activité inaugurale de la psyché pour laquelle toute représentation est toujours auto-référente et reste à jamais indicible,**

ne pouvant répondre à aucune des lois auxquelles doit obéir le dicible, pour élémentaire qu'il soit. Cette spécularisation soi-monde démontre l'ambiguïté de l'acception, donnée couramment au concept de narcissisme primaire... La totalité synchronique de l'excitation des zones est d'une importance fondamentale: préalable nécessaire à l'intégration du corps comme unité future, mais, aussi, cause d'une fragmentation de cette "unité" qui est à la source d'une angoisse de morcellement, dont on comprend quelle désintégration de l'image du corps elle implique. Cette synchronie des plaisirs érogènes est de plus coextensive d'une première expérience d'allaitement qui met en présence une bouche et un sein et s'accompagne d'un premier acte d'avalement de nourriture qui, dans le registre du corps, fait disparaître son état de besoin. **Si le concept d'oralité, ou de phase orale, tient une telle place dans la théorie analytique, c'est bien parce qu'il réfère à cette expérience inaugurale de plaisir...** Le sein doit être considéré, en ce stade, comme un fragment du monde qui a la particularité d'être conjointement audible, visible, tactile, olfactif, nourrissant, et donc d'être dispensateur de la totalité des plaisirs... **C'est pourquoi la bouche deviendra représentant pictographique, et métonymique, des activités de l'ensemble des zones, représentant qui *autocrée par avalement* la totalité des attributs d'un objet - le sein - qui sera à son tour représenté comme source globale et unique des plaisirs sensoriels.** Zone et objet primordiaux qui n'existent que l'un par l'autre, leur indissociabilité est corrélative de leur représentation et de son postulat, exactement au même titre que dans l'expérience de l'audition sont indissociables l'activité de l'organe sensoriel et l'onde sonore, source d'excitation. Cette "*zone-objet complémentaire*" est la représentation primordiale par laquelle la psyché met en scène toute expérience de rencontre entre elle et le monde... Ce que l'activité originaire perçoit du milieu ambiant (psychique) où elle baigne, ce qu'elle intuitionne quant aux **affects dont sont responsables les ombres qui l'entourent** se présentera pour elle et sera par elle représenté par la seule forme dont elle dispose: l'image d'un espace extérieur qui, ne pouvant être que le reflet d'elle-même, devient l'équivalent d'un espace où entre les objets existe une même relation **de complémentarité et d'interpénétration réciproque...** Toute représentation d'une zone érogène, et de sa fonction, devient métonymie de la totalité de l'espace et de l'activité du corps et, donc, de l'espace et de l'activité psychique. Toute production de cet espace sera métabolisée par l'originaire et représentée comme effet de son pouvoir d'engendrement de l'objet de plaisir... (pp. 59-62, 68; boldface added)

Of course, in these new Castoriadis-Aulagnier's developments is readily discernible the influence of Jacques Lacan's original psychoanalytic teachings, as Mélon (1976 p. 29) has already pointed out. The connection between the former triad and Lacan's own one of the *Real - Imaginary - Symbolic* records is rather an easy one to make, as well as with Peirce's semiotic concepts due the latter's strong linguistic slant. In Fages (1973) words:

...Cette identification primaire de l'enfant à son image [spéculaire] est comme la souche de toutes les autres identifications. Elle est "duelle", c'est-à-dire

réduite à deux termes (le corps de l'enfant et son image)... Lacan la qualifie d'*imaginaire* en se tenant au plus près de l'étymologie du terme... Simultanément l'enfant est mis en présence de ses pairs en âge. Il les agresse ou les imite et par là tente de s'imposer à eux... Il bat et dit avoir été battu, il voit tomber et pleure. Or cette relation agressive est homologue à celle du corps face à l'image du miroir. Elle est "duelle", se caractérise par l'indistinction, la confusion du soi et de l'autre... Cette relation au miroir et cette relation agressive vis-à-vis des autres enfants ont des traits communs avec la relation première vis-à-vis de la mère. L'enfant, à l'origine, ne désire pas seulement être touché, allaité, soigné par la mère. Il désire être son tout ou plus exactement son complément; il désire tenir lieu de ce qui manque à sa mère: le phallus. Il se fait, pour ainsi dire, désir du désir de sa mère. Ici encore relation duelle et immédiate, indistinction, identification narcissique, aliénation^[144]. Autant de traits de l'ordre imaginaire... Pour comprendre l'accès à l'ordre symbolique, il faut reprendre avec Lacan le thème freudien de l'Œdipe, c'est-à-dire du rapport avec les différenciations sexuelles. Le stade du miroir avec la relation d'indistinction de l'enfant à la mère était le premier temps du rapport œdipien: l'enfant s'identifiait au désir de la mère, au phallus. Voici qu'en un second temps, le père intervient, en trouble-fête, pour priver l'enfant de cette identification, et la mère, du phallus: l'enfant se voit interdire la couche de la mère et la mère, la récupération de l'enfant. Ce second temps de l'Œdipe est donc rencontre de la Loi du père. Le troisième temps sera l'*identification au père*. C'est ici précisément que s'opère l'entrée dans l'ordre symbolique, dans l'ordre du langage. En effet, le rôle principal du Père n'est pas celui de la relation vécue ni celui de procréation, mais celui de la parole qui signifie la Loi. "C'est dans le *nom du père* qu'il nous faut reconnaître le support de la fonction symbolique qui, depuis l'orée des temps symboliques, identifie sa personne à la figure de la loi"... Si la mère et l'enfant acceptent la Loi paternelle, l'enfant s'identifie au père comme à celui qui est détenteur du phallus [comme signifiant métaphorique paternel]. Le père, pourrait-on dire, remet en place le phallus: comme objet désiré par la mère, comme objet distinct de l'enfant. Cette remise en place est une *castration* symbolique: le père castre l'enfant en le distinguant du phallus et en le séparant de la mère. L'enfant doit accepter que cette castration lui soit signifiée. Moyennant cette acceptation - cette identification à la Loi, au père - l'enfant entre dans la constellation, dans la triade familiale, et y trouve sa juste position. Il dépasse la relation "duelle" avec la mère, il devient sujet distinct des deux autres, il est *libéré*, il acquiert la subjectivité. Il entre dans le monde du langage, de la culture, de la civilisation... L'enfant... accepte la Loi paternelle qui le castre et le limite; il finit par nommer le Père; nommant le Père il nomme l'objet de son désir, le phallus, mais nomme métaphoriquement cet objet confiné dans l'inconscient. Le Nom-du-Père est un substitut métaphorique, un symbole.

¹⁴⁴ Another meaning of the term (Laplanche & Pontalis 1968, "c") concerns the triggering of animal behavior by the Gestalt of a same-species individual, which brings us back to the plate II browns as when we were discussing Peirce's Secondness!

L'enfant, au terme de l'Œdipe, a donc accès à l'ordre symbolique. En termes freudiens, l'identification à la Loi du père peut être dite *secondaire*, tandis que celle à l'image, à la mère, pouvait être dite *primaire*. (pp. 16-21)

But just as other previous authors, before these Symbolic (secondary) and Imaginary (primary) orders Lacan discovered in Freud's 'Irma injection' dream still an initial Real record, eloquently described in terms akin with the oral/light-dark/anxiety atmosphere we already know:

...Lacan réinterprète ce rêve... Il en souligne l'image terrifiante vue par Freud au fond de la gorge de sa patiente: "grandes taches blanches", "extraordinaires formations contournées", "et sur elles de larges escarres blanc grisâtre" [plate I, Rorschach or Zulliger?]. Cette forme complexe et insituable révèle un réel dernier, devant quoi tous les mots s'arrêtent [Castoriadis-Aulagnier's 'non-speakable' above]: "l'objet d'angoisse par excellence", dit Lacan pour définir ce qui, dans le rêve de Freud comme dans la théorie qu'il nous livre, apparaît comme premier. Il précède en effet l'imaginaire, qui surgit dans le rêve sous la forme des personnages où se projette avec un certain désarroi le sujet Freud. Il semble appeler ce qui à la fin du rêve va donner structure à cet imaginaire chaotique auprès de ce réel innommable: le symbolique. Le rêve se conclut en effet par une formule chimique, que Freud voit devant ses yeux, imprimée en caractères gras. Elle manifeste la présence du symbolique, et Lacan dit qu'elle vient ici apaiser l'angoisse de Freud, née de la vue de ce réel... Avant l'avènement du sujet de l'inconscient et son passage symbolique à l'existence, le réel "était déjà là", dit Lacan. Ajoutons qu'ordinairement c'est à la mère qu'il revient de l'incarner. Ce réel attendait l'intervention symbolique du père, qui évite à l'enfant d'être à la merci du désir de la mère... (Chemama 1993, pp. 237-8)

We just have to refer here to pp. 296-8 above where we gave formal conclusion to the subject of the direct connection between Leopold Szondi's psychoanalytic or Fate-analytic drive schema (in Jacques Schotte's particular triadic pathoanalytic re-reading of it) and Rorschach's perceptanalytic one (also in Hans Zulliger's triadic revisualization), initiated in the previous section (C.2). Let us just express our pure amazement on how, in a completely independent albeit identical and thus most eloquent way, the diverging history of both of these excellent projective procedures has led to the demonstration of their total identity in psychological scope and implications, giving absolute reason to Schotte's early assessment in this sense:

Nombres existentiels premiers, et de la forme pure du tableau de base szondien [et rorschachien]... Il est bien certain que dans le projet szondien du tableau pulsionnel, un rôle considérable peut avoir été joué par l'appréhension, progressive peut-être, ...d'une sorte de *symétrie* de base [cf. Fig 2 p. 278], qui joint à leur point d'équilibre une structure globale tout juste restée simple et une complexité interne déjà considérable. Mutatis mutandis, c'est là l'équivalent szondien de la "rythmique spatiale" qui fait le merveilleux équilibre des planches de Rorschach, ou du moins l'aspect général formel de cet équivalent [c-à-d le principe général *B - F - Fb* de tout le matériel: cf. Fig. 4 p.

291]... Ce qui en résulta dans le cas du "Szondi" [tout comme du "Rorschach"] est aussi une sorte de jeu mesuré, dans lequel interviennent de manière mesurante quelques nombres fort simples... Depuis cette symétrie de la *droite* et de la *gauche* de tout le tableau, à propos de laquelle on pourrait parler comme on le fait déjà d'une dialectique du *centre* [coartation-dilatation] et de la *périphérie* [introversion- extratension]; et, d'autre part, facteur d'une manière de rupture de toute l'ordonnance si parfaite de ce jeu, l'intervention d'un 3 [inattendu, introduit par Schotte et Zulliger respectivement]... Dans cette deuxième série [triadique], qui groupe les "pulsions" [ou facteurs]... selon une progression cette fois [génétique], cette *dissymétrie* secrète se trouve même redoublée, parce que *S* et *P*, qui forment notre "gauche", se rapprochant très fort structurellement l'un de l'autre, constituent aussi bien les deux faces d'un seul et même moment du tout. Un rapprochement semblable est à faire par la "droite", mais du fait de la place tout à fait singulière qui revient à *Sch*, on devra de ce point de vue le distinguer de *C* et à la fois tous deux de l'ensemble *S-et-P*. Une nouvelle triade est ainsi dégagée, où cet ensemble [*F-et-Fb*, au Test-Z] a le rôle de *moyen terme* brisé, qui sépare et rattache du même coup l'un à l'autre les 2 *extrêmes* que sont dans cette perspective, dynamique et non plus statique comme plus haut (centre-périphérie), *C* et *Sch* [*Hd* et *B*]. Comme enfin ce dernier [niveau/planche III] réunit à la fois, d'une certaine manière, tous les autres par lui, on dira également que dans cette progression l'on va de l'unité à une pluralité chaque fois restructurée - et par là en fin de compte à une vraie unité. (1990 p. 35-6)

In the case of Schotte this systematizing insight was gained in no small measure thanks to the continued exchange with his friend the phenomenologist August Deese, assistant of W. Szilasi at the University of Fribourg-in-Brisgau's famous Philosophy chair, the same one occupied previously in succession by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. This philosopher, who curiously and intriguingly enough never wrote one word, was according to the former one of the greatest he was ever to meet and in his sole speech their true contemporary successor, since he "...développe actuellement... sa propre visée d'une '3^e dimension' de la *phénoménologie* elle-même, dont Husserl et Heidegger auront constitué dans ce sens les '1^{re}' et '2^e' " (# p. 52). Similarly, he was the first of the German phenomenologists to stress the congeniality in thought between Phenomenology (Husserl) and Psychoanalysis (Freud), making of him the appropriate choice to close our argument. We must refer to his unwritten ideas through some of Schotte's citations:

...c'est la rencontre avec un philosophe, Deese, qui nous a engagé dans ce mode de penser. Car Deese situait comme son projet le développement d'une troisième dimension de la phénoménologie, qui serait une reprise originaire des deux étapes précédentes, majeures: la phénoménologie de Husserl, qui, comme il le démontrait, traite de tout ce qui a trait à la première dimension et actualise ce premier mode primordial de l'articulation de l'existence; l'entreprise de Heidegger, qui a fait glisser la phénoménologie vers une deuxième étape, non plus une philosophie "théorique", caractéristique du premier niveau, mais une philosophie "pratique": toutes[s] les structures

heideggeriennes se rapportent au deuxième niveau et actualisent non seulement une deuxième dimension de l'existence mais une dimension à deux versants, marquée par les dualismes, alors que la première est unidimensionnelle et la troisième [la sienne, "logique"], tridimensionnelle.¹⁴⁵ (1981 p. 163)

To point the orientation of his research, Deese constantly resorts to such conceptual triads with the intention of deriving from their own diversity an ensemble of truly originary structures, accentuating each time the last term simultaneously as the true goal and the true *origin* of the accomplished developmental series which already surreptitiously played its role from the very beginning¹⁴⁶. The most comprehensive conceptualization is to be found in his triadic articulation between what constitutes the Basis, the Foundation and the Origin of a phenomenon, which we should examine and be sure to understand first from Schotte's very paedagogical exposition (1977):

La base, par le biais du grec βασις, a un rapport immédiat à la marche. C'est aussi ce sur quoi on marche [c.-à-d. le sol]. Un fondement, quant à lui, est autre chose qu'une base... le fondement d'un bâtiment se creuse dans le sol et constitue la condition même pour qu'il puisse s'élever à partir et bien au-delà de la base. La cathédrale, par exemple, s'enlève sur un fondement complexe, qui la distingue dans sa façon d'apparaître du temple grec [plus ancien]. Car ce dernier, qui n'implique ni fondement, ni donc négation de ce sur quoi il s'enlèverait, s'élève en quelque sorte sur sa base. En outre, il est situé dans le paysage et le fait vivre à travers lui. Il entretient un rapport de co-vivance ou, comme disait CLAUDEL, de co-naissance avec la nature dans et avec laquelle il se situe. La cathédrale, tout au contraire, ne s'inscrit pas dans l'espace du paysage mais dans un espace orienté, qui est un espace mental, puisque son choeur, quel que soit le site, est toujours orienté dans la direction de la Terre Sainte. L'origine, enfin, vise quelque chose d'encore plus mystérieux et de plus caché dans ses composantes. En effet, si le fondement est caché, ses effets sont en permanence visibles. Pour qu'un édifice puisse s'élever, il doit nécessairement s'enfoncer dans le sol, comme les racines de l'arbre. Mais quelle est l'origine d'un temple ou d'une cathédrale? Quelle est-elle, sinon leur création même [le *plan*], qui ne s'atteste d'ailleurs que dans la production. L'image de la source, évoquée par GOETHE, est à cet égard éclairante: il n'y a de source qu'aussi longtemps qu'elle coule... L'origine... est à proprement parler indatable dans la mesure où elle est ce qui doit se continuer tout le temps...

¹⁴⁵ Schotte, and Deese through him, with these uni-, bi- and tri-dimensional successive approaches refers here specifically and explicitly to Peirce's already discussed triadic phenomenology.

¹⁴⁶ We see no contradiction in the fact that Castoriadis-Aulagnier used the same term 'origin' to refer to the developmentally beginning stage: as explained below, although related to development Deese's point of view is radically different and actually demonstrates Heidegger's dictum in the sense that "what is ontically first is ontologically last and viceversa" (Mélou & Lekeuche 1982/1989, p. 53).

De l'une aux autres de ces notions, on s'élève en quelque sorte en creusant par dessous. Ainsi, le fondement apparaît plus tardivement que la base, mais lorsqu'il apparaît, il se pose comme fondement de la base. De même, l'origine créatrice de tout ce qui se manifeste à travers la base et le fondement ne se pose comme problème qu'au-delà. Mais au moment où il se thématise, ce problème se donne donc comme originaire même par rapport aux deux autres. Pour concrétiser ces notions qui peuvent sembler bien abstraites, faisons référence au mouvement même de l'existence. Si l'enfant trouve sa base dans le monde maternel qui a affaire avec la terre nourricière sur laquelle il apprend à marcher, dans l'Oedipe se pose la question du fondement même de cette base maternelle, à travers l'émergence de la figure du père. Car l'élément décisif de l'Oedipe tient dans le fait que le pôle orientateur de l'existence bascule de la mère vers le père et que se manifeste à ce moment une dynamique conflictuelle articulée dans le sens sexuel-social qui se substitue à la participation contactuelle. En ce sens, le problème du fondement de l'existence va se promouvoir dans l'opposition et son cortège d'éléments agressifs. Mais ce fondement, c'est clair, avait déjà toujours été là - fût-ce même sous forme déficiente. Car ce qui fait qu'une mère est mère et qu'un enfant est enfant d'une mère, c'est bien sûr qu'il existait déjà un père. Autre chose encore est l'origine comme origine mienne. Comme dit DOLTO, pour qu'un enfant naisse et vive, il faut qu'il y mette du sien. A ce niveau, il apparaît, par une espèce de renversement complet, que ce qui fait qu'il y a un père et une mère, c'est d'abord et surtout qu'il y a un enfant. A travers la problématique de la procréation surgit donc la question de la constitution originaire et de la création personnelle. Ce problème toutefois ne se thématise comme tel qu'à l'âge adulte. Les trois étapes mentionnées sont, en effet, en rapport intime avec les trois âges de la vie. L'enfance, bien sûr, a un rapport électif avec l'univers du contact, même si une esquisse provisoire des problématiques sexuelles-sociales et même personnelles s'y dessine déjà. L'Oedipe ne trouvera à se liquider fondamentalement qu'à l'adolescence, qui est donc congéniale au registre de la névrose et de la perversion. Quant à l'âge adulte, c'est l'âge où, de façon manifeste, se formule la question de l'origine, lorsque le sujet, cessant de se référer à la mère et au père, est sommé d'avérer ses "propres" potentialités personnelles créatrices, - par rapport, à vrai dire, tant dans l'espace du "monde" que dans le temps des générations qui le font en se succédant, à bien autre chose encore qu'à la seule "cellule familiale". A chaque âge de la vie sa "maladie à faire". (pp. 125-8)¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ This direct reference to the three ages of life is for Schotte a demonstration of the *exhaustive* character of this and the successive Deese's triads, in the same measure than his constant reference to the three grammatical 'persons' (cf. 1977 pp. 141-2) or to Aristotle and the ancient Greeks' triple levels of life and of the 'psyché' (pp. 138-9): vegetal (cf. the plate I -where the 'vertical' axis/dimension clearly predominates- common "leaves"), animal (again, the plate II popular browns which particularly stress the 'horizontal' dimension), and specifically human (of course, the plate III *B M V*); this is furthermore in perfect coherence with Kuhn's observation that while *Hd* perception (fundamental for plants by the way) stresses the vertical dimension, the *Fb* one (key for triggering some specific animal behavior: bees-flowers, mimetism, mating in general) does the same with the horizontal one (chap. II.C above).

From these core concepts derive for Deese a host of triads of which we will choose just some to demonstrate their elective relationships respectively with the 3 levels implicit in Zulliger's successive inkblot plates, for example the one of 'strength-violence-power' and its pertinence for deepening the understanding of the diverse shocks (cf. Schotte 1977, pp. 137-8): at the 1st plate/level the subject is confronted with the crude, rough, gross, overpowering *strength* of the light-dark determinant that even for such a relatively small area can be so entirely disturbing for oversensitive subjects (Schachtel 1966, chap. 10; cf. Simón-Bachelard) who just can't hold the ground and so give away completely in 'fright' (dark shock) so much like the phobias of small children; at the 2nd one it is the *violence* of the confrontation of the different, primary colors-elements (Peirce, Bachelard-Simón H.) which imposes or suggests the conflict between sex drive and social law and its corresponding 'anxieties' in affective-social relationships (color shock); finally at the 3rd the domain of kinesthesia represents precisely the accumulated personal *power* ('potential energy': Laplanche & Pontalis) implicit in the secondary process that has mastered the previous elementary and 'kinetic' energy, or on the other hand the personal impotence (movement shock: Zulliger, Piotrowski, Salomon) of 'despaired' subjects who distrust or lack confidence in themselves and so feel 'castrated' and unable to rise to the level of the particular exigencies of their own lives.

The next triad, *quantity-quality-measure*, requires a closer inspection since as we saw earlier for Peirce Firstness -not Secondness- is the specific category of 'quality'. Unresolvable contradiction? Not quite, since both philosophers use the same term metaphorically (Schotte "faire dire autre chose au même mot", quoted by Mélon 1976 p. 55 footnote) each with a different meaning in their respective systems, thus needing a 'translation'. Note that from a dialectic (thesis-antithesis) Hegelian perspective, Deese makes reference above to the classical opposition or dialectic complementarity between 'quantity' and 'quality' which is not at all the case with Peirce: the latter opposes rather 'quality' to 'fact' just as an abstract, rather vague, just possible uniform may-be (Kant's '*Ding an sich*', for ex. 'hardness') would be opposed to its specific incarnation in a concrete, phenomenal or 'real' being (a silex stone). This Peirce's 'quality' is thus not, as it's usually understood, an adjective of some object (1978 pp. 80-1, 83-4, 88-92). Deese's perspective is entirely other, to be understood rather in this second sense (cf. Barison & Passi T. 1982 chap. 7). Light-dark (plate I) implies an objectively imprecise, uniform dimension where only differences in *quantity* exist, it is a question of a "more" or a "less" which determines the subject's parallel well-being or mood in his world ("a bright/dark world"). But just as with horses when they accelerate their gait (walk, trot, gallop) differences in quantity eventually bring about differences in *quality*, and definite changes in light wavelength correspond to the appearance in perception of specific colors (plate II) representing the variety of qualities of, or of affects associated with, specific objects the subject feels attracted to or repelled by ("a beautiful pink flower" or "a disgusting bleeding wound": cf. Rorschach 1921/1967 chap. VII.A.3.b). About the intimate relation between the concept of *measure* and the entirely different dimension of movement (plate III) we leave the word to Schotte (1977):

...la quantité, la qualité et la mesure. Comme il a été démontré, le problème de la quantité est caractéristique de la première dimension. Quant à la qualité, on conçoit aisément... [que] la deuxième dimension... s'y rapporte. La mesure, pour sa part, renvoie à une unité originaire déployant à la fois la quantité et la qualité dans leur opposition et leur jointure. Si elle a, à première vue, rapport avec la quantité, elle suppose toujours une comparaison de deux quantités en fonction de tout un système, puisqu'on fait usage d'une unité de mesure. Ceci démontre déjà la complexité plus grande de la question à ce niveau... Mais il faut aussi entendre la mesure au sens où quelqu'un donne sa mesure [quality of *B*] ou n'est plus à la mesure [*B*-shock] d'une tâche donnée, pour faire surgir la dimension plus originaire qu'elle véhicule. Enfin, il n'est que trop évident que ces catégories ne sont pas propres à un domaine donné, mais valent, par exemple, tant en physique qu'en psychologie: ce qui démontre encore leur allure transversale par rapport à l'opposition du psychique et de l'organique. (p. 132)

Another easy-to-relate triad, this time taken up from Eugen Fink (also a disciple of Husserl), is the one of 'space-time-movement': as discussed by us above, since in plate I the typical response is a simple-global instantaneous one it is as if time has no existence there while in contrast the whole of its *space* and "climate" (its tone, mostly light-dark: Binder's *G Hd*) is considered and embraced in the interpretation; in plate II this space sort of shrinks and recedes into limited area (blot) details while simultaneously the succession or *time* taken to review and interpret each one in turn becomes an essential diagnostic sign (cf. the importance of reaction-time here, as a sign of general or individual-color shock)¹⁴⁸; and is there still any doubt that plate III is the *movement* plate, according to the term chosen by Rorschach himself? We repeat Kuhn's words that "*Rorschach's W M+ responses may thus be regarded as an intricately organized space-time entity*". We know already from Physics that the formula of movement (III) or speed is calculated according to the relationship between space and time (I & II), but the issue is more complex in Psychology and has to do with what Guillaume called the 'implied time' of verbs which precisely define the movement response: "...Loin qu'il faille penser, comme il est fait d'ordinaire, le mouvement comme composé à partir des notions de temps et d'espace, préalablement objectivées, il faut bien plutôt poser que le mouvement construit son espace et son temps. C'est le mouvement qui est originaire. Il engendre, dans la rencontre du monde, son espace et son temps bien plus qu'il ne se déploie dans cet espace et ce temps. En ce sens, la vie et, pour l'homme, l'existence se spatialise et se temporalise: elle déploie son propre temps impliqué..." (Schotte 1977, p. 69).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Kuhn 1944/1992 p. 78: "Une différenciation temporelle assez subtile ne peut effectivement s'accomplir dans une réponse globale primitive [Test-Z I] comme cela peut quelquefois se produire lorsqu'une tache de Rorschach [Test-Z II] se décompose en une suite de différentes appréhensions de détails ou bien lorsque des réponses globales bien combinatoires [Test-Z III] sont élaborées. L'appréhension globale primitive ne peut que se répéter avec un autre contenu. Cependant, jamais elle ne présente une succession cohérente avec un début et une fin à moins qu'on ne réussisse, en partant de l'appréhension primitive, à atteindre une forme supérieure."

Equally suggestive is Deese's triad that makes follow each other the concepts of 'similar-alike-same': following Castoriadis-Aulagnier, in level I predominates a global *similarity* and indistinction between infant and world (Freud's "I am the breast"), as well as on the other hand the satisfaction of orality implies a similar global pleasure of all zones; in level II where the partial zones and drives really differentiate, anyway the result is everywhere *alike* and for every component each one is just as exciting, distracting and partially "misleading" as the next one, leading inevitably to their respective partial castrations ("I [don't] have it, therefore I am not it"); finally in level III is reached the crucial issue of becoming truly oneself ("falling back into being"), i.e. the ipseity-alterity problematic through the confrontation of the *same* (cf. the 'uncanny' above), compare this poetic verse produced by a blot very similar to this plate (Rosenzweig 1944, p. 42): "A Something met a Something / in the mists of shadowland. / They ran against each other, / and came quickly to a stand. / "And who are you?" said Something One. / And Something Two, said he, / "That's just the very question that / at once occurred to me".

But in our opinion the most demonstrative and compelling example is offered by his series "pieces-parts-members" which allows us to show how some eminent Rorschach exponents have arrived -independently- to absolutely identical concepts: a "primitive" response (Bin-der) to the shading of plate I, like "slag," has this feature of being composed of *pieces* that don't differentiate themselves essentially neither from each other nor from the homogeneous elementary ensemble itself (Kuhn, 1953/1977, p. 505); contrarily on pl. II the heterogeneity of the stimulation by the different colors invites to express in a separate way the *partial* drives in action (Salomon, 1959b pp. 243-257, 1962 chap. III; cf. Murphy, 1947, p. 66); and the integration of the different details as the *members* of a complete human body thanks to a kinesthetic percept is what is expected in pl. III (Rorschach, 1921/1942, chap. II.5.b; Zulliger, 1948-54/1969, chap. 1; Dolto, 1961/1981, pp. 73-74)!¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, that the material worked out by Zulliger and shaped by him into his three images has resulted so perfectly balanced that it has come to constitute inside science the equi-valent to a Work of Art, like a triptych which reveals through its equilibrated perceptual-formal symbolism the stages as well as the more important components in the development of that same human existence, can be demonstrated having recourse to the opinion of one of the most re-known specialists in the field:

¹⁴⁹ To wrap this whole argument up from beginning to end, demonstrating at the same time that extremes certainly meet, compare the following quote concerning Spencer's system – precisely the one with which we began this series of philosophical foundations: "Depuis les formes vivantes les plus inférieures jusqu'aux plus élevées, le degré de développement est marqué par le degré d'agrégation des parties qui constituent un assemblage coopératif. Le progrès qu'on observe en allant de ces créatures qui continuent à vivre après qu'on les a coupées en *morceaux*, jusqu'à celles qui ne peuvent perdre une partie importante sans périr, et une *partie* quelconque même peu considérable sans souffrir de grands troubles dans leur constitution, est un progrès où à chaque pas on rencontre des créatures qui, plus intégrées au point de vue de leur concentration, sont aussi plus intégrées en ce qu'elles se composent de parties [*membres*] qui vivent pour toutes les autres et par elles" (rendered according to Parisot 1948, p. 83; italics added). This cannot but reminds us also the crucial implications for human psychology contained in Freud's concept of castration.

If one wishes to be admitted to the presence of a work of art, one must, first of all, face it *as a whole*. What is it that comes across? What is the mood of the colors, the dynamics of the shapes? Before we identify any one element, the total composition makes a statement that we must not lose. We look for a theme, a key to which everything relates [compare with Bohm, 1959/1977, pp. 308-309 attitude #2].... Safely guided by the structure of the whole, we then try to recognize the principal features and explore their dominion over *dependent details*. Gradually, the *entire wealth* of the work reveals itself and falls into place, and as we perceive it correctly, it begins to engage all the powers of the mind with its message [*italics added*] (Arnheim, 1974, Introduction p. 8)

(compare also this quotation, as well as the following one, with Simón H., 1973a, pp. 139-141); and still:

Why is balance an indispensable factor of aesthetic composition? One of the reasons, which is often overlooked in discussions of the subject, is that visually, just as physically, balance represents the state of distribution in which all elements have come to rest^[150]. In a balanced composition *all factors of shape, direction, location, etc. are mutually determined by each other in such a way that no change seems possible and the whole assumes the character of "necessity" in all its parts* [*italics added*]; (Arnheim, 1951, p. 267)

and it is precisely this wager that Zulliger has accomplished with the specific placing of the locations, determinants, sequence, etc., of his plates, without willfully pursuing it but spontaneously, like the true Rorschach artist that he was. On this issue Mélon & Lekeuche (1982/ 1989) offer us a final illuminating judgment:

...La perfection esthétique est un critère non négligeable de la vérité en matière de science quoi qu'en pensent la majorité des scientifiques qui, presque toujours ignorants de la question, la tiennent habituellement pour dérisoire. Inversément, une grande oeuvre artistique, qu'elle soit picturale, littéraire ou musicale, obéit à des règles mathématiques rigoureuses que le créateur ignore évidemment toujours mais dont c'est la mission d'une esthétique véritablement scientifique, c'est-à-dire non métaphysique, de les découvrir. (p. 80).

It is this kind of 'discovery' which we have made our best effort to attain concerning Rorschach's work through the one of his best disciple Zulliger.

¹⁵⁰ Interestingly enough, Arnheim is referring here to Rorschach's key movement response i.e. in our Zulligerian systematization to the final stage/plate III, about which we can also quote the always brilliant words of Spencer: "At length, to the query whether these [evolutional] processes have any limit, there came the answer that they must end in equilibrium. That continual division and subdivision of forces, which changes the uniform into the multiform and the multiform into the more multiform, is a process by which forces are perpetually dissipated; and dissipation of them, continuing as long as there remain any forces unbalanced by opposing forces, must end in rest. It was shown that when, as happens in aggregates of various orders, many movements are going on together, the earlier dispersion of the smaller and more resisted movements, establishes moving equilibria of different kinds: forming transitional stages on the way to complete equilibrium... And our concluding inference was that the penultimate stage of equilibration, in which the extremest multiformity and most complex moving equilibrium are established, must be one implying the highest conceivable state of humanity" (Spencer 1862, Part II chap. XXIV "Summary and conclusion", § 189 pp. 548-9).

IV. Demonstrative cases

In what follows a very small collection of cases exemplifies the concepts we presented and systematized in detail in the previous chapter. As already explained from the beginning, this Thesis is not primarily an experimental research -although it firmly grounds itself on many studies of this kind- and the following protocols may seem largely insufficient from this restricted point of view. But our goals concern the polishing and deepening of theoretical concepts, which may allow us to see clearer and more relevant things about any case to be encountered. Our approach here largely coincides with the one of McCully whose fitting words we may quote:

...These cases have been selected because they show the kinds of processes and qualities that pertain to our theses. While [some may think that] they are unusual, many facets in their materials are common enough in everyday clinical practice. How we approach them may be used for any kind of case. It was not an analysis of hundreds of papyri that enabled scholars to translate the Egyptian language, but the Rosetta stone. We believe that certain cases teach us more than others, and that they are statistically infrequent. Each case has been selected to amplify our approach and to illustrate our point of view. They were not, though, sorted out from many... Any number of cases might illustrate single points, but these particular ones appeared to pertain in a larger sense to our goals... (1971, p. xviii)

The first one is an original, unpublished case from Rorschach himself from his last weeks of life and will serve us to show in which ways our views integrate with and complete the final ones of the Master; a comparison with Piotrowski's (1957, pp. 446-74) reinterpretation of the Oberholzer case may be instructive in the sense of reflecting our differing goals, a complementation and not a modification in our case. The second case is the disputed one of Adolf Eichmann, the sadly famous Nazi war criminal which in its historical importance, in the plenty of top experts to have voiced their opinions, and particularly in the unresolvable contradictions which it has generated has absolutely no equal in the projective literature; we will show how we have definitively solved the issue. Two final, absolutely contrasting cases that each in their own way gave an unexpected, but unequivocal and welcomed demonstration of the well-founded nature of our conceptions close the sample.

A) An original Hermann Rorschach protocol evaluation (unpublished)

"Between his first disciples in Switzerland circulated for learning purposes a number of interpretations along with recorded protocols and calculations of form-interpretation tests that had *Rorschach* as the author, and which are witness of the 'astonishing, almost dizzy height' [*Oberholzer* in the Introduction of the above mentioned essay", added in a footnote] of the evaluation of the findings. In front of me lie 18 such works of *Rorschach*, copies and originals. They stem from the years 1921-1922, the last two being dated III/

1922. The test subjects are in 12 cases known, in part by me personally known musicians, painters, writers, scientists... The protocols were taken by friends and acquaintances of *Rorschach*, the diagnoses being thus all so-called 'blind diagnoses'. They show so very correct images of the test subjects that one could identify them with nothing further, even if one did not know their names. This might be the reason why nobody published the expertises, although they are instructive in the highest degree and let us learn a variety of things that don't let themselves be taken out from the 'Psychodiagnostics'."

Hans Zulliger (1949, p. 293; our translation)

The question of the collection of form-interpretation-test protocols originally worked-out in detail by Hermann Rorschach before his untimely death, besides the 28 short examples plus the highly interesting, ulterior Oberholzer case included in "*Psychodiagnostics*" (the only one which offers a good idea of the thorough nature of the rest), is a crucial one from the point of view of the scientific advance of his method. Let us listen to what Bash has to say about them in his Prologue to Rorschach's 1965/1967 "*Collected Papers*":

...The contents of the present work does not constitute a complete compilation of RORSCHACH's works, although we expect that with time it would be a part of a series of volumes which would include the complete works-the already published as much as the unpublished, the scientific ones and those of biographical interest-of Hermann RORSCHACH. The first volume of that series would be represented by the *Psychodiagnostik* and by the study added to the latter and posthumously published *Zur Auswertung des Formdeutversuchs für die Psychoanalyse*. Both works constitute without doubt RORSCHACH's main work. In the present volume we try to put together and harmonically regroup his remaining publications...

A different problem is constituted by the numerous, original and still existing, protocol studies of the Rorschach *test*, as well as the author's letters, all of it of a great scientific value and of the highest personal interest. Just a minimum part of it all has been offered to publicity to date: some protocols and some fragments of letters. The holders of protocol studies, that are particular in their majority, have said no in part to their publication, claiming that the results refer to persons still alive and that even exert public activities. This seems to us to be justified. But, on the other hand, a psychological phenomenon seems to enter into play here that has been observed by us and by other persons who have also attempted to offer to the knowledge of the specialized public, with interest on it, diverse fragments of the so zealously guarded documents. The majority of their holders have responded with a singular irritation and even with brusqueness to the publication request, motivated exclusively by a practical interest. Such phenomenon represents an involuntary testimony about the effectiveness of Rorschach's *test* as emotional stimulus, as "experimental diagnosis of affectivity", to use RORSCHACH's own words. It is to be expected that such personal emotivity, which seems to

surround until now everything related to the *test*, yields facing the understanding of the practical necessity of research before the invaluable treasure that such documents suppose perishes in the hands of a blind ignorance. To prevent that possibility it has been established in the university library of the city of Bern, and under the control of the Rorschach Commission of the Swiss Society of Psychology, the Rorschach Archive, to which can be trusted all the originals of the author that concern us, in the assurance that they will find themselves under scientific custody. What has been said refers to the letters no less than to the protocols. RORSCHACH's correspondence with Dr. Georg ROEMER, maintained during the last two years of the former's life, specially contain such a quantity of new ideas, conclusions and new points of view concerning psychodiagnostics, that make their urgent publication much to be wished for. A singular recognition deserves the late professor Ernst SCHNEIDER, from Basle, who has found and published diverse protocol studies verified by RORSCHACH himself. After careful meditation, we have renounced to reproduce them here, in the hope that they will find their due place in a future volume dedicated to *test* studies and letters of RORSCHACH... (pp. 18, 20-1; our translation)

Keep in mind these words were uttered already more than 40 years ago. We have only recently benefited from the publication of the third volume of the wished-for series, a very significant selection of Rorschach's "*Correspondence*" (2004; and note the dilated spacing between them: 1921-1965-2004!), and we wonder how long will we have to wait for the 4th protocols-volume¹⁵¹. Rorschach admitted himself in the latter book by the way that "I believe that it would be good to publish blind diagnoses, although it looks somewhat like pocket-betting" (p. 342), assertion to which his Editors added:

H[ermann]. R[orschach]. obtained from different sides (E. Oberholzer, E. Bleuler, O. Pfister, A. Weber, E. Schneider between others) test protocols sent for evaluation, by which were only available particulars about age and sex. In these cases he spoke about "blind diagnoses". The back-reports about the "psychograms" established by him were for Rorschach understandably very important. Meanwhile out of these arrangements with colleagues was made possible for him to obtain test protocols from persons that were out of range for him in Herisau. Numerous unpublished protocols of this kind find themselves in RA [the Rorschach Archives]. (loc. cit., footnote 3)

According to our estimate based on this volume's indications as well as from comments like Zulliger's earlier or Exner's (2000 p. 8, 2001 p. 7, 2002 p. 5), there must be dozens and dozens, maybe even more than a hundred of them. From these only a very small fraction has been published, as mentioned by Bash thanks

¹⁵¹ Not to mention the also welcomed publication of other important documents related to "*Psychodiagnostics*" like the deleted 70-80 pages from the original manuscript (Exner 2000 p. 8, 2001 p. 7), the three previous monographs on which it was based (Rorschach 2004 pp. 182-4), and other notes, drafts, tables, graphs, and above all inkblots (Exner 2000 p. 8, 2001 p. 7, 2002 p. 5).

particularly to the generosity of Schneider (1922-23, 1937, 1950/54¹⁵², 1955), to which we must add the single protocol interpretation appeared as *Rorschachiana XII* (Bohm et al. 1975; which is the Rorschach Test self-administration of the psychiatrist Hans Christoffel: cf. Rorschach 2004 pp. 378 & 404) to complete the list.

We honor here the recently deceased Prof. Roland Kuhn for the kindness of letting us have a copy of the 12 protocols mentioned by Zulliger on pp. 329-30 above, during one of our visits to his home in Münsterlingen. This collection of mostly artists/musicians' protocols was most certainly put together by another direct disciple of Rorschach, Arnold Weber (cf. Rorschach 2004, pp. 378 footnote 7 & 420 footnote 2), himself an accomplished pianist and acquainted with this group. We have chosen one particular case from this 105-page monograph to present here Rorschach's instructive, original blind interpretation, as a motivation for the taken-up-again of the plan for an extensive case-volume¹⁵³ - complemented with some additional interpretive comments by us.

*

Miss Sauerbeck.

Rorschach protocol.¹⁵⁴

(Dancer of the Laban School, more plastic than musical, formerly Jacques Dalcroce, has musical talent, plays the violin quite well).¹⁵⁵

I.

Λ Fox's face, looking towards the inside.- 1. G F+ Td O+

¹⁵² This one is his most important reproduction of a collection of 4 protocol evaluations, of which the 1st is exactly the same case of his former two publications; excluding the poorest case with only 9 responses, 3 of them were translated in the 1954 Vol. 18 of the *Journal of Projective Techniques*. His following and last publication is also a new case.

¹⁵³ We have no direct but much indirect evidence that this text is original from Rorschach: 1st of all Kuhn was a Rorschach disciple of Zulliger as well as of Weber, both direct disciples of Rorschach himself; 2nd, the monograph is introduced by a copy of a letter by Zulliger explaining its origin; 3rd, in Zulliger's 1949 article are quoted excerpts from these interpretations to be found in the text itself; 4th, in Rorschach's 2004 "*Correspondence*" (pp. 378 footnote 7, 420 footnote 2) are explicitly mentioned confirmed features of this text and of the cases included in it; and 5th, the terminology and the characteristic way of interpretation are undoubtedly Rorschach's as can be confirmed in the original German version of the "*Psychodiagnostik*".

¹⁵⁴ In the typewritten original the scores were not indicated side by side with the responses but in a final, horizontal recapitulation of scores by plate Rorschach used to make (cf. 1921/1967 chap. VII.A p. 214). Our additions or modifications are placed between brackets and explained in footnotes, respectively. For the expert reader's convenience we have added the Exner's latest (formerly Beck's) *D*, *Dd* and *DS[Zw]* location codes, sometimes arrived at by a careful educated guess. Our translation.

¹⁵⁵ This is most probably an addition by Weber while typing the protocol evaluation, since Rorschach used to interpret these protocols totally blind except for the subject's age and sex. We have found no precise age indication, but one gets the general impression we are talking about a young woman.

	Fool's face, with big nose.- ¹⁵⁶ O+	2.	D[2]	B+	M	
II.						
Λ	2 clowns, dancing fox-trot.- V	1.	G	B+	M	
	Sort of cat's face.-	2.	G	F+	Td	O+
V	Owl's head (beak black center below).-	3.	G	F+	Td	O+
III.						
Λ	2 birds in tails.-	1.	G	B+	T	-
V	2 black women, who throw one leg in the air.-	2.	D[1]	B+	M	-
>	The whole from V could also be a face, but I see O-	3.	G	F-	Md	
	it only from > since the black women bother me.-					
IV.						
Λ	Face of an Australian ibex.- O-	1.	G	F-	Td	
V	Bat.-	2.	G	F+	T	-
	Trio: Queen the middle, on each side a woman.-	3. 4.	D[1] D ¹⁵⁷	F+ F+	M M	- -
Λ	Center below: an animal standing on the head.- O+	5.	G	F+	T	
	Two figures leaning on each other, dancing.- M -	6.	Dd ¹⁵⁸	B+		
V.						
Λ	2 sleeping figures, center like bat, V	1. 2.	D[4] G	B+ G	M F+	- T
	that holds the persons with his wings.-	3.	G	B+	comb.	O+
<	Flying woman - upper body.- M -	4.	D ¹⁵⁹	B+		

¹⁵⁶ The plate orientation for this response was indicated as ">" but this content as *D* only makes sense to us in the standard plate position (cf. Exner Vol. 1 1st ed. 1974, Table A card I *D2* p. 158); it was also scored by Rorschach (or Weber) as *B+ M* so the whole body and not only the face must have been seen. That said, let us add that in the recapitulation of scores were recorded 2 more responses as "D B+ M O, D B+ M V": it does make sense that such a kinesthetic-prone person as Miss Sauerbeck could have given more movement responses to this plate (the count of only 2 Rs makes of it the less productive plate of the whole protocol by the way), particularly to the center detail ("V"), but if it is true that the typist left out here a couple of responses we have no way of recovering them and thus must keep leaving them out of consideration.

¹⁵⁷ Beck's *D7*, ultimately Exner's *Dd31*.

¹⁵⁸ The lower half of *D1*.

¹⁵⁹ *D6*, eventually *D7*: our educated guess.

VI.

Λ	Above little bird.-	1.	D[3]	F+	T	-
	Below hide.-	2.	D[1]	F+	T	V
>	Scene on a hill, a man lying down, O+	3.	Dd[29]	B+		M
	offering an arm to a woman reclined over him, O+	4.	D ¹⁶⁰	B+		M
	below water reflecting.-	5.	G	B+	comb.	O+

VII.

Λ	2 women's heads, 2 erected busts.- V	1.	D[1]	F+		Md
	>	Man's body, head backwards.-	2.	D ¹⁶¹	B+	Md
V		Animal with camel body.-	3.	D[1] ¹⁶²	F+	T
	Dancers; head with very little arms and legs.- O+	4.	G	B+	M	-
	Face: center Zw.-	5.	Dd ¹⁶³	F+		Md
		6.	Zw[7]	F+	Md	O+

VIII.

>	Icy landscape at sunrise.	1.	D[5]	FbF	Ice	O+
	Right of the sun a beautifully illuminated view. Sun -	2.	D[7]	FbF		
V	A polar bear crawls over it.	3.	D[1]	F+		T
	Below all is reflected in the water.- O+	4.	G	FbF		comb.
	V ¹⁶⁴ Flower formation.-	5.	G ¹⁶⁵	Fb	Pl.	-

¹⁶⁰ Beck's *D9*, ultimately Exner's *Dd24*; this response and the previous one were scored in the reversed order by Rorschach.

¹⁶¹ *D3* + Beck's *D10*, ultimately Exner's *Dd23*; our educated guess.

¹⁶² Our educated guess.

¹⁶³ We have interchanged the places of this response and of the following one (respecting the order of the scores in the recapitulation by the way), otherwise the center *Zw* "face/head" with arms and legs doesn't make any sense: so the latter limbs (*Dd21+D5*) must refer to the dancing figures.

¹⁶⁴ From this point on we have in this plate the reverse than with plate I: there is no scoring recorded for the remaining 7 responses in the final recapitulation, so we had to reconstruct the individual scores "subtracting" from the entire formal psychogram the scores of the rest of the protocol and sensefully distributing the remainder scores here. We remain quite confident of the accuracy of the result.

¹⁶⁵ See Exner Vol. 1 1st ed. 1974, Table A card VIII p. 188. There is one pure *Fb* scored in the formal psychogram and this must be it.

	Red above animal head, the little holes in it the Td - eyes.-	6.	D ¹⁶⁶	F+	
Λ	Gray: many people and animals, agglomerating O towards the top.-	7.	D[4]	B+	M(T)
Λ	Gray and blue [+] middle Zw: caricature of a ruler O+ with Napoleon hat. One has the feeling that there are things hanging from it.-	8.	DZw ¹⁶⁷ F+		M (Obj.)
	Gray: cunning face grinning; little holes: the eyes; O white icy beard, blue vest, red pants, Cloth. -	9.	DZw ¹⁶⁸ F+		Md
	two children in the arms: elephant as grandfather.- O+	10.	D ¹⁶⁹	FFb+	
		11.	G ¹⁷⁰	B+	comb. (M,T)

IX.

Λ	Animals claw themselves firmly below, above like O+	1.	D[11]	B+	T
	horse, below like bird, they spray fire and look at Fire - each other, or animal with big eyes, that claws himself firmly with the forepaws and throws fire from the head above.- ¹⁷¹	2.	D[3]	FbF	

¹⁶⁶ Beck's *D6*, ultimately Exner's *Dd33*.

¹⁶⁷ *D4&5 + Zw3*.

¹⁶⁸ *D4 + Zw3*; more than by the very small "eyes", the latter *Zw* is implicated by the smiling mouth and the subsequent "white icy beard".

¹⁶⁹ *D5 + Beck's D6*, ultimately Exner's *Dd33*.

¹⁷⁰ The whole percept is certainly a fabulized combination, but retains its plausibility particularly with the main character turning out to be an imaginary "elephant grandfather"; the "two children" are obviously the popular lateral animals (*D1*).

¹⁷¹ Here is how we reconstruct and see this complex percept: the facing animals are the two greens with their horse snouts in the green/brown fuzzy part (*Dd28*), the tails of the bird (chicken-like) bodies are positioned towards the outside of the greens (*Dd24*), the claws are the finger-like extensions (*Dd21*) connecting them to the lower red, and the upper brown is the fire (*D3*: the content of this interpretation was incorrectly scored as "*Frau*"=woman instead of "*Feuer*"=fire, a plausible mistake); the conjunction "or" introduces in fact an alternate interpretation of the same blot area (amounting on the whole to *D12*) where *one* animal is facing the subject, his eyes being the big *Zw* in the greens (*DdS29*), his snout the lower part of the big violin-like *Zw* of this plate (*DdS22/23*), the claws and fire remaining the same percepts as before. Rorschach decided to score only once these similar percepts and we respect his decision.

V	Tree with red above, two heavy green leaves, 3. that nearly crush two brown birds.- O+	D ¹⁷² 4.	FFb+ D[3]	Pl. B+	- T
>	Brown: deer-like animal, that turns the head to the T - side (fuzzy part), is being held from the horns by a thick fellow.- ¹⁷³ O+	5. G 6.	F+ D[3]	comb. F+	O+
Λ	Brown: two animals with horns on the back.- 8.	D[3]	B+[?]	T	O+
X.	"Oh my God!".				
Λ	Gray above: 2 beetles leaning themselves on the T - middle, face with tears.- 2.	Dd ¹⁷⁴ 3.	F+ D ¹⁷⁵	Md Bkl+	O+ T
Λ	Blue: spider dancing tambourine (green).- O+[V] Light- and dark-blue: little couple dancing, he 4. makes a step forward, has a big green fan.- Green center below: animal head, green hair flows Td - towards the sides.- Lateral gray: female dancer that flies from clouds.- O+	D ²⁵ 5.	B+ D[10]	M F+	-
>	Violet: faces with giant wigs, "inciting things".- M -	6. D[7] 7. D[9]	B+ F+	M	
V	Blue center: gorilla, that gropes his way on O+ red rocks, behind hangs the tail out.- Red: two outraged and back-bouncing figures, 9. because of the green snake in the middle.- T -[V]	8. D[6] 9. D[9] 10. D[4]	B+ B+ FFb+	M	T -

Responses: 58.

¹⁷² D9+11.

¹⁷³ This brown+green combined percept amounts, again, to *D12*. The "deer head" is a not uncommon percept in the fuzzy part from this position, which completes the brown body; the *B M* in the green from this position is also not uncommon.

¹⁷⁴ Seemingly the faces of these same animals, probably scored *Md* because of the humanlike crying attitude.

¹⁷⁵ D1+12.

G	10 ¹⁷⁶ [17]	B	23	M	19[18(19)]	F[+] = 88[92] %
D	36	Bkl	3[2]	Md	7	T = 39[41] %
Dd	5[4]	F	24,3-[25,2-]	T	16[(18)]	O = 50[48] %
Zw	1	FFb	3	Td	6	V = 13[12] %
Do	-	FbF	4	Pl	2	
		Fb	1	Fire	1	
		F(Fb) ¹⁷⁷	-	comb.	5	
				Ice	1	
				Sun	1	
				[Cl	1]	

[See also Appendix]

Individual peculiarities: The generous easiness of the entire way of interpretation.- The high number of G - the many Orig. which make at least half of all interpretations - the small number of V.- The very numerous B - the strong tendency to combinations.- The whole a very peculiar finding.-

The kinesthesias are extraordinarily numerous. There is a strong readiness to empathize experience kinesthetically. This kinesthetic feeling-with seems also not to spare the perception of animal figures, seemingly passing over still strongly to lifeless objects. No preferred movement motive lets itself be uncovered, no prevalence of flexor or extensor kinesthesias, the experiential capacity seems to be absolutely receptive to any kind of movement, little as some mood lets itself be settled in, some affect felt in. This kinesthetic experiential capacity must be directly cultivated. It it were not directly cultivated, then some movement motive would have to return strongly, flexor or extensor, hasty or slow movement pictures etc. Therefore the kinesthetic sphere must possess a kind of objectivity, which is like a mirror in a position to reflect it all.

[This is certainly a case with an extraordinary number of *B*-responses (23!) which are present in every plate and, curiously enough, consistently rise in average through each of the 3 successive determinant-related sections in which we divide the test material -actually, *R* productivity in general does- while we usually see rather the reverse (Piotrowski 1957, pp. 318-9): as incredible as it may seem given their abundance, nevertheless something must have somewhat retained their free(er) expression until after a 'warming-up' period (more below). Several of them have an animal content, and Rorschach's inclusion of lifeless objects in the discussion immediately recalls Klopfer's (1936) and Piotrowski's (1937) original suggestions for a separate scoring of these: cases like this must be the ones that prompted the former's assertion that "Il y a des sujets qui peuvent ressentir kinesthésiquement non

¹⁷⁶ This figure is an obvious mistake since the sum for the locations column would remain short by 6 responses.

¹⁷⁷ Rorschach's original scoring symbol for the light-dark determinant, later on changed by Binder for *Hd*. By the way, about this determinants' column note how -even vertically- Rorschach maintains the same sequence we have insisted on: first movement, then form, finally color.

seulement des hommes ou des animaux anthropomorphes¹⁷⁸, mais encore des animaux de toute sorte, des plantes, même des figures géométriques et de simples lignes" (1921/1967 chap. II.5.b p. 14), and contrary to Piotrowski's (op. cit., p. 68) assumption we can clearly see here that Rorschach scored them as *B* and not as *F* giving reason on this issue to Beck and particularly to Schachtel's (1966 pp. 222-9) -as usual- more sound reasoning (i.e. based like Rorschach's on a formal and not on a content determination). The simile to a mirror in the last phrase is most probably an implicit reference to 2 reflection responses of the protocol, Rs VI-5 & VIII-4, special phenomenon which if our assumption is correct would deserve according to Rorschach an interpretation closely related to the *B* factor (comp. Rapaport et al. 1945-6/68 p. 360, and Dworetzki 1939 p. 339 observation 1.): this determinant's extraordinarily strong presence, its conveyed character of 'objectivity', would put the subject in the position of a experiential mirror capable of empathizing with and affectively participating of almost any experience (human, animal, of nature...) with which she comes in contact as if it were her own, in the position of sharing and living life at full depth. Without any previous knowledge of this case-study this is precisely one of the factors Mélon (1976) underlines, basing himself on Salomon and simultaneously on Schotte's 'circuits theory', while interpreting the *B*-responses as intimately connected with Lacan's conception of a mirror-stage and its crucial role in human development (theoretical connection not made by Salomon by the way); here his long but crucially relevant, illuminating interpretation which involuntarily expands Rorschach's intuition above:

D'une manière générale, on peut dire que les réponses mouvement sont en rapport avec l'activité de pensée dans la mesure où celle-ci est créatrice et antagoniste du passage à l'acte immédiat. On peut dire aussi, et c'est devenu un lieu commun dans l'interprétation du Rorschach [mais pas toujours avec la nécessaire explication théorique, laquelle suit], que les kinesthésies sont le meilleur indice de la capacité identificatoire, laquelle implique nécessairement une démarche réflexive, car penser, c'est identiquement "se" penser: "cogito, ergo sum". Que le sujet qui "se" pense ne pense que son leurre est une autre affaire. [p. 56]

F. SALOMON, dont nous avons déjà dit l'intérêt pour l'interprétation psychanalytique du Rorschach, pense [aussi] que deux facteurs majeurs interviennent dans la genèse [des] kinesthésies: la régression anale et la prédilection accordée au plaisir de rétention (Retentionslust) d'une part, et d'autre part, une régression narcissique devant l'angoisse de castration, qui entraîne un reflux de la libido objectale et un retrait dans l'univers fantasmatique pré-oedipien où la mère n'était pas encore l'épouse du père. [p. 86]

[Pour l'expliquer en termes Szondiens:] La capacité de produire des réponses kinesthésiques relève manifestement des fonctions k_{\pm} et p_{+} ... En k_{\pm} le sujet introjecte (et isole du même coup) et l'objet convoité et l'interdit (la défense) qui le frappe. Nous voyons là se dérouler le processus qui aboutit à la constitution de la réalité interne et du fantasme qui la soutient, à travers une

¹⁷⁸ A largely unknown clue to further research this issue has been given by Ellenberger (1964/1995, pp. 484-5).

succession de moments dialectiques: investissement de désir (k+), angoisse et recul devant le désir (k-), renoncement et valorisation de la défense (k±)... Cette digression nous permettra peut-être de mieux saisir la complexité de ce qui se déroule en k±. Il y a là, essentiellement, une tentative de solutionner, par l'isolation et la temporisation, la problématique soulevée par la convoitise de l'objet partiel. Ce qui importe pour notre propos, c'est de voir qu'à cette problématique est liée, congénialement, la constitution de la réalité interne et l'origine du fantasme. Ainsi s'explique la corrélation positive entre k± et la production de réponses K[B]. Le conflit que nous venons d'évoquer trouve son paradigme dans l'ambivalence anale entre l'opposition et la soumission à la "demande de l'Autre"...

L'autre facteur important à prendre en considération est p+. L'angoisse de castration qui naît de l'envie de l'objet partiel (k-) peut aussi entraîner une régression de l'Avoir à l'Etre [cf. Freud p. #III103 above], c'est-à-dire un repli narcissique dans le sens du retour à l'identification primaire à un objet complet, parfait, total, ne manquant de rien. C'est la solution hystérique [au sens pathoanalytique]: la libido objectale se reconvertit en libido narcissique, le corps total est érotisé au détriment de la région génitale, une identification phallique se dessine, nourrie par le fantasme d'une bisexualité glorieuse. Les mouvements de danse [très présents aussi dans cette danseuse, cf. plus loin] connotent ce déplacement. Dans la danse, en effet, l'érection est déviée et affecte le corps dans sa totalité. C'est pourquoi, d'après nous, les kinesthésies de danse sont le meilleur indice d'une identification au phallus, objet total par excellence, à la différence du pénis, objet partiel [ou en termes strictement Freudiens, identification *génitale* au lieu de simplement phallique-pénienne]. En résumé, nous pensons que la capacité de produire des réponses kinesthésiques est essentiellement liée à deux facteurs:

k± : inhibition de la décharge, temporisation, intériorisation (maîtrise anale)

p+ : production d'une image du corps unifié et globalement érotisé (confirmation- tion narcissique de soi).

Il existe d'ailleurs un lien intrinsèque entre ces deux facteurs dans la mesure où l'avènement d'un moi différencié (et donc d'une image de soi constituée) postule l'élaboration d'une réalité intérieure reconnue distincte de la réalité externe. [pp. 94-5 & 98]

[De l'autre côté] SALOMON (1962, pp. 103-12) qui les a particulièrement bien étudiées situe les réponses reflet (Spiegelungen) à un moment génétique correspondant à la fin de la phase orale. Les sujets qui donnent ce type de réponses ont le narcissisme fragile (mangelhafte narzisstische Ich-Besetzung), leurs limites du corps, au sens de FEDERN, sont mal assurées du fait d'une carence primitive d'apport libidinal extérieur d'origine maternelle... Nous situons les réponses miroir sur le trajet [compliqué: voir infra] qui va de p- à p+, où nous pensons que se constitue l'image du corps propre. Jacques LACAN a précisément créé le terme de [et pareillement daté le] stade du miroir pour désigner ce processus qui aboutit à fonder l'identité primaire du sujet. En deça

[p-], il n'y a qu'un corps morcelé dont les membres épars ne peuvent être rassemblés que par l'amour de l'Autre. [pp. 117-8]

...L'homme naît non seulement hors-la-loi, mais encore hors-le-moi. A le laisser végéter dans l'état natif, pour autant que la chose soit possible, on verrait que son tropisme pour les images le pousse irrésistiblement à s'identifier à ces images et à devenir, en l'occurrence, un enfant-loup[!], par exemple. Il y a chez l'homme une compulsion à l'identification dont les sédiments constituent le moi. Autrement dit, le moi est un précipité d'identifications.

L'homme ne peut pas se constituer comme tel - et il ne peut pas ne pas être un homme - sans se trouver doublé d'une image de soi étayée sur l'image qu'il se fait du corps. Comme LACAN l'a souligné en exergue de son oeuvre, l'assomption de cette image est tout à la fois source de jubilation et production d'une leurre irréductible, imago spéculaire aliénante signant l'impossibilité de toute rencontre entre soi et l'image de soi, témoin d'une séparation -"refente", "spaltung"- originelle, et cependant fondatrice de la première identification proprement humaine. "L'homme est un schizophrène-né" (MALDINEY).

C'est ici que s'ouvre la question de l'Être, question qui demande réflexion, et ne se pose évidemment qu'à l'homme, seul être qui réfléchisse, c'est-à-dire se dédouble, pour le meilleur et pour le pire.

La question du moi ne se réduit sans doute pas à celle des identifications imaginaires, mais ignorer cette dimension [comme le fait l'*Ego Psychology*] revient à occulter l'essentiel. C'est-à-dire que les fonctions défensives et adaptatives du moi (k) ne peuvent être dissociées de ses fonctions imageantes et identificatoires (p). Comme FREUD le notait déjà dans les "Etudes sur l'Hystérie", c'est en tant que "masse de représentations" que le moi se fait agent de la défense.

"Être ou ne pas être" [$p+$ ou $p-$], il n'est pas sûr que la crucifiante interrogation d'Hamlet convienne seulement aux philosophes et aux schizophrènes. Si le schizophrène s'y engloutit, c'est qu'il... n'entrevoit dès lors d'autre solution que mythique, fusionnant avec l'Autre ($p-$), dont tout doit provenir, le bien comme le mal, la béatitude paradisiaque et la persécution, ou fusionnant avec une image grandiose et mégalomaniacale de soi ($p+$) par la grâce de quoi le monde transfiguré redevient vivable...


La question de l'Être est insoluble aussi longtemps qu'elle ne trouve pas de médiateur. Le médiateur de p , c'est k , où se pose la question de l'Avoir.

Au moi diastolique, qui se trouve absorbé dans les brumes de l'Être, fait pendant le moi systolique qui se contracte et se concentre sur un objet et qui veut cet objet. Il veut l'avoir et le faire entrer en lui, il l'introjecte ($k+$) de manière à se préserver à jamais de sa perte...

Si $k+$ recouvre ce qu'on pourrait appeler la fonction d'investissement objectal du moi - tandis que $p+$ correspond plutôt à la fonction d'investissement narcissique du moi - il faut insister sur le fait qu'il s'agit avant tout d'un investissement de désir, dans lequel l'objet est beaucoup plus créé, en conformité avec la représentation de désir - Wunschvorstellung -, que donné.

Parce que ce désir là est évidemment un désir sexuel, il subit durement l'impact de l'interdit... C'est le sens de $k-$...

SZONDI a soutenu que les quatre fonctions du moi se développaient dans un ordre précis, chronologiquement déterminé, représenté par le "circuit" (Umlaufsbahn) du moi (1963, p. 391).




La question se pose de savoir si ce circuit en boucle est conforme à ce que l'expérimentation nous apprend sur l'ontogenèse du moi...

...L'expérimentation confirme la rareté de p+ dans l'enfance, en contraste avec sa brusque augmentation de fréquence à l'adolescence [ce qui coïncide étroitement avec les résultats de Dworetzki (1939 pp. 331-40 & 394, 1952; cf. Mélon p. 86) et surtout de Kuhn (chap. II.C above) concernant l'apparition tardive des B].

Nous avons assimilé p+ à la fonction de constitution du Je, associée à la production d'une image de soi - et du corps - complète et différenciée.

Cet événement, LACAN l'a daté et défini comme stade du miroir.

Si p+ ne s'affirme qu'à l'adolescence, au moment où éclot chez l'individu le désir de s'affirmer dans toute son originalité, ce moment est cependant préfiguré par l'assomption du Je vers la fin de la première année de la vie. Même en admettant que p+ entre en fonction, au moins théoriquement, à ce moment, il est plus adéquat de se représenter le circuit du moi sous la forme d'un alpha [à la suite de Schotte, qui confirme ici Freud: p. #III103 above]



A la projection participative, succéderait donc l'introjection.

La fonction $k+$ renvoie, selon nous, tout ensemble à l'investissement, à l'introjection et à la reproduction, hallucinatoire ou illusoire, de l'objet partiel, soit, primitivement, le sein.

Le sein est investi d'emblée, bien avant qu'il soit perçu comme sein et qu'une différenciation même sommaire existe entre le moi et l'objet. Il n'est pas exagéré d'affirmer que, dans tous les cas, Sch+- connote une tentative de recouvrer la toute-puissance de l'objet partiel par identification cannibalique à cet objet...

On peut penser que c'est pour contrer la tendance régrédiente à la satisfaction hallucinatoire, représentée par Sch+-, qu'entre en action le refoulement originaire (Urverdrängung).

Cette fonction de refoulement est assurée par $k-$. Dans le même temps que le refoulement originaire est mis en branle, le moi se constitue véritablement comme tel en se produisant comme sujet doté d'une image de soi ($p+$). Considérés sous cet angle, refoulement originaire et stade du miroir ne constituent qu'un seul et même moment [en d'autres mots, le stade du miroir signe la fin de la phase orale inaugurale parce que l'enfant a bouclé pour la toute première fois le circuit complet du moi, circuit qui se refait néanmoins indéfiniment tout au long de la vie comme par exemple à l'adolescence et l'arrivée à l'âge adulte, etc.].

Tandis que Sch+- renvoie à un mode d'identification - métonymique - à l'objet partiel tout-puissant, Sch-+ recouvre un mouvement inverse de désinvestissement de l'objet avec report de la libido sur une image du moi idéale - c'est le stade du narcissisme entendu dans le sens de FREUD - qui deviendra plus tard l'Idéal du Moi, constellation imaginaire rassemblant sur le mode de la condensation - métaphorique - toutes les identifications idéalisées d'un sujet. [pp. 38-43]

...Ce que LACAN montre, c'est précisément que l'image de soi qui confère à l'individu un semblant d'unité, à savoir l'image que le miroir lui reflète, est l'image d'un autre.

Sa thèse majeure, celle de l'aliénation imaginaire qui constitue le moi, a été largement développée dans l'article intitulé "Le stade du miroir comme formation du Je" (1949) et dans les "Propos sur la causalité psychique" (1946).

L'histoire du sujet se développe en une série plus ou moins typique d'identifications idéales qui représentent les plus purs des phénomènes psychiques en ceci qu'ils révèlent essentiellement les fonctions de l'Imago. Et nous ne concevons pas le Moi autrement que comme un système central de ces formations, système qu'il faut comprendre comme elles dans sa structure imaginaire et dans sa valeur libidinale...

LACAN montre ensuite qu'au moment où il s'objective comme individu, se désignant d'abord en troisième personne avant de le faire en première, l'enfant est encore en plein transactivisme: il impute volontiers ses actions et ses sentiments à l'autre, se plaignant par exemple de recevoir les coups qu'il porte. Sa relation à l'autre est une relation

"en miroir", en ce sens que le sujet s'identifie dans son sentiment de soi à l'image de l'autre et que l'image de l'autre vient à captiver en lui ce sentiment...

... Ainsi, point essentiel, le premier effet qui apparaisse de l'Imago chez l'être humain est un effet d'aliénation du sujet. C'est dans l'autre que le sujet s'identifie et même s'éprouve tout d'abord...

C'est à la position d'un tel problème que répond ma construction dite du "stade du miroir"... mon but est d'y manifester la connexion d'un certain nombre de relations imaginaires fondamentales dans un comportement exemplaire d'une certaine phase du développement... Ce que j'ai appelé l'assomption triomphante de l'Imago avec la mimique jubilatoire qui l'accompagne, la complaisance ludique dans le contrôle de l'identification spéculaire... m'ont paru manifester un de ces faits de captation identificatoire par l'Imago que je cherchais à isoler... [comp. Dolto #]

A la vérité, j'ai poussé un peu plus loin ma conception du sens existentiel du phénomène en le comprenant dans son rapport avec ce que j'ai appelé la prématurité de la naissance chez l'homme, autrement dit l'incomplétude et le "retard" du développement du névraxe pendant les six premiers mois [pourquoi l'Imago intégrée du corps dans le miroir est nécessairement anticipatoire en puissance, idéale pourtant, quelque peu mégalomane]... C'est en fonction de ce retard de développement que la maturation précoce de la perception visuelle prend sa valeur d'anticipation fonctionnelle [point souligné par Salomon aussi]. Il en résulte, d'une part, la prévalence marquée de la structure visuelle dans la reconnaissance, si précoce, de la forme humaine. D'autre part, les chances d'identification à cette forme, si je puis dire, en reçoivent un appoint décisif qui va constituer dans l'homme ce noeud imaginaire absolument essentiel, qu'obscurément et à travers des contradictions doctrinales inextricables, la psychanalyse a pourtant admirablement désigné sous le nom de narcissisme. C'est dans ce noeud que gît en effet

le rapport de l'image à la tendance suicide que le mythe de Narcisse exprime essentiellement...

C'est un des traits les plus fulgurants de l'intuition de Freud dans l'ordre du monde psychique qu'il ait saisi la valeur révélatrice de ces jeux d'occultation qui sont les premiers jeux de l'enfant (Lacan fait ici allusion au jeu de la bobine où Freud montre que l'enfant surmonte la douleur de la séparation d'avec la mère en la répétant à travers un jeu hautement symbolique; dans cet exemple on voit aussi que l'enfant joue à faire apparaître et disparaître non seulement la bobine mais encore sa propre image dans le miroir).

Au départ de ce développement, voici donc lié le moi primitif comme essentiellement aliéné et le sacrifice primitif comme essentiellement suicidaire: c'est-à-dire la structure fondamentale de la folie. Ainsi donc cette discordance primordiale entre le Moi et l'être serait la note fondamentale qui irait retentir en toute une gamme harmonique à travers les phases de l'histoire psychique dont la fonction serait de la résoudre en la développant.

L'être de l'homme, c'est la folie, "cette passion d'être un homme, qui est la passion de l'âme par excellence, le narcissisme, lequel impose sa structure à tous ses désirs, fût-ce aux plus élevés". [pp. 25-7]

This narcissistic passion, probably originated by some unknown disturbance in the normal relationship with her mother figure as suggested by Salomon above (p. #9: 2 reflection Rs), dominates also in our view Miss Sauerbeck's approach to life, just like Hamlet does she poses to herself the demanding issue of "to be or not to be", why she indefinitely tries one image-role (B) after the other in the never-ending search for the right one; we are reminded of the children's poems of A. A. Milne like: "Perhaps I am a Postman. No, I think I am a Tram. I'm feeling rather funny and I don't know *what I am*" (quoted by Deri, 1949 pp. 217-8). We also imagine¹⁷⁹ something quite similar to what Dworetzki tells us about an almost identical case she encountered (we have even wondered about same-other issues, Switzerland being such a small country!) about which she says:

Chez plusieurs enfants et adultes que nous connaissions comme très préoccupés de leur propre personne nous avons été surpris d'un nombre très fort d'interprétations kinesthésiques. Ainsi nous avons trouvé dans le procès-verbal d'une jeune fille particulièrement "narcissique" (elle passait des heures devant la glace, essayant des costumes, des pas de danse - elle aimait jouer et danser devant un public, etc.) une quantité excessive de K[B] (21), dont presque tous des visions de femmes.

Comme le sentiment du moi dans l'introspection est en relation avec une sensation musculaire ["Cf. Ed. CLAPARÈDE, *Note sur la localisation du moi*, Arch. de Psychol. XIX, 1925", added in a footnote; comp. Schachtel's similar

¹⁷⁹ We decided not to make an effort to track biographical data about this person, probably a complicated albeit perfectly realizable task for us given today's technology. We are convinced that when this and other protocols become formally published in Switzerland there will be included plenty of life-clinical data from persons in a better position to do so than us, so we decided to work still mostly blind.

reference to Wolff #], il est possible que l'impulsion motrice accompagnant l'interprétation des taches traduise en quelque sorte la conscience de la propre personne. De ce point de vue nous rejoignons les conceptions de Furrer, Binder et de Mme. Loosli-Usteri qui voient dans les kinesthésies la "Selbstobjektivation" de l'individu. (1939, p. 339)

Based on the analysis of more than 50 cases of reflection-interpreters Salomon further adds:

L'anamnèse de plusieurs sujets nous avait amené à penser que ce type de réponses provenait de gens qui avaient eu ou avaient encore l'habitude (devenus adultes) de se regarder [même] nus dans une glace... Ce comportement s'accompagnait toujours chez les adultes et sans doute aussi chez les enfants d'un sentiment de plaisir, de culpabilité et de honte... Il s'agit donc toujours d'une attitude très ambivalente envers son propre corps...

Des enquêtes poussées menées dans le sens psychanalytique, ainsi que quelques cas féminins en psychanalyse chez nous, nous ont permis d'attribuer à ces réponses la signification diagnostique suivante: il s'agit d'abord de survivances partielles de l'instinct primaire exhibitionniste et voyeuriste ainsi que de la curiosité sexuelle infantile qui n'ont pas été intégrées à une sexualité génitale d'adulte. A cela il semble exister de multiples raisons... Dans tous ces cas le fait de *regarder*^[180] subsiste comme instinct primaire et reste chargé d'un investissement libidinal infantile qui est resté réfractaire à une soumission à la sexualité génitale...

...Chez des sujets féminins.. les réponses-reflets, surtout si elles sont accompagnées d'interprétations sexuelles, indiquent que la femme essaye consciemment et inconsciemment de provoquer sexuellement les hommes par son comportement, et cependant une éventuelle réponse à ces invites les laisse extrêmement étonnées [would R X-9&10 be a perfect example of this?!]. Les choses se déroulant toujours de la même façon, ces femmes arrivent à la conclusion générale suivante: "Les hommes sont tous les mêmes; ils ne voient dans la femme qu'un objet de satisfaction de leurs désirs."..

Les sujets, tant féminins que masculins, arrivent à peine à aimer vraiment, ils restent passifs, dans l'expectative, veulent être aimés - de la même manière que leur mère, autrefois les a aimés ou, pour être plus exact, de la même manière qu'ils auraient voulu autrefois que leur mère les aimât. Ce manque d'amour les avait fait repasser, entre autres au début de la phase anale, vers une phase antérieure. Ce changement régressif de libido objectale en libido narcissique nous explique les difficultés qu'ils rencontrent à établir des relations objectales ultérieurement. Pour autant qu'un choix d'objet leur est possible, il se fait surtout sur le mode narcissique...

¹⁸⁰ Apart from the 2 reflections we have 5 other responses that go in this sense: 3 "eyes" (Rs VIII-6&9 and IX-1) plus 2 "looking" (Rs I-1 and IX-1) interpretations. Salomon (1962 p. 108) also interprets reflections as pointing to paranoid character traits (Szondi's *p*: Mélon!).

Il est possible, mais ce n'est là qu'une hypothèse, que les réponses-reflets soient parfois la marque des difficultés à établir des relations objectales par la vue, au stade préverbal. (1959b pp. 239-43)¹⁸¹

It is thus also possible that our subject tries many specific roles so as to captivate and please her audience in order to obtain the desired love from whoever takes this position in front of her: she can equally play the fool, the clown, or the accomplished dancer, whether with a "big nose" or with "little arms and legs"; the passive, leaning sleeper or the secure holder, the children or the grandfather; the fiery, the crushed, or the groping animal, as well as its "thick" tamer; the dancing, the grinning, the crying, or the outraged figure. Miss Sauerbeck must have been a terrific performing artist, able to reflect the whole gamut of human emotions! But despite the pathoanalytic similarity in dynamics and maybe even in outward behavior (emotional lability, sexual ambivalence), this is not a case of clinical hysteria: she is much too conscious of her representations and does not resort to repression (introversive E.T., absence of Fb-shock).]

The B normally behave themselves in correlation with the G and the Orig. This normal correlation is also available here. The G as well as the Orig. stand like the B high above the average. It must be tied then with this kinesthetic experiential capacity a very lively inner life, a very pronounced characteristic personality, a great loosening and presence of associations, a great wealth of sensory memory-pictures and simultaneously a strong energy inside this psyche, an easy binding and severing of associations, a strong mobility. The experience type includes here all the characteristic signs of the introversive experience types.

Apart from G, B and Orig., the tendency to combination belongs to the introversive experience type. The imaginative-combinatory note is quite strongly pronounced in the entire finding. It is so almost even more than the manner of picture-apprehension itself that confers the finding a strong originality. This combination shows several transitions to construction. Both reach different goals at their ends: the combination a scene, the construction a construction: the combinations that simply tell out a story from the inside and experience the telling, they make in general a more immediate impression than the compositions that build a picture with an aesthetic ultimate goal. The constructions mix themselves more with combinatory moments than the reverse. Basically the test-subject must be an imaginative nature. The constructive vein is also very strongly available, but available however a little more as a necessity than as a disposition. The last plate with its disparity causes a kind of shock. This happens above all in those test subjects that carry a strong need for closure, for unity. This is the case in all combinator and constructors. The simple opportunist, who goes after the detail of the picture, rather sighs in relief at the last picture.

[Here we have a clear and explicit confirmation by Hermann Rorschach himself of one of our most important assumptions, the specific intimate correlation between the

¹⁸¹ It is instructive to compare this interpretive richness and depth of Salomon's –and Mélon's subsequent– psychoanalytic approach, who antedated the following even in the noting of 'pairs', to Exner's just empirically and statistically derived rather superficial interpretive conclusions about these same responses.

combinatory, superior *G* and the *B* (pp. #III111-7 and passim above) as persistently maintained also by some of the best authors like Dworetzki, Kuhn, and Piotrowski, which corresponds to our IIIrd or most developed stage. The proportion of *G* only reaches numerically 29%, but with protocols with *R* productivity highly above average like this one one cannot trust pure percentages and must also consider the absolute number of *G*, in general more difficult to multiply than *D* or *Dd* (cf. Rorschach 1921/# chap. II.6.c, Rapaport 1945-6/1968 pp. 333-4, Kuhn 1947? pp. 27-9): this number is always outstanding whenever it surpasses 10 and here we have 17! As Rorschach very perceptively remarks plate X is not just the only one without a *G*, since the subject always tried and succeeded in giving at least one to each and every other plate, but is also the only one with an immediate shock-remark; she succeeded nevertheless in giving very good combinatory *G*s to both plates VIII and IX, an outstanding feat that goes against the usual incompatibility between color and superior *G* (cf. Furrer 1930 pp. 7, 20, 50-1, 53; Rapaport op. cit. pp. 312 & 334; Bohm 1959/1977 pp. 308-9). Zulliger (1948-54/1969 chap. 1, plates II & III) has specifically referred to the superior intellectual achievement represented by this kind of responses, in the same sense as Rorschach's interpretive comments above. It is also very instructive to complement what Rorschach says about the "need for closure, for unity" in our subject with the illuminating phenomenological interpretation of Kuhn (pp. #II75-6 above) about the *G* and their special connection with and reflection of the subject's Ego, in perfect fitting with what we have already quoted from Mélon above.]

Many interpretations recall the infantile. That is easily understandable with the great dilatation of the experience type. The type is in general that of a more inner than outer art of living, with which is always tied much infantile. Great original grasps, wit and astuteness, can be intermixed with ideas of an infantile generosity, unconcerned about structure or form exactness, unconcerned about deduction or induction. With the infantile it must be characteristic of the type at the same time a strong intuitive trait. In general the combinatory interpretations, which are formed with *B*-components, are more sharply apprehended and also certainly more convincingly experienced than for instance the peculiar abstractions of the beginning of the test, the big animal and human faces; in the abstractive interpretations rather betrays itself a kind of infantile impetuosity, for instance corresponding a priori conclusions, sudden ideas and quick skills, rejection of all closer going into details. A tendency to disregard the small details of the working-through of any situation, of any task, to quickly come above all to an affective general judgement, should be characteristic of the test subject. She has more at her disposal the capacity of concentration for experience and of concentration for apprehension than the capacity of concentration for elaboration. She might be able to replace this for the most part with the great richness of ideas and the readiness of associations, but will hardly be able to apply patience in a more generous measure for things that do not interest her.

[We have here the most contradictory and even paradoxical trait of this result, the simultaneous and unconcerned going in two opposite directions by the subject as Rorschach so perceptively remarks. Note how the infantile *G* "faces" intriguingly

cluster around the 1st third of the cards (which by the way also fail to have many Vs or any *Fb-R*), precisely the *B* plates: Rs I-1, II-2&3, the clearly confabulatory III-3, and still IV-1 (the latter two *F-*); there are 2 additional "face" responses in the protocol, VII-6 and the alternate to R IX-1&2 (see footnote #21), however neither of them is a *G*. This curious fact enters in sharp contrast with the absence of any combinatory *G B+* in these plates, naturally to be expected given the subject's above commented constructive-integrative ability, while their majority (3/5) takes place as already noted in the last, colored cards: in other words, both primitive and developed *Gs* occur precisely in the least likely conditions as if having intentionally interchanged their places. One could certainly argue if the subject did not in fact follow concerning these apprehension modes a *temporal-developmental* succession, recovering herself gradually and brilliantly from an initial regression or disorientation, fact that could be made out to be as if contradicting our theoretical assumptions about the non-temporal symbolic value of the Rorschach plates (a simultaneous Z-Test would have allowed to decide the issue); that may well be, but we also believe this possible fact is still explainable by the dynamics associated with the succeeding plates according to our theory: precisely because of her own personal history, of her original narcissistic deficiencies the subject was too soon confronted with the demands for developed, integrated full-body kinesthetic identifications and productions and this generated, as unlikely as it may superficially seem given the total result, something near to a *B*-shock (particularly concerning pl. III which is most intriguingly below her general average, cf. Piotrowski 1957 pp. 171-2 & 305-6: "birds" instead of the *M V* in such a kinesthetic subject, no *Fb-R*, the undisputed confabulatory *G F-* which is an 'infantile abstraction') subsequently triggering a gradual, exaggerated *B*-reaction as if to catch-up with and to prove herself, to give her true 'measure' (Schotte p. #III142 above; comp. also Piotrowski p. 306 with our first comment above: "Plate III shocks seem to occur most frequently... when the subject is taking serious stock of his personality... It seems justified to assume, in every case of *M[B]* shock, an ambivalence concerning one's life role"). The unique pure-*Fb* as *G* in VIII and the concluding pl. X *G*-shock, on the other hand, are also in this case arguments against the contrasting rigidly developmental, *temporal* theory of the Rorschach card series¹⁸²: as Chabert (1983) so clearly explained...

...nous ne sommes pas convaincue par l'existence d'une continuité temporelle, chronologique qui irait de la planche I à la planche X, retraçant les différentes étapes du développement libidinal. Nous n'adhérons pas non plus à une conception du développement psychologique linéaire, qui se déroulerait à

¹⁸² One may recall here again the essential difference between the abstract structure of (a) theory and the concrete form of (an) experience, that must not be confused with each other (cf. chap. III.A.1 above). It is not that the theory, the "system spirit", rigidly dictates how things must happen down to the smallest detail but, as Schotte so sharply puts it (pp. #III18-20): "Cette question, en fin de compte, revient à se poser celle même de la *structure, dans sa nécessité*... Mais encore faut-il voir finalement surtout que cette nécessité n'est pas en quelque sorte purement "théorique", voire "opérationnelle", mais véritablement *elle-même tout existentielle*: soit tenant, pour mieux dire, à ces *opérations par lesquelles se constitue la seule réalité humaine* dans la variété de *formes*, proprement infinie, de ses *réalisations*, – qui néanmoins, toujours, viennent ainsi au *réel* à travers un même jeu de *structures essentielles*"; theoretical structures which allow us to further *see* and *understand*, i.e. truly *interpret* the actual events happened in reality. Peirce's distinction between *quality, fact and law* also clearly illuminates these domains (cf. pp. #III123-8 above).

l'image d'un escalier que l'on monterait marche après marche jusqu'au palier de la génitalité et des relations d'échange idéalement définies dans la sécurité de l'identité et le respect de l'altérité.

Nous serions plus proche de R. Schafer, en ce qui concerne ce point de discussion, en ce sens que le niveau de développement et le registre conflictuel abordé par le sujet à telle ou telle planche est largement dépendant de ses projections, de ses aménagements défensifs, de ses représentations et de ses affects face à un stimulus donné... On est justement frappé par le caractère apparemment discontinu des significations latentes du matériel, par les ruptures parfois brutales induites par les planches de par l'introduction inattendue d'éléments manifestes nouveaux.

Cette discontinuité apparente, cette oscillation progrédiente ou régrédiente, cet appel plus fort à la régression ou aux motions pulsionnelles, cet apaisement possible par l'atténuation des contrastes, ce retour peut-être sécurisant à une réalité plus évidente, plus simple et facilitante, puis à nouveau l'éventuel passage de l'unique au duel ou au multiple, de la centration narcissique à l'interpellation relationnelle, ces schifts [*sic!*] du pré-génital au génital... bref tous les mouvements permis par le matériel, pour peu que le sujet se sente suffisamment libre de s'y laisser aller, sans s'y perdre, dans une mobilisation à la fois associative et créatrice, ces mouvements donc nous semblent caractéristiques du test de Rorschach et précieux à préserver: en effet, il paraît difficile d'exiger et d'obtenir d'un sujet, dans l'espace-temps d'une passation, qu'il se lance dans une course d'obstacles qui le hissera au sommet d'un statut d'être face au monde, en respectant une chronologie qui ne peut être que le fruit d'une lente reconstruction. (pp. 63-4).

Let us stay a little longer with the peculiar "face" interpretations. Few authors have concerned themselves with them. The most detailed study of a similar response is Kuhn's book on masks (cf. pp. #1169-70 above) that may give us some clues. This author makes a meaningful phenomenological distinction between the perceptual experience of front-view, almost life-size masks that face the subject (group I: just like the responses of Miss Sauerbeck) and profile ones usually as *D* (group II); the orientation of the view (together with the size) happened to have its importance since according to him "chez les sujets qui ont fourni des interprétations de masque du groupe I, il est apparu qu'en face des interprétations il n'existe pas de démarcation entre la conscience du Moi et la conscience de l'objet, le Moi et l'objet se confondent plutôt. C'est l'inverse qui se produit au groupe II; là, le sujet s'ingénie à séparer nettement le Moi et l'objet..." (loc. cit.), which appears to be immediately significant given the already discussed characteristics of our case. A step more revealing seems the following short comment by Salomon (1962):

Zulliger describes in the individual-Z book [chap. 9] the "infantile abstractions", where it is a question of a summing-up of the blot into a whole going out from its outer contour. Here we have exactly that which we have described above as

task of the synthetic function of the Ego [Nunberg 1931¹⁸³]. According to Zulliger these responses correspond, in children, to an effective tendency to abstractions which is, side by side with good F+%, very promising for the future development of intelligence. Sometimes we are dealing in these interpretations with figure-ground fusions; it is always characteristic of them a slight confabulatory tendency. Let us quote the original examples:

Plate 3: "That's a person's head" (points to the contour of the blot), "here would be the mouth" (points to the inner red), "but not because of the red color" = DG F- Md inf. ...

With the beginning of puberty these responses should not appear anymore, since "at this time should have taken place a separation between 'realistic' and 'rational' thinking". Their appearance would correspond then to a backlog in development, reality control becomes uncertain, fantasy and reality mix with each other, like in children.

Sometimes one still finds this sort of responses also in adults. Whether it is there about an infantile fixation or regression is hard to see, the former being probably more likely - but naturally not always. In any case it shows that the adult carries out his generalizations and syntheses according to infantile patterns, that his synthetic Ego-function is therefore affected and that he makes desperate efforts to maintain his Ego integration. Only one such response in the protocol of an adult, more at the same time are extremely rare, shows therefore a great gap in his logical-causal thinking. Whether the face interpretations still also have an additional connection with the recognition of the mother's face from the first years of life, we cannot answer either positively or negatively. Perhaps these interpretations are connected with problems of the individual plates or with sexual perceptions; that must one attempt to clarify individually in each case. (pp. 175-6; our translation)

In any case this "Spitzian" interpretation (of which the Szondi Test makes ample use by the way) fits perfectly with what we have begun to reconstruct about this subject's mother-infant seemingly problematic relationship, much more perfectly anyway than Phillips & Smith's (1953, p. 144) interpretation according to which "virtually all faces are seen in profile... The development of a front view face is unusual and is often associated with paranoid schizophrenia... To the extent that faces are given to space areas (as a reversal of figure and ground) [R VII-6] even as profiles, the more aberrant are the thought processes and the greater the likelihood of paranoid schizophrenia":

¹⁸³ We are aware that Lacan as well as Schotte have strongly criticized this concept (as developed by Hartmann), but we understand it in the precise sense that "le moi n'exerce pas davantage une 'fonction de synthèse', il est plutôt 'compulsion à la synthèse', aspiration à la totalité" (Mélon 1976, p. 25), or in Szondi's sense for whom it is no less than another drive, the Ego drive (cf. Deri 1949, chap. X). In this direction Deri (1984) has made a fruitful metapsychological use of the concept, particularly in understanding creative artists (cf. pp. 287-91) which very well applies to our subject, criticizing in the same gesture another representative of Ego-psychology (E. Kris); to quote just a chunk: "Although the artist's 'love affair with the world' implies a strong empathic reactivity to his or her animate and inanimate surrounding, it does not imply constant and dependable object libido in relation to specific persons. Artistic (aesthetic) empathy may occur in an otherwise self-involved, narcissistic individual. Biographies of great artists offer ample evidence of this... It is the artist's unusual aesthetic sensitivity that allows for this empathic, even though often narcissistic, participation with his or her environment" (pp. 288-9).

there is a core of truth in this interpretation, but they should have obviously made a more pathoanalytic assessment!]

No special peculiarities are attached to the sequence. Any logical thinking methods are not to be observed. The entire apprehension is that of artistic experience and that of fanciful elaboration. Besides the kinesthesias body sensations play also a great role, although only those that stay near to the kinesthesias. Feelings of pushing, flying, at most even the feeling of being crushed, in general pleasant body sensations seem by far to predominate. It could be though that the general mood of the test subject during the test was a particularly good one, good until far down into the Unconscious and that at another times she would have reacted rather differently. But the likelihood is however that this mood is at least not uncommon in the test subject. To a high percent the forms are reached less through self-criticism and form sharpness, than through the plenty of visual pictures that are at the command of the test subject.

The intellectual adaptation is in general rather left behind by the affective one, but the deficiency could be amply made up for through presence and richness of ideas. It results in this way admittedly not a scientifically logical, theoretical, methodical thinking type, it just results a lively freshness of the experience capacity. In spite of the predominant reactivity the activity also can not be too mean by the way, first are also extratensive moments substantially included, then B-responses and color-responses follow one another with so much speed, in so free an exchange, that a great liveliness also towards the outside is to be accepted. There also exists a tendency to secondary and to little B, which speaks as well for a free motility and activity towards the outside. The representational type should be visual on the first line, in a very high degree however also kinesthetic; primarily speaking it should be more kinesthetic, consciously more visual, probably also not a little auditory.

The talents must be numerous, presumably more for recounting and self-representing -"talent for spectacle"?, than for drawing or painting. Perhaps a certain tendency to fragmentation were it not for the so much emphasis layed on the conscious cultivation of kinesthetics and introversion, that as a result already decided beforehand the selection between many possibilities.

[Just as Rorschach remarks the subject is in her sequence less a 'logical' scientist (orderly: pl. I) than a 'fanciful' artist (loose: pls. III, IV, V, VIII, IX); there is also a definite tendency to inverted sequence, most clearly visible in pls. VI and VII which may suggest a sexual shock (particularly in VI with the simultaneous reflection and the 1st resp. "*little bird*") but the evidence is insufficient so, more than a neurotic reaction the excellent performance (absence of shock behavior, V present, 3 B+ O+, the superior combination) rather suggests artistic imagination too (Rorschach 1921# chap. II.6.e). Something more or less similar can be said about the doubtful red-shock (no *Fb-R* in pls. II-III): more than indicating repression of object libido the subject seems to have been too much concerned about herself (narcissism) to pay attention to these details and in this sense was not open (Piotrowski 1957 p. 319), but in the last 3 full-colored plates this situation is amply remedied (the red color does not show any peculiar shock-reaction by the way) and introversion-extratension demonstrate a

more open coordination between themselves. It is also amazing the way Rorschach characterologically tempered the very developed introversion with his remarks about the subject's simultaneous "free motility and activity towards the outside", almost pinpointing the particular dedication to dancing - which takes us back to Dworetzki's (1939 pp. 339-40) 2nd 'observation' (cf. p. #14 above): interested in the supposedly inverse relationship between motility and the kinesthetic inclination, she tested a dozen of young female dancers just as Miss Sauerbeck (even from a Dalcroze institute!) believing to have proved Rorschach wrong in this respect. Mélon has already given an excellent response to this confusion of issues (cf. footnote #III18 and quotation pp. #III133-4 above) but we are also interested in what he adds specifically about the "dancing" B to his comments on p. #9 above while discussing reflections, which would explain the fate of the narcissistic issue and even our subject's choice of activity:

Il y aurait beaucoup à dire, et des choses très intéressantes voire amusantes, à propos du **contenu des réponses kinesthésiques**. Cela nous entrainerait à des développements très longs et nous éloignerait de l'aspect formel des choses, où, par souci de rigueur, nous nous cantonnons.

Nous ferons cependant une exception pour les **mouvements de danse...**

Les mouvements de danse (aux planches III, VII, II, X et I par ordre de fréquence décroissante) ne sont pas rares; on les rencontre chez 15 % de nos sujets. Leur répartition est significativement caractéristique: la plus haute fréquence est liée à p+, la plus basse à p-. A notre avis, les sujets qui peuvent donner une kinesthésie dansée ont un schéma corporel satisfaisant; leur image du corps est narcissiquement unifiée parce que globalement érotisée. Cette érotisation du corps global a souvent valeur de défense contre une angoisse de castration toute proche, comme on le vérifie couramment chez l'hystérique dit génital.

A l'inverse, les projectifs, dominés par leur noyau paranoïde persécutif, sont généralement inaptes à produire des kinesthésies témoignant d'une érotisation de l'image du corps propre. Ils donnent par contre très fréquemment, pour ne pas dire toujours, des réponses où transparaît clairement leur angoisse de destruction et de morcellement: personnages coupés en morceaux, disloqués ou incomplets, anatomies positionnelles, réponses chair, os, animaux dévorant des cadavres etc. [dont nous ne trouvons la moindre trace dans notre protocole] ...

Plus intéressante est la répartition des **réponses en miroir** (Spiegelungen). On sait qu'elles sont l'indice de préoccupations narcissiques au sujet de l'image du corps. Bien que ces réponses ne soient pas très fréquentes, elles sont l'apanage presque exclusif des sujets p, fait qui confirme l'opinion que p est bien le facteur de l'identification imaginaire.

Si la problématique spéculaire est cruciale chez ces sujets, son destin évolue de façon radicalement différente selon que l'orientation se fait dans le sens de l'inflation ou de la projection. L'inflatif parvient à se donner une image du corps qui est unifiée, érotisée et phallicisée - ce dont témoigne la fréquence des mouvements dansés [6 in our subject!] - tandis que le projectif échoue dans cette entreprise et se retrouve souvent morcelé. (1975, pp. 264-6)

About this mostly fortunate solution of the narcissistic dilemma Salomon had also offered a hint:

The chosen determinant of the mirror interpretations seems not to be unessential. By the non-human interpretations [R VIII-4] it is mostly about light-dark responses, sometimes about color interpretations, by which the light-dark impact is however probably always present likewise. The latter really seems to us also by the movement interpretations never to be entirely absent. We usually find in each case still several other light-dark interpretations in the same protocol... And that's certainly no accident. Since the Hd point, no matter if it is about FHd, HdF or pure Hd, even about a Hd-shock, to conflict-laden object relations...

From the prognostic point of view the reflections with B [R VI-5] seem to be the most favorable, then come the color-interpretations [R VIII-4] which correspond to the desire for libido cathexes; the toughest for the setting-up of a transference relationship are the Hd-interpretations [i.e. depending from the earlier actual onset of the trauma, according to a regressive Z-Test point of view]. This is valid naturally independently from all other test factors that obviously must also be largely taken into consideration for a respective judgement. (1962 pp. 107-8; our translation)]

The affectivity must be lively, impressionable, capable of enthusiasm and seemingly also capable of generating enthusiasm in others. The introversion basically has a stronger experiential readiness than the extroversion, is easier to awaken than the affective manifestations towards the outside.- Despite all vigor the affectivity is stabilized in a high degree, makes perhaps a more "inward" impression than that of a quick-changing readiness, but must be vigorous and lively once it is stimulated. The egocentric affectivity outweighs the adaptable one. Still the adaptability of the affectivity is also not scarce, and even in the egocentric affectivity must be a great part of adaptability in so far as the sublimation builds there bridges of adaptation into aesthetics. The sublimation capacity can not be small, and the affectivity that exhausts itself in these sublimations must be particularly lively. In the affectivity will also exist a main condition and main necessity as unifiedness: quick changes of mood are scarcely likely, much more likely the conscious enjoyment of a "mood", aversion for sudden affect-thrusts and for sudden disturbances, seemingly up to quite more pronounced sensitivity, in general however a certainly strong capacity to create herself the harmony, the unity of mood, less through will than through the stabilizing moment of the introversion, reactive, selective way of experience: i.e. the capacity to choose from the impressions coming across those that best correspond to the respective basic mood and least are in a position to disturb it. A strong trait for enjoyment must certainly be available, not a simple "materialism", but a strong sense for the concrete, not a pure abstracted aestheticism, but a preference for a full, whole, harmonic, rich undiluted experience and in general a more optimistic than pessimistic attitude, more opportunistic than fanatic-onesided, more concretistic than abstract, more for the moving than for the quiet, more for dynamic than for pure lyrical, more for variable than for stereotype (only that the variation may not endanger the stricken affective theme), more for individual style, than for

traditional, more for characteristic forms, than for etiquette, etc. Mood displacements could occur rather in the direction of good mood than in the one of depression. In good mood impulsivities are also certainly possible, whereas otherwise the impulsivity probably does not break out so easily, although it is available in a sizeable measure. Mood displacements in a depressive direction are not likely, if they occur the anxious must be in them more distinct than the painful, however in general painful things seem rather to be rejected. It is lacking also the tendency to the anxiously-cautiously-depressively nuanced adaptation [*Hd-R*]. The adaptation is rather more an immediate, genuinely affective one, than one that goes the roundabout way over the intellectual standard. Against any hesitations, pettiness, etiquette etc. it exists much rather a pronounced aversion. At best are possible mood displacements that result in the aftermath of dreams, or follow daydreams, or then things like presentiments (telepathies and similars), that is such that have something to do with processes in the introversion. During such mood displacements is then the affective adaptation perhaps hindered up to irritability and affective inadequacy, unpersuadability.

[The lively, vigorous, even egocentric or impulsive affectivity is indicated among the color responses above all by the pure-*Fb* (R VIII-5), but the Experience Type remains 23 : 7 and the *FFbs* always close the color series i.e. predominate in the long run. Concerning the sublimation of affectivity let us recall the 3 superior, combinatory *G* and the 10 *B* (+ 2 *Bkl*) in the last color-plates. By the way this observation is also a welcomed confirmation of our *Illrd* and last level as the most developed one, the one of maturity, genality, and sublimation (comp. pp. #III112-5 & Table 2 p. 118 above, and Mélon & Lekeuche 1982/89 chap. 3.V pp. 85-97). Furthermore this instance is also an example of the more open usage by Rorschach of the psychoanalytic terminology in these later, unpublished case-studies than in "*Psychodiagnostik*", as Zulliger underlines (1949 p. 294, point 3). About the affectivity Rorschach also remarks how besides color *Hd-R* are totally absent, the representatives of depression and mood disturbances in general, all the more surprising and prognostically favorable since this happens despite the 2 reflections (cf. last observation in our previous comment) and the clear tendency to primitive *G*, their unseparable sidekick: as stated by Salomon "the absence of *Hd* in a protocol demands in each case an investigation about on which grounds this could be the case. First of all that would therefore be typical for a mentally healthy test subject" (1962 p. 62). We believe that was basically the case with Miss Sauerbeck, despite her personal dynamics and difficulties which are not only a part, but the original life-motivation of every human being.]

The inclination to opposition [*Zw-Rs*] usually is probably not strong, for certain rather obstinate persistence than pleasure for opposition. Rather something like opposition towards the inside, applied against the own Ego, perhaps in the form of insufficiency feelings, perhaps rather still in the form of a defiance against oneself, a wanting to force oneself.

B) The Adolf Eichmann disputed case: a solution¹⁸⁴

"...A bien considérer les choses, c'est l'idée de l'homme *sain* qui est le véritable mythe, non reconnu comme tel, 'parent des mythes nazis' (M. Merleau-Ponty). 'La névrose', disait Freud, 'est privilège humain'."

Jacques Schotte (1990, p. 32)

Certainly no other case study in the whole of projective literature, and one concerning such an important historical figure, has generated so diametrically opposed and unresolved opinions over the decades from so many top testing experts like the one of Adolf Eichmann (sort of a failed "Gregor": Bell 1949): just compare the following quotations representative of all the works generated since his capture 46 years ago...

A sadomasochistic-pervert individual... *a criminal with an insatiable killing intention... an almost unique case*; (Leopold Szondi 1961, blind interpreting his Szondi Test, cited in Kulcsár, Kulcsár & Szondi 1967, pp. 45-7)

An ordinary, rather untroubled person who... was not bent on the destruction of whole populations of human beings... the epitome of banality; (Barry Ritzler 1970, blind interpreting his Rorschach Test, cited in Zillmer, Harrower, Ritzler & Archer 1995, pp. 8-12)

these amazingly contradictory statements (do they really refer to the same unique individual?!!) actually represent, respectively, the very first and the latest -before our own assessment- of the projective expertises on the case and suffice to demonstrate that time alone had not brought a solution and that an effort at integration of the still dispersed data was yet to be done - a contradiction particularly intriguing in this instance when one considers the following scientific finding:

...il existe certaines correspondances, voire des rapports étroits, entre les données expérimentales du Szondi et celles du Rorschach. Notre recherche, qui porte sur plus de quatre cents protocoles, nous a permis de dégager quelques corrélations hautement significatives (la plupart au delà de p .001 avec la méthode du CHI²) entre la configuration du moi szondien et un certain nombre d'indices Rorschach. (Mélou 1975, p. 270)

Add to these facts that even within the highly select "Nazi elite" test-subjects population (Zillmer et al. 1995, p. 6 and chaps. 2, 3 & Appendix; Robinson 1965, pp. 12-3) Eichmann's constitutes due to several reasons a case with no equal, its careful individual assessment promising to be a rewarding endeavor: not only did he play a key role in one of the most characteristic, infamous and attention-deserving features of the Third Reich (namely its extreme anti-Semitism: he was the head of the Jewish Department of the *GESTAPO* since its creation, having been charged of spying on them from 1935 on) to the point of inspiring the main works on Nazism of authorities like Arendt (1963) and Milgram (1974; see Zillmer et al. p. 5), but also his psychological

¹⁸⁴ This case study was originally delivered at the Szondi Workshop of the XIVth International Rorschach Congress (Lisboa, July 1993), to honor Leopold Szondi in his birth centenary.

testing record is the most complete of them all having included in total a battery of seven procedures (Szondi, Rorschach, TAT, ORT, Bender-Gestalt, H-T-P-P, and WAIS¹⁸⁵). This research chooses to be then, in contrast to previous inconclusive nomothetic investigations (Zillmer et al. chaps. 1, 6 & 9), an idiographic clinico-psychological study of an individual personality (Kadinsky 1970, pp. 45-7) that besides happened to be a part of a more widespread political movement, not any attempt to capture any elusive collective "Nazi personality" *in abstractus*.

Table #
Chronology of Historical Events in Eichmann's Life and Psychological Assessment

-
- 1906 (March) Adolf Otto Eichmann born in Solingen - Germany.
 - 1932 Joins the Nazi Party (SS) and begins his military career.
 - 1934 Assigned to spy on the Jews for the SD Main Office as Sergeant.
 - 1938 Charged with the first deportation of Jews (Austria), now a Lieutenant: a great "success"; many note a 180° change in his personality.
 - 1940 Becomes head of the Jewish section (IV-B-4) of the *GESTAPO* as Captain.
 - 1941 Assigned a role in the "Final Solution" (massive deportations to extermination camps) and promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
 - 1944 His negotiations with Kasztner in Hungary save Szondi's life.
 - 1945 Germany's defeat; captured by U.S. soldiers fakes identity, and is taken to a detention camp. Beginning of Nuremberg trials, with defendants tested by Kelley and Gilbert.
 - 1946 Revelations at the trials force him to escape; hides and lives as a woodman.
 - 1950 Thanks to *ODESSA* crosses Austria and Italy, to eventually reach Argentina by sea.
 - 1957 Autobiographical interviews with Dutch journalist Sassen (ex-SS).
 - 1960 (May) Captured in Buenos Aires by the Israeli *Mossad*, is taken to Jerusalem; *Life* magazine publishes part of the Sassen interview.
 - 1961 (January-February) Tested by Kulcsár: fascinated chiefly by the Szondi pictures (thus "fate" reunites them again); (March) successful experiment of blind diagnosis of this test by Szondi himself, then in Switzerland. (April) Trial and (December) death sentence, attended by both Arendt and Selzer; Gilbert as witness discusses the test results with Kulcsár.

¹⁸⁵ TAT = Murray's Thematic Apperception Test, ORT = Phillipson's Object Relations Technique, H-T-P-P = Buck's House-Tree-Person-Person (both sexes) drawing technique, WAIS = Wechsler's Adult Intelligence Scale. This wealthier variety of material in Eichmann's case is due to the fact that he managed to escape and avoid the Nuremberg process (to most of whose defendants were only administered the Wechsler-Bellevue and the Rorschach, and to some the TAT), but having been captured and brought to Israel in 1960 a well-trained Psychiatrist, Dr. Istvan S. Kulcsár (whose name has been often misquoted as I. M. Kulcsar or even Kulscar), administered this whole thorough battery to him alone.

- 1962 (June) Execution. Szondi learns the real identity of the subject. Newspaper article by Prosecutor Hausner offers the first published results (Szondi): perversion, sadism.
- 1963 Consensus-creating book by Arendt (with inaccuracies) intriguingly rejects this: average, normal, "banal" person. Experiment and article by Milgram indirectly support Arendt. Article by Gilbert based on his experience at Nuremberg and on Eichmann's test data: murderous robot. Szondi makes known his diagnostic success in a set of conferences at Zürich University.
- 1965 Book by Robinson (Hausner's assistant) severely criticizes the deficiencies of the one by Arendt.
- 1967 Chapter by Kulcsár (widely overlooked) offers the condensed, official test and psychiatric interview data: sadomasochistic perversion.
- 1969 Szondi includes Eichmann's case and his blind report in his book on Cain figures.
- 1970 Eichmann's Rorschach (probably released by Gilbert) begins to circulate in the U.S.A.; Brenneis' Rorschach blind diagnosis experiment by Ritzler and colleagues: simple, ordinary man.
- 1975 Book by Miale and Selzer first publishes the Rorschach protocol: psychopathy.
- 1976 Articles by Harrower on her own Rorschach analysis and blind experiment with experts: normal personality.
- 1977 Selzer receives the original test protocols from Kulcsár, confiding them to the Library of Congress in Washington; his article on experts' blind analysis of Eichmann's drawings (including reproductions): aggressive personality.
- 1980 Article by McCully calls attention: Rorschach protocol not so banal, just appears so.
- 1983 Book by Szondi (ignored), thanks to Mélon, first publishes the Szondi protocol: murderous criminal.
- 1995 Book by Zillmer, Harrower, Ritzler & Archer insists on the Rorschach: no evidence of psychopathology.
- 1999 Article by Peralta first tries to recover and reintegrate the dispersed test data: borderline personality.
- 2005 Peralta & Kramer's successful TAT blind diagnosis experiment by Chabert: borderline-perverse functioning.

Note. For the meaning of the German acronyms refer to Zillmer et al. 1995, pp. 3, 21 & 25.

Analyzing first in retrospect the latest psychological assessment on the case (Zillmer et al. 1995) become noticeable some inaccuracies that must be isolated from their main argument and then rejected. These experts (pp. 8-12, 177) based their judgment heavily on Arendt's (1963) very ill-conceived opinion -as has been subsequently demonstrated (Robinson 1965; Miale & Selzer 1975, pp. 5-7)-, aside from including several false assertions: it is plainly not true that "half a dozen psychiatrists

had certified him as 'normal'" (Arendt, pp. 22-3; cf. Kulcsár et al. 1967 p. 48, Selzer 1977 p. 129), neither that she as journalist had open access to the Rorschach and other test data as a source for her thesis of "banality" (Zillmer et al. pp. 9-10, 177; comp. Arendt herself pp. 259-60) while authorities like Szondi (1983, p. 58) and Gilbert (1963, pp. 35-6) both confronted strict limitations for accessing these highly classified documents (Hausner 1962 p. 20, McCully 1980 p. 313); nor is it historically correct (cf. chronology Table # above) to assert that "*by most accounts* he [Eichmann] was far less psychiatrically disturbed and closer to normal than almost everybody would have thought" (Zillmer et al. p. 177; italics added). What has happened here is that, surprisingly, by following uncritically Arendt's bad example -who by the way was not a qualified mental health professional- none of the previous analysts of the case that has found Eichmann a "normal" person (not Harrower, 1976a pp. 343-4, 1976b p. 79; neither Ritzler, 1978 p. 352 Footnote 2; nor Zillmer et al., pp. 9 & 239-40) has ever referred to Kulcsár's (et al. 1967) sole authorized opinion, has analyzed a single test other than the Rorschach, nor has at least published the concrete step-by-step procedure leading to a "normality" diagnosis in the latter (in the careful way suggested since only by McCully 1980, who however remained struck precisely by its peculiar character).

To be able to go beyond previous studies in order to reach a final, undisputed diagnosis in this case we had to make a serious effort both to secure overlooked data as well as to analyze it in a proper way. Having been initially able to recover Kulcsár's psychiatric report (et al., 1967) and the Szondi test protocol (1983), both of them already published but remained entirely unknown (!) to the U.S.A. projective community -where practically all of the discussion had taken place-, and being also aware from our side of Szondi's original remarkably accurate blind analysis of his test plus of Mélon's (1975, 1976) soundly established Szondi-Rorschach intimate correlation, we could not accept other's contrasting opinions about Eichmann's Rorschach -center of the controversy- without making first our own careful analysis of it. This we began to report in an initial article (Peralta 1999) where, based on our distrust for the new "systems" of Rorschach interpretation (maybe the main cause of contradiction: Zillmer et al. 1995, p. 191) out of the powerful theoretical reasons exposed in detail in this Thesis (cf. chap. III above) we chose to apply the always dependable Classic Swiss methodology (Bohm 1951/#, Prefaces) as we have personally developed it inside the Zulliger-Salomon tradition; we were certainly able to demonstrate there the permanent coherence between these two methods' results but voluntarily limited ourselves to a so-focused analysis, announcing a future extension of our case study. This is precisely what we offer in what follows¹⁸⁶.

1. The Rorschach

The following reproduction, if need be authorized by Robert S. McCully (personal communication, Feb. 3 1994) and Michael Selzer (personal communication,

¹⁸⁶ Except for the WAIS we were able to obtain copies of the remaining 6 original test protocols of Eichmann, however in this Thesis we will only concentrate on 4 of them leaving also aside the ORT and the H-T-P-P.

#. # 199#), is our careful translation -with the generous assistance of Christian Steiner, whom we thank- of Kulcsár's original handwritten protocol in German, not always easy to decipher, with a minor addition from Kulcsár himself (et al. 1967, p. 31); we were not able to understand just some parenthetical notes apparently written in another unknown language other than German or Hebrew (left blank in the following text). We could correct however some mistakes and omissions that made their way into Miale & Selzer's (1975, pp. 289-91) initial published protocol (by the way, the ulterior reproductions by McCully 1980 p. 312, and by Zillmer et al. 1995 pp. 239-40, were based on the former one and were thus bound to reproduce the same -if not further- mistakes/omissions). There does not seem to have been a proper inquiry, forcing us more than in other cases to make a meticulous perceptanalytic reconstruction of Eichmann's concrete Rorschach 'experience' (*Erlebnis*: Bohm 1951/#, chap. 16.V.1; Schachtel 1966, p. 4 & chap. 11) carefully following the Classic Swiss School's principles, task made somewhat easier thanks to our subject's elaborated way of expression (Kulcsár et al. pp. 20, 28-9; McCully pp. 312, 313-4); interscorer agreement with an expert in this tradition -the late L. J. Rijo- was 82% (cf. Zillmer et al. pp. 73, 120). One of the foremost results is that we have not always retained Kulcsár's (or Miale & Selzer's, for that matter) response numbering or scoring: below it is thus absolutely about our own analysis, scoring and interpretation of the raw findings. We keep using the classical scoring symbols (abbreviated from German#) strictly following their best presentation as represented by Bohm, and suggest some new secondary ones (! for "shock", > for "tendency to [more]"; some other abbreviations are adopted from Piotrowski's works). Below the responses produced for each plate in the test administration proper, separated by an horizontal line, we have added the detailed rationale of our respective scorings (including Beck/Exner's location codes) and other assigned special phenomena (in Bohm's sense, chap. 6). Let us finally add that for scientific (validity, counter-biasing) purposes we applied Bohm's scoring rules in a very stringent way, even against our better judgment, hoping to stay in this way above the previous-knowledge-effect usual criticism in Nazi research.

Adolf Otto EICHMANN (54), ex-soldier

January 21, 1961

(11:26)

I.

Λ Bat from a collector or a museum, with spread-
V
out wings.
awareness

1. G F+ T
decreased interp.
COLLECT. "or" EXHIB.

1. One must always refer in what follows, as it is the case with this very common response, to Bohm's (1951/#, end of chap. 4) "auxiliary tables for scoring" established with subjects of practically the same German cultural environment as Eichmann. The

latter's very precise phrasing for specifying the origin of the object of his perception lets us deduce an important decrease of interpretation awareness (chap. 6.2), leaving place however for two real options united by the conjunction "or" (chap. 6.28); the themes derived from content analysis, like here those of "collecting" and of "exhibiting", will be indicated in capital letters.

- II. (_____)
- Λ Two brown bears pressing against a glass (_____) 1. G B T
V, O
hats on their heads which are blown away. Like
(Cloth.)
performing exercises. 2. asym. B, >mirror
Even the snout is drawn on the left one and also 2. Dd F+
Td -
the ear on the right one. Very clear bear ear. 3. Dd F+
Td -
- Very quickly drawn with neutral ink. aSym, obs; SEX. DIFFER.
<itp.aw., >(B), red?

1. A very frequent kinesthesia in animals of anthropomorphic characteristics (bears: Bohm chap. 4.A.1.2.b) very often associated also to this blot (V), but the contents of the concrete actions proposed and the general scene are rather original (in the scoring of content we have also secondarily taken into consideration the clothing: the upper red "hats"; but in contrast to the following plate we have not considered this G B as a constructive O+ -cf. Piotrowski et al. 1963 pp. 65-6- due to the following suspect signs). The left-right particularities eventually brought up by the subject classify this B as asymmetrical (Kuhn 1949? pp. 97-9, Salomon 1962 p. 91). The qualification "brown bears" could be interpreted as the product of a projected color effectively perceived in the black (Bohm chap. 6.52) but that's very doubtful. The "glass" allows to more likely suppose in contrast, sort of vain effort to counter the asymmetrical perception, a tendency to mirror response (Bohm chap. 6.70: why if not must there be a glass between the two animals, in a blot where there is not such a marked central axis?). By the way there is no actual reference to the incomprehensible "dueling" at all (Miale & Selzer p. 289) in the original protocol but simply to exercising (*turnen*), so all the previously suspected tendency to contamination (because of the simultaneously incompatible actions), red intervention (as blood) and gory image of "heads blown away" (McCully 1980, Peralta 1999) become now eliminated.

2. & 3. As we see it, the bears (black D) are not to be imagined as full-body ones but as the equally plausible upper-body images (cf. Exner 1974, Table A D1 p. 162) where the complete, facing heads are the upper half of this area (Beck's D7, ultimately Exner's Dd21) with the forepaws or hands "pressing against a glass" being the upper center black point D4, the "snout" the adjacent approaching area, and the "ear" the outer pointed Dd31. That is, with these two additional responses (not scored separately by Kulcsár) we have 2 sure Dds which we do isolate and score (cf. Bohm

chap. 4.C.1.2) because of the importance given to them by the subject himself and because they are the product of a new reflection about the preceding larger animal images (cf. the point that separates the two sentences-responses and the word "even..." [*sogar*]); those enigmatically asymmetrical percepts (Bohm chap. 6.27) suggest according to Kuhn (loc. cit.) an -unconscious- sexual differentiation of the two characters, as well as (Schafer 1948, p. 28 #10) a meticulous-obsessive approach¹⁸⁷ (the *obs* phenomenon has been sharply defined by Piotrowski, 1957 pp. 398-9). The last sentence, again a sign of decreased interpretation awareness, appears like an *a posteriori* attempt to repress ("drawn") the kinesthetic component, and associated with the other negative signs that accompany resp. 1 it implies as likely the presence of a red!(?) (Rapaport et al. 1945-6/1968 pp. 359-60 & 453-4, Bohm chap. 6.16; see next plate).

III.	Is that also a humorous drawing?	(B) = B!; < itp. awareness
Λ	Two overly polite dandies tipping their hats to 1. each other, greeting themselves very pompously, POLIT.>AGGR.	G F+ M(Cl.) V, O+ react. form.;
	there are even the high-heeled shoes there, the Cloth. -	2. Dd F(Fb)
	patent leather shoes.	TIDINESS
	Two clowns who want to do their best, masked. O+	3. G B M
	White collars at the neck,	4. Dd F(Fb) Cloth. -
	the red could be an eye-catching stage decoration	5. D FbF
	Obj. -	"red"!, perspective
	in the background.	

 The reference to "drawing" (again) implies for sure the repression of the *B* (according to Bohm: deduction α in chap. 4.A.1.2.b, and its elaborations in chaps. 6.16 & 6.34 that have been precised by Salomon, 1962 p. 93), i.e. the movement shock *B!* (see Piotrowski 1957 p. 171: besides plate VII, a very similar one by the way, this is the only other plate where the subject makes an -interrogative- comment before interpreting it).

1. The *M V* under the form of an *F*-response (Bohm: auxiliary tables, and cases N° 28 & 30), with the *D7* "hats" being the 3rd element necessary for the combinatory *G O+* (Piotrowski pp. 73-4). The *extreme* insistence on politeness is obviously nothing else than a reaction formation against the latent hostility (probably stimulated by the red; Schafer 1954, chap. 10.F&G).

¹⁸⁷ The following comment by Szondi, quoting Kulcsár, seems very relevant concerning the obsessive features of these responses and of the ones in the following pl. III: "The father [of Eichmann] inspected with strictness the clothings, the drawers, the homeworks, the ears of the children; he was an overly pedantic, strict father..." (1969 p. 63).

2. Beck's *D10*, ultimately Exner's *Dd33*. About the separate scoring, which still adds to the combinatory character of the preceding *G* response, apply the same considerations than for *Rs II-2/3*; furthermore with these "*patent leather shoes*" the subject consciously and rightly stresses a light-dark nuance (recognized also by Kulcsár) present in this blot *Dd*, thus response *F(Fb)* in the precise sense of Binder (Bohm, 1951/# chap. 4.B.II.1, 1959/77 pp. 312-4) which one must not overlook (Bohm 1951/#, chap. 4.C.II).
3. Response from show business which obviously includes the following two ones (4. & 5., from where the *G O+* character), and for which one must cautiously consider the (*B*) as expired (Bohm chap. 6.69: group III mask interpretation in movement).
4. "*White collars*" (an easily located but uncoded *Dd*) idem R 2. above, and white as color (Bohm chap. 6.50).
5. *D2+3*. Color naming for location purposes + perspective resp. (both as defense mechanisms facing a threatening anxiety: Salomon 1959a pp. 290, 291; Bohm, chap. 6.29) where the "eye-catching" quality of the red (Schachtel 1966, pp. 159-60) clearly predominates over the form of an object that remains indefinite, thus *Fb!* to the red (Salomon, 1959b p. 247, 1962 pp. 27-8; Bohm, chap. 6.7) to connect with the above already traced (*B*) (Bohm chap. 6.16).

IV.

<p>Λ A stretched-out cowhide or hide of a killed V hunting piece, bear. It's spread out for drying, or already treated. It is also badly trimmed, obj.criticism the forepaws, the rear part. The head is very badly drawn, the backbone well drawn, it also goes well toward the side. Here in front wrinkles.</p>	<p>1. G F(Fb) T</p> <p style="text-align: right;">"or", TIDINESS,</p> <p style="text-align: right;">< itp. awareness obs</p>
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1. V resp. but with the light-dark shades very meticulously elaborated (McCully 1980 p. 314, and also p. 316 while talking about R VIII-1 where he adds: "his use of color includes an almost unnoticed idiosyncrasy, not dissimilar to the way shading was used on Plate IV") otherwise without any real advantage (= *obs*: Piotrowski 1957 pp. 398-9, Bohm chap. 6.3), very similar to an example so scored by Binder (quoted in Schachtel 1966, pp. 253-4) despite its being a *G*. Rorschach has always considered those "hide" responses as full-body animals from the content point of view (Bohm chap. 4.A.I.3). Once again it is erroneously for the subject about a drawing executed from a model (decreased interpretation awareness).

V.

<p>Λ Bat, much better than the first one. V</p>	<p>1. G F+ T</p> <p style="text-align: right;">< itp. awareness</p>
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1. The scoring offers no difficulty (Bohm "auxiliary tables").

(11:37)

VI.

Λ	Also a skin, but the head part doesn't fit with it. (V) Also a hunting skin. CASTR?	1.	D	F+	Td
	The head part like a head ornament of the Aztecs.	2.	D	F+	Cloth.
	O				

1. *D1*. The upper detail (the "phallus") is explicitly excluded as in Klopfer's barred *W*, which gives us the *(V)* (due to the frequency of this behavior it is not a *Do*: Bohm chaps. 4.A.1.1.ab & 4.A.1.4.a) and perhaps also a *sex!* (Bohm chaps. 6.9 & 6.68; see also next plate).

2. *D3*. The subject comes back to the previously excluded *D* to associate to it an outstanding and well-seen image; since it is about an ornament to wear on the body it seems psychologically more meaningful to us to consider it as clothing than as a simple object (Bohm chap. 4.A.1.3).

VII.

Λ	(Long hesitation) Outlines of continents. I must cover the lower part.				sex!
V	South America down to Fireland, Caribbean Sea Geog. - with the - here Brazil, Argentina, Chile.	1.	DZw	F+	memory
Λ	Again a humorous drawing: two dancing elephants, T - trunks raised, eyes a little wrongly drawn, standing crit. = obs on one foot.	2.	D	F+	(B), <itp.aw., obj. EXHIB., PHALLIC?, EYES

Here took place apparently the longest latency time corresponding thus to a *sex!* (Kulcsár et al. 1967 pp. 30-1, where this phenomenon is also clinically confirmed; cf. Bohm chap. 6.68, Piotrowski 1957 pp. 306-8, and preceding plate).

1. For the first time there is a technical divergence here between Kulcsár's and Miale & Selzer's protocols: the former resorts also for the first time here to the symbol "Λ" to indicate the plate's position, while for the latter the respective position is exactly the reverse; the general context of the whole record as well as the specific reactions to this plate obviously indicate that Miale & Selzer must be the ones right in this instance (it makes perfect sense since the 1st resp. in a shock situation often implies the reversal of the plate). So: *D1* (the left one, in this reversed position) + the nearest corner of *DS10*. According to the evidence and in our opinion, here it isn't about two

different resps. (Bohm chaps. 4.C.I.2 & 4.C.II) but about one image which gradually becomes more precise by turning the plate: the 1st third (now below and to the left) is finally associated -as it is sometimes- with this particular geographic region; even if Bohm scores this response once as *F-* (1975, case #1) it is in an understandable way statistically *F+* in Argentina (Alicia M. Passalacqua, personal communication, July 13 1995; lacking a published regional *F+* Table we also scrutinized the complete collection of the journal *El Rorschach en la Argentina*, cf. Rubel 1993 pp. 80 & 85); let's not forget that Eichmann had just lived there for 10 years and the response obviously makes implicitly reference to this part of his past (Bohm chap. 6.46; see the reference to Lerner in the next plate to appreciate the extent of his attachment to that country). The reference to the "sea" indicates us that the *Zw* was secondarily implied in the resp. too in combination with the blot part in question.

2. *D2*. *Idem* R III-1 above (repression of *B* with a fixed, drawn image of anthropomorphically positioned animals; comp. Piotrowski et al. 1963, pp. 61-4), however those elephants remain a rather common interpretation to the upper two thirds (cf. similar resp. in Bohm 1975, case #4 R VII-3).

(11:42)

VIII.

<p>Λ A leaf chewed up by insects, which is spread-out O- for herbarium. The shading of the colors would crit.=obs, mem. look different in a fall leaf, but in Argentina there EXHIB., is a leaf whose color is similar.</p>	<p>1. GZw HdFbF Pl. F b! < i t p . a w . , O R A L M U T I L . , COLLECT., DECAY</p>
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1. The *G* leaf with its violated integrity thus includes the inner *Zw* (*DS3*, *DdS28*...) as cavities (*GZw* in Zulliger's sense: cited in Bohm chap. 4.A.I.1.a, cf. Schachtel 1941 pp. 88-90). The expression "the shading of the colors" and the generally somber tone of the resp. (the fall leaf in obvious decay: fallen and partially eaten, decomposing, almost disintegrating = morbid originality) are witnesses of the influence of the overall shading of this colored blot as an essential, predominant determinant (cf. the dysphoric insecurity so well described by Schachtel: loc. cit., to be compared with 1966 pp. 243-50): the corresponding score is thus *HdFb*, again introduced by Zulliger (1948-54/1969 chap. I.5, and last case *Celina Kohler* in chap. II.1; undoubtedly a *Group A Hd*-resp. according to Salomon, 1962 pp. 52-3, 57-8, 75-7, and also 109-11 particularly in relationship to the equally strong oral-narcissistic, peculiar asymmetric reaction to the next plate; Bohm chaps. 4.B.II.2.c & 4.B.III.2). A very primitive and personal existential anxiety, awoken by the fact of having been teared apart from his Argentinian refuge (memory: cf. Lerner 1991 p. 108, Piotrowski 1957 p. 354) and of facing death in Israel (cf. Zillmer et al. 1995 p. 186), resonates behind this response. Taking into consideration the presence of the classical popular responses practically in all the preceding plates, it is very remarkable here the absence of the most frequent

V of all (the lateral "animals": cf. Piotrowski 1957 pp. 106-11) fact which suggests to us that the *Fb!* present (Bohm chap. 6.4, Piotrowski 1957 pp. 298-302) is predominantly a *red!*

IX.

Λ First impression: a coat of arms; (_____ 1. Dd FbF- Her. O-
 _____)¹⁸⁸ above the helmet, heraldry in the middle, Fb! aSym.
 drawing below. But one must cover one side.

1. One half, asymmetrically. We have here again a reaction against the symmetry of the blot (cf. plate II), all the more strange since coats of arms are always bilaterally symmetrical! It is thus about a -negative- original resp. by apprehension (Bohm chap. 4.A.1.4.b), at the same time about a *Dd* delimited in an unfrequent way from the point of view of its *Gestalt* (chap. 4.A.1.1.c.B; cf. case #17 R I-6). According to Miale & Selzer (p. 291: "It's more the color") at the inquiry the subject states himself the predominant role played by *Fb* in his interpretation (cf. Rorschach 1921/#, case #5 R VIII-2) which is obviously responsible for this shock reaction as in the preceding plate (cf. also: Bohm chap. 6.27, and Piotrowski 1957 pp. 308-9 where the relationship to *sex!* is confirmed), with the red standing out again by its indeterminateness.

X.

V From Botany: a colored drawing, a flower, stamens, 1. D FFb
 Pl. -
 pistil, stalk. < itp. awareness, BISEX?
 On the sides a detailed drawing of stamens drawn 2. DG FbF- Pl.
 O-
 for a better view of the pupils. Fb! MASC.COMP? EXHIB.

As it was the case earlier with plate II and the never existed "dueling", also here we have to introduce important corrections thanks to our effort in obtaining Kulcsár's original recording. First of all we confront a total contradiction between the former's and Miale & Selzer's scoring of locations: twice *D* and twice *G*, respectively; at face value it is hard to imagine that the original tester could be wrong on this score. Furthermore regarding the plate orientation signs, with Kulcsár using "Λ" for the 2nd and last time (comp. plate VII) and Miale & Selzer maintaining the same sign for resp. #1 and introducing ">" for resp. #2. Below our subsequent deductions in full detail.

1. The unexpected *D* score gave us the initial clue, but the repeated "Λ" sign was the key for the solution of this enigma: each isolated time Kulcsár used it he must have systematically meant the reversed position, just using the inappropriate sign to indicate it. Now everything does make sense: this resp. does not refer to the whole blot but to everything inside and including the reds and lower gray (*Dd22*) in this

¹⁸⁸ Perhaps the meaning of this enigmatic parenthetical remark was "covers half", as Miale & Selzer have it (1975 p. 291).

reversed position, i.e. an unexpected but undeniable *FFb* (Rorschach 1921/#, ex. #2 R X-6). We had to entirely discard our previous scoring of this resp. (Peralta 1999: *DG FbF-*) based on the both times wrongly recorded Miale & Selzer's "Λ" position and *G* location (cf. Rorschach case #27 R X-1, and Bohm's auxiliary scoring tables).

2. Miale & Selzer also wrongly introduced the ">" plate orientation sign for this resp. out of their will to make sense of the record and based on an incorrect reading or translation of Kulcsár's handwritten words "*An den Seiten...*" ("on" the sides, not "from the side"-view): the plate remains in the same reversed "V" position and the resp. obviously refers to the previously excluded rest of the blot (outside the red "flower": *D12+1+15+7+13*) as being individual types of "stamens" which together with the big colored central flower "drawing" complete a botanical school chart. Instead of the scoring *D F-* chosen by Kulcsár we believe the confabulatory *DG* is in place since these remaining details are combined with the previous *D* to arrive to a whole *O-* response, somewhat in a forced way since only certain details support the perception of "stamens" (Bohm case #14 R X-2), in any case more forcibly than with Rorschach's case #2 who immediately saw the *G* from the beginning. In other words Eichmann began with a good resp. but the initial inversion of the plate, the reversed sequence, the final *DG-* and the absence of any of the several possible *V* confirm anew the already mentioned and insurmountable *Fb!* that continues to compromise the formal quality of his resps. since plate VIII. We are not sure but it remains nevertheless a defensible hypothesis, that there may be a bisexual fantasy with subsequent masculine compensation behind his successive percepts.

(11:45)

The general psychogram is presented in the Appendix p.463 below, we just have to add here some summary data before passing on to our interpretation. Concerning the all-important subject of shocks, discarded by the way in the "Comprehensive System", *besides* Bohm's criteria we decided to apply also the more precise ones of Piotrowski (1957, pp. 297-8) which offer a more sure starting point; his 4 conditions have established thus, respectively (refer to the plates in question above):

- (1) not applicable
- (2) for certain, *sex!* in pl. VII (+VI?)
- (3) *B!* in pl. III, also *red!* in Salomon's sense (+II?)
- (4) *Fb!* in pls. VIII-X (respective R = 21%, quality of areas chosen, *F- O-* resps.,

no *V*)

The tabulation of special phenomena present is the following:

8× diminished interpretation awareness

5× obsessiveness (4× object criticism)

2× asymmetry, personal memory, "or"

1× reaction formation, color naming for location purposes, perspective, white

as color

> mirror resp.

And the content themes offered are:

- 5× EXHIBITION
- 3× TIDINESS
- 2× COLLECTING
- 1× POLITENESS, SEX DIFFER., MASK (group III), EYES, ORAL MUTIL., DECAY
- > AGGRESSION
- PHALLIC COMPENSATION (2×)? BISEXUALITY? CASTRATION?

*

Concerning the two published analyses of this Eichmann record previous to ours, we can confidently say that each has its own significant limitation - even if their authors came to reach conclusions similar to ours. Miale & Selzer's (1975, pp. 286 footnote & 289-292) Jungian-inspired one is definitely an all-too superficial and purely content analysis that hardly carries any convincing power with their conclusion of "psychopathy". McCully's (1980) one on the other hand, apparently meant to correct what his former teacher Miale may have overlooked, has the undeniable merit of also calling attention in a very perceptive way to the "banality of evil" proponents that they cannot so hastily discard a supposedly unnecessary analysis of this protocol as if self-evident and done with; but he himself defined his illuminating "commentary" as really not an interpretation (p. 313) and didn't even made an attempt at scoring. Nonetheless, this is infinitely more in any case than to simply prejudice Eichmann's recors as "banal" without any attempt at demonstrating it from the data themselves. Let us begin by quoting his key general observation:

Ritzler's (1978) [critical] article, "The Nuremberg Mind Revisited," prompted this writer to re-examine the Rorschach protocols of 16 Nazi leaders published in Miale & Selzer's (1975) book, *The Nuremberg Mind*. The book includes Adolf Eichmann's Rorschach in an appendix. The nature of Eichmann's record struck me as worthy of attention in its own right... The authors had done little with this record other than fit it into the broad [content] categories designated in their study... Harrower (1976) included Eichmann's record in her study, designating it a sample of a "normal personality" among the Nazi officials [without any further specific detail about *why*]... Ritzler (1978) [similarly] judged Eichmann's record "a rather banal, commonplace protocol." He omitted it from his statistical study for that reason and because there was no inquiry. **Had Eichmann's record been overlooked because authoritative opinion about the man himself had been so pervasively accepted or unquestioned?...**

Insofar as a theory of Nazi personality is concerned, the Eichmann trial had a more widespread effect on social philosophy than did the Nuremberg trials. This was largely due to Hannah Arendt's (1964) personal study and report on her [lay] observations of Eichmann at his trial. This led to her widely influential proposition of the "banality of evil." Evil, according to Arendt, often thrives because of the banality of quite ordinary men. Eichmann struck her as a prime example of this. Arendt's view was strongly supported by Stanley Milgram's (1975) famous experiments on obedience to authority... Most people have tended to accept this view of Eichmann, particularly since Milgram's

experiments lent it credence. **Contrarily, Eichmann's Rorschach struck me as a very unusual one by any standards.** (McCully 1980, pp. 311-3; boldface added)

Following his excellent example we will attempt to go still further in this direction, starting precisely from a list of conspicuous features of this protocol just like Rorschach used to do in his detailed analyses (Zulliger 1949 p. 294 point 4, cf. Piotrowski 1957 pp. 424-5) as we saw in the previous case.

Most conspicuous features of Eichmann's Rorschach:

- the 2 very peculiar asymmetric reactions (pls. II and IX)
- the 100% *F+* in the general rigidly obsessive context of the record (5× *obs*, etc.)
- in sharp contrast, the irremediable formal crumbling in pls. VIII-X (expression of a *Fb!*)
- a similar contrast between the shading/light-dark interprets.: 3 *F(Fb)* against 1 *HdFbF*
- the *B!* plus other characteristics of the *B*-responses
- the marked *sex!* together with other sexual-related dynamics of the record
- the unbalanced Apprehension Type
- the high *Cloth%*

The first instance of an asymmetric view of an interpretation, covering all responses in plate II (the bears and their particular body parts), is remarkable since objectively the respective *Dd* at both sides of the blot do not stand out for any inequality as can be sometimes detected elsewhere in Rorschach's plates (1921/# chap. I.1). For some enigmatic reason then the subject *forced* this sides-difference in his percept: the left bear supposedly standing out for his snout, and the right one for his ear (?!). In his usual perceptive way Kuhn (1949? pp. 99) suggests a couple of interpretive explanations: there could be moral issues involved ("right/wrong", symbolically), and/or sexual ones in the sense of a particular attention to sexual male/female differentiation (by below-above displacement in this case, the protruding "snout" possibly having a male value and the "ear" -as receptive organ- a female). Salomon (1962 p. 93) specifically endorses this second possibility stressing at the same time, due to the being about an asymmetric *B* in this case, traits like "...a great ambivalence in the object relations. Aside from this lack of symmetry-seeing one often finds still other disturbances of this kind [confirmed in Eichmann's case: pl. IX]. Like in the not-seeing the symmetry (see chapter VI, mirror interpretations) there exists therefore also here a lack of adequate narcissism in the Ego structure" (p. 91); he gives thus implicitly credence to our hypothesis of an underdeveloped mirror response (see below). This leads us to a key observation by Mélon (1976) connecting the Rorschach and Szondi tests, that may prove of value in the subsequent interpretation of this case: "La réponse 'un homme et une femme' [totalement équivalente à celle qui nous occupe], qui introduit une différence là où elle n'est pas objectivement perceptible, est le signe d'une telle confusion [psychotique des sexes]. Cette réponse est rare, mais révélatrice, à notre avis, de fortes tendances paranoïdes projectives (p-). [Ajoutant dans une note en bas:] Notre expérience ultérieure nous a

révélé que ce trait était également fréquent chez les pervers ([Sch]+0, ++)" (p. 119). The 2nd blatant instance of asymmetry (pl. IX) is no less remarkable since, instead of simply searching for small asymmetric details between both sides, the subject unconcernedly discards as unnecessary one entire symmetric half of the plate in the normal position, even if -as we mentioned before- coats of arms are *always* symmetrical; in this instance thus the interpretation has the stronger de-forming character of a total rejection of the symmetry, as something maybe even despicable¹⁸⁹. This kind of peculiar interpretation, that some seem to have deemed "a rather banal, commonplace" reaction, must have a deeper meaning. A very good beginning of a response has already been offered to us above (pp. #1166-7) by Binswanger, particularly with the passage where he asserts that "dans la *déformation* réelle ou supposée, donc contraire à la symétrie, nous pensons percevoir quelque chose d'étranger, d'hostile à la vie, de destructeur de la vie, ce qui signifie: la proximité de la mort"¹⁹⁰ (1947/71 p. 231): stated more than a dozen years before Eichmann's testing! It is then a very pessimistic finding from the prognostic point of view, to which we will return when discussing the TAT. Let us pay due attention to the further findings announced by Salomon above who has specifically studied this phenomenon:

One of the most outstanding signs in the test of a normal narcissistic cathexis of the Ego is the seeing of the symmetric figures, specially of the moving persons, naturally *without* any additional remark of the subj. concerning the symmetry at all... There where the symmetry, even if this occurs only once in a test protocol, is *n o t* seen, we must conclude in Federn's sense on a narcissistically weakened and impoverished Ego, i.e., on a great difficulty of object-relationship and cathexis. (According to the common language usage we call these persons "narcissistic".)

We obtained the most convincing proof of this assumption while we looked through, with a view to that, over 50 Z-[Test-]protocols of psychiatrically diagnosed schizophrenics. There were only 5, event. 6 [10-12% of] cases between them by which we did *n o t* observe the lacking symmetry. We encounter this factor however also in many obsessive-compulsive neurotics. To prevent every misunderstanding we might underline it once more, that we speak of lacking symmetry no matter if it is about persons, animals, nature responses or objects interpreted. The only requirement is for these to be usually and normally interpreted as if being a pair. The psychological after-effect of the early childhood frustration of libido exchange is to be estimated as rising in severity and more strongly repressed corresponding to this enumeration. (1962, pp. 110-1; our translation)

¹⁸⁹ One may even say, a total rejection of the double or other, of the mirror image, as if completely abandoning the unsuccessful attempt of pl. II (cf. the "glass" between the bears); in a very graphic way Salomon (1962 p. 184) speaks here of an Ego 'defeat' and 'resignation'. Cf. pp. # above.

¹⁹⁰ This may also be taken as a beginning response to Zillmer, Harrower, Ritzler & Archer when they ask: "During his trial, Eichmann was portrayed in the media as a depraved killer responsible for the deaths of millions. But the Rorschach protocol did not fit. Where was the depravity? Or, perhaps, an overwhelming sense of guilt? Sadism? Bigotry? Hatred? None of these seemed apparent in the psychological test profile" (1995, p. 9).

In Eichmann's case then we have one example of the more severe and stronger repressed early narcissistic frustration, of the weakest Ego structure; we will see how the Szondi Test results completely confirm this interpretation. The finding of this factor by Salomon (and also by Schafer: 1948, p. 28 #10) in obsessive-compulsive neurosis will allow us to smoothly pass on to the next conspicuous feature.

The extreme $F+\% = 100$ is not such an extraordinarily unusual finding, but it finds itself (despite Kulcsár et al.'s assertion to the contrary: 1967 pp. 32-3) in the context of an also extremely obsessive record (cf. Bohm 1951/# chap. 11.B.II.5, Schafer 1948 pp. 23-4 & 27-31): $5\times obs$ -that is, in half of the plates- at which times the subject constantly criticizes or meticulously elaborates his percepts with such forced perfectionism that a paramount heavy, arduous, obviously clinically significant obsessive-compulsive character prevails (the psychiatric interviews as well as many other biographical data have amply confirmed this); complemented the rest of the time with the A.T. //D Dd/, $>loose$ sequence, E.T. = 2(4) : 4.5 very near to ambiequality, $B!$, $FFb << FbF$, $Fb!$ & $red!$, 3 $F(Fb)$, $sex!$, the above discussed asymmetries, $2\times$ "or" responses, color naming for location purposes + perspective both to the red color (pl. III, isolation defense mechanism: cf. Salomon 1959a pp. 290-1), and complex themes/resps. (particularly B) concerning tidiness, collecting, exaggerated politeness (as reaction formation against aggression), and probably castration. In this context then the 100% $F+$ points to such an extreme rigidity, pedantry and perfectionism (cf. also Schafer p. 28 #1, about the interpretation in this sense of the rare /R) that it must have been almost impossible for anyone to make Eichmann deviate from his compulsive thinking and behavior habits, precisely because he needed them as permanent defenses against the equally extreme intensity of his latent sadism. A spontaneous declaration by Eichmann himself in the Sassen interview comes totally in point here, which we quote from Robinson's (1965) meticulous book:

Attitude Toward His Work

According to Miss Arendt, Eichmann was a bureaucrat of the Final Solution, a man of *Kadavergehorsam* (corpse-like, i.e., robot-like, obedience) completely devoid of any particular interest in carrying out his assignment ([1963] p. 120). Eichmann offered a [contrasting] partial self-portrait in the Sassen Papers, in a section that was authenticated by both defense and prosecution and admitted in evidence by the court:

And so the Jews are actually right. To tell the truth, I was working relentlessly to kindle the fire wherever I thought there was a sign of resistance. Had I been just a recipient of orders, then I would have been a simpleton. I was thinking matters over. I was an idealist. When I reached the conclusion that it was necessary to do to the Jews what we did, I worked with the fanaticism a man can expect from himself. No doubt they considered me the right man in the right place.... **I always acted 100 per cent, and in the giving of orders I certainly was not lukewarm.**

(pp. 33-4; boldface added)

A pertinent example of this avowed extreme rigidity is represented by the infamous episode of the November 1944 compulsory foot marches of the Budapest Jews to the

Austrian border, considered an atrocity at the time even by other Nazi officials, after the usual railroad transportation system had been destroyed by Allied bombing - precisely to prove to the Allies that he could continue the Final Solution deportations despite the destruction of the railway (cf. Robinson pp. 28-30). This brings us to an amazingly accurate interpretation made by Salomon (1962) of the maximum-highness of this factor, again put in paper at a time when no one besides the Kulcsárs had any knowledge of Eichmann's Rorschach:

...By extraordinarily high $F+$ %, above all in obsessional-neurotic and depressive states, this corresponds, aside from a sadistic Super-Ego, to a regression to the anal-sadistic developmental phase [// $D Dd$ /] with simultaneous reaction formation and character change [pl. III]. To have to deal with such people is almost always unpleasant; they are devoid of warmth and humor, out of touch, stubborn, appear libidinally impoverished and narcissistic, in contrast to their behavior generally passive and turned against themselves they could become sadistic when placed in a position superior to others. Their sadistic Super-Ego and their formalistic logic know neither sympathy nor compassion. (p. 145; our translation)

There is hardly a more perfect description of Eichmann's personality as confirmed by well-founded biographical data. He even seems to have actually undergone around the year 1938 exactly that 'reversal into its opposite' of the aggressive drive (from in- to outside directed, from masochism to sadism) described by Salomon: cf. Chronology above, as graphically described by Arendt herself, 1963 chaps. III-IV particularly pp. 38-41 & 58-9; for the future fate of the seemingly then somewhat unleashed aggressive drive see also Robinson's dramatic descriptions, 1965 pp. 13-5, 24, 26-48, 53-4, 57-9.

This situation changes completely, quite surprisingly but nevertheless understandably -since all rigidity is evidence of latent weakness-, in the last plates VIII-X where the quality of production literally crumbles, the $F+$ entirely disappearing and leaving their place to the $FbF-$ and making way particularly for the pathognomonic $O-$: the destructive $HdFb$ to pl. VIII, the untenable asymmetric percept to pl. IX, and the confabulatory DG to pl. X. This obviously corresponds to a $Fb!$ but goes too far beyond that (i.e., beyond a simple repression: cf. Salomon, 1959b chap. III, 1962 chap. III), actually implying a definite Ego failure, in other words a decompensated obsessional neurosis: this phenomenon might very well be a live micro-reproduction of Eichmann's 1938 'reversal into the opposite' discussed above, and in the case of an obsessional neurosis the opposite is sexual perversion¹⁹¹. Salomon still offers us several pertinent indications on this issue, to connect with the regression mentioned by him in the previous quotation above:

¹⁹¹ Freud: "Neurosis is, as it were, the negative of perversion" (S.E. VII Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 1905/53 Summary p. 231); Mélon: "L'obsessionnel ne régresse pas seulement dans le fantasme inconscient comme fait l'hystérique. Il transgresse réellement quoique sur le mode du déplacement... Du fait qu'il transgresse plus que l'hystérique (qui fait transgresser davantage qu'elle ne transgresse), l'obsessionnel a un pied dans la perversion et l'autre dans la névrose" (& Lekeuche 1989#, p. 113).

...On plate 2 [Z-Test, corresponding to VIII-X in this context], a good F+% indicates the positive attitude, free from anxiety, of the Ego towards drive demands without regression danger.

Only there where the F- gain the ascendancy, where the F+% sinks below 70, the regression *cannot* be controlled by the Ego anymore; it is passively experienced, under the pressure of the repressed drive claims or of the Super-Ego... a bad F+% also points to a diminished reality control and adaptation, diminished secondary elaboration, a relative Ego-weakness, all in all, towards the danger of an Ego-regression.

One recognizes very nicely this Ego-restriction by the imprecise F to the colored or the Hd blots, as well as by the responses preceding, following or as such given complexual ones. Above all it sometimes occurs in the colored plate[s] that we obtain no F at all to it [them], but only color responses by which the FFb are then extremely rare [precisely our case]. One sees in there a considerable failure of the controlling functions of the Ego; it is taken by surprise by the drives, put in part out of the way. As soon as drive impulses become aroused in these people, sets in a strong regression to the pleasure principle, is demanded an impetuous and direct drive satisfaction, the Ego is compelled to regression... That is more the case, the more the color responses approach themselves to the FbF- and the pure Fb... (1962 p. 146; our translation)

From another point of view this is also exactly what Bohm describes as 'initial censorship' (1951/# chap. 6.67) with the following words:

...it is not rare that the first complexual response is symbolically disguised or distorted while the last ones are more clear, or the reverse... We call the first case *initial censorship*...

The censorship is an excellent *indicator for the assessment of the relationships between the Ego energy and the instinctive force*. During the tendency for a repressed complex to appear the Ego is concerned about hiding its manifestation by a reinforcement of the repressive tension; if it succeeds, the corresponding complexual responses are more strongly repressed (*final censorship*), thus resulting this symptomatic of an *energetic Ego*, and indicating, in cases of doubt, a *neurosis*. If the continued suppression of the repressed complex is not achieved, one finally gets to the irruption of the repressed (*initial censorship*), which is because of that symptomatic of a *weak Ego* and in the differential diagnosis speaks in favor of a *psychosis*, psychogenic or otherwise, or, at least, of a disposition for it. But it could also be about a *perversion*, which always has as a prerequisite a certain weakness of the Ego and almost always shows, too, a psychotic family load. (p. 178; our translation)

It is very instructive to compare here Eichmann's performance with the previous case, as concerned the final resolution of the respective conflicts: with him we find concentrated in the last 3 plates the worst Gs and Os and no Bs at all, while with Miss Sauerbeck it was exactly the reverse (cf. pp. #8, 16-7 & 22-3 above); even the fates of the shared narcissistic problematic are entirely the opposite of one another (cf. pp. #20-1), with Eichmann incapable of producing a mirror response (pl. II) but instead its asymmetric opposite (the already interpreted pl. IX *Orig.*) to connect with the

following interpretation of the pl. VIII original taking ground on Mélon while talking about projective-participating people's Rorschachs (*p-* in the Szondi, cf. his other quotation above p. #35): "...La destructivité s'exprime toujours dans le registre de l'oralité et l'angoisse de castration soulevée par l'évocation du sexe féminin [cf. pl. VII-shock below!] se prolonge d'une angoisse de morcellement..." (1976, p. 153), to which can be perfectly appended Piotrowski's one...

...The response "a leaf" or "a tree" projected onto a whole blot or a large part of it is psychologically different from "leaves" that are imagined in small areas. The large-detail or whole-blot "leaf" in plates IV and VI, sometimes in I, is encountered in many records of children between four and six. When such a response occurs in an adult's record, it denotes not only infantilism in some thoughts but an infantile, uncritical, and superficial manner of thinking about some life areas. Healthy adults have no leaf or tree responses of this kind. Torn, decayed, or oddly shaped single leaves are imagined almost exclusively by psychotics, who thus project their own weakness and disintegration upon plants the vitality of which is lower than that of humans or animals. (1957 p. 354; again, interpretive opinion written while Eichmann was still at large)

The other feature of this response, its *HdFb* determinant character, will be addressed immediately.

A similar contrast can be observed in the sequence of his shading/light-dark responses, beginning with the in itself high number of 3 *F(Fb)* on pls. III-IV, and closing with 1 *HdFbF* on pl. VIII (in both instances connected with the presence of color, the representative of pregenital drives and affects: Salomon, 1959b chaps. III-VI, 1962 chap. III). The former are to be considered a positive sign regarding the strength of the Ego confronting a potentially regressive-traumatic situation, in a slightly anxious and intellectually(*F*)-predominant way, and speak of its elaboration and reality-adaptation abilities. Note how on pls. II-III, which feature bright-red (the specific representative of 'hot', impetuous, aggressive emotions) color details, the reaction gradually and successfully establishes itself in a more and more obsessive-defensive way: first there is the potentially dangerous asymmetric *B* followed by 2 *Dd* with a meticulous elaboration of the quality of these details and a late tendency to repress both the action and the affective impact ("...quickly *drawn* with *neutral* ink"), then in III the obsessive mechanisms multiply exponentially (*B* repression from the very beginning with reaction formation, 2 of the *Dd F[Fb]*, persistent reference to the tidiness of the figures, and after all that a double isolation of the color) until finally could take place a successfully deactivated interpretation of the red. It is during this second defensive moment that the shading responses appear, concentrating in succession (with an attitude more typical of *Fb-R*: Bohm 1959#) on the small lighter-toned "shoes" and "collars", easier to manage affectively-diluted details; the collars as "white" confirm this attitude, expressing at the same time susceptibility and control over the dysphoric reaction. This attitude even extends to pl. IV, the darkest of all, by concentrating on isolated light-dark differences as the "backbone" or the "front wrinkles". The *F(Fb)* thus correspond mostly to the resort to the defense mechanism of isolation (Salomon 1962 p. 78), and their number heightens the obsessive character

of the record. The latter *HdFb* on pl. VIII¹⁹² on the other hand is "on the contrary to be valued rather negatively diagnostically and prognostically. Subjs. with *HdFb* are people with the tendency to surrender to the dysphoric moods, to let themselves fall into the dysphoria" (Zulliger, quoted by Salomon 1962 p. 75). According to Salomon (pp. 75-7) these responses indicate an additional 'sexualization', i.e. a motor discharge toward objects (attributable to the *Fb* part of the formula) of the depressive-anxious inner tensions (corresponding to the *Hd* part) above all in aggressive behavior; in other words, the Super-Ego aggressivity usually directed inwards to the Ego becomes diverted towards the outside. They are usually accompanied by particularly severe guilt feelings about the subject's own sexual impulses and thus by an intense castration complex.

The analysis of the *B!* falls in place here since it seems to have sexual connotations. It corresponds first of all to (sexual) identification difficulties, as Piotrowski puts it to ambivalence regarding the role one is to play, to doubts about one's own self; he found in it a more psychotic than neurotic connotation (1957 p. 172). If our assumptions (following Bohm both times) are correct in the sense that the reference to "drawing" in pls. II-III is a sign of (*B*), and that it was specifically provoked by a *red!* (Bohm chap. 6.16: note the contrasting normal reaction to the also kinesthetic pl. I, and the excess of responses specifically to these 2 red-featuring plates, cf. previous paragraph), then Eichmann's *B!* may be interpreted as his temptation accompanied by ambivalence regarding the possibility of acting in an aggressive-sadistic way (cf. Zulliger#: "People with B-repression... mistrust their own interior... They are afraid of their unconscious forces, expect from them disaster and distress; that's why they remain in an attitude of instinctive defense against their fantasies..."). Let us follow Piotrowski's interesting reasoning, one of the authors that have reflected the most about *B* responses:

...In the case of *M[B]* shock the ambivalence concerns the advisability of acting in accordance with prototypal roles. If *M[B]* are produced and are of a single type, the ambivalence probably pertains to the role expressed by the *M*; it is possible also that the type of *M* producing the *M* shock does not appear in the record but has been inhibited... *M* shock always indicates a definite neurotic anxiety associated with the acting out of the prototypal role which caused the shock. The anxiety may be so great that the acting out of the role is suppressed almost completely... If the anxiety associated with the *M* shock is sufficiently severe, it may prompt the patient to develop a reaction formation, and tendencies opposed to his *M* may appear occasionally in overt behavior. (pp. 171-2)

That is exactly, in our opinion, what we have in R III-1: the repression of a virtual aggressive *B* (prompted by the red: cf. Vergote 1994 p. 118) and the subsequent production of its opposite, an overly polite (*B*) carrying all the signs of a forced

¹⁹² It is false that this scoring only refers to black with a color value (although those are the most frequent interpretations of this kind), and that therefore there cannot be a *HdFb* in a colored blot or plate (i.e., only *FbHd*: explicitly contradicted in Salomon 1962, pp. 248 & 252): the decisive feature is which perceptual impact or impression predominates, the light-dark or the color one, both present in black as well as in colored plates.

reaction formation; we have already seen the inability to maintain such a defense when the color -the stimulation- became pervasive (pls. VIII-X). Bohm in particular has connected this kind of shock with obsessional neurosis. Passing on to a review of the quality of the 4 B-responses (including the 2 repressed ones), we have already interpreted the asymmetric B (R II-1) and the (B) with reaction formation (R III-1). The next one (R III-3) is a perfect example of a group-III mask interpretation according to Kuhn's fine distinctions: we find difficult or insufficient to just give a general-summarized interpretation of it (as Bohm suggests: chap. 6.69) without carefully following the original author's subtle phenomenological reasoning...

...les sujets [du groupe III] se sont reproduits eux-mêmes dans leurs interprétations de masques et de clowns... ceci confirme le fait bien connu que les interprétations de mouvement représentent, au moins dans beaucoup de cas, des objectivations personnelles (Binswanger et Furrer). Nous avons rencontré de ces objectivations personnelles au chapitre I, lors de la discussion des interprétations de masques qui sont des réponses globales [groupe I]... En opposition avec les résultats du premier chapitre, apparaît ici *une objectivation des modes habituels de l'existence*, objectivation dont le sujet lui-même est à peine conscient...

Les interprétations de mouvements et surtout celles qui comportent deux figures dont l'expression s'affronte ou se complète, révèlent, en général, des rapports humains. Le contenu des interprétations de mouvement permet souvent toutes sortes de conclusions concernant la nature de ces rapports... il est facile de voir ici que la forme masquée doit suggérer un rapport humain qui n'est ni libre ni nettement défini... *on trouve souvent une ambivalence anormale; les sujets se sentent par exemple, ...[qu']ils ne peuvent maîtriser leurs agressions vis-à-vis de l'objet aimé... Outre une vanité évidente, qui est sans doute le signe de rapports affectifs défectueux [dissimulés], on constate des airs guindés, des gestes cérémonieux, de vaines manifestations de politesse.* Les formes sous lesquelles se manifestent les rapports humains sont ludiques, superficielles, futiles, ironiques jusqu'à l'hostilité... Nous allons explorer tous ces problèmes en étudiant le caractère kinesthésique des interprétations ainsi que le rôle du vêtement dans les réponses mouvement. [pp. 106-9]

...Dans le Rorschach, en présence d'interprétations qui touchent plus ou moins aux vêtements et aux costumes, nous ne devons pas seulement voir des objets servant exclusivement à l'habillement. Le fait même d'être vêtu ou dévêtu pose, au cours du test de Rorschach, toute une série de problèmes; qu'on imagine, par exemple, deux types de protocoles diamétralement opposés, où chez l'un le costume, le chapeau, les bottes, les gants, le masque définissent le déguisement intégral alors que l'autre va littéralement à l'exhibition des organes génitaux. Il existe entre ces deux types des degrés intermédiaires. *On peut dire, en général, que les protocoles contenant des interprétations de masque, offrent rarement, à quelque groupe qu'elles appartiennent, des réponses sexuelles et elles trahissent une tendance marquée à l'habillement, sans règle absolue d'ailleurs...*

Notre matériel nous permet de reconnaître d'abord que si l'interprétation de forme accuse un intérêt particulier pour le vêtement, tel que nous le rencontrons dans nos cas, cet intérêt est dû au fait que le vêtement joue un rôle correspondant dans la vie des sujets. En qualifiant la plupart de ceux-ci de "vaniteux", nous n'avons atteint qu'une partie des faits qui s'y rapportent... Le vaniteux, on le sait, attache une importance particulière à l'aspect extérieur d'autrui et ses rapports avec lui sont fondés surtout sur des détails extérieurs... Le vêtement dissimule! Il cache la force, la faiblesse, la beauté, la laideur, le bien et le mal. De même que l'élément psychique se manifeste en images qui ressortissent aux diverses sphères psychologique, somatique et cosmique (Binswanger), de même *le refoulement s'exprime par la dissimulation sous les vêtements...* Lorsqu'il en est autrement ou à un moindre degré, c'est le mouvement qui l'emporte nettement dans l'élaboration des interprétations de masque. Il existe un rapport bien défini entre l'importance de l'habit entravant l'expression et l'expression kinesthésique qui s'élabore. Nous n'oublions pas que le vêtement s'interpose comme un mur entre le moi et le monde servant à l'élaboration de la conscience du moi ou de la personnalité et il entrave la "communication sympathique" (Straus). Conformément à cela, on peut montrer dans le Rorschach combien, *à mesure qu'augmente l'attention portée au vêtement (queue de pie, col dur, chapeau, chaussures, etc.), le mouvement se raidit, devient figé, guindé, cérémonieux, affecté, conventionnel, ridicule. D'autre part, à mesure que diminue cet intérêt, on voit l'expression kinesthésique s'animer, et plus riche devient l'apport du mouvement.* (Kuhn 1944/1992, pp. 112-3; italics added)

This subtle interpretation thus confirms not only the repressed character of the kinesthesias on pl. III that we had assumed, but also the complementary nature of Rs III-1&3 the latter more explicitly implying the character of masking, of dissimulation. This was then Eichmann's habitual mode of existence: vain, rigid, conventional (probably the one that successfully fooled Arendt), etc., superficially polite but covertly ambivalent; all this in an effort to hide guilty sexual and/or aggressive impulses and fantasies in him, probably both at the same time, as Zulliger so clearly saw and expressed (loc. cit.). The insistence on pieces of clothing may well be then a masked reference -by displacement, as in pl. II- to sexual organs, as a veiled expression of an imperfectly repressed perverted-sadistic sexuality, like in fetishists. The last interpretation on this determination line, VII-2 as another (*B*), will be addressed shortly. Finally, the virtual number of possible *B* (4) and their often *G O+* quality (pl. III) clearly point to Eichmann's definitely superior intelligence, again in contradiction to Arendt's assumption.

We have made reference several times to sexual difficulties in our subject and it is time to address them directly. The most direct expression of them in the protocol is the acute pl. VII shock (the most strong of all, in Piotrowski's ranking) as a *sex!* Both Bohm (1951/# chap. 6.68) and Piotrowski (1957 pp. 306-7) assume a rather straightforward interpretation of this inhibited behavior as having a specific sexual meaning, as neurotic ambivalence and anxiety at the sight of female genitalia; but someone as careful as Schachtel (1966 pp. 31-2, 260-1) cautions us against an

automatic assumption in this sense, so we prudently approach the issue looking first for appropriate evidence of why this might be the case with this subject in particular. In all honesty, we have no direct evidence that Eichmann took the lower center detail of this plate for a vulva and reacted accordingly (in other words, the repression or denial of the perceptual representation might have been too successful), but we do have quite confirming circumstantial or contextual evidence apart of course from the fact of this statistically established (cf. Exner 1974#, Table A D6 p. 186) not uncommon association. First of all, that the subject in which we found this shock behavior was generally a sexually repressed individual is explicitly and clinically confirmed by Kulcsár (et al. 1967 pp. 21-2, 30-2); then we also have the concurrent although less intense, doubtful "shock" reaction to pl. VI where the upper D1 also bothered him as unfitting, thus spoiling the V; next, in the context of the whole protocol, the above discussed high *Cloth%* that points in this same direction: note in this sense the interesting fact that in the record *Cloth.* was mostly associated with B or (B) human figures like the subject, and that the only instances when he allowed himself to refer to -most probably- sex-symbolical body parts it was without exception about more distant B or (B) animal figures (cf. Salomon 1962 pp. 93-6; pls. II & VII: "snout", "ear", "trunks"...); more specifically, as already recognized by Miale & Selzer (1975 p. 291) we think the subject's evasion of the female figure in the whole record is undeniable, and the rare instances he approaches anything even far resembling a feminine image there is always a curious 'male compensation': the "snout" balance the "ear" in pl. II, the "elephants[]" trunks" close the production in pl. VII where the anxiety-provoking "lower [female] part" was never interpreted, and to the "flower" with equilibrated bisexual characteristics in pl. X are finally added numerous overflowing male "stamens"; and to return finally to the plate in question, the fact that the suggesting expression "I must cover the *lower part*" could be equally applied word for word to the human body. All this taken together makes quite probable the reaction in pl. VII as a specific female sex! On the other hand this also fits perfectly with Freud's (1928/1950) theoretical description of pervert dynamics, just as we have induced them in detail above in our subject, and their intimate relationship to the castration complex. To summarize, the pervert picture is very well confirmed in the Rorschach protocol -above all and most pertinently- by the two asymmetric reactions symbolizing the typical Ego-weakness (pl. IX: Salomon 1962 pp. 183-4, Bohm chap. 7 app. 1.2 & chap. 11 app.) or 'splitting' through the simultaneous acceptance and denial of castration (pl. II: asymmetric isolation of Dds) and hence of sex difference (Kuhn 1949? p. 99, Salomon p. 93, Mélon 1976 p. 119), as well as otherwise by the F+% shifting from one extreme to the other (in other words, the '[merely] initial censorship'), by the HdFb-R and probably even by the numerous *Cloth.*; the unbalanced Apprehension Type reflects of course the fixation/regression to pregenital psychosexual stages (Zulliger, Salomon), the "polymorphous-pervert" inclination. As an additional confirmation we even took the pain, even if only in a highly mechanical way, of checking -and eventually corroborating- in our record the presence of the

detailed perverse picture proposed by Merceron, Husain & Rossel (1985, 1988)¹⁹³ about whose underlying dynamics it would also be an instructive exercise to verify the close correspondence with the results of McCully's (1980) careful analysis.

Talking about Rorschach studies of perversion, although he is absolutely right in calling attention to the complex pitfalls involved in indiscriminately identifying denial and psychoanalytic pervert dynamics in general from the Rorschach¹⁹⁴ (cf. Schachtel about *sex!* above; cf. also our similar criticism of Exner's approach to "projection" in the Rorschach: pp. #III53-5), we cannot follow Mormont (1987) to the full implications of his clever reasoning. In a way that reminds the shortcomings indicated by Anzieu (#), he asserts between other things that "le déni semble peu repérable au Rorschach... le fétiche n'ayant aucune particularité *formelle*... Le fétiche est une perception substitutive dont le contenu [est] aléatoire (il dépend par exemple de liens de contiguïté)... Selon Freud, le fétiche est identifiable à son effet excitant et à cela seulement: sa forme est sans lien, sinon *accidentel*, avec la forme du pénis" (pp. 194-5, italics added); if that were true, it would surprise us very much coming from a man that characterized, according to our understanding, precisely by paying attention to and developing just the opposite concepts: compare our detailed developments in chap. III.B above (see in particular pp. #41-2 & #51-2 for Freud about *form* and *accident*, respectively) where we quote his firm conviction that made him explicitly say "I believe in external (real) chance, it is true, but not in internal (psychical) accidental events" (our 'Rorschach creed')! The mere fact of the fetish being often conditioned by the fact of being just the last perception before the discovery of feminine castration like a shoe or lingerie, or precisely "hairy" like velvet or leather, could hardly be considered "accidental". We believe Mormont strives at making here too sharp distinctions and makes himself deserving of a similar criticism than McCully's too restrictive ideas on (sexual) symbol formation, an author we otherwise respect as we have repeatedly mentioned in this Eichmann case evaluation. For instance, when Mormont asserts that the creation of an alternate fetish-image makes it unlikely the renewed perception of the original traumatic one, thus excluding any consecutive allusion to the "castrated", penis-lacking genital (in Rorschach terms, subsequent absence of interpretation of a shock-provoking hole-Zw for example), his argument carries conviction and we tend to agree with him: by the way that's exactly what happens with Eichmann in pl. VII, the shock-provoking stimulus is not only covered

¹⁹³ These are the Rs in the record (in parentheses) corresponding to their list of 7 signs: postures (statements #1-2: R VII-2), fetishistic contents (point #1: Rs III-2&4, *Cloth.* = 26%, R IV-1; point #2: Rs II-2/3; point #3: in R VII-2 substituting the "trunks raised" for the shock-provoking lower part; point #4: references to sight in Rs I-1, III-5, VIII-1 and X-2), disavowal (compliments in Rs II-3, IV-1 and V-1; location: deficiency denial in the *GZw* of R VIII-1; process: R IV-1; content: "glass" in the white of R II-1), distortion of relationship (category #2: reference to his personal knowledge from Argentina in R VIII-1), suppression (something akin may be implied in the formulation accompanying the pl. VII *sex!* "I must cover the *lower part*"), symbolic disfunction (class blending category #2: recurrent shifts from natural percepts to "drawings" and collected items; class misuse: R X-2 *DG*), and object categories (the assemblage in R IX-1, the scopophilic use of R X-2 etc.).

¹⁹⁴ He states, and we couldn't agree more: "...la question qui se pose est de savoir s'il est possible de repérer sa présence et l'œuvre du déni au travers d'une production telle que celle que l'on recueille au Rorschach... il semble que cela ne soit possible que par la reconstitution hypothétique du processus qui a engendré la réponse" (p. 195).

with his hand but he never interpreted the *D4* lower third, keeping his glance away from it, while both in pls. VI and X in contrast he did come back to the previously excluded "phallic" details. The same can be said about Mormont's observation regarding bisexual characters on pl. III as not typical of perverts (cf. Mélon's same finding, 1976 pp. 119-20): he does not mention however responses like "a man *and* a woman" (equivalent to Eichmann's asymmetrical interpretation of pl. II) which Mélon theoretico-clinically did find and explained in perverts¹⁹⁵. But we cannot agree with him in that "a woman with a *pony tail*" to the same plate VII, or similar interpretations, are to be interpreted exclusively as neurotic phallic-symbolic negations of castration and could never be fetish-images by denial: even Freud himself mentions in his article on fetishism the example of plait-cutters thus sharply contradicting him; in Freud's case of the "glance on the *nose*" as well, how could one defend that "le fétiche est le substitut perceptif et non le symbole du pénis... il ne sert pas davantage à la reconstitution d'une image plus intègre de la femme par adjonction d'attributs compensatoires" (p. 195)? That is in fact how we interpret Eichmann's post-shock R VII-2, the elephants with their "trunks raised": this phallic erection as a compensatory image away from the anxiety-arousing female genital (what was missing in a previous, non-verbalized perception becomes exaggeratedly underlined in a subsequent one), particularly in a repressed (*B*) *T* which are for Salomon (1959a pp. 292-3, 1962 pp. 93-6) specific formal signs of denial¹⁹⁶; in other words, our interpretation fulfills all of Mormont's requirements (p. 195 point 3) except for the last one which demands that "la fuite vers une perception contiguë... [dont] son contenu ne peut être soupçonné de servir à dénier la perception inacceptable (absence de symbolisme [phallique]). Notre seul soupçon repose sur l'analogie de ce contenu avec des fétiches 'classiques' et non sur un quelconque indice formel". The Rorschach examples he gives are of course cited out of context by contrast to ours, but just as he recognizes it of his own acceptable "red sox" and "beard" ones we do think one cannot be so categorical about what is or isn't denial and that the specific *formal* dynamics leading to one or the other response will be the deciding feature over these alternative *contents*. In Mélon's research (1976), who describes his methodology with the words "nous nous sommes servi de l'outil szondien pour disséquer le Rorschach" (p. IV), he succeeded in advancing one step forward in this formalizing direction:

Au moi diastolique, qui se trouve absorbé dans les brumes de l'Etre, fait pendant le moi systolique qui se contracte et se concentre sur un objet et qui veut cet objet. Il veut l'avoir et le faire entrer en lui, il l'introjecte (k+) de

¹⁹⁵ "Le pervers... bute indéfiniment contre l'écueil de la castration; il ne peut ni ne veut admettre la réalité de la différence des sexes. Cette attitude de désaveu (*Verleugnung*) retentit gravement sur l'organisation du moi; le moi pervers va se trouver scindé, clivé (*Ich-Spaltung*) en deux moitiés: l'une qui admet la castration, l'autre qui la refuse" (Mélon 1976, p. 291): the right bear, the left bear, respectively!

¹⁹⁶ Using a much wider conception of denial (*Verleugnung*: i.e., not only against the unique perception of castration) and in sharp contrast with Mormont, Salomon offers a whole series of formal Rorschach signs of its effective action against external traumatic perceptions in general: 1962 pp. 51-2, 55-6, 75-6, 93-6, and particularly 133-43 (often associated with the *Z*-plate I center *Zw*, the "vagina"). Eichmann's record features many of them: the 'group A' *HdFb*, the 2 (*B*), the final positive appreciation of R VIII-1 ("...for herbarium", cf. McCully 1980 p. 316) despite the *Fb!*, the female *sex!* and stupor, the initial predominance of *V* resp., the consecutive *G B M* in pl. III, the *DG*...

manière à se préserver à jamais de sa perte. L'introjection vise à conjurer la perte de l'objet, à de multiples niveaux. Qu'on songe, pour illustrer le processus, à l'hallucination, au déni mélancolique, au fétiche pervers et, dans des registres plus "normaux", à l'objet transitionnel, à la production artistique, aux "constructions" dans l'analyse, bref, à toutes les formes possibles de création...

La fonction k+ renvoie, selon nous, tout ensemble à l'investissement, à l'introjection et à la reproduction, hallucinatoire ou illusoire, de l'objet partiel... [pp. 39, 42]

...Le rôle des identifications primaires - identification à la Mère toute-puissante (Urmutter) du petit enfant qui s'efforce par là de (com)penser son absence, et identification concomitante à une image de soi complète et idéalisée (Alles-sein) - est d'une importance majeure pour la suite de l'évolution. Car cette assomption narcissique primaire toute empreinte de captation imaginaire sera mise à rude épreuve quand se révélera la différence des sexes, représentation incompatible avec celle d'une totalité narcissique parfaite.

L'angoisse de castration qui se développe alors réclame du moi une prise de position urgente qui scellera son destin. Suivant qu'il aura rejeté (verworfen), désavoué (verleugnet) ou refoulé (verdrängt) la représentation de la castration, il versera dans la psychose, dans la perversion ou dans la névrose. Dans la transcription szondienne, on peut assimiler sommairement le refoulement à k-, le désaveu à k+ et le rejet à p-.

...L'introjection... est un processus non métaphorique - c'est-à-dire concret, réaliste, matériel ou objectal, comme on voudra - d'identification à l'objet par incorporation cannibalique: je le suis, parce que je l'ai au-dedans de moi.

Dans le registre k, le désir réclame un objet tangible. Comme il n'est pas possible de dévorer l'objet total, sauf métaphoriquement, le désir objectal est nécessairement métonymique, contraint de choisir la partie pour le tout. L'objet du désir est toujours d'abord un objet partiel. La coprophagie du catatonique, l'avarice du mélancolique, le fétichisme du pervers, la cleptomanie du voleur et la monomanie du savant en sont autant d'exemples. Toutes ces "déviation" révèlent la fonction k+. [pp. 52-3, 55]

[Et pour passer alors à ses corrélations empiriques au Rorschach:]

...l'intervention de k+ entraîne une augmentation du pourcentage des réponses forme. Une étude des contenus ferait apparaître que les introjectifs donnent plus que toute autre des réponses "objets". Ils ont une prédilection pour tout ce qui est inanimé, figé, concret, objectivable, saisissable.

Si notre interprétation de k+ comme fonction d'investissement de l'objet partiel est pertinente, nous pouvons penser que l'association de formalisme et d'objectivisme qui caractérise ces sujets est en rapport avec leur tentative de maîtriser et l'objet partiel et l'angoisse que soulève inévitablement le désir de l'introjecter... [p. 68]

Nous attribuons l'augmentation des dd[Dd] chez les sujets k+... à leur goût particulier pour tout ce qui "dépasse" ou se "détache"; en quoi se manifeste

leur investissement très puissant de l'objet partiel et/ou les formations réactionnelles de coloration généralement anale, dirigées contre ce type d'investissement. [p. 76]

He also found (p. 112) a rise in *Sex.* responses as typical of those cases, which become substituted in our subject by the numerous *Cloth.* (an object category by the way). But the important point here are the *formal* signs encountered by him, which could be complemented with Dworetzki's very perceptive descriptions (1939 pp. 288-98). Directly following Mélon's we have undertaken our own research which has theoretically led us to our paramount systematizing Rorschach schema (cf. pp. #III112-5 above) where the couple *Dd F* being specifically the one corresponding to the Szondiian *k+* function's place in the developmental circuit. How does this theoretical construction hold in Eichmann's concrete case of perversion? Quite well we must conclude, if we systematically check and follow the sequence on the purely schematic level: the Rorschach forms characteristic of level I (primitive *G* and *Hd*) clearly do not predominate in the record, perhaps gain some importance only at the end; regarding level IIb then, *//D* are reduced and *Fb*-responses are strong but - comparatively- not as outstanding as other key factors; level III is not the characteristic performance either, with the *G* too varying in quality and half of the *B* repressed. Now level IIa does seem to be Eichmann's preferred fixation of choice, with the *Dd/* elevated in number and remarkable in content plus featuring a particular emphasis in form perception expressed in the maximal *F+%* and the 3 *F(Fb)*. And what about the subject's most critical *sex!*, which by comparison to the 3 classical others (*Hd!*, *Fb!*, *B!*) may well be called the *F-shock*? One cannot, Mormont is right in that, apply even these theoretically-based formal signs or related formally-based syndroms in an automatic, indiscriminant way: and even if they apply almost perfectly in our case, what we have done before searching for them was to reconstruct the psychoanalytic dynamics that ultimately explain the clinical-diagnostic picture. And to make a final, generalizing assessment we have endeavored to evade all along: it is well documented that Nazis stripped their Jewish and other victims, collecting all their clothes, shoes, glasses, even teeth, before killing and discarding their corpses (cf. pl. III interpretations): isn't that a prototypically pervert, sadistic-fetishistic behavior? "...Le sadique, en représentant de Thanatos, ne rêve que de prélever sur le corps de l'autre l'objet (partiel) dont il espère tirer jouissance" (Mélon 1976, p. 35). More details about the all-important perverse component in Eichmann are found in the next section, as well as about some above unmentioned schizoid features.

2. The Szondi

In sharp contrast to what happened with Eichmann's previous interpretations of his Rorschach protocol (cf. p. #34 above) in the case of the Szondi Test we do have an excellent, flawless interpretation made blind by L. Szondi himself in which we support ourselves, including a copy in English of his verbatim original report (Kulcsár et al. 1967, pp. 45-7), the same in German with some additional reflections (Szondi 1969, pp. 62-7, 175-6), and finally the protocol itself -recovered by Mélon and never included up to this point- plus the analysis of Existential Forms in French (Szondi 1983, pp. 58-60). Since this makes our work much easier and since we don't want to

contradict the Master -there is no point to it-, we will limit ourselves to some additional complementing interpretive comments (aside from the Existential Forms, interpretive method to which Szondi almost exclusively confined himself) plus a specific focusing on the Rorschach-Szondi correlation to counter the assertion that "I. S. KULCSAR came to the conclusion that the destructive urge could not be explained through the banal life-history of A. E[ichmann]. Also the other projective tests... could not uncover this destructive drive. 'This happened first through the experimental Drive-diagnostics, through the Szondi Test', the author wrote" (Szondi 1969 p. 66). The raw data for this test is presented in Table # (reproduced from Szondi 1983, with some *EKP* minor corrections from Kulcsár et al. p. 46 and Szondi 1969 p. 176).

Unfortunately for the endorsers of the "banality of evil" position, the protocol in an overall view does not appear as a normal one at all¹⁹⁷. With the exception of isolated factors like *s* or *e*, perhaps also those of the *C* vector, there are too many changes and qualitatively too extreme for that (mirror reversals). The Ego in particular (Sch vector) is extremely unstable, a

<u>VGP:</u>	S		P		Sch		C	
	h	s	e	hy	k	p	d	m
I	+	±	-	-	-	+	-	+
II	+	±	±	-	0	±	-	+!
III	±	±!	-	0	0	+	-	+
IV	+	±	-	±	-	+	0	±
V	-	±	-	0	+	0	0	±
VI	-	±	-	-	+	0	-	+
VII	±	±	-	0	0	-	-	0
VIII	+	±!	-	0	0	-	0	0
IX	±	±	0	±	-	0	0	+
X	±	±	±	0	0	±	0	+

<u>EKP:</u>	S		P		Sch		C	
	h	s	e	hy	k	p	d	m
I	±	∅	-	±	+	-	+	+
II	+	-	0	±	±	-	-	+
III	+	∅	0	+	+!	-	-	-
IV	+	∅	-!	+	+	+	-!	0
V	±	∅	-	+	+	-!	-	0
VI	+	∅	-	+	+	-!	-	+
VII	+	∅	-!	+	+	-!	±	+
VIII	+	∅	-	±	±	0	±!	0
IX	+	∅	-	+	+	-	±	+

¹⁹⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, we are always referring to the *VGP* or foreground profile.

very pejorative sign. To give a more objective assessment of these changes let us pay attention to two important quantitative indexes, the global variability index (GVI) and the global disorganization index (GDI), both established by Mélon. The GVI = 36 which is just over the normal limit: "L'index de variabilité reflète la souplesse ou la rigidité d'une structure... élevé, il signifie absence ou perte de contrôle, défaillance ou faiblesse du Moi, anarchie, chaos pulsionnel... Plus le syndrome psychiatrique est grave, plus la probabilité grandit de rencontrer un index anormalement élevé ou bas" (Mélon 1974a, p. 85). The other is also clearly abnormal: GDI = 0.16 about which Mélon adds...

Nous avons souvent remarqué que la présence dans une séquence factorielle de réactions pleines de sens contraires [h, k, p]... était un indice de mauvaise intégration pulsionnelle, particulièrement lorsque les variations en sens contraire sont quantitativement importantes (ce qui se manifeste par la présence des signes de tension: !). Ce phénomène est assez caractéristique de la psychose et des autres syndromes psychiatriques graves...

...Nous obtenons un quotient que nous baptisons *index de désorganisation globale* (IDG). Nous avons choisi le concept de désorganisation en raison de sa neutralité sémantique relative, mais d'autres auraient pu convenir aussi bien: déstructuration, désintégration, désintrication, désorientation... Le préfixe dés-... indiquant chaque fois que nous renvoyons à un processus négatif, péjoratif dans l'optique d'une référence à un idéal d'organisation psychique dont la clé de voûte résiderait dans le concept d'intégration.

Nous sommes légitimés à croire que l'IDG mesure une certaine forme de déséquilibre psychique dont nous tenterons de préciser plus loin les contours. L'examen de l'ensemble de l'échantillon des cent quarante et un sujets nous porte à *fixer l'index 0,09 comme limite supérieure de la normale. Nous admettons dès lors que tout IDG égal ou supérieur à 0,10 est pathologique*, dans l'acception statistique du terme. [p. 96]

L'index de désorganisation globale (IDG) apporte des renseignements au sujet de la qualité de l'intégration pulsionnelle. On peut admettre que lorsqu'un sujet fournit dans plusieurs vecteurs des réactions pleines de signe contraire, l'intégration est déficiente. Tout se passe comme si, confronté à la réalité du dualisme pulsionnel, l'individu, pour conserver l'équilibre, était tenu d'opter soit pour l'unitendance (+ ou -) ou l'ambitendance intégrée (±). Nous pensons que le fait de donner la parole tantôt à l'une, tantôt à l'autre tendance d'un même besoin pulsionnel (+ et -) est l'indice d'une certaine *faiblesse du Moi*. (1974b, p. 104)

It is thus not surprising that neither of the two possible normal profiles is recognizable, the sublimated (S-- Sch++) or the adapted (S++ Sch--) one; the latter finding is interesting in view of Arendt's theory and we will return to this issue of the *Alltagsmensch* (the banal "everyday man") later on. From an initial, very superficial reading the 1st profile gives the impression of a simply inhibited-neurotic individual (probably just the same impression Eichmann gives at first contact) but this becomes clearly dispelled in the rest: there is for ex. a recurrent "psychopathic loss of the center" (hyO kO) rather typical of acting-out or of paroxysmal crises; towards the end

one *may* recognize an obsessive overall organization (and of course through the permanent s_{\pm} , the most constant reaction of all), but we are obviously facing something more serious than a neurosis. There are also arguments in favor of a psychosis (kO and changing) but the contact is too good for that¹⁹⁸. From this superficial initial inspection what seem more likely are an epileptic or a criminal disturbance (charge in S , $e-$, weak or primitive Ego) but, again, the contradicting positive reaction $m+$ predominates in the contact vector.

The social index goes in the same direction of the latter conclusion being somewhat low (37%), becoming more of a warning sign in the *EKP* (only 27%: cf. Szondi later on). To finish once and for all with the quantitative indexes, the sexual one is also abnormal for a man, very feminine (0.59; thus supporting the Rorschach). The symptomatic index is quite high (54%) indicating an abundance of symptoms or abnormal behaviors and feelings in the subject which without necessarily being dramatic should be evident for any observer (Kulcsar #), particularly because of an overabundance of ambivalent reactions (doubts, obsessions, blockings...): the quotient $\Sigma O/\Sigma_{\pm} = 0.95$ which is low "...comme c'est le cas dans les tableaux où prévaut l'inhibition (névrose obsessionnelle, schizoïdie)" (Mélon 1975 p. 172). So we bump again into the probable obsessive trait which we will address first in the detailed analysis by factor we now pass on to¹⁹⁹.

The aggressive-sadistic factor of the sexual drive (the erotization of motility, the active/passive or aggressive/compliant manipulation of the other's/one-own's body; *Thanatos* according to Szondi: cf. Binswanger above#) is at the same time the most stable, the most charged (see *EKP*: drained $s\emptyset$), and the most ambivalent one of the 8: one can confidently say then that this personality is irremissibly marked - fascinated, obsessed- by the sadistic need as an essential trait in it, that it is the most constantly dynamic one of all determining character and behavior in a large measure, but also that it poses for him a lot of trouble from the point of view of maintaining a conscious conflicting attitude towards acting or not, being active or passive, aggressive or submissive, a sadist or a masochist, homicidal or suicidal, even masculine or feminine²⁰⁰, with subsequent blocking and eternal doubts. The unbalanced general picture (see for instance the contradictory behavior of the closely

¹⁹⁸ It is interesting to note that, just as here the C vector seems like the most normal one, in the Rorschach Test the *Hd*-determinant (corresponding to the 1st stage in the circuit of vectors according to our theory) was also the only one without a shock.

¹⁹⁹ In our way of interpreting the Szondi we strive to follow the same 3-step procedure Bohm defends for the Rorschach, that we have made much profit of in our previous theoretical chapter III.D.2: an initial global qualitative impression supplemented by the consideration of the quantitative general indexes; then a focused attention to the minimal units of the method, need factors and tendencies and their specific interrelations, which will establish clear interpretive lines and choices; from there, and passing through the superior level of analysis by drive vectors, we arrive to the general interpretive synthesis of the whole protocol including due attention to the background profiles.

²⁰⁰ "La réaction s_{\pm} manifeste l'ambitendance sado-masochiste, où la question posée est toujours la même: qui doit être au-dessus et qui doit être en-dessous? Très souvent, elle est corrélée avec une incertitude quant à l'identification sexuelle, qui résulte d'un échec devant l'Oedipe et d'une régression subséquente au stade sadique-anal" (Mélon 1975 p. 67: cf. Rorschach interpretation above, $F+\%$ and $B!$).

related k factor, which expresses this need's handling by the Ego, which disconnects itself most of the time: 5×0) and the intensity of the need (Kulcsar et al., p. 45: "...of the six respectively exposed murderer-images [s photos], the subject chose twice 4, six times 5, and *twice all 6 murderers*. Thus, while normal subjects usually chose two to three out of the six murderers, this man chose on the average five murderers in the foreground choice") makes one expect without doubt pathological symptomatic expressions. There are 3 equally open factors (each $5 \times$) pointing to overt behavior or symptoms: *hyO* is hard to interpret, but may indicate easily expressed emotionality, anxiety, etc., or -even pathological- lack of emotional control, emotional acting-out (this becomes more probable due to the often accompanying $e-$); *kO* as suggested above may indicate the pejorative inability of the Ego to take position in face of or control the strong $s \pm$ sadomasochistic ambivalence, the inclination to let action based on these urges just happen by themselves (the same phenomenon as the $F+$ crumbling in the last polychromatic Rorschach plates), in other words a narcissistic and egocentric acting-out behavior with no regard for reality; and *dO* probably indicates first of all the anal fixation and corresponding symptoms (once it must have been completely drained, as indicated by the *EKP d±!*), or otherwise some form of apathetic depression (with $m \pm$). Most changing factors are the p (presenting all four choice signs!) and the k , suggesting according to Deri 1949 p. 73 some severe form of schizoid disturbance (since we have already discarded psychosis). Szondi's calculations classify Eichmann in the $Sh+$ uni-dangerous drive class (in him presumably the most dangerous, unsatisfied need able of playing a powerful dynamic role in pathology), which includes according to him those subjects with early frustrations in their infantile or primary love; in his reasoning since the s , aggressive "masculine" sexual need is the most symptomatic of all, it leaves behind its twin sexual partner, the h tender "feminine" need in the deepest unconscious state of constant insatisfaction from where the dangerous drive unbalance. He calls it the "*class of the latent bisexuals and of those with infantile violence...* It is deduced that man, after the loss of the [primary] love object, becomes aggressive. The aggression is directed either towards the own person (fear, epilepsy, paranoid depression) or against the others (theft, homicide, murder). Only the chosen ones are capable of sublimation ('homo sacer')" (Szondi 19# pp. 310-1; our translation). The abridged drive formula is: $s \pm hyO / e-$; meaning that below the most symptomatic, above commented sado-masochistic strong ambivalent doubts or behavior and the uncontrolled emotional acting-out, there is the dynamic root need of the Cainist who experiences sudden brutal emotions and wants nothing less than to kill his equal²⁰¹. We must give all its importance to this latter need since it is not only the most deeply rooted one (inverted 'degree of tension' = 3; even more than the above commented h ,

²⁰¹ An interesting anecdote perfectly illustrates the functioning of this need in Eichmann: "He was no less conscious of his zeal and authority in 1943. This appears from an incident reported by him concerning Karl Wolff, head of Himmler's personal staff, who held the rank of general. An almost grotesque situation developed when Eichmann became involved in a telephone argument with Wolff, a man as arrogant as himself. Wolff insisted that the life of a certain Jew should be spared; Eichmann was equally insistent that it should not be. As the argument became more intense, Wolff shouted: 'Do you realize that you are talking to a general of the SS?' Eichmann replied: 'Do you realize that you are talking to a lieutenant colonel of the Gestapo—Adolf Eichmann?' Wolff thereupon slammed down the receiver, an affront which so enraged Eichmann that he challenged the general to a duel. Only through the personal intervention of Himmler was the duel called off" (Robinson 1965, p. 34).

which has as many \pm as $+$ signs) but the most stable of the 2 being consistently in $e-$ position (7 \times , just behind the unchanging $s\pm$ which is however a symptomatic factor). The importance to be given to this root need in particular may be gleaned from the fact that Szondi (1969) included this case precisely in his book on Cainists, from where some passages need to be reproduced:

Example 5. A desk-Cain. The case describes the fate of one of the greatest war criminals, Adolf Eichmann (A. E.), a "desk-Cain" who, without killing as such himself, had obliterated - quasi with a fountain pen - millions of lives in his office...

A. E.'s statement about his anxiety is psychologically surprising: "All my life I felt fear, but I did not know of what. This I felt also at those times when I was completely free and independent. This was an inner uncertainty. I could not go to any place where I would encounter strangers. I had to know beforehand who will be present. My palms were sweating. The less I thought about it all, the easier it was. Whenever I prepared myself for a meeting, it turned out badly. I was forgetful, did not know afterwards what I had been speaking about." This sensitive, somewhat paranoid anxiety and the neurotic symptoms like nailbiting, stuttering, sweating in strange company, shyness, nervous twitches in the face do not speak against his cainistic constitution, since we can observe them often even in the most brutal murderers...

We have now discussed the life courses of two war criminals. The fate of the Police Colonel, Mårton Zöldi, precipitated the extreme clinical possibilities of appearance of a paroxysmal Cain: epileptic attacks (in youth), sadomasochistic perversion, mass-murder on a minority and religious delusion. His fate companion, Adolf Eichmann, was on the contrary actually free from the mentioned extreme clinical symptoms of a Cain. Anyway the test profiles showed the reverse: while the manifest epileptoid-paranoid Zöldi produced in the test the killing disposition, meaning the Cain sign [i.e. Existential Form] of ten foreground profiles only in two, of ten theoretical background profiles only in 1½ profiles, altogether of twenty profiles therefore only in 3.5, the clinically symptomless Eichmann gave of nineteen profiles ten times (!) the test sign of the Cain, and indeed only once in the foreground, but nine times (!) in the background. One can draw the following conclusions from these researches: The de-facto-living-out of the Cain disposition in clinically striking symptoms (like manifest epileptic attacks, perversions, religious ecstasies etc.) can relieve the psyche of a building up of the killing disposition in the background. Affect-murders can nevertheless appear (M. Zöldi) under particular circumstances - in place of the clinical discharge -. A Cain who is unable to divert his killing disposition built up in the background into clinical symptoms, can - under chaotic circumstances - in a politically disguised way obliterate the lives of thousands, without killing de facto himself (A. Eichmann). The violent acts of mass-murder of all times - like that of the Crusaders and other religious wars, pogroms (against Jews, Armenians etc.) - have arisen with great likelihood from the same cainistic basis... That's why we mention here the relationship between violent crimes and epilepsy, since we do understand the cainistic killing disposition in general - even without manifest attacks - as a

transmitted paroxysmal-epileptiform [e-] predisposition. (pp. 62-3, 65-7; our translation)

Deri (1949) further offers us some relevant considerations about this specific drive formula:

...It signifies rejection of stimulus material supposedly expressing strong control over emotional outbursts. Therefore the minus *e* constellation is obtained from people who are likely to have aggressive outbursts. The correlation of negative *e* with [loaded] *s* is obvious. The [loaded] *s* constellation gives information about the state of tension resulting from the need for aggression felt by a subject, while the minus *e* constellation shows how this need is handled. The "minus *e* state" is experienced by the subject as strong emotional tension with no positive mechanisms of control. Such a tense state is likely to result in some kind of sudden emotional release, since the minus *e* constellation represents a state of unstable emotional equilibrium, in which people usually do not remain for long periods of time... Individuals for whom minus *e* is characteristic are usually impulsive; ethical problems are not of primary importance to them, and generally they are characterized by a lax superego... Invariably, a constant minus *e* results in a general restlessness and a tendency to act out id impulses spontaneously. (p. 93)

So, *e*- further feeds the fire of the pejorative implications of the 'loss of the center' components, the letting free play to the base instincts, above all a sexualized aggression.

We will make now only a quick review in the analysis by vector.

- C: No mirror reversals, 5 different constellations often (5×) unbalanced in loading, predominating however the favorable diagonal splitting (4×) $-+$. The number of changes is not excessive nor is their quality abnormal. There is some intermittent activation of one twin need without the other (unitendency or vertical splitting) but nothing alarming. All in all, this is more or less the most normally behaving drive vector. The "faithful" constellation $C--$ is a very positive one from the social point of view, and several additional ones are just the breaking-up of it into its component elements ($O+$, $-O$). While we were discussing this case at the Lisboa 1993 International Rorschach/Projectives Congress, Mélon was of the opinion however that, in the context of the rest of the vector profiles, this meant that Eichmann was able of behaving in a sadomasochistic way with anyone person he came in contact with. Just as in the Rorschach, where despite the absence of a '*Hd*-burden' (Salomon) there appeared an important isolated *Hd*-reaction (pl. VIII), here we also have a few that merit mentioning: O_{\pm} (2×) implies a somewhat obsessive-depressive attitude towards the object, $-O$ (1×) anality of character, and OO (1×) a very infantile polymorphous-pervert sexuality with strong oral-anal regressions (cf. the Rorschach A.T.).
- S: No mirror reversals, 3 different constellations rather balanced in -heavy-loading, predominating (4×) the total drive $\pm\pm$ or otherwise the tritending splitting $+\pm$ (the remaining $-\pm$ indicating there is no real solution). This is the most ambivalent vector of the 4 indicating above all a pervasively undecided

bisexuality, sexually-based anxiety (like phobias), and sexual obsessions-compulsions, all three strongly characterizing this personality. Despite appearances this drive vector is functioning quite abnormally and a sexual perversion becomes understandable on this basis. In the *EKP* clearly predominates the constellation +Ø (6×) which nicely corresponds with Szondi's above interpretation of the drive-class: an unsatisfied infantile-passive yearning to be loved (h+: narcissism) with a possibility of a violent reaction (sØ).

P: 2 mirror reversals in 6 different constellations (the normal quantity being 2-5) often unbalanced in loading (6×), predominating the unitending splitting (4×) -O. Unfortunately for this subject the center vectors become the more pathologically unstable ones, reflecting his poor self-control over his more primitive border drives, particularly his abnormal sexuality. The predominating -O constellation is most undesirable, with the most primitive egoistic affects (e-) playing alone or even reinforced by the tendency to emotional acting-out (hyO). The -- constellation (2×) is an indicator of the diffuse anxiety so well described by Eichmann himself above and is also a confirmation of the above just mentioned (unconscious) sexually-based anxiety, as well as a regular component of paroxysmal dynamics (cf. Rorschach interpretation). His more obsessional attempts at a solution (±- or -±; O± or ±O) obviously are not working (decompensated compulsion neurosis). In the *EKP* clearly stabilizes the pure cainistic reaction -+ (5×) about which we will leave the corresponding explanations to Szondi himself below.

Sch: 2 mirror reversals in 6 different constellations almost always (8×) unbalanced in loading, none of which seems clearly predominant. Not only that, but the 4 elementary Ego functions (O+, +O, O-, -O) appear to be functioning alternatively with no defining structuralization: the primitive 'splitting' defense mechanism must be thus very pathologically active in this highly schizoid individual (Deri 1949 pp. 43-4). This is also an undisputable confirmation of the Ego-weakness already clearly detected in the Rorschach (asymmetries, sudden dropping of F+%, initial censorship, B! with asymmetric-B), against those who contend that we have doctored our results. Again in the *EKP* finally sets in a structure and clearly appears as predominant (6×) the autistic +-(!) constellation which reveals the preferred functioning by stubborn, omnipotent, almost hallucinatory wish-fulfillment with consecutive acting in accordance with it in reality, despite objective limitations and proofs to the contrary; Deri gives us here a useful description:

Adults who give this configuration in the *Sch* vector are nonconformists and have the tendency to form autistic and unrealistic relationships toward the world. They are likely to make and follow their own laws of behavior which depending on the remainder of their personality structure might result in asocial as well as in socially highly valuable behavior [hardly the case in this context]. However, even in the latter case, subjects with plus *k* and minus *p* are likely to be "atypical" individuals who refuse to follow the crowd. They might, for example, rigidly insist on acting according to their convictions and their

conscience, and cannot be deterred from an original course of action even when the course seems impractical and maybe even be undesirable. These are the people who may be fanatics in the good or bad sense of the word, depending on the rest of the test profile...

...Seriously antisocial individuals who are "professional" criminals yield this *Sch* configuration with approximately twice the frequency of the unselected population... Plus *k* with minus *p* can be found however, in nonconforming schizoid psychopaths. (1949 pp. 219-20)

Mélon has also found it, discarding the obvious psychotic possibilities, in schizoid perverts (1975 p. 128). This schizoid structure²⁰² (the one particularly underlined by a Nazi expert like Gilbert: 1963) obviously becomes an important diagnostic consideration in this case, and we must mention here that we have also clearly detected it in the Rorschach through Bohm's (1951/#, chaps. 9.1.2 and 12.B.II.3) syndrom of 'schizoid sensitivity': "*isolated F(Fb)* ('sensu', BINDER) *with no, or few, FFb and many FbF and Fb*; these show the typical inner sensitivity with lack of external contact, and here finds itself the point of contact of schizoids with sensitives"; to which could be added Zulliger's white-as-color reaction (chap. 6.50) and the 'diluted' schizophrenic signs (cf. also Schafer 1948 pp. 90-1) of 1DG, 1 bizarre *Dd* to pl. IX, O+ and O- qualitatively very different, >loose Seq., absence of the most popular resp. to pl. VIII in the context of such a "banal" protocol up to that point, asymmetric *B* to pl. II (Salomon 1962 pp. 91-3), personal memory to pl. VIII, asymmetry to pl. IX (Salomon pp. 110-1), initial censorship, and compensated *red!* (chap. 6.6).

For the general *VGP-EKP* diagnostic synthesis we can perfectly and confidently lean on Szondi's blind report:

A. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE PREDECESSOR [*VGP*]

1. Predecessor is seen as a sadomasochistic-pervert individual. Of the ten foreground-profiles, the subject produces *t e n t i m e s* the typical test sign of sadomasochism ($\pm s$). The following test indicators point towards a character of public danger in this sadomasochistic perversion:

1. The "murderer-syndrome" in the foreground-profile IV ($-e, -k, \pm m$);
2. The autistic-perverted "power-ego" (*Sch +O*) in V, VI;
3. [The above mentioned overloading of the *s* need factor]...

B. ANALYSIS OF THE SUCCESSOR [*EKP*]

²⁰² Mélon (1976) has seen many cases like the one of Eichmann: "Chez vingt sujets, aucun profil du moi n'apparaissait prédominant. Nous les avons rangés dans le sous-groupe Z et assimilés au groupe projectif pour la bonne raison que la seule structure qui apparaît quelquefois dans cette population était la structure paranoïde projective. Une bonne moitié d'entre eux sont d'ailleurs des schizophrènes avérés... Les exemples qui suivent appartiennent au groupe autistique ($+-$) et au groupe Z qui rassemble les sujets les plus déstructurés de notre population. Chez ces derniers, la réaction $+-$ n'apparaît qu'une ou deux fois, mais elle est omniprésente; même si elle n'apparaît qu'une fois dans un protocole, la réaction *Sch+-* est pathognomonique d'une composante schizoïde" (pp. 60 & 155).

- I. The successor emerges in all nine profiles as a Cain, who is capable of carrying through his killing intentions in a completely autistic fashion, that is out of a passion for power and with disregard for the limits set by reality...
- II. The extent of public danger stemming from the successor is also expressed through the finding that of thirty-six (9×4) vector reactions, thirty-two, i.e. 88 per cent are of a social-negative character.

C. ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONALITY

I. Since the background-figure represents that part of the personality that sometime in the past did play a role on the foreground stage and that also might at a future time reappear in the foreground, one has to regard this man as extremely dangerous for society.²⁰³

II. By referring to the case history, that is unknown to me, two possible morbid states should have to be excluded: (1) a genuine epileptic disorder; (2) a paranoid schizophrenia. Against the assumption of epilepsy there is pointer in the (a) lack of reaction S ++!, ++!! and (b) the presence in the foreground of the ego of : Sch +O. This does not occur in epileptic patients and points rather to a state of perverted sadomasochism. On the other hand, the background reaction -!e could indicate a carrier of epileptic disorder. This might be verified by tracing the family history.

Against the assumption of paranoid schizophrenia, there is the indication that the typical diagonal splittings in three to four vectors are missing (+-, +-, O-, O- etc.).

We arrive at the conclusion: This man is a criminal with an insatiable killing intention. His public danger is still increased by the autistic power-ego and the tendency to projection.

It should be noted that, during our experience with the test during twenty-four years (1937-1961), there was not one among the more than 6,000 interpreted test sequences that showed the autistic Cain-figure [Existential Form] with homicidal intention as a background element in similar quantity or dominance. *Therefore, we are confronted here with an almost unique case.* (Kulcsar et al. 1967, pp. 45-7; boldface added)

It is interesting to remark how the 3 global Szondi profiles, VGP (foreground profile, based of the classical like-dislike free choices), EKP (empirical complementary profile, by forced choices with the previously unselected half of the

²⁰³ *Uncanny!* This kind of demonstration lead Schotte to write the following laudatory words about his Master: "...Szondi n'a sans doute pas été électivement homme de parole, du moins sous sa forme publique. Ses cours étaient généralement, à la manière germanique, tout écrits et ensuite lus, – sauf si bien sûr il en venait, en cela inimitable et irremplaçable, à évoquer où que ce soit, autour d'une table ou à une tribune, l'un de ces *cas de vies comme destins*, de patients, d'amis, de connaissances ou de figures historiques: circonstance dans laquelle surtout se manifestait aux yeux de tous à quel point il était capable – par les *vues* mêmes qu'il développa dans toute son oeuvre scientifique – de ressaisir les *lignes de force* de n'importe quelle biographie. Ce génie touchait à son comble au moment de ressusciter, en un 'diagnostic aveugle', une vie entière sur la seule base de protocoles de son test, ne comprenant pour le profane que sigles inintelligibles; un jour, mis en présence d'un test dans lequel il pointa aussitôt le plus grand tueur qu'il eut jamais à reconnaître de toute sa carrière, il apprit qu'il ne s'agissait de personne d'autre que d'Adolf Eichmann" (1990 pp. 18-9).

photographs), and *ThKP* (theoretical complementary profile, which Szondi didn't analyze in Eichmann until after knowing the identity of the subject), each reflected a different aspect of this man. The *VGP* showed the sexual-aggressive **perversion** to begin with, the *ThKP* mostly the **obsessive** defensive structure (Szondi 1983²⁰⁴; not at all surprising since, as Freud taught us, "neurosis is, as it were, the negative of perversion": exactly how this profile is constructed as the negative-picture of the *VGP* by reversing all signs!) but just in theory, and the *EKP* clearly the criminal **schizoid** disposition. And *all three pictures* were also reflected without exception in different aspects of the Rorschach psychogram (Peralta 1995), as we showed earlier and as it logically should be according to Mélon's (1976) and our own (chaps. III.C.2 & III.D.2) scientific findings concerning the quasi identity between these two extraordinary projective methods. Based on all of the above we consider the best synthesizing diagnosis in Eichmann's case to be that of a *borderline personality disorder* (cf. Merceron et al. 1988 pp. 377-8; and Kwawer, Lerner, Lerner & Sugarman 1980 p. 2 & chaps. 2-3) revolving mainly around those three psychopathological structures. Mélon's relevant reflections should wrap-up the issue, as if they were meant for this man:

Les cas-limites (Borderline)

L'appellation cas-limite est de plus en plus utilisée dans la littérature psychiatrique pour désigner un syndrome complexe qui combine des traits névrotiques (phobies multiples, inquiétude hypocondriaque, symptômes de conversion fruste, obsessions-compulsions), psychotiques (troubles de l'organisation de la pensée, contaminée par les processus primaires, sens faible de la réalité, prépondérance de l'imaginaire, transperence de l'inconscient, idées de référence sensitive), pervers (polymorphisme sexuel), psychopathiques (instabilité, intolérance à la frustration, tendance à l'acting) et caractériels (narcissisme profond), mélangés avec des traits de comportement normal (bonne intégration sociale, réussite professionnelle et parfois même aptitude limitée mais réelle à la sublimation). Les cas limites ont également la somatisation facile, autre signe de leur inaptitude à élaborer les tensions pulsionnelles. A la différence des psychopathes et des pervers, avec lesquels ils ont beaucoup de traits communs, les cas-limites vivent généralement dans un état permanent de tension intérieure et d'angoisse... Le mécanisme de défense utilisé dans ce type de relation est le clivage, au sens où l'entend Mélanie Klein. Le sujet prend l'habitude de cliver les objets en bonnes et mauvaises parts, et son moi, ses affects etc... sont eux-mêmes clivés sur le même modèle. Il en résulte une incapacité d'établir une relation totale, c'est-à-dire génitale, avec un objet total, par impossibilité de surmonter l'ambivalence originelle... [Note how in the Rorschach his only 2 *G B M O+* (pl. III), precisely the resps. called to fill this function of a total-object

²⁰⁴ "En fait cet homme qu'était Adolf Eichmann ne pouvait pas s'opposer efficacement à ses tendances meurtrières morbides. Si les contingences n'avaient pas favorisé leur accomplissement, seule la voie de la perversion sexuelle lui serait restée ouverte. Théoriquement il disposait à l'arrière-plan de mécanismes de contrainte obsessionnelle, dont la force n'eut toutefois jamais suffi à contenir son énorme penchant meurtrier" (p. 59).

relationship, become immediately restricted or 'splitted' by an overmeticulous attention to irrelevant *Dd F(Fb) Cloth.* parts]

Il n'existe pas encore d'étude szondienne sur les cas-limites. Dans notre expérience les cas limites nous sont souvent apparus comme des sujets qui associaient des traits pervers psychopathiques (syndrome de plaisir, perte du centre) avec des indices de surrépression sexuelle (h-!/, s-!/), d'affectivité hystérique (P++, OO, +O, O+, hy-! ou +!) ou d'angoisse sensitive (eO,- hy-!) et surtout un grand polymorphisme du tableau pulsionnel global (alternance rapide de profils névrotiques, voire normaux ou sublimés, psychopathiques et psychotiques, surtout dans le sens paranoïde inflatif (p+!), images du moi en miroir (-+ / +-), index de variabilité et de désorganisation élevés) reflétant l'activité intense du processus de clivage. (1975 pp. 322-3)

Nous ne possédons pas d'exemple de perversion pure. Il est d'ailleurs peu vraisemblable qu'un tel cas existe, la perversion étant toujours associée à quelque chose d'autre: névrose, psychose, sublimation, dépression etc... ce qui confirme sa position centrale, au lieu où se noue le drame humain fondamental, lieu de la révélation de la différence des sexes. Lorsque nous rencontrons un "Szondi pervers", nous avons le plus souvent affaire à un "cas-limite". Les deux cas que nous présentons ici sont typiques à cet égard (Mélon 1975, p. 323). On notera tout particulièrement l'alternance des profils SchO+ et +O, par où se manifeste une sorte de tiraillement entre le Moi Idéal (+O) et l'Idéal du Moi (O+). Nous sommes tenté de voir dans cette alternance la marque spécifique, au niveau du test, de l'état-limite. Notre opinion rejoint, sur ce point, celle de FLOURNOY. Le cas-limite se présente comme un sujet possédé à la fois par un désir de complétude absolue, nourrissant un fantasme de "soi grandiose" (p+) et le projet d'affirmer concrètement sa toute-puissance, le plus souvent par l'exercice d'une sexualité perverse (k+)... (Mélon 1976, pp. 297-8)

It remains to be considered Szondi's interesting theory of the *Alltagsmensch* and its possible relationship with Arendt's one of the "banality of evil". Mélon has been particularly interested in this subject (1975 pp. 121-4, 254-5, 325-9) and is a good source to approach the issue. Making a long story short, we must conclude both theories are identical (with the mandatory precision however that Szondi's theory has a far more sound scientific, theoretical *and* empirical, basis) in the sense that the statistically most common or banal personality type, Szondi's *Sch--* "drill-Ego", is paradoxically also easily capable of leaning towards crime. Deri reflects on it with these words:

Minus *k*, minus *p* is the ego picture of the child whose [originally magical, animistic, fantasizing] ego has been "successfully" broken down by the overwhelming strength of the environment. The picture's first appearance as the most frequent *Sch* configuration, occurs at approximately the age of schooling, and remains the leading configuration, among the sixteen possible variations of the *Sch* vector, through all the age groups. This means that the most frequently used ego-dynamism throughout life, in an unselected population, corresponds to that of the "broken-in" six year old child, who, on

the basis of experience, has discovered that environment is stronger than he, and that the path of least resistance is conformity with whatever the environment expects... This could be called the stage of the *disciplined ego*... The presence of the minus p shows that there is a continuous unconscious projection of needs through action without, however, an awareness of this process; i.e., these children (and adults who yield the same *Sch* picture), acting according to their latent needs, are unaware of underlying sources of motivation and would be convinced that their actions are determined purely by the objective characteristics of their environment. This lack of insight in the underlying motivational sources of action is, indeed, characteristic for the so-called average person, which corresponds nicely with our findings that minus p , minus k is the *Sch* vectorial constellation appearing most frequently in all age groups from six years on... we must assume that the latency period is a point of fixation strongly favored for a great number of adults. Accordingly, a great number of adults must have psychologic characteristics similar to those of children from six to nine years old. I think that the generally accepted stereotype of the "average man" bears out this conclusion. Minus k , minus p -in the clinically symptomless population-is given primarily by those subjects who are extremely realistic, "down to earth" individuals. These are the people for whom "a spade is a spade"; that is, the people by whom the world is perceived and accepted at face value. They are overwhelmed by concrete objects and by reality to such an extent that there is no psychic energy left for introspection. Ego-processes as such are not cathected; the person is occupied with solving what to him seem to be "real" problems, and he often considers preoccupation with one's own needs and psychologic welfare to be a ridiculous waste of time...

Minus k , minus p is also frequent in criminals, particularly in the most violent forms; first of all in murderers... It is worth while to mention an apparent contradiction in the findings that on one hand minus k , minus p is the prototype of the disciplined and conforming ego, while its pathologic significance relates to the most antisocial forms of pathology, in psychoses as well as among the various forms of criminality. The interpretation of these data would imply that the conforming ego has achieved discipline by repressing (minus k) aggressive impulses with no insight into either the impulse or the repression. Thus the dynamic force of these impulses are at the outset inhibited from any open or sublimated discharge (high correlation with plus h and plus s) and thereby kept in latency which-as we know-increases rather than releases the dynamic urgency of the particular need which is forced into this latent position. At the time the dynamic urgency of the repressed need has reached a certain intensity, a sudden and uncontrolled outbreak of the impulses heretofore repressed takes place. For this reason, the more definitely negative the minus k and p factors are, the greater the probability for an uncontrolled antisocial outbreak in the near future becomes. The reason for the fact that antisocial outbreaks-in psychotics and otherwise-in subjects with minus k and minus p appear abruptly and are seriously violent lies in the complete lack of insight into the deeper layers of their *self* in these subjects

(no plus k , and no plus p). Thus there is no way for the nonaccepted needs to be mitigated in their appearance by a previous process of intellectualization and transformation (lack of plus k function). The constellation reveals that the subject has reached no degree of the awareness of his socially dangerous needs which would be required for his mobilization of the most efficient forms of repression... The presence of the minus p in this configuration is a memento that the intensity of the nonaccepted needs has not been really reduced at all; it has merely not been recognized consciously. That is why the loadedness of the minus p in particular determines the seriousness of the possible antisocial outbreak. Criminals who yield this *Sch* configuration belong to that type of individual who for years lives the life of an ordinary and apparently well-conforming citizen, then in a day-to the great surprise of his community-commits a serious crime. For examples of this type one need refer only to the headlines of daily tabloids rather than to textbooks of psychiatry. (1949 pp. 224-31)

On this firm basis Mélon adds then some reflections about normality, adaptation, socialization and sublimation, which are particularly relevant since he makes a specific reference to Eichmann and to the Nazis in general that must be addressed by us:

L'adaptation (Anpassung) est le produit de la renonciation (Verzicht, Entsagung). Le profil du moi qui s'adapte est donné par $Sch--$ qui correspond à la négation (Verneinung - $k-$) de la projection ($p-$).

Qu'est-ce à dire?

Un individu est "adapté", prétend SZONDI (Ich-Analyse 352) lorsqu'il peut renoncer à ses désirs primitifs de fusion avec l'objet et qu'il se persuade que la toute puissance qu'il attribuait à cet objet du fait de l'idéalisation primaire, est inexistante. Il n'y a donc pas lieu de chercher un tel objet dans la réalité, puisque c'est un pur fantasme.

L'adaptation telle qu'elle s'exprime à travers $Sch--$ est corrélative de la dévalorisation de l'objet primaire, de la mort du désir et d'une défantasmatisation généralisée. L'individu adapté a perdu la capacité d'idéaliser.

Aussi sa vie est-elle plate et grise, dominée par l'insatisfaction et le ressentiment. C'est avant tout un individu négateur, au sens de NIETZCHE: il dénigre la vie, il est incapable de dire oui (bejahung) au désir, il dit toujours non, et s'il valorise certaines choses, ce sont les plaisirs grégaires, la table, le sport, l'automobile, ou les valeurs consacrées, l'argent, l'ordre établi.

L'individu adapté participe ($p-$) du groupe, il ne peut vivre en dehors de lui, il est un produit du groupe dont il épouse complètement la mentalité. C'est le Drill-Ich, le moi dressé, sans personnalité autre que celle dont l'habilite l'idéologie dominante.

Si la morale du groupe change, la sienne change aussi. Le bon père de famille devient un tortionnaire modèle. C'était le cas d'EICHMANN et de la plupart des fonctionnaires nazis. Mais c'est aussi le cas de la plupart des hommes. Y a-t-il lieu de s'étonner du "deuil impossible" des peuples (A. et M. MITSCHERLICH,

1972). La majorité des hommes sont incapables d'un vrai travail de deuil, en raison précisément de leur propension à nier et à dévaloriser (k-) les objets. On ne fait le deuil de quelqu'un - ou de soi-même - que si on continue à l'idéaliser, ce dont le Drill-Ich est incapable.

Nous avons vu que le profil de l>Alltagsmensch: ++ -- -- ++ se rencontrait surtout chez les asociaux, plus ou moins psychopathes, les déprimés chroniques (inaptes au travail de deuil) et les psychosomatiques.

Ce fait est très intéressant car ce sont justement des affections qui ont la réputation d'être "des maladies de la civilisation". Ce sont les maladies de "tout le monde", maladies de "l'adaptation"...

Les enquêtes de SZONDI (sur 1000 sujets hongrois) et de SOTO-YARRITU (sur 2.356 Navarrais) ont montré que le profil du Moi dressé était le plus fréquent dans la population générale et que sa fréquence augmentait rapidement avec l'âge (50 % après 70 ans, 32 % entre 20 et 60 ans, 22 % entre 13 et 20 ans)...

SZONDI insiste beaucoup sur le fait que le Drill-Ich, s'il comporte des qualités qui permettent d'en faire le ciment de base des sociétés, recèle aussi de grands dangers, dans la mesure où les sujets qui ont nié tout désir et chez qui cette négation ne se maintient que sous l'effet de la pression du groupe - on peut dire qu'ils n'ont qu'un surmoi social - sont aussi les premiers à laisser la bride sur le cou à leurs besoins jusque là réprimés, lorsque s'écroule l'ordre social qui les soutenait et les contenait.

SZONDI qui a vécu dans sa chair les effets des persécutions nazies sait de quoi il parle. Il a connu ces myriades de citoyens dévoués, fonctionnaires zélés et parfaitement candides d'une formidable machine à tuer.

On voit que les notions de normalité et d'adaptation sont considérées par SZONDI avec une bonne dose de scepticisme.

L'adaptation permet une certaine socialisation des pulsions pour autant que les composantes tendres et agressives de la sexualité soient associées (S++) et que le besoin ne soit pas excessif (absence de !). La présence de e- ou m- est un indice d'asocialité.

L'index social donne généralement une idée juste des capacités d'intégration sociale d'un individu. (1975 pp. 325-9)

...Mais il faut bien considérer que cet homme dit normal ne l'est qu'au plan statistique. Son profil psychologique apparaît au test de Szondi comme le produit d'une organisation répressive (le Drill-Ich de Szondi) plus stérilisante que féconde. A partir de là s'édifie une anthropologie szondienne dont les postulats ne sont pas éloignés de l'affirmation célèbre de l'antipsychiatre anglais Ronald LAING: "Notre état normal n'est qu'un effrayant état d'aliénation!" (op. cit. p. 301)

All that sounds very reasonable and well thought, the only problem is that *Eichmann showed no trace at all of the drill-Ego of the Alltagsmensch (either in the fore- or the background), in the same test with which the concept was given concrete*

*form!*²⁰⁵ In other words, maybe Arendt's theory (or the one of the *Alltagsmensch*, for that matter) is actually right for the majority of Nazis, we have no proof of that since we personally know no particular tested case, but this essentially correct theory was *forcibly made to fit* in Eichmann's case which doesn't support it at all and that is the specific part of the issue we challenge.

In 1996 we were part of the panel on Nazism at the Boston International Rorschach Congress, sharing the podium with most of the authors of the Zillmer et al.'s 1995 book and thus playing the role of the "maverick". At the conclusion of the session we were publicly pointed at, concerning Eichmann's case, as if disregarding scientific methodology we specifically "made him out to be" more of a pathological case than he really was. We must make clear here we became interested in this one case almost by accident: our European formation but American residence put us in a favorable position to become aware of the mutually isolated and at the same time partial data on the case discussed at both sides of the Atlantic, and we thought an integrating case-study research would be a useful contribution. Being of Latin-American origin and too young to have known the 2nd world war (we were born almost at the time Eichmann was captured in Argentina) neither we personally nor any member of our family had suffered directly the harmful effects of Nazism or the war, so there was hardly any hidden political agenda from our side. Being however aware of the subtle unconscious workings of a still possible bias, we willfully decided for our Rorschach interpretation to stick to the literature and particularly to Bohm's rules in a very stringent way: as a scientific precaution, when scoring the protocol we concentrated on a detailed, narrow-focus analysis of each response separately (not the best clinical method) avoiding as much as possible a synthetic overall view or even an interconnection between some of the separate data until the end, with the result that we were ourselves honestly amazed at the finally resulting truly close correspondence between the respective Rorschach, Szondi, and clinical syndroms (Bohm's schizoid constellation -which I had never used before-, the maximal F+%, the castration-pervert conflict, the important change in quality towards the end of the record, all that took shape of its own will as it were). Szondi's blind analysis by its very nature remained anyway entirely bias-proof²⁰⁶. Arendt on the other hand, and is well known, was not only a Jewish scholar but the former lover of her professor the famous German philosopher Martin Heidegger, a convinced Nazi supporter at his time: so she did have strong personal reasons both to believe one could find seeds of Nazism in almost anyone around us and to justify some particular case of Nazi adhesion on grounds of "banality". It is a scientific truth that she distorted the facts concerning *Eichmann in particular* (cf. the scathing and well-documented rebuttal by Robinson:

²⁰⁵ We were very surprised by the obviously erroneous (according to the test data) reference to Eichmann as an 'adapted' individual by Mélon, an excellent Szondian. In 1975 he must have been under the influence of Arendt's Eichmann-based theory of "the banality of evil", but after 1983 when he came into possession of the Szondi Test data he could not have maintained that opinion anymore.

²⁰⁶ In this sense we would be very interested in hearing, among all the authors of Zillmer et al.'s book (1995), the reaction of Molly Harrower in particular to these data as compared with the Rorschach: since, in contrast to her colleagues, she was a proficient Szondi practitioner and regularly used both in calculating "mental health potential" (#).

1965). And to those who hastily stick to her unscientific view -clearly written with an agenda- of *this man's personality* as "banal" that does not hold up to a serious psychological analysis, rejecting anyway from their side any psychopathological diagnosis (Zillmer et al. 1995, p. 9), we would remind the following: when Eichmann distinguished himself during his military training in 1933-34 by showing "rather dubious pleasures" in bodily punishment drill (Arendt herself: 1963 p. 31), or when referring to the years 1938-45 he declared spontaneously that "I always acted 100%, and in the giving of orders I certainly was not lukewarm" (cf. # above), or when facing the anonymous Szondi pictures in 1961 he always picked out with particular insistence precisely the one of the sadistic murderer (Hausner 1962, p. 20; cf. # above), those are hard historical *facts* pointing in the same direction that must be accounted for, and that is precisely what we have done with this projective case study.

3. The TAT

After our presentation of this case in Boston 1996 contacts were initiated with Dr. Rick Kramer from Chicago who was particularly interested in it, and who would prove very helpful in the subsequent development of this research. During our initial investigations we had been able to locate Michael Selzer (the person who succeeded in obtaining from an aging Kulcsár all the original material on Eichmann: cf. Chronology above) who had told us that he confided everything to the Library of Congress in Washington, an information seemingly nobody knew. This hint we passed on to Kramer who at his turn convinced one of his students, Sandy Krohn, to go get the material directly from the Library. That is how we came into possession, among still other material, of a very interesting and never published TAT protocol. A plan was made to make an inaugural presentation of it at the Barcelona 2005 XVIIIth International Rorschach-Projectives Congress, and to obtain for that occasion blind interpretations of the protocol from leading figures on this test. Through Prof. Jean-Marie Barthélémy from the Université de Savoie (since our name could be associated with our 1999 Rorschachiana article, and for whose graceful intervention we thank him) we asked and obtained from the renowned Prof. Catherine Chabert²⁰⁷ of Paris the agreement to participate in this experience. All precautions were taken to keep the identity of the subject anonymous (even the references to "Argentina" were disguised), so the results would remain unquestionable concerning the Nazi-bias issue - just as in Szondi's case above. Below is the translation we made of the original German TAT protocol (taking some hints from Kulcsar et al. 1967), and following it Chabert's interpretation verbatim.

T.A.T. of Adolf Otto EICHMANN (54), Jan.-Feb. 1961

1. The father's violin. The son cannot play the violin yet, but dreams about being able to play some day as beautifully as the father. The facial expression is like lost in his dreams, the relaxed facial features tell me that. (Will he succeed?) I

²⁰⁷ Contact was also made with the venerable Prof. Roy Schafer from New York, but he declined to participate.

- don't think so, for he seems too lost in his dreams. Artist natures are often hard to judge.
2. That's a farmer family, their parents are either dead or old. A relatively strong man. It's a young couple, and the sister, the pregnant woman, is the farmer's wife, the other is a teacher, seemingly on her way to school. The other has bodily troubles. (What will hap-pen?) The teacher will get married, follow her profession or give up this profession.
 - 3BM. A desperate, dejected young girl, that has just learned that the father of her unborn child has broken up with her.
 - 6BM. A mother with her son. The son is oppressed, troubled, he makes a confession to the mother. The mother is thoughtful, grief-stricken, it must be a very dark communication, it might be a mistake or a complete commercial bankruptcy out of his own fault.
 - 7BM. Father and son. Morally inferior [i.e. the son]. Vicious... (long pause) ... vicious... The facial expression of the father... cunning... he talks over, with the son, a dark matter... drugs... smuggling... The son gives the impression of an addict to me. The expression of the son tells us that he is not at all resolute. (What will happen?) The attitude of the son's mouth tends to brutality. I think he will accept the father's offer. The mouth, the lips tell me, that he is capable of doing so.
 - 8BM. (Long pause) ... (turns the picture around and around, contemplates it for a long while) ... That's... a rifle?... I cannot begin anything with it. A dream image?... This young man in the foreground... he thinks... this scene... but what is this?... Is this an operation? But it's not!... Oh, it could perhaps be a hunting accident, but then it's very badly drawn. It's the first where I... where I... everything I think contradicts itself. I can't imagine what this thing may be (pushes the card back; he stammered and a storm of tics distorted his face).
 - 9BM. South America, a ranch, where half-castes rest from tractor work, having thrown them-selves in the grass. They doze off and wait until the time comes to climb back on the tractors. The sun shines, since they cover their eyes with the sombreros. The sun cannot be high, I see no shadows, perhaps a bad drawing.
 11. (He turns the card around). Is it right this way? (Yes). It could happen in Argentina - a road covered with rocks, where once was located an aqueduct, where in the slide a small entry door became opened, where the indians have retreated because of the conquista-dors. It is romantic. An antediluvian animal, but there are no such things in nature. Said on the spur of the moment: on a high mountain where I have been, if it were drawn in Europe the people would say there's no such thing.

- 12M. Those are two young fellows that play the hypnotist. The hand appearance is rather bony, it is probably an older person - a hypnotist, who hypnotizes a young fellow. The facial expression is like droll - they are two young fellows after all. I have never been hypno-tized yet, but he should be tense.
- 13.²⁰⁸ Nothing... it's empty, cosmos, celestial vault. Some constellations, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,9, 10... 13... 16... different planets are visible in the infinity of space.
- 13MF. Yes... that's also something I don't understand. A young woman - judging by the breasts it should be a young girl, after sexual intercourse because of the still and relaxed attitude. Unclear is the posture of the man, who's dressed and covers his eyes. As if he were ashamed of himself. That doesn't fit how I represent myself things, in cases when I have been together with a woman that I love... The posture of the man is not in accord, that cannot seem to be in a normal way. (What's the story?) It's abnormal and I can find no explanation.
15. Front cover of a book with the title: All Soul's Day.
- 18GF. ... A love scene, between a young seaman and a girl. On the ground floor, at the end of the stairs that lead to the first floor. The girl doesn't resist, but the left hand of the sailor is either badly drawn or crippled. He belongs to the merchant navy, since he wears no uni-form. The girl seems to be from eastern Asia, according to the profile.
- 18BM. Also an unrealistic picture. The hands don't match. Completely disorganized and sense-less. Even the coat is unnatural. The right hand doesn't fit anatomically. The hands... are not those of a woman or a servant, they're too gross, unprofessional. It's misdrawn on purpose.
20. ... (Pause). Under a cotton stand, the cotton is about to become ripe, in the early morning. A person prepared to carry on some task.

We will not make in this context a personal interpretation of this record, that task will be left to Prof. Chabert, but we want to point nevertheless to several peculiar characteristics of these responses worth of an eventual in-depth consideration. Note how the subject makes vain efforts at proposing a purely "objective" interpretation of the pictures by reference to small details of them to which he pays an obsessive attention (often having to do with body parts of the characters: facial features, mouth, hands, breasts, clothing...), arriving however to highly idiosyncratic inductions. Other features of his performance also directly remind the Rorschach: the recurrent criticisms ("badly drawn"), other equally obsessive

²⁰⁸ Before the 3rd and definitive edition of the TAT (1942) there were a number of images originally included but then discarded: this must be one of them.

characteristics (the pathetic choosing and undoing in pl. 12M, the compulsive counting in pl. 13...), the references to Argentina and South America, etc. Something new but that should not be overlooked is the racial comment "half-castes" in pl. 9BM, given the Nazis attitude in this sense. The reaction to some singular plates is particularly interesting (the criminal depiction of the father figure in pl. 7BM, the severe shock in pl. 8BM, the perceptual distortion in pl. 18GF) and will be addressed later on. All in all, this is obviously far from a "rather banal, commonplace protocol". Chabert sent us the following interpretation:

Proposition d'éléments d'interprétation du protocole de TAT. Homme, 54 ans.

Traduction vraisemblablement maladroite en maints endroits.

Usage de planches sans qu'un contenu latent en ait été préalablement dégagé (9BM, 12M, 15, 18GF, 18BM, 20).

Protocole qui donne une impression d'ensemble étrange du fait de la qualité hétérogène du discours, au vocabulaire parfois choisi (« oppressé », « animal antédiluvien ») mais à la syntaxe souvent maladroite.

Diversité d'usage des procédés d'élaboration du discours, sans que l'alliance de ces divers procédés ne soutienne de façon durable la mise en histoire correcte au plan de la secondarisation.

On peut notamment observer une convocation fréquente des procédés rigides (A1, A3-1, voire A2), sans que leur poids économique soit fort, ni leur qualité de dégagement opérante. A plusieurs reprises (1, 7BM, 11, 13MF), les procédés rigides s'avèrent inefficaces pour contenir la désorganisation engagée par le contenu latent. L'appui sur le percept (CL1) prend sinon souvent le relais de l'investissement esquissé de la réalité interne. De même, les procédés narcissiques ne s'avèrent pas des paliers d'aménagement défensif trophiques. L'accent porté sur l'éprouvé subjectif (à défaut de pouvoir vraiment porter l'accent sur un conflit de facture intra-personnelle), les références personnelles, les mises en tableau et l'attention parfois portée aux qualités sensorielles du matériel n'empêchent pas le dérapage de la logique interprétative et de la rigueur syntaxique engagé du fait des sollicitations pulsionnelles (1, 2, 13MF).

Conjointement, les procédés d'inhibition (essentiellement les pauses intrarécits et quelques latences introductives) rendent compte de façon ponctuelle à certaines planches (7BM, 8BM) du grand malaise de traitement de la sollicitation dont le sujet a beaucoup de mal à se dégager.

Cet aspect du protocole apparaît de fait très en contraste avec une mobilisation notable des procédés labiles témoignant d'investissements de la relation et de capacités nettes de dramatisation. S'il faut reconnaître à ces procédés une valeur positive de possible mise en avant de l'investissement de l'objet, de possibilités d'expression d'affects parfois forts, on ne doit pas négliger leur tendance nette à céder la place à des procédés trahissant l'émergence des processus primaires, procédés également variés, touchant tant l'altération de la perception (12M, 18GF, 18BM, 20) que la désorganisation des repères identitaires et objectaux, de

la logique interprétative (1, 2, 7BM, 11, 18BM, 20) et aussi l'altération des processus de pensée (plutôt E4-2 que E4-1, sauf si le patient est francophone).

Les problématiques qui semblent pouvoir être dégagées de ce protocole dévoilent plusieurs niveaux de fonctionnement :

- **une façade adaptative et névrotique**, avec reconnaissance possible de l'immaturation fonctionnelle, du désir de l'objet, de l'investissement identificatoire des figures parentales sur un mode qui peut être positivement idéalisé (1) et surmoïque (6BM), possible lien entre affect de tristesse et représentation de perte d'objet (3BM)

- **une fragilité très nette de la permanence et de la solidité de la facture intra-psychique du conflit (1, 2, 7BM, 8BM)**. A plusieurs reprises, le protocole trahit une fragilité des limites sujet/objet très nette dans le traitement pulsionnel et le traitement de la perte. Les émergences en processus primaires prennent alors la relève des procédés labiles, rigides ou narcissiques, et trahissent le difficile appui sur une figure identificatoire ou d'étayage clairement différenciée (sauf en 6BM, où le déplacement apparaît opérant et dégageant mais n'empêche pas le recours à l'inhibition).

- **Le texte apparaît empreint de recours au clivage qui permet, au sein de ce protocole, la cohabitation de conduites psychiques et de problématiques fort hétérogènes**, ne participant pas d'un conflit intra-psychique. Le défaut d'intégration surmoïque de la figure paternelle apparaît conjointement à la fragile différenciation sujet/objet et à l'impossible traitement de la perte (2, 7BM).

- **La succession des récits donne l'impression, au fil du protocole, d'un épuisement de la mobilisation des défenses névrotiques repérables de prime abord, néanmoins déjà fragiles**. Les dernières planches, pour lesquelles nous n'avons pas de contenu latent rigoureusement dégagé, trahissent une fragilité identitaire vraisemblable, avec représentations d'atteintes corporelles et fausses perceptions (18GF, 18BM, 20).

Au vu de ce protocole de TAT, il semble possible de proposer l'hypothèse d'un fonctionnement psychique de type limite. (C. Chabert, personal communication, Dec. 14 2004; boldface added)

Prof. Chabert's amazingly accurate interpretation hardly calls for any comment, given our former detailed interpretation of the Rorschach and Szondi Tests: the obsessive procedures and/or anxious-labile dramatizations however just as a neurotic-adaptive façade, the fragility of defenses and the primary process breakthrough, the recourse to splitting and the subsequent presence of quite heterogeneous problematics, the exhaustion of defenses towards the end and the final borderline diagnosis, there couldn't have been a more perfect fitting. Since she offered to add nevertheless further complementary interpretations if needed, we took advantage of the opportunity but time and responsibilities before the Barcelona congress prevented

any in-depth elaboration; she did add however a few comments not without their intrinsic interest:

[Le 28 juin 2005:] J'ai besoin de précisions concernant ma contribution au cas aveugle: participerai-je "officiellement" à cette séance? Pour le complément TAT, je pense qu'il y a des mécanismes de clivage du Moi évoquant des éléments sinon une organisation perverse de la personnalité. J'aurais besoin, si je dois intervenir, des données du Rorschach car, comme vous le savez sans doute je travaille toujours avec les deux épreuves. En revanche, dans un premier temps, je préfère ne pas disposer des données anamnétiques.

[Le 10 juillet 2005:] J'ai bien reçu le Rorschach que je trouve passionnant; je n'en ai fait qu'une lecture rapide mais, à première vue, le fonctionnement narcissique est absolument prédominant, les éléments névrotiques fragiles signalés au TAT disparaissent, la froideur affective, le mépris et la dérision concernant les représentations humaines sont frappants. Les mécanismes de clivage sont puissants et l'absence d'angoisse même minime évoque pour moi des éléments pervers peut-être structurels? J'ai le sentiment, toujours après une première lecture, que des possibilités de déstabilisation des défenses narcissiques très solides qui soutiennent des capacités d'élaboration au niveau intellectuel très remarquables, sont susceptibles d'être analysées plus finalement à partir de la planche VII et surtout des planches pastelles. Pour l'instant, je ne vois pas de désaccord entre le RSH et le TAT mais j'ai "oublié" le TAT pour lire le RSH. Je vais me remettre à une analyse plus approfondie que je vous adresserai au cours de cette semaine. (C. Chabert, personal communication; pressing time however made things stay there)

We from our side will choose one isolated example, the severe shock facing pl. 8BM, to make not only a specific and detailed connection with our earlier Rorschach - and Szondi- interpretation (cf. pp. #35-6 above, reference to Binswanger while approaching the pl. IX asymmetry) but a genetic reconstruction of the main aspect of this subject's dynamics. Kulcsar's first-hand reporting should be a good starting point...

The Aspect of Emotions, Instincts, Defenses

E[ichmann].s emotional atmosphere is perhaps best characterized by his embarrassed reaction to card 8BM of the TAT, which usually provokes reactions connected with aggressiveness... The unusually intensive startle reaction and also the overall failure point to the shock provoked by the picture. He became confused, stammered and a **storm of tics distorted his face**. He reacted, not always to the same degree but in similar manner and significance, wherever he sensed even a hint of aggression. At times, when the provocation seemed less intensive, he annulled and misinterpreted the presented situation, omitting the conflict-ridden details and turning them into their contrary [cf. perceptual distortion in 18GF]. In his narrations during the clinical interview he denied aggressive feelings, repeating the stereotypes known from the trial: "I never killed anyone, nor did I give an order to anyone to do so..." It was extremely difficult here to differentiate between the defense of a defendant faced with his trial, and **those deeper defenses within an individual horrified at his own**

murderous impulses. Later, in discussion with the Attorney-General the subject arose about this reaction of horror. The Attorney-General, in keeping with his position, did not believe in the defendant's sincerity. The psychiatrist held the opinion that even in most extreme phenomena we were still dealing with a human being, made up of contradictions, conflicts, hopes and fears. At one occasion we were particularly inclined to believe him. He spoke of his experience when he first witnessed the execution of civilian population, women and children, saying: "I felt that I sink to the ground." We are convinced that this was a reaction similar and analogous to that after looking at card 8BM of the TAT..

The manifest inhibition of his antisocial drives and the conflictual tension resulting from this antagonism is brought into relief by the answer to 7BM of the TAT [we agree, but Kulcsar should have more strongly stressed the disqualification of the father figure, model for the Super-Ego, by turning him into a criminal perverter: cf. card interpretation above]... The aggression, as well as the sexuality appear in the course of the examinations interwoven within the texture of the defenses constructed against them and one has to dig up and reconstruct them from the later ones... (Kulcsar et al. 1967, pp. 29-32; boldface added)

The connection to the Rorschach comes through the severely "distorted face" of the subject in front of card 8BM, a matter directly touched on by Binswanger (cf. pp. #1166-8 above) in his article on symmetry²⁰⁹: we may thus equate this TAT reaction with the most pathological one facing Rorschach's pl. IX. To paraphrase Binswanger with the purpose of understanding Eichmann's behavior:

...Lorsqu'un malade affligé d'une paralysie faciale [un tic], un portrait de Picasso et, surtout, un masque ou une caricature "asymétrique" nous semblent *grotesques*, nous effrayant ou nous inquiétant, ce n'est pas parce qu'ici nous voyons un principe esthétique lésé ou bien, come chez Picasso, que nous croyons le voir lésé - ce qui ne nous effrayerait pas - mais parce que, bâtis symétriquement comme nous le sommes, nous *sentons* lésé un principe vital, un principe de création vivante... Dans la *déformation* réelle ou supposée, donc contraire à la symétrie, nous pensons percevoir quelque chose d'étranger, d'hostile à la vie, de destructeur de la vie, ce qui signifie: la proximité de la mort. D'autre part, lorsque, dans le test de Rorschach, de nombreux malades schizophrènes, névrotiques ou dépressifs se "cramponnent" de façon surprenante à la symétrie, disant: "Je suis tout le temps frappé par la symétrie!" ils se cramponnent aussi à la *vie* [conduite contraire à celle de Eichmann]. Cela exige d'être examiné plus en détail.

La symétrie dans le test de Rorschach joue des rôles très différents... Déjà, les interprétations d' "images en miroir" [laquelle il se révéla être incapable de produire à la pl. II], où la symétrie est un élément de construction expressif

²⁰⁹ Hausner (1962) includes in his article a number of interesting snapshots of Eichmann in different poses, including one in which his uncontrollable tic twists his mouth to the side accompanied below by this caption: "His twitch made him look grotesque" (p. 22); exactly the same expression used by Binswanger referring to asymmetric faces!

"conscient" de l'interprétation, sont quelque peu "en deçà de la vie", "en reflet", comme nous le disions plus haut, le fait d'insister sur la symétrie est encore plus en retrait de la vie, voire même étranger à la vie. Au moins, dans la schizophrénie, comme nous avons pu le montrer dans le cas Jürg Zünd, la symétrie peut être, en fait, la dernière bouée de sauvetage à laquelle la présence [*Dasein*] se raccroche et grâce à laquelle elle essaye de ne pas sombrer dans le chaos. La symétrie est alors le dernier et unique principe d'ordre du "monde" et, ainsi, l'ultime tentative, le "dernier effort", comme dit Jürg Zünd, de se conserver à *soi-même* [Eichmann, au contraire, renonça à cette tentative pour sombrer volontairement dans le chaos]...

...Ce n'est que sur le terrain de l'argumentation de Pascal qu'il devient compréhensible pourquoi justement la symétrie distordue d'un propre corps, d'une propre âme doit conduire à une surcompensation de la symétrie, à une accentuation prononcée de la symétrie. La symétrie, l'harmonie²¹⁰ ou la proportion est si profondément ancrée dans l'organisation et le sentiment vital de l'homme que son altération, soit dans la sphère physique, soit dans la sphère psychique et spirituelle ou dans toutes les sphères à la fois, est ressentie comme une *menace* et, en ce sens, comme une proximité de la mort. [Dans une note en bas:] Hermann Rorschach a fait à ce propos la démonstration de son génie visionnaire en choisissant pour ses "formes fortuites" des images symétriques et cela en prenant en considération la réalisation de certaines conditions de la rythmique spatiale et l'expérience que des images asymétriques sont souvent *refusées*... Pour Simmel [tout comme pour Rorschach], la symétrie c'est le "commencement du façonnement de la matière. Afin de porter dans les choses idée, sens et harmonie, il faut avant tout les façonner de façon symétrique, égaliser entre elles les parties du tout, les ordonner symétriquement autour d'un centre médian. Ainsi la puissance créatrice de l'homme est matérialisée, face au hasard et au chaos de la simple création de la nature, de la façon la plus rapide, visible et directe. Répétons-le: la symétrie est la preuve première de la force du rationalisme, grâce à laquelle il nous libère de l'absurdité des choses et de leur simple acceptation." (1947/1971, pp. 231-4)

Eichmann then explicitly took a decidedly opposing stand against this life, this creative principle -so well applied by Rorschach to his test material- expressing in this way his total identification with the side of *Thanatos*. Binswanger even gave us a hint of its cause ("les cas de *refus* de la symétrie... Pour de tels sujets, les taches ne sont pas trop peu, mais bien trop préformées. Dans ce refus de la symétrie, il peut s'agir d'un refus de toute contrainte qui, de son côté, peut avoir à nouveau les causes les plus diverses") which, in our opinion, can be clearly deduced from Kulcsar's (et al. 1967) clinical data: the strong latent rejection of the father's overly strict upbringing...

Early memories centered around the person of his father. This emerged spontaneously since no leading questions were posed by the examiner. In his

²¹⁰ It is interesting to note that plate IX was designated by Rorschach (1921# chap. III.1), in contrast to VIII, as "unharmonious in color and form". This lack of harmony must have also triggered the lack of symmetry.

speech, conventional clichés kept recurring, and the obligatory respect towards one's parents was one of these. Yet, the father was mostly spoken of in a negative fashion. According to his son's characterization, the father, director of the local tramway company, was a strict, perfectionist person who had brought up his children supervising them with compulsive scrutiny. He reviewed and inspected their personal cleanliness, and their clothes, their desks and their school work, and their behavior and manners. Children, unless they were asked a question, were not allowed to speak at mealtimes. They were frequently scolded and nagged by their father, who readily let them have a box on the ear. In his autobiography, however, E[ichmann]. contradicts this characterization and writes that the father educated only him in this fashion, and was more indulgent towards his other children... Yet behind this facade of revolt and repulsion, feelings of reverence emerged, at times bordering on adoration... [pp. 21-2]

The subjective world in which E. lived was inhuman, biological at best, and fundamentally mechanical... This mechanical state of things is ruled by an impersonal, mechanical God... [substitute of his father, whom may very well have uttered the words:] "The order of the world is unchangeable..." Through this [fatalistic] philosophy he tried to explain that he himself could not do anything about his situation. It was unconceivable to change the course of events [which he was forced to endure in a passive-masochistic way]... The main principle of this mechanical existence is that of order [symmetry]. All things have their own place, in society as on the shelf. The highest degree of order is manifested in the Reich. "The Reich, not only in the pragmatic but in the ideal sense... the steady, the conforming, the undisrupted, the reliable. Internal peace, internal security. *The opposite of all that I felt in myself.* After the defeat, the place of order was occupied by a feeling of disruption." [pp. 25-6]

For the psychiatrist, the challenging question arose, why E. had made such a point of displaying his love of order and why he had to emphasize and stress this quality. "The punctuality came from the home. My father insisted on it. I got my sense of order from my father. Disorder was the source of all bad humor. In the end I became a slave of orderliness. If a book is put on the table in the oblique direction, I have to correct that... Disorder makes me uneasy. Order gives pleasure also."

At first sight it seemed that obsession was a basic defense mechanism with E. Nevertheless and strangely enough, the Rorschach does not confirm this supposition, even though it is a sensitive indicator of obsessive traits [we almost entirely disagree on this point, except for the absence of precisely symmetry remarks which are a typical Szondi *e+* reaction (Schafer 1948 p. 28 #10, Deri 1949 p. 89, Salomon 1962 p. 183)]. The punctuality appears more as a learned behavior, an outcome of training rather than an obsession. The interview lent further support to this supposition. Speaking about order, he added as an afterthought: "In the landscape I dislike order. I also do not like regular streets. I prefer the old cities of Europe, where everything is discomposed, unsettled. *Nature should be unconstrained.*" [By contrast, or in

opposition to his father] He relinquished orderliness in his children's training. He thought they would be happier with freedom. This was the only instance when-speaking of his family-he expressed feelings of tenderness. With a smile of satisfaction he related that his three big boys are *Schlendrian* (idlers)...

Actually, one of the most difficult psychological problems was that of his activity versus passivity [Szondi: s_{\pm} !]. For his defense in court, E. tried to appear as someone who only executed commands... A passive acceptance of orders is.. not corroborated by his life history. He had been carelessly negligent although his father had insisted on orderliness. He did not like to learn, while his father stressed the need for good scholarship. He skipped school, went tramping. He had interrupted his studies. His conservative father disapproved of his joining the Nazi Party. In any case he was not the model child he would have liked to appear during the trial...

The central conflict of his personality revolves about his ambivalent relation to his father. He sees him strong and successful, but feels him to be distant, demanding and hostile. He wants to overtake him and identify himself with him, but feels himself not gifted in comparison with the father and so unable to fulfill this wish. Therefore he capitulates to his demands, gives up his male identity and becomes passive. He feels himself to be weak and undecided in spite of his brutality and the unattainable ideal father-figure becomes an aggressive enemy from which he wants to flee and find a remote shelter... [pp. 32-5]

The impulses that break through from the deepest layers of the personality threaten the more recently developed structures of higher order. The id, the collective unconscious, in a certain balance of forces, temporarily annihilates the ego. This danger is a "peril of the soul" tantamount to the loss of life itself but perhaps more to be feared... Dissolution beckons and threatens as the abyss and the vortex do. It causes a vertiginous dizziness, the vertigo of existential anxiety, the fear of getting lost without leaving a trace... E. lived in the throes of existential fear. He feared the forces that presided in him, because he felt he was unable to dominate them... This was the fear that erupted with annihilating power at the sight of aggression-provoking imagery, at the sight of executions and possibly whenever he established human contact. It may be easier to understand if we compare it with the anxiety of the latent homosexual when exposed to real homosexual seduction. Frequently, this homosexual trauma triggers an acute psychotic reaction. But the existential fear is far stronger than this. It does not only threaten a part of the personality, but (it threatens) the whole ego-regardless of whether the passions that flood it are morally right or wrong... From the time that he was confronted with his instincts and his prohibitions, E.'s life history became an incessant striving to live out his drives at the least price of anxiety. For this, the period and society in which he lived afforded a unique and extraordinary opportunity... (pp. 41-2)

In our -and Szondi's- interpretation, and despite Kulcsar's (pp. 42-3) diminishing of this factor, according to this life history Eichmann was obviously dominated by a strong Cain complex (Vergote 199#, 1971 cf. p. 452: "...il lui faut en outre [à la conscience]

une image paternelle positive. Sans elle la loi reste une instance agressive externe, un surmoi destructeur contre lequel le sujet se hérissera sans cesse, si bien qu'il s'épuiserait en conflits au lieu d'orienter ses forces vers l'avenir") generated by the strict regime suffered under his authority, and the main horror-provoking -given his ambivalence- murderous unconscious drive was the desire to kill his father, or all the others, or even God for not loving him with preference. All the above quoted data, not to mention our interpretation of the specifically mentioned test data, points in that direction. As Szondi concludes, Eichmann adopted from him by identification the obsessive defenses but at more decisive moments (Rorschach's pl. IX, TAT's card 8BM) he violently rejected all this order, symmetry, and forced politeness to voluntarily give free reign to chaos or *Thanatos*.

4. The Bender-Gestalt

By one of those enigmatic twists of fate this well established test is extensively used both in North and Latin America, however in the European continent in general it is relatively little known. Created in 1938 by Laretta Bender defining it as a 'visual motor Gestalt test', this instrument has generated diverse methods of interpretation, both "objective" (psychometric) and "projective". The most frequently used one with adults in the U.S.A. is the Pascal & Suttell (1951) scoring, but in our opinion the most complete and clinically sensitive one is the original method of Hutt (1960/77). Be it as it may, the fact is that Kulcsár knew about this instrument and decided to apply it to our subject: size-reduced copies of Eichmann's B-G reproductions are presented below in Figures #-A&B. In this context we will use it just to confirm interpretive conclusions already established in the previously analyzed tests.





Figure 6-A. Figures A to 4 of Eichmann's Bender-Gestalt.






Figure 6-B. Figures 5 to 8 of Eichmann's Bender-Gestalt.

The photocopies are not perfect and one cannot get a clear view of certain features, for example the guidelines always drawn by the subject to assist his execution. Sandy Krohn, who held the originals in his hand at the Library of Congress, reacted to them in this way: "I went to the Library of Congress yesterday and made copies of Eichmann's tests. I must say that it was an amazing feeling holding the original tests in my hands. If anyone is around the [Washington] D.C. area, I highly recommend going in to take a look at them. I do not think the copies that I made do justice to how incredible Eichmann's Bender was. On almost every drawing he first put down lines to dictate where he was going to draw. You really got a sense of his extreme rigidity" (personal communication, April 3 2004). Figure # contains a reproduction of the Pascal & Suttell scoring. This purely quantitative method is not very informative since it just concludes in a numerical score: 35 (raw score) which according to their statistical treatment is equivalent to a Z score of 68 (standard score). In their textbook one can find this assertion: "We may look at cutoff scores in

terms of theoretical probabilities based on the normal curve. If, for instance, a subject receives a Z score of 67 the chances are 5 in 100 that he will be normal" (1951, p. 35); an objective assessment makes thus quite improbable Eichmann's "banality".

Date

SCORE SHEET—BEYBEE-GESTALT TEST

Name Adolf Otto EICHMANN Age 57 Sex M

Education I.Q. Diagnosis

DESIGN 1	DESIGN 4	DESIGN 7
1. Wavy line (2)	1. Arch. Cox. (3)	1. Ends on join. (8)
2. Dot, dash, cir. (3) <u>3</u>	2. Break circ. (4)	2. Angles on (3)
3. Dashes (2)	3. Cr. not center. (2)	3. Angles min. (3)
4. Circles (8)	4. Circle (4)	4. Ext. war. (3)
5. No. dots (5) each	5. No. joined (8)	5. Dbl. line (3 ea.) <u>1</u>
6. Dbl. line (6)	6. Cr. radius (3)	6. Tumor (4)
7. Workover (2)	7. Touch-up (4)	7. Discontin. (3 ea.)
8. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)	8. Tremor (4)	8. Guide lines (2) <u>2</u>
9. Rotation (6)	9. Discontin. (4)	9. Sec. attempt (3 ea.) <u>3</u>
10. Des. min. (8)	10. Guide lines (2) <u>2</u>	10. Rotation (4)
Design Total <u>3</u>	11. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)	11. Des. min. (8)
	12. Rotation (6)	Design Total <u>6</u>
	13. Des. min. (8)	
	Design Total <u>2</u>	


DESIGN 8	DESIGN 5	DESIGN 6
1. Wavy line (2)	1. Asymmetry (5)	1. Ends on join. (8)
2. Dash or dot (2)	2. Dot, dash, cir. (3)	2. Angles on (3)
3. Shape cir. (3) <u>3</u>	3. Dashes (2)	3. Angles min. (3)
4. Cir. min. ext. (2)	4. Circles (8)	4. Ext. war. (3)
5. Cir. work. (2)	5. Ext. join. dot (2)	5. Dbl. line (1 ea.) <u>2</u>
6. Des. start (2)	6. Ext. radius (2)	6. Tumor (4)
7. No. end. (2 ea.)	7. No. dots (2)	7. Discontin. (3 ea.)
8. Fig. on 2 lines (6)	8. Discontin. (4)	8. Guide lines (2) <u>2</u>
9. Guide lines (2) <u>2</u>	9. Guide lines (2) <u>2</u>	9. Workover (2)
10. Workover (2) <u>2</u>	10. Workover (2)	10. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)
11. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)	11. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)	11. Rotation (4)
12. Rotation (6)	12. Rotation (6)	12. Des. min. (8)
13. Des. min. (8)	13. Des. min. (8)	Design Total <u>4</u>
Design Total <u>4</u>	Design Total <u>2</u>	

DESIGN 3	DESIGN 6	CONFIG. DESIGN
1. Asymmetry (3)	1. Asymmetry (3) <u>3</u>	1. Place Des. A. (2)
2. Dot, dash, cir. (3)	2. Angles (2)	2. Overlap (2 ea.)
3. Dashes (2)	3. Pt. crossing (2 ea.)	3. Coincidence (2)
4. Circles (3)	4. Cr. min. (8)	4. Lines & ext. (2)
5. No. dots (2)	5. Dbl. line (1 ea.)	5. Order (2)
6. Extra row (4)	6. Touch-up (8)	6. No. sides (8)
7. Missing (4)	7. Tremor (4)	7. Ext. war. (8)
8. Discontin. (4)	8. Discontin. (4)	Total <u>0</u>
9. Guide lines (3) <u>2</u>	9. Guide lines (2) <u>2</u>	
10. Workover (2) <u>2</u>	10. Workover (2) <u>2</u>	DESIGN TOTALS
11. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)	11. Sec. attempt (2 ea.)	1. <u>3</u> 5. <u>2</u>
12. Rotation (4)	12. Rotation (6)	2. <u>7</u> 6. <u>7</u>
13. Des. min. (8)	13. Des. min. (8)	3. <u>4</u> 7. <u>6</u>
Design Total <u>4</u>	Design Total <u>9</u>	4. <u>1</u> 8. <u>4</u>
		9. <u>0</u>

Total Raw Score 35

Standard Score 68

Figure 7. The Pascal & Suttell score sheet for Eichmann's Bender-Gestalt.



The quite different Hutt method (1960/77) also confirms this general finding (cf. Table # below): the Psychopathology Score was 61.25, from the point of view of

severity close to the mean for "inpatient neurotics" (61.70) who "were hospitalized for a variety of neurotic syndromes, mostly severe anxiety or depression", for the rest nearly doubling the mean for "normals" (32.80) in any case more than 5 -almost 6- standard deviations (4.90) above the latter mean (pp. 153-4). Let us review the factors more strongly present in Eichmann's performance. Under the heading ORGANIZATION factors 3 (abnormal Use of Space, I: both excessively expansive and constricted, alternatively), 4 (Use of Space, II: expanded reproductions of all 9 figures) and 7 (Shift in the Position of the Paper for all figures) all have an extremely high incidence. Factor 3 (together with the Fig. 2 progressive and regressive shifts in angulation) fits perfectly with the Szondi outstanding s_{\pm} : ambivalent interpersonal adaptive behavior, inconsistently active or passive, either overtly hostile or masochistic. Factor 4 strongly suggests in addition that aggression finally prevails. And factor 7 suggests passive oppositional qualities, egocentricity, and pedantry. Regarding factors related to SIZE, there is an overall -more specifically a *progressive*- increase in most of the figures (factors 9 and 10): the former strongly suggests the presence of pervasive anxiety and feelings of inadequacy and impotence (perhaps outgoing compensatory behavior), and the latter an increasing tendency toward loss of Ego control and impulsive acting out (just as in the Rorschach and TAT!). Severe or moderate -but not extreme like in the above factors- changes in the QUALITY OF THE GESTALT occur under the form of closure and crossing difficulties (factors 12 & 13): these are associated with fearfulness in interpersonal relationships (Eichmann's own description above) or emotional disturbance in general, and blocking (indecisive, compulsively doubt-ridden, phobic behavior) respectively. From the point of view of individual figures the most difficult for the subject was undoubtedly #6: Hutt argues that "...representing such a direct portrayal of emotionality [Zulliger's stage IIb? Szondi's *P* vector?], ...not only does the curvature present problems to some patients²¹¹, but the intersection of two sets of curves in a *nonsymmetrical* manner aggravates the problem for many. Patients who are able to maintain a facade of appropriate affectivity but whose affective behavior is not spontaneous have great difficulty here... (inability to handle the 'hot' emotional meaning of these stimuli? [red color in the Rorschach, *e* factor in the Szondi])" (pp. 138-9; italics added); the counterclockwise mild rotation particularly suggests emotionally provoked oppositional tendencies (p. 113), and the somewhat spiked end curves perhaps some difficulty in holding aggressive drives under check. Less outstanding difficulties are also provoked by Figs. #3 (reducing the acuteness of the angles and thus its aggressive quality, plus the compulsive heavy dots) and #8 (suggesting sexual difficulties). The following quotation (describing a performance similar to what Eichmann did) is also worth mentioning: "...Another feature associated with masochism is the placement of dots within each of the circles [in Fig. 2]" (p. 137). All these results are very much in agreement with what we know from the previous tests.

²¹¹ "From clinical and experimental evidence we know that difficulty in expressing aggressive drives is associated with difficulty in reproducing curved figures, whereas corresponding difficulty with passivity is associated with straight-line figures" (Hutt 1960/77, p. 134).

	Figs.: A	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Scale:
ORGANIZATION:										
01. Sequence							1			01.00
02. Pos.A/ 03. Sp. I constr. 11.00		exp.			constr.			exp.		
04. Space II	exp.	exp.	exp.	exp.	exp.	exp.	exp.	exp.	exp.	---
05. Collision									>	02.50
06. Use of Margin				1					1	---
07. Paper Shift 10.00		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
08. Card Shift ---										
SIZE:										
09. Overall increase		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	---
10. Progressive	1		1	1	1		1	1		---
11. Isolated										---
Gt. CHANGES:										
12. Closure	1		2		1			2	2	07.75
13. Crossing							1	1		07.00
14. Curvature 04.00								1		
15. Angulation 04.00				1	1					
Gt DISTORTION:										
16. Percept. Rotation 04.00								10°		
17. Retrogression		1								04.00
18. Simplification										01.00
19. Fragmentation										01.00
20. Overlapping										01.00
21. Elaboration										01.00
22. Perseveration										01.00
23. Redrawing <u>01.00</u>										
										61.25

Table 5. The Hutt scoring sheet for Eichmann's Bender-Gestalt.

C) "To be or not to be": antithetical representatives of both poles

We have seen earlier (particularly at the end of chap. III.C.2, and III.D.2 pp. 114-5 plus Table #; cf. also pp. #8-14 above) that for Szondi the verbs 'to have' and 'to be' are the paradigms of his Ego dialectics (*k* and *p* factors, respectively), and that particularly the latter one represents the essence of human *being*. The following two cases are selected to illustrate precisely this point from the point of view of the Z-Test, of which we have not yet presented a case study: this instrument demonstrated to be particularly revealing in both cases, offering a perspective not readily evident from the Rorschach. To both cases were administered also the Rorschach Test²¹² but unfortunately, for reality-principle reasons, we could only apply two administrations of the Szondi Test. These will prove however sufficient to illustrate our point concerning the polar opposition between both cases.

1. A social transformator

"...In other words, neurosis does not deny reality; it just doesn't want to know anything about it. Psychosis denies and tries to change it. We call normal or 'healthy' a behavior that combines certain features of both reactions; that is, that *does not deny reality, like neurosis, but makes an effort to transform it, like psychosis*. This normal and adequate behavior naturally leads to a manifest work over the external world and is not content, like in psychosis, with the production of internal modifications..."

Sigmund Freud (1924; italics added)

"Catuxo", initially an Economist, is a Doctor of Sociology entirely dedicated to field work in an underdeveloped Latin-American country with the most deprived populations. He is director of a non-profit, Non-Governmental Organization dedicated to help poor inmigrants facing discrimination and prejudice; but this almost personal project is also very much concerned by any other form of discrimination and abuse (sexual, racial, political...). If there was ever an "idealist" and committed social transformator, he -as well as practically his whole family- is a prime example of identification with humanitarian ideals, interspersed with left-wing truly democratic principles and Christian convictions, all of them preached through living day-by-day example in the middle of a society almost completely disregarding these difficult realities and unsatisfactory human conditions on the basis of any easy excuse. Although never cultivated to their full extension there are also definite artistic veins

²¹² All these tests were translated by us from the original Spanish to the English language. Rorschach psychograms in the Appendix p. 463.

in this subject: time ago and during 8 years he dedicated -even professionally- to play the sax, and for some time now has yielded to his secret love - the plastic arts (particularly drawing: just like both Rorschach and Zulliger!). Knowing him personally we can testify of his being one good example of sublimation of base drives transforming them, up to a possible and always imperfect measure, into socially highly valuable forces. His test data follows of which we will offer a limited-focus interpretation at the end.

Rorschach Test
1996
Catuxo (49), Sociologist

March 13,

10:04 AM

I.

(Turns the plate around, fixed stare, then comments:) orientation!
 Do you want me to tell you?
Well, it looks to me as if they were two human 1. D B M
 O
 figures sticking in the center, it gives the impression as *lien*
 it were a representation, they have the hands opened,
 raised (upper center); the surrounding doesn't give it
 a context, that's a difficulty.
 Two dancers, disguised persons that are dancing around 2. G B M
 O+
 that center motive, they are back to back, they look over
 there, they make a movement with the hands. The move-
 ment of those two figures is in contrast with that other
 central figure, the figures on the sides give a sensation
 of movement, the center figure does not, it rather gives
 the sensation that it has arrested itself after a movement. (B)
 It's a sympathetic movement, they form part of a whole,
 the peripheral figures complement the central one.

II.

Two dance figures that meet... light figures that touch 1. G B M
 V, O
 on the hands (choreographic move).
 This lower part looks like a flower, a butterfly, like 2. D FFb
 Pl. -
 something that is an expression of that meeting. (T)
 Behind there is a horizon line. 3. Dd F+ Nat. O
 pers.
 If one looks at the darker part: head, snout, eye, ear, 4. D F+
 Td (V)
 neck, part of what would be the upper part of the side. [Bears?]

III. Bodies in movement turning around something..... V (2 mins.) that.	1.	G	B	M
IV. A figure like from cartoons seen from below looking up, one sees some big feet, rather boots. (Cloth.)	1.	G	F+ T	- perspective
A cartoon of a bird but the upper part, those would be Md - like arms but not well seen. (Turns the plate, 25", asks if he may turn it, turns)	2.	D	F±	obj. crit.
V Heads of two elks (laterals). Elk's head and hook to hang coat. O	3.	D	F+ Td	O
	4.	D	F+	Obj.
V. (Turns it) Butterfly. Gives the impression that behind the bushes there Md - would be like a leg, thighs (lighter tones). Mythical figure: head, arm, elbow, body; repeated M - on both sides. When one sees that the center seems not to have any sense. Reclining figure looking this way (gesture) over the O shoulder. At ease images.	1.	G	F+ T	V
	2.	D	F+	(Pl.)
	3.	D	F+	
	4.	D	B	M
				second.
VI. An aerial or anatomical photo. First impression photo of canal, physiological-anatomical canal. (Anat.)	1.	G	FHd Nat.	O "or"
Upper part looks like a penis but I couldn't get the Sex. - agreement in relationship to the rest of the image. The upper part has no context.	2.	D	F+	
It recalled me the map of Spain.	3.	D	F±	Geo. -
At the inside (above) in the black it would look like M - a human figure, extending his arms inside that as if (Cloth.) it were a fabric, a clothing. The center is not only of a different color but of a	4.	D	B	

different texture than the rest of the graphic.
 A passage with depth seen from above, made of
 O bricks, over there one notices a lightness - the lower
 lighter part.

5. D F(Fb) Arch.

VII.

Two women talking or dancing face to face.

1. G B M

V "or"

(Turns it) animals' heads, pig and dragon.

2. D F+

Td -

Hind part of a cat (tail above).

3. Dd F+ Td -

VIII.

Mmh! Two animals (sides), armadillo, ferret.

1. D F+ T V

Aside trunk and roots of trees.

2. D F+ Pl. -

Below leaves because of their texture and smooth-

3. D FbHdF

Pl. -

ness of the color.

Vertebrae at the center.

4. DZw F+ Anat. -

I can't see anything as a whole.

(Turns it) upper part similarity with a lobster.

5. D F- T -

IX.

I like the colors, it has depth, as if there were other
 planes behind.

perspective

Marine picture, fishes of different types, the openings

1. GZw FbF

Nat. -

(at the center) give depth, all the movement is related
 with the center and that center is liquid.

>B (T)
 WATER

X.

This one is like from carnival. The white suggests an
 inner figure and the colors suggest the profile. It's festive.
 (Cloth.)

1. GZw FFb M O+
 Fig-gr. fus.

Many loose little figures appear that are not natural figu-
 O

2. D F± Obj.

res, they seem rather creations and movement. As if they
 were travelling through space flying.

>B
 imprec.

I think the figure is male, there is a penis in the center.

3. Dd F- Sex.

O-

Map of Italy (in red).

4. D F+

Geo. -

Part of the spine (black center above).

5. Dd F- Anat. -

11:00 AM

Zulliger-Test
1997

Sept. 9,

Catuxo (50 years), Sociologist

I. (15")

Here I see several things. The first thing I see is as if 1. it were an insect.

G F+ T (V)
imprec.

And then in the upper center part it looks like a lion's
Td -

2. DZw F+

face or rather the caricature.

And then looking at the rest of the image it gives the 3. impression of seeing two dancers one on each side (laterals), they are gracious light figures in movement. The figure in the center is like a puppet.

D B M O

(M) -

4. D F+

The part behind that puppet looks like a copse.

5. D HdF±

Pl. -

6. Dd F-

The lower part gives the sensation of an anatomical
Anat. -

figure (?) like the hind part of the insect.

7. G B(Fb) Scene (Sex.)

There is a difference in the gradation of the colors

O+

and it gives the sensation as if they were several planes, the planes at the background seem to have more movement than the ones in front.

perspective

II. (40")

Well here... the first one gave more the sensation of a whole to me, this looks more like a composition, maybe because they are separated by the white.

The lower part, the brown, looks like animals in
V

1. D FbF T

movement as if they were communicating.

impr.

>B "Fb"

(Upper part) It suggests many things, it could be
Pl. -

2. DZw FFb

the cross-section of a flower, in the center (white) would be the stamen.

It could also be a cross-section of the back where
Anat. -

3. DZw FbF

this part (white) would be the spine and the lungs (red).

The green suggests plants but has less definition.

4. D FbF

Pl. - "Fb"

When one looks carefully at the brown in the inside
 Nat. - "Fb"
 looks like a prairie landscape, mountain chains.
 In a general sense, the lower part goes towards the
 inside and the upper one towards the outside.

5. Dd FFbHd

III (10")

This one has much movement, I see two figures in
 V, O+

1. G B M

movement like dancing and two little figures behind
 V

2. D B M

that are also a part of the dance, the big ones are dan-
 cing towards the inside and the little ones towards the
 outside.

In the middle there would seem to be a butterfly, it
 V

3. D F+ T

could be some symbol that would be part of the dance.

Inside the red there is like a landscape that reflects itself
 O

4. Dd F(Fb) Nat.

in a tenuous lake in the middle.

reflection, "Fb"

If the big gray figures are seen from below up they could
 T -

5. D F+

look like animals.

In this plate the parts are in relation one with the other,
 by contrast to the previous one where it was hard to see
 the whole.

This part (lower side) may be like a centipede.

6. D F+

T -

The head of the dancers has like a headdress, a head
 O

7. Dd F+ Cloth.

ornament like it was the usage at the carnival in the
 Middle Age.

Z-Test Psychogram

DG = -
 G = 3
 D = 12
 Dd = 4
 Zw = (3)

B = >4
 F+ = 7
 F± = 1
 F- = 1
 F(Fb) = 1(2)
 FFb = 2
 FbF = 3

T = 5
 Td = 1
 M = 3
 (M) = 1
 Sex. = (1)
 Anat. = 2
 Pl. = 3
 Nat. = 2
 Cloth. = 1

V = 4 + (1)

 FFbHd = 1

sequence that took us years of hard work and study to induce! (see the underlined and italicized comments in the protocol): *light-dark and easy wholes, color and a segmented detailed view, movement and combined wholes, all of these significant interrelations are matters of course to him and he expresses them beautifully*. That such a highly humanized individual arrived to exactly the same conclusions than we did is no small fact for us. We cannot help but think about the way Zulliger worked out his material, entirely spontaneously without conscious theoretical considerations to guide his choices.

His few Szondi profiles will allow us to add some final comments. Besides the already mentioned sexual sensitive area (SOO, ++), we want to call attention to the regular reaction $p+$ (!) and to the highly developed and complex Ego $Sch_{\pm+}$. We have no better way to conclude than by quoting Mélon:

SZONDI évoque l'image du "travailleur compulsif" (Zwangsarbeiter) pour désigner $Sch_{\pm+}$, tandis qu'il invoque la "mentalité primitive" pour caractériser le moi "participatif" Sch_0- [son opposé théorique: cf. cas suivant].

L'opposition entre un moi hyperdéveloppé et la forme du moi la plus primitive ou la plus régressée pourrait valoir pour en désigner bien d'autres, mais, fondamentalement, cette opposition se ramène à ceci: ce que le "Zwangsarbeiter" travaille compulsivement, c'est la pulsion, dont il tend à produire, davantage que tout autre sujet, un maximum de rejets, aussi bien dans le registre de l'affect (Affekt-Repräsentanz) que dans celui de la représentation (Vorstellungs-Repräsentanz); le "participatif-projectif", à l'inverse, ne produit rien, il s'en remet totalement à l'Autre pour tout ce qui regarde le traitement de ses tensions pulsionnelles. Dans le premier cas, le contenant destiné à recevoir les pulsions est un appareil psychique hautement différencié, dans le second cas, il n'y a pratiquement pas d'activité psychique à proprement parler, le contenant, c'est nécessairement l'Autre.

Le moi $\pm+$ s'efforce de dépasser la question de l'identification "paranoïaque" primaire ($p+$) en la médiatisant (k_{\pm}) par le truchement du travail créatif [les mêmes facteurs derrière la production des B , cf. pp. #8-9 above]. -"L'homme n'est rien d'autre que la somme de ses actes" dit SARTRE - et nous avons pensé qu'il n'existe pas de plus belle allégorie de ce type de sujet que l'esclave hégélien, dont l'analysant est aujourd'hui le fidèle héritier: se transformer et transformer le monde ne constituent qu'une seule et même entreprise...

Expérimentalement [au Rorschach], c'est bien ce que nous constatons: tandis que les "travailleurs" viennent en tête pour la production de "représentants" pulsionnels, de représentations (K)[B] et d'affects (C, E, Clob)[Fb, (Fb), Hd], les "participatifs" viennent en queue.

Le contenu des kinesthésies est ici très révélateur. Tandis que les "travailleurs" en produisent un grand nombre où s'exprime précisément leur acharnement à porter le fardeau de l'existence, les "participatifs" n'en donnent que quelques-unes mais, très significativement, elles traduisent presque toutes le besoin fusionnel, ou, plus normalement, celui d'un lien affectif fort. On ne peut malheureusement empêcher que la tendance fusionnelle ait pour corollaire obligé l'angoisse de persécution et d'anéantissement.

La trajectoire O- → ±+ accomplit le destin promis par la Genèse: l'homme chassé du paradis (p-) pour s'être voulu semblable à Dieu (p+) est maudit dans son sexe (k-) - Yahvé dit au serpent "Je mettrai une inimitié entre toi et la femme" - condamné à procréer, à transformer la terre et astreint au patient et douloureux "travail du négatif" (k±). (1976 pp. 399-400)

Avec le schéma pulsionnel, Szondi [et Zulliger aussi, avec son schéma perceptanalytique implicite entièrement équivalent] a produit une métaphore exceptionnellement réussie. Sans doute est-ce dans un de ces moments de grâce où le négatif desserre son étau que Szondi a "vu" cette chose extraordinaire qu'est le Triebssystem. Les grandes découvertes se font par bond. A ses héritiers, Szondi lègue le soin de poursuivre le patient travail du négatif qui produit les concepts dans la longue marche de la science. (& Lekeuche #1989, p. 38)

Keeping due distances, as a good productive paranoid "Catuxo" must have also 'seen' those systematic Z-Test connections in one of those rare 'leap' positive moments. To us on our side, there's no alternative than the patient and arduous "negative work" of which this Thesis is but a reflection.

2. "Jack the ripper"

"...S'il existe en psychiatrie une notion nosographique du même ordre de grandeur que celle de psychose et de névrose, ...ce serait celle de *psychopathie*..."

"...ce qui s'esquisse... comme système de *catégories psychia-triques* - système également triadique, si on veut bien se souvenir que déjà Freud a souligné que les perversions et les névroses sont le 'positif' et le 'négatif' d'une seule et même problématique, que nous proposons de situer comme 'seconde' par rapport à une 'première' (psychopathique...) et une 'troisième' (psychotique). Finalement, la formule de Freud sur la névrose comme 'négatif de la perversion' pourra se compléter dans ce sens par une autre faisant de la psychose le 'positif' d'un 'négatif' qui serait la psychopathie..."

"...Je renverse la formule pour souligner que cela n'est pas tout à fait symétrique puisque nous faisons se rejoindre à travers psychose et psychopathie les termes extrêmes de notre échelle, entre lesquels se situent les deux autres..."

"...le sujet k- est le sujet névrotique par excellence, il est le négatif du sujet pervers k+... Le sujet psychotique au moment fécond est un sujet p+ et le sujet de la perturbation humorale ou de la psychopathie est un sujet p-..."

"Dès lors, la schizophrénie [au sens pathoanalytique: le Moi sujet au dilemme 'psychotique' de l'ipséité et de l'altérité] ne présente à mon sens des formes tout à fait primitives d'existence qu'au moment où se passe ce que vous pouvez appeler sa 'psychopathisation', c'est-à-dire une certaine façon de régresser *secondairement*

(non au moment fécond, non au moment déci-sif, mais secondairement): celui qui aspire au plus haut, celui qui est confronté au problème le plus élevé, peut aussi re-tomber au plus bas. En ce sens seulement il peut y avoir régression."

Jacques Schotte (1990, pp. 180, 206, 131, 138, 166)

Luis A. CABRERA J. is a serial rapist/killer, evaluated in jail in coordination with the authorities while awaiting trial at the conclusion of which he was in effect found guilty and condemned to the maximum penalty allowed by the law of the land, 30 years in prison. He earned his nickname "Jack the ripper" because of the fact that, after raping them, he used to stab his victims several times in the abdomen with a knife. Being a taxi driver by profession, his simple *modus operandi* consisted in picking an unsuspected young girl on the street, driving her to an isolated area where he could then commit his crime at knife point, finishing her in the usual way. He was finally captured and brought to trial because one of his last victims, with extreme coolness from her side, faked being already dead and endured the stabbing without making a move, being subsequently able to get some help and survive; this happened, to top the story, while his wife was at the hospital having just given birth to his last child! As with the former case the entire test data follow before we give a final assessment.

Zulliger Test (double administration according to Salomon's technique) Sept. 21, 2004

Luis A. CABRERA J. (30 years), serial rapist/killer

4:49:00 PM

I. (22")

.....It looks like, it could be a scarab (puts it down). 1. G F+ T

V

(More?) No. (Encouragement)..... (moving it continuously)

looks like a scarab (OK). 2. Dd F+ Td -
 [(?) round form (?) legs.] (scored from comment on pl. II)

II. (52")

Fb!

...(Frowns, waves it)it's coming to look like, because 1. D F- Td

O

of its form, like something being born (?) it looks like the first figure, being born, or developing, the only thing missing would be the little legs, the stings, in the front and behind, I'm absolutely sure it's the same, the development of the first figure; done (puts it down). illusion of similarity
EMBR.
obj. crit.
confabulation

[(?: he meant the red) (?) round form, missing something.] green!, brown!

III. (>1')

B!!

.....Something similar to the first and second figures, much illusion of similarity
 similarity, but I cannot find... (encouragement, take time) ...
 It has much similarity, yes, to the first and second, but 1. GZw F- Td
 O-
 something is missing in the middle, the part in white, a draw- persev., "Fb"
 (Anat.)
 ing is missing to complete. obj. crit.
 [(?: black G) (?) in the middle something is missing to com- confabulation, impotence
 plete the scarab figure (?) the center, lungs, esophagus, plus MUTIL.
 legs, stings (also missing?) yes. (Title?) the first part of the EMBR.
scarab, when it comes out of the egg, it opens at the bor-
der, with nothing in the middle, not yet formed, later on.]
 There are sticks coming out, some arms outside the back. 2. Do F+ Md
 (V),O-
 It has two little red figures that the others don't have, in the 3. D F+
 (M) (V)
 form of cartoons. "Fb" (B)
That's it (puts it down). red!
 4:55:17 PM

2. part:

I. () Hd! failure
(Waves it) ...well, this as I said before looks like a
scarab already completely formed, all its parts, I do
not find anything weird in it.
 (Something new, different?) ...(shakes head) ...for me it is
 the same thing, scarab, it doesn't look like anything else to
 me... (1'55")

II. () Fb! failure
 ...(Waves it) ...(concentrated) ...(waves it) ...it looks the
same to me, the development of a scarab, being born,
the beginning, I don't find something... anything else,
 the same thing, the development of the scarab (puts it
 down: 1'21")

[(Testing the limits: brown) ...(smiles: ?) like a plantation, (1. DdDZwFbF Nat.
 O)
 soil, like it opens in two, through there through the lower confabulation,
 EARTH
 part is from where the scarab climbs and begins its deve-
 lopment.]
 [(Testing the limits: green)I can't find a logic, no (take green!
 time, encouragement)..... I don't see a response to that
 one, Doctor.]

III. (32")

...This one looks like the first and second figures to me.

Also the two black figures like two persons, with many

V little branches, sticks, something.

Pl. - [(Black G) (Do the arms come out *from* the back?) Yes (with perplexed face).]

The two red ones cartoons, little horn on the head.

Td - [(Outer red: ?) little angels (with horns?) ... (Kind of RELIG.

cartoon?) From TV; on the buns like something that O)

propels him to fly (What?) One second..... I can't be imprec., ANAL exactly precise.]

Middle red a butterfly, the beginning or development 4. of a butterfly.

EMBR.

[(?) Because it doesn't look that developed, wings like stuck in the center, middle form.]

5:01:38 PM

- 1. G B M
- 2. Dd F± impotence
- 3. Dd F+ "Fb", PHALLIC,
- (5. Dd F± Obj. f a b u l a t i o n ,
- D F+ T V,O "Fb", >persev.,

Z-Test Psychogram

	1.	2.	1.+2.		1.	2.	1.+2.		1.	2.	1.+2.
DG	= -	-	-	B	= 0	1	1	T	= 1	1	2
G	= 2	1	3	F+	= 4	2	6	Td	= 3	1	4
D	= 2	2	4	F±	= -	2	2	M	= 0	1	1
Dd	= 1	3	4	F-	= 2	-	2	Md	= 1	-	1
Zw	= (1)	(1)	(2)	FFb	= 0	-	0	(M)	= 1	-	1
Do	= 1	-	1	FbF	= -	1	1	Anat.	= (1)	-	(1)
	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>		<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>	Pl.	= -	1	1
V	= 1(3)	2	3(4)	FHd	= -	-	-	Nat.	= -	1	1
O	= 3	3	6	HdF	= -	-	-	Obj.	= -	1	1
									<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>12</u>

Apprehension Type:	1.	1.+2.
Experience Type:	GV- //D Dd/ GZw/ Do	GV //D DdD Dd// G,DZw/ Do
Sequence:	0 : 0	1 : 1
	orderly > loose (pl. I)	

	1.	2.	1.+2.		1.	1.+2.
time	= 6'17"	6'21"	12'38"	F+%	= 67	70
t/R	= 1' 3"	1' 4"	1' 3"	T%	= 67	50
				M%	= 25	21

R = 6 6 12 Anat% = 17 8

Rorschach Test
2004

Sept. 22,

9:20 AM

I. (15")

...It looks like the same figure than yesterday to me, 1. DG F-
Td -
scarab, but semiformed, not whole, semiformed; the sting confab., persever.,
illus. sim. behind is missing, the two at the front are almost completely obj. crit., EMBR.,
CASTR.
developed. Done (puts it down).

II. (21")

...It looks like the same figure of the scarab, already like 1. G F-
Td -
in a beginning already formed, not completely, very close persever., confab.,
illus. sim. to the one we just mentioned (puts it down). EMBR.
[Round form, oval on the sides, sting behind (2 red elon- PHALLIC
gated *Dd*).]

III. (19")

...This one looks like the figure of the scarab to us, already 1. G F-
T -
mentioned in the figure of three (means Z-Test), where one perseveration,
illus. sim. sees two persons, not completely formed but a beginning of2. D B M
V
the same (puts it down). confab., EMBR.
[The two blacks persons like figure III from yesterday, not
completely developed like those of yesterday, a beginning obj. crit.
(lower *D* are included; center black *D* included or not?)
I would say those are the hands, but no form, looks like
something filled below. (Why less formed than yesterday?)
Are missing little horns that came out from the one of yester- CASTR.
day.]
[(?) Also form of the scarab (sides).]
[(Reds?) Also like part of the beginning of the same figure, red!
I couldn't say because it doesn't look like anything to me.]

IV. (25")

.....It looks like the same scarab to me, already getting
 T -
 out of the egg, initial phase.
 confab.
 [Form (around), sting behind, it carries the same form
 (around).]

1. G F-
 illus. sim., persev.,
 EMBR., PHALLIC

V. (22")

...This one looks to me like a... the beginning of a butterfly.
 T V
 [(Any?) A butterfly, the beginning. (?) Because of parts of
 wings like narrow, not totally opened, little head yes, little
 stings behind and in front, little wands to detect.]

1. G F+
 obj. crit., EMBR.

VI. (24")

.....This one looks like the underdevelopment... of the
 T -
 same scarab.
 persev.
 [Already coming out, or taking form inside the egg:
 little stings (below), little head (upper D), inside the egg.]

sex!
 1. G F-
 confab., illus. sim.,
 "or", EMBR.
 PHALLIC

VII. (23")

(Sighs)This one looks to me like the same figure of
 Td -
 the scarab, already in its initial phase, missing many steps
 confab.
 to go. Done.
 [It follows the same rythm (sides), it misses the center to
 be formed, above head, it doesn't have the stings. (What
 does it have?) The outer part of the body (sides).]

sex!
 1. GZw F-
 illus. sim., persev.,
 EMBR.
 obj. crit., MUTIL.
 CASTR.
 impotence

VIII. (37")

.....> Λ... Over here looks like the same to me, the same
 Td -
 scarab, different is the color, its parts still lacking develop-
 impot.
 ment, not yet developed, initial phase of development.
 CASTR.EMBR.

Fb!!
 1. G F-
 illus. sim., persev.,
 " F b " c o n f a b .

> (turning encouraged) V < ... Λ > Λ that's OK.
 [> They look in the form of two animals, little animals,
 (V)]

obj. crit.
 (2. D F+ Td

form, < here another one (?) > well... I don't see in it the
 form of what type of animal, one sees little beak on the
 head, its four legs, one does not see a tail to say a more
 developed animal Λ... (?) >..... (encouragement) more or

imprec.
 obj. crit. CASTR.

less the form of a mouse, in its beginning, without tail.]
 [(Scarab?) It carries the form of the same scarab (makes
 round gesture over the sides), the beginning, isn't it?]

EMBR.

IX. (19")

Here it looks like the beginning of something, of the same
 T -

1. G F-
 confab. persev.
 illus. sim., EMBR., EARTH

scarab, the beginning, like coming out of the plant, of *the*
 (Nat.)
earth.

... V Λ (puts it down).

[Here (red below) like the earth, like the hole from where
 it comes out, above it begins to take form. (Plant?) ...
 (Scarab? grenn + brown).]

SEX.

X. (24")

Fb!

.....It comes to be the same figure of the scarab, it's diffe-
 Td -

1. GZw F-
 illus. sim., persev.,
 M U T. impot.

rent in the colors, like some empty spaces that lack filling
 "Fb"

to be the complete scarab. Done.
 confab. EMBR.

[(What is it distinguishable?) Form (around) which is ini-
 tiating, some things are missing, stings that it has which are
 CASTR.

obj. crit.,

too little (the "feelers" of the gray insects), the ones from
 below not well formed (lower green), and the colors which
 scarabs don't have so many colors (?) they don't correspond
 to the scarab (colors in excess?) yes, I don't think that a
 scarab in its initial form takes so many colors to be formed.]

9:33 AM

Szondi:	<u>VGP</u>	S	P	Sch	C
	h	s	e	hy	k p d m
I	+	-	+	-	O - ± +
II	+	O	±	-	± - - +
	<u>EKP</u>	S	P	Sch	C
	h	s	e	hy	k p d m
I	+	+	-	-	± + O -
II	±	±	Ø	-	- - + +

We will interpret basically from the Z-Test since the pre-established set greatly
 affected the Rorschach. The general picture corresponds perfectly with Schafer's

(1948 p. 55) "psychopathic character disorder": protocol generally poor but with an evident fabulatory note, /R, T%/ , /F+%, popular percepts elaborated in a fabulatory way, just 1FbF (Z testing the limits, with just 1 "technical" B and 2Zw), absence of Hd-R, 1DdD (1DG in the Rorschach), oppressive perseveration with a total absence of articulated percepts; according to Bohm (1951# chap. 12.B.II.9, quoting Boss) also Zw/, G± and A.T. G-Dd-Zw. Despite the total absence of Hd-R (probably corresponding to the psychopathic lack of feeling or anxiety, as described by some authors: cf. Salomon 1962 p. 62) it is unquestionable that this subject corresponds to the most primitive level I in our Rorschach schematic systematization (see by the way how the performance went downhill from pl. I on): the primitive G are clearly if not completely predominant (Rorschach), functioning by "magic wand perseveration" just as Klopfer (cf. pp. #11130-1 above) described it in the smallest children! His sexuality, initially undergoing a severe repression -probably induced also by imprisonment-, even if scarcely and indirectly finishes by making itself manifest (1. part: Fb! in pl. II and subsequent B!! in III without Fb-R or B = total coartation, "Fb", no Sex. R; the Fb! subsists in the 2. part as a failure and the only additional R obtained 'testing the limits' here does finally have a symbolic sexual connotation: DdDZw FbF Nat. O) as a widely abnormal one (the performance in pl. II is the poorest of the record = the most intense shock just as in Rorschach's VIII: just 1 F- perseverative-confabulatory R to the red without any to the brown -until the inquiry- or the green, which means the only pl. without F+ or V, besides no Fb-R with additional confabulatory DdD *in extremis* to the brown and unsurmountable green!; in the Rorschach we have both sex! to pls. VI & VII), dominated by complexes²¹⁴, 'polymorphous pervert' (intense and diverse pregenital partial fixations: specific Fb! to the 3 partial colors and A.T. G-// //D Dd// Zw/, as well as the insistence on the theme of the different embryonic stages of the "scarab", Z 3× & Ro 11×, and other life forms interpreted) and probably crude in its expression (the already mentioned only Fb-R offered -in the inquiry, hidden behind the severe repression- is not only a confabulatory FbF with a clearly sexual connotation, but also crude and elementary -"earth": Piotrowski 1957 pp. 228-9- found by Zulliger -1970 pp. 227-8- in cases of psychopathy). In this sense it is highly meaningful how, in contrast to our previous case who confirmed our systematic Rorschach view, *in the Z-Test this subject interpreted the perseverative "scarab" percept following precisely a developmentally regressive process from pl. I ("already completely formed") to III ("the first part of the scarab, when it comes out of the egg... not yet formed, later on")!* We do believe ourselves authorized to call this case literally one of de-generation, a sad example of a total failure in the process of

²¹⁴ The castration complex is central in this predominant Fb!: visible in the way how the specific red! (Salomon) stands out in the picture (1.II F- R already mentioned, 1.III "Fb" and repression of the BMV to the outer red D without R to the center red until 2. with two more "Fb", and the testing-the-limits additional R confabulated precisely from the previous R to the red; in the Rorschach total absence of R to pl. III red Ds and to pl. VIII lateral "animals" until the inquiry), also by the unsurmountable green!, and furthermore by the Do and the proportions T<Td (Rorschach too) and M<Md (1.), and by the contrast between the phallic theme (Z 1×, Ro 3×) on the one hand and the mutilation (Z 1×, Ro 2×) and castration (Ro 6×) ones on the other. Already the highly symptomatic – symbolically phallic– act of *stabbing* women in the abdomen, as if the previous penetration with his penis (rape) were insufficient in its effects, indicates by itself phallic inferiority feelings and fits very well with an anecdote from his biography: being a private in the army he *stole his gun* from an unsuspected officer friend since he was convinced he deserved it from the beginning.

human becoming. The projective-paranoid component is by the way not only evident in the form-interpretation tests (illusion of similarity in *every* plate, confabulations, Dd// and Zw/, severe green!) but also in the Szondi: profile I complete form of existence S+– P+– SchO–, with the equally projective Ego Sch±– the 2nd day. Let us finish by quoting the always sharp Mélon: "SchO–, par contre, qui signe la carence de toute prise de conscience possible - le réel extérieur est le seul incriminé en tant que facteur causal du comportement du sujet [exactly Luis Cabrera's case: it was always the woman's fault] - se rencontre chez les criminels les plus asociaux et les plus dangereux (brutalité gratuite, crimes crapuleux, banditisme, meurtres impulsifs)" (1975 p. 268).

V. Conclusion

"...It seems to me worthwhile to attempt the task of carefully scrutinizing psychological theories, far removed in content... in order to see whether we find formal dynamic laws which tie these distant fields of investigation into a meaningful whole. If conclusions gained independently in different areas of science and with different methodology, turn out to support each other in their theoretical dynamic implications, then each originally independent research has gained in validation, and the total structure of science has come closer to the ultimate goal of unification."

Susan K. Deri (1963, p. 45)

At the end of this long and laborious work we feel almost tempted to talk about seemingly light subjects such as 'chance' (*Zufall*) -already an important concept for Rorschach however-, or about the 'uncanny' return of the same, or even the always controversial 'synchronicity' in Jung's term. What we mean to convey is that, having been personally impressed very often along this road by the meaningful "coincidences" encountered among the very many Rorschach contributions reviewed, we feel the need to search for clear explanatory answers perhaps not always at the reach of our scientific methods. Some other researchers with similar research objectives and endeavours may have been chiefly struck by the differences and contradictions among the diverse contributions in our common field, but for us it has been the reverse. Many scientists seem to be closer to one another than they realize.

First of all let us reflect a little bit about the paramount issue of symmetry in Rorschach and his work. Everybody knew that his inkblots were symmetrical, that some subjects noticed the fact and reacted in one way or the other, but that was just about it. Some critics (Stern) have even strongly rejected this element as an intrinsic limitation of the instrument. We on our side were quite impressed by how far this principle extended and pervaded all of Rorschach's work and thinking, the construction of the blots being just the reflection of something much deeper, a need for balance present since very early in his minor works (cf. Bash), something perhaps even vital and thus emerging from the material body itself as Binswanger would suggest, probably identifiable as a harmonious way of living, an *Er-lebnis-typ* in the case of Hermann Rorschach the man. The 10 blots are not only symmetrical in themselves making them *Raumrhythmik*, but the whole series is also symmetrically organized with *Zeitrhythmik* (Simmel). And that holds for the "*Psychodiagnostik*" in its entirety, whose obscurities (Ellenberger) we hope to have clarified in part. As we said earlier, we have no 100% direct proof that this was a voluntary decision in our author but the evidence is overwhelming; and if so, why didn't he overtly expressed his convictions in this sense, in writing, instead of keeping this to himself? That is a real enigma that perhaps with the publication of the still safeguarded material will become more clarified.

But maybe even more impressive than these intraindividual coincidences is how the same perfectly symmetric principle presided the work of Szondi, not only as related to his test but in his whole take on the human condition through his *Triebssystem*. That coincidence in itself is amazing. J. Schotte reflects:

...*De la forme pure du tableau de base szondien...* Pourquoi ne pas nous tourner ne fût-ce qu'un instant vers vers l'*aspect formel pur* que présente le problème? Car il est bien certain que dans le projet szondien du tableau pulsionnel, un rôle considérable peut avoir été joué par l'appréhension, progressive peut-être, ...d'une sorte de *symétrie* de base, qui joint à leur point d'équilibre une structure globale tout juste restée simple et une complexité interne déjà considérable. Mutatis mutandis, c'est là l'équivalent szondien de la "rythmique spatiale" qui fait le merveilleux équilibre des planches de Rorschach... (1990 p. 35)

Our results entirely confirm this impression.

But furthermore, how about a comparison between the almost identical 'circuitous' elaborations of Zulliger and Schotte, sharing a triadic structure and a developmental outlook, over the works of their respective Masters Rorschach and Szondi? Isn't that truly uncanny?

Bohm had already expressed a similar surprise concerning the repetition of the same genetic-triadic principle in far away thinkers and countries (Spencer, Renan...), as if they had been secretly in previous agreement. This kind of "coincidence" must be definitely based in shared conditions.

If one considers the cases studied in chap. IV, the same impression offers itself. In neither of the two Zulliger-Test cases for example, were we expecting perceptions of the material so meaningful from the point of view of our understanding of the instrument and simultaneously so in line with the respective, opposite clinical pictures. In the case of Eichmann too, the very detailed "coincidences" between the interpretations of the very diverse tests was reassuring regarding the true grasping of the corresponding personality.

These are in our opinion, if not merely superficially interesting aesthetic phenomena, eloquent scientific productions aiming at the *essence* of human nature.

We believe the aim at *integration* expressed in the Introduction was quite met by this work. In our understanding this fact speaks in favor of a rich, multiple theoretical approach; not multiple in the sense of a summativity but, as demonstrated in their practice by open-minded theorists of the caliber of Binswanger, Szondi, Ellenberger, or Schachtel, in the sense of the ability of handling these theoretical scientific tools as one integrated unity to take the most of the benefit while working with so complex an object as the human nature. This is the reverse of what some have feared from theorization, the "taking hostage" the instrument by the

theory for its own purposes. Not even our strong identification with Psychoanalysis has blinded us in this sense.

Given the best scenario, this may be certainly promising concerning the applicability of our views, rationales and conclusions by other researchers, even of quite contrasting theoretical outlooks. It may also be, on the other hand, that this approach turns out unproductive for some, not attuned with their own *Erlebnistyp*. But anyway the effort and the contribution are there available, speaking for themselves.

Following Rorschach's model, we have attempted to perceive some form, some sense in these supposedly recurring chance-coincidences. We hope that it has been as meaningful to the reader than for us.

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“Une Thèse pour Introduire le Problème Structural de la Perceptanalyse” (Résumé)

Cette Thèse est le produit d'au moins 15 ans de travail direct sur et de polissage soigné de ses concepts. Ayant participé pour la première fois dans un Congrès Rorschach International en 1990 (Paris, le XIII^{ème} de la série), une expérience très stimulante, nous avons laissé la réunion avec l'impression durable -entre autres- de l'intéressant travail en train d'être produit par des chercheurs des quatre coins du globe tout comme avec la ferme conviction d'un manque général de communication ou de connaissance effective parmi les experts du travail des autres chercheurs, soit à cause de barrières langagières ou d'école ou peut-être même dû à d'autres causes additionnelles pas claires pour nous en ce moment. Notre compromis de mettre nos idées Rorschach sous une forme visible et communicable, et d'offrir des rapports réguliers de leur développement tous les 3 ans vient de cette expérience en particulier. L'*intégration* a été dès le départ un idéal suprême pour nous, soit dans le sens diachronique-historique, géographique, ou langagier du Rorschach.

Ayant été un "parvenu" pour ainsi dire en dehors des centres principaux de recherche Rorschach, nous avons eu toutefois la chance d'avoir été initiés dans la méthode par un défenseur convaincu de la tradition Suisse Classique, feu L. Jaime Rijo, et d'avoir entré en contact avec des légendes vivantes de cette école comme Fritz Salomon mais plus spécialement Roland Kuhn. S'il y a une leçon à être tirée du travail de ce groupe entier d'experts c'est la façon comment, sans préméditation, leurs contributions individuelles se coordonnent parfaitement les unes avec les autres peut-être à un degré jamais atteint ailleurs. Ayant suivi volontairement leur exemple, le présent travail doit être considéré à la fin comme un produit tardif de cette tradition scientifique dans un effort pour démontrer comment toutes les branches contemporaines du Rorschach sont en rapport organique avec le même ferme tronc classique, et alors à travers cette connection comment elles restent essentiellement compatibles les unes avec les autres. Un autre mot clé dans toute cette entreprise, et lequel différencie nettement notre contribution d'autres avec des buts ambitieux similaires, c'est '*théorie*': cet aspect souvent mécompris et négligé de la science contemporaine -en contraste à nouveau avec nos prédécesseurs Rorschach communs- dû à une insistance contraire fréquemment exagérée sur "le pur empirisme", mais qui est en fait le seul facteur dynamique capable de tenir ensemble cohésivement tous ses éléments intrinsèques ou les 'faits' scientifiques résultants courant sinon le risque de la dispersion.

Après plus de $\frac{3}{4}$ de siècle, et en dépit de l'exemple constitué par l'impérissable préoccupation de H. Rorschach dans ce sens (1921/1948, Introd., chaps. II et IV; Rorschach & Oberholzer, 1923/1948, Introd. et 3^{me} partie; Binswanger, 1923/1967; Zulliger, 1949, pp. 294-295; Roemer, 1967, p. 196), il n'y a pas encore eu de progrès vraiment 'franchissant du seuil' dans la fondamentatation théorique de son "expériment" dans son ensemble (de l'aveu des mêmes concernés: Schachtel, 1942; Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1943, pp. 41-42; Kuhn, 1944, p. 38; Hertz, 1951/1962, pp.

392-394; Holt, 1954, p. 501; Schachtel, 1966, p. 1; Exner, 1978, p. 37; Leichtman, 1996, pp. 1-3); s'il est vrai qu'il y a eu quelques contributions même capitales à la compréhension psychologique des éléments isolés ou des dimensions essentielles mais toujours partielles de l'instrument, il manque néanmoins toujours un regard explicatif accompli visant le tout du système formel original de H. Rorschach dans son intégralité, rassemblant en même temps d'une manière cohérente tous ces apports antérieurs: à notre connaissance seules les oeuvres de Salomon (1962) et de Schachtel (1966), déjà à mi-chemin de l'histoire de notre méthode, se sont approchées significativement à cet idéal. Au contraire et à différence d'autrefois, aujourd'hui prédomine largement dans le monde l'approche "empirique" de l'instrument qui laisse précisément de côté ce genre de préoccupation. Notre prétension alors est d'apporter un regard nouveau, structural et définitif sur la manière dont la pratique du Rorschach -au moins dans sa version classique ou compatible avec celle-ci- prend fondement sur les solides colonnes de respectables concepts acquis de notre science psychologique qui donnent un sens cohérent à tout ce que les plus renommés spécialistes de notre discipline qui nous ont précédé ont toujours prétendu avoir révélé par le biais de cette merveilleuse épreuve: notre contribution donc, primordialement théorique, s'appuie néanmoins fermement sur de nombreuses recherches empiriques en leur donnant un sens original et révélateur les rassemblant dans une synthèse achevée; des applications pratiques qui en découlent sont aussi esquissées dans le Chap. IV. Nous avons fait un effort très poussé et sérieux pour apporter une contribution autant décisive qu'originale, dont les réussites et nouveautés suivantes en font preuve: révision aussi exhaustive que possible, dans les sens géographique et historique, de la littérature pertinente en plus de 5 langues principales; dévoilement du parfait système théorico-formel de H. Rorschach, schéma de référence central organisateur de toutes ses idées et observations, qui nous a permis entre autres de découvrir le principe de sériation de sa collection de 10 taches d'encre; récupération d'une douzaine de protocoles originaux jamais publiés du Maître, dont un est présenté et analysé au chap. IV; analyse approfondi et tranchement prétendu définitif du toujours disputé cas du criminel de guerre Adolf Eichmann, avec du matériel largement méconnu et jamais rassemblé depuis son évaluation en 1961; etc. Examinons ces buts plutôt ambitieux encore avec un peu plus de détail.

Introduction Théorique

Permettez-nous d'introduire notre propos par la mise en situation de notre recherche dans le contexte historique de l'investigation sur le Rorschach, avec l'aide de quelques citations de certains théoriciens Rorschach accomplis, précisément ce que nous comptons devenir à la fin de ce travail. Pour commencer par le début, voici les paroles avec lesquelles Hermann RORSCHACH a introduit son oeuvre maîtresse, le 'Psychodiagnostic' (1921):

Dans les pages suivantes sont décrits les méthodes et les résultats obtenus jusqu'à présent avec un **expériment psychologique** lequel, malgré sa simplicité, a confirmé sa valeur dans plusieurs sens, autant dans la recherche que dans le diagnostic pratique. **Anticipons que ce travail est d'une nature**

éminemment empirique. Les questions qui ont promu les premiers essais dans ce sens (1911), étaient fondamentalement différentes des problèmes qui ont surgi des nouvelles expériences. Par conséquent, les conclusions ont simple caractère empirique, et ne doivent pas être considérées comme des inférences théoriques. **Les fondements théoriques de cet expériment sont encore, pour la plus grande partie, assez imparfaits.** [gras ajouté par nous]

A peine quelques mois après la parution de cette publication meurt l'auteur laissant dans cet état inachevé son importante contribution à notre science psychologique, le test de taches d'encre qui est devenu avec les décennies un des plus utilisés et respectés dans le monde entier. Mais, malgré son insistance dans ses écrits et avec ses élèves directs (ZULLIGER, 1949, pp. 294-295: "...il se plaignait toujours à nouveau du fait qu'il n'était pas encore arrivé à fonder suffisamment son travail d'une façon scientifico-théorique"; ROEMER, 1967, p. 196: "Il écrivit [dans une lettre] qu'il voulait atteindre plus de certitude concernant sa méthode, et, avant tout, formuler pour sa procédure une meilleure base théorique. Il avait le sentiment qu'il ne pouvait pas continuer à contrer des enquêtes sur la logique interne toujours avec le commentaire stéréotypé: 'la méthode a fait ses preuves dans la pratique, mais la théorie est nébuleuse' ") sur l'absolue nécessité de cette fondation théorique de son expériment, l'écrasante majorité de ses continuateurs indirects (ceux qui ne l'ont connu qu'à travers son livre) se sont concentrés unilatéralement dans l'amplification et la sophistication de ces données empiriques. Écoutons les paroles de l'auteur d'un des très rares en même temps que le plus récent des livres sur la théorie de l'épreuve (LEICHTMAN, 1996, pp. 1-3):

LE PROBLEME CENTRAL EN THEORIE RORSCHACH. Au long des derniers 70 ans, le test de Rorschach a été le sujet d'un corps massif de littérature. Une variété de systèmes pour l'administration, la notation, et l'interprétation du test ont été avancés; une foule d'études ont examiné la signification de signes particuliers du test et de patrons de performance dans le test; et une infinité de livres et articles ont décrit des applications cliniques de l'instrument. Mais ce qui est le plus étonnant à propos de cette littérature ce n'est pas ce qu'elle inclut, mais ce qu'elle manque. Dans ces dizaines de milliers de pages, il y a remarquablement peu de discussion de la question la plus significative qui peut être posée concernant le test: Quelle est la nature de la tâche Rorschach elle-même? [Et lui de se référer aussi dans ce point à l'Introduction au 'Psychodiagnostic', pour conclure:]... Certainement, le problème de base posé par Rorschach n'est pas moins avec nous. Maintenant, comme alors, la question fondamentale reste...

La preuve la plus immédiate de la vérité de cette affirmation nous l'avons dans l'impressionnante oeuvre -essai d'unification des très diverses traditions de pratique- de John EXNER, le créateur à partir des années '70 du "Système Compréhensif" du Rorschach lequel sans discussion exerce contemporanément le plus d'influence dans la pratique mondiale de la méthode. Or, cet auteur insiste dès son premier volume (1974) et toujours aujourd'hui sur la nature primordialement empirique de sa propre contribution, laissant comme tant d'autres avant lui le soin de la fondation théorique définitive aux continuateurs:

...Le travail présenté ici, [est] **basé largement sur des données empiriques...** Le but de ce travail est de présenter, dans un format unique, le “meilleur du Rorschach.” Ce système profite de chacun des systèmes, en incorporant ces traits qui, au scrutin soigné, offrent le plus de rendement, et leur ajoute d’autres éléments sur la base de travaux plus récents avec le test... **Il ne se base sur aucune position théorique particulière...** [gras ajouté par nous] (pp. x-xi)

Nous nous sommes dits qu’il était vivement temps d’aborder d’une façon privilégiée ce côté largement négligé de la recherche Rorschach, et nous sommes adonnés à la tâche de rédiger cette Thèse **primordialement théorique** sur la nature essentielle, psychologique, de cette technique et sur le sens à donner, psychologique à nouveau, à cette quantité de données empiriques rassemblées avec l’épreuve pendant des longues années sans connection suffisante avec la théorie psychologique établie. SCHACHTEL, un de nos principaux précurseurs et modèles, dans l’introduction à son livre (1966) a décrit mieux que quiconque cette visée particulière de notre tâche scientifique et nous devons le citer *in extenso*:

Le but principal de ce livre est de contribuer à la compréhension du test de Rorschach... De la vaste littérature sur le test, largement la plus grande partie a été dévouée à ajouter à ces observations empiriques et à raffinements de la technique; relativement peu d’essais ont été faits pour questionner sur la logique interne du test et pour contribuer à ses fondements théoriques... L’essai pour augmenter notre compréhension des fondements du test me paraît important pour plusieurs raisons... Il est capable de contribuer encore plus à l’usage du test par le *clinicien*. On peut atteindre quelque compétence dans l’usage du test avec la simple connaissance des trouvailles empiriques que certaines cotations ou combinaison de cotations tendent à indiquer certains types de pathologie, certaines tendances, et certains avantages et limitations dans la personnalité de l’évalué. Mais une telle compétence et un tel usage du test restent aveugles dans le sens qu’ils ne découlent pas d’une compréhension du *pourquoi* les cotations signifient ou indiquent ce qu’elles sont supposées d’indiquer. Cette situation ressemble à un diagnostic sur la base de symptômes sans compréhension de la nature de la connection entre le symptôme et la condition qu’il indique couramment. Le mot “couramment” est important ici; sans compréhension de la connection entre symptôme et la condition empiriquement trouvée avec lui, on ne peut pas savoir quand ce qui semble être dans la surface le même symptôme n’indique *pas* la même condition. La “validation” empirique de la signification symptomatique de certaines cotations Rorschach ne diffère pas en principe de part de la validation sur laquelle repose beaucoup de la sagesse banale, c’est à dire, sur l’expérience récurrente d’une relation entre deux facteurs, une cotation et un trait ou une tendance... La différence principale c’est que maintenant nous disposons de méthodes statistiques qui nous dissent quand faut il accepter une telle relation comme valide mais qui n’excluent pas la possibilité que dans n’importe quel cas particulier elle peut ne pas être valide. Aucune quantité de validation des significations des cotations-Rorschach peut se substituer à la compréhension de

ce qui se passe dans le test et dans son interprétation... De l'autre côté, utiliser le test sans un essai sérieux pour comprendre autant que possible de sa logique interne est tentant aussi bien que dangereux. C'est tentant spécialement pour le novice, mais aussi pour l'expert, dans la mesure où il peut leur donner un sentiment bâtard de sécurité de s'appuyer sur une signification fixée d'une cotation particulière ou d'un symbole particulier qu'ils ont appris d'une autorité - un professeur ou un livre. C'est plus difficile si on doit toujours examiner à nouveau si éventuellement une telle signification s'applique vraiment à la réponse concrète devant eux. Ceci ne veut pas dire, bien entendu, qu'une relation statistiquement valide entre une cotation particulière et une signification particulière soit sans valeur. Cela veut dire seulement qu'il y a encore besoin de jugement pour décider si éventuellement la signification courante s'applique dans un cas particulier. Si la dépendance aveugle de significations apprises de cotations et similaires est un danger, le développement d'un langage Rorschach et d'une psychologie Rorschach ésotériques, point ou pas suffisamment en connexion et intégrés avec notre connaissance générale de la psychologie de la personnalité normale et anormale et des relations interpersonnelles, c'est un autre. L'usage d'un tel langage ésotérique et d'une psychologie Rorschach spéciale comporte le danger qu'ils ne communiquent pas significativement avec d'autres personnes, et même pas avec d'autres psychologues et psychiatres. (pp. 1-3)

Méthodologie Scientifique

En accord avec l'état de choses défini dans l'Introduction il ne s'agit pas dans cette Thèse d'encore une autre recherche expérimentale personnelle, mais en contraste d'une réflexion primordialement théorique avec l'intention de trouver et de donner un sens cohérent et intégrateur (1^{re} hypothèse) à cette quantité de trouvailles primordialement empiriques de nos prédécesseurs qui ont justement manqué en général d'une systématisation théorique satisfaisante.

Avant de développer notre propre vision des choses, et simultanément avec notre expérience quotidienne avec l'épreuve dans notre pratique clinique et d'évaluation générale depuis 25 ans déjà, nous avons fait (chap. II) une révision critique et exhaustive de la littérature sur la théorie du Rorschach depuis 1921; bien que celle-ci soit une tâche matériellement faisable pour un chercheur dû au manque relatif déjà mentionné de publications sur le sujet, il ne faut pas se méprendre sur son énormité dû à l'éclatement du mouvement Rorschach dans une infinité d'écoles, langues, pays, pendant plus de 80 ans. Heureusement cette entreprise a déjà été menée à bon terme. Comme résultat nous avons été frappés par quelques contributions significatives et éclairantes à la compréhension de la nature de l'instrument par un petit groupe d'auteurs, couramment ceux avec accès direct ou identifiés avec les idées classiques du créateur de la méthode, mais en général surtout par les désaccords innécessaires et le manque global d'intégration même quand les différents auteurs ont avancé des théorisations valables et à nos yeux compatibles/complémentaires (2^{me} hypothèse) avec celles des autres. Pour ne

donner qu'un exemple, c'est le cas d'auteurs de la tradition phénoménologique à suivre attentivement comme MINKOWSKA ou même KUHN, toujours réticents aux aussi respectables théorisations psychanalytiques en dépit de l'influence capitale et inquestionnable que l'oeuvre de FREUD a eu dans la création de RORSCHACH (3^{me} hypothèse).

Avec l'aide de cette per(rétro)spective nous nous sommes alors dirigés (chap. III) précisément à la source elle-même, c'est à dire à l'oeuvre de RORSCHACH, pour essayer d'explicitier le concept que l'auteur se faisait de sa propre création et ainsi être en mesure par la suite de développer une compréhension ou théorisation de l'instrument en accord avec son essence originaire. Bien qu'il a eu manifestement une intuition globalement valable et qu'il a même avancé quelques idées concrètes sur sa conception de l'épreuve (comme un expériment "percepto-diagnostique", ou "perceptanalytique": PIOTROWSKI), le fait reste qu'il n'a pas tout écrit ou explicité et qu'il faut faire un travail d'induction ou de reconstruction à partir des détails à la main. Ajoutons que nous ne nous sommes pas contentés avec le recours à son seul livre mais que nous nous sommes référés aussi à tout autre source capable de nous éclairer sur ce que RORSCHACH avait en tête, y compris ses oeuvres mineures, ses protocoles non publiés, ses lettres, ses taches, et les informations facilitées par ceux qui l'ont traité en personne ou qui ont eu accès à la partie toujours jalousement gardée de ces mêmes sources (MORGENTHALER, OBERHOLZER, ROEMER, ZULLIGER, ELLENBERGER, KUHN, BASH, EXNER).

Deux choses nous ont frappé particulièrement: tout d'abord l'évidente présence déjà mentionnée de la Psychanalyse comme la référence théorique majeure chez lui; et -ce qui était largement moins évident- une omniprésente mais implicite formalisation triadique de ses idées, visible par exemple dans l'énumération close de ses catégories de cotation des réponses (localisations: globale = G, détail courant = D, et détail rare = Dd; déterminants: mouvement = B, forme = F, et couleur = Fb) et significativement comparable à des schémas théoriques similaires (comparez par ex. la dernière série avec la triade de son maître BLEULER: pensée, volonté, affect), et qui dénonce l'existence d'une intuition structurale *a priori* (4^{me} hypothèse) contre l'avis de ces "systématisateurs" (EXNER) athéoriques *a posteriori* qui ont toujours supposé (par projection, puisque jamais démontré) une méthode asystématique chez notre auteur. Un exemple aussi parlant est celui de la sériation standard de ses 10 (originellement 15) taches: leur auteur a décidé de la sorte mais en disant très peu, des successeurs ont supposé une séquence psychogénétique symbolique, l'expérimentation ne l'a point confirmée (DWORETZKI, 1939), et à nous de trouver l'explication plus que plausible dans le même principe de structuration spatiale des déterminants par la division des planches en trois sousgroupes (gauche-centre-droite; B-F-Fb; I-III, IV-VII, VIII-X). Ces et encore d'autres trouvailles similaires nous ont pleinement convaincu d'avoir découvert et mis en place, pour la première fois explicitement, le système original de pensée de RORSCHACH organisateur de toutes ses idées et observations, mais comme il ne l'a jamais décrit noir sur blanc lui-même (au moins dans ses documents à notre disposition) il ne nous reste pour l'établir que le chemin de la méthode inductive (il a eu la diffuse intuition globale du début et sur

cette base a rassemblé ensuite des données expérimentales détaillées, pour nous laisser à nous le soin de la synthèse supérieure, théorico-empirique, qui relie ces deux domaines) et pour le démontrer la validation par la reconstruction herméneutique (FREUD, 1937). Sur la scientificité de cette méthode (cf. aussi RICOEUR, GADAMER) et son rapport avec l'expérimentation, il nous semble utile de citer ici les propos de l'éminent psychiatre-phénoménologue Ludwig BINSWANGER (1926/1970):

...Cela ne change rien au fait historique que la psychanalyse de Freud a, pour la première fois systématiquement, *fondé* l' "étude intrinsèque de l'humanité" sur l'expérience. Ce fait est en règle générale négligé aussi par les "critiques" sérieux de la psychologie de Freud, ou n'est pas situé sous son vrai jour. Conformément à la nouveauté de sa procédure à l'intérieur de la science *médicale*, on s'est principalement attaché à ce que Freud appelait interpréter (Deuten), sans se douter, ou en oubliant que cet interpréter, précisément comme "interpréter", avait déjà un nom et s'était déjà acquis un droit de cité dans les sciences les plus différentes. Sous le nom d'*herméneutique*, ou de procédure herméneutique dans le sens d'un "art de l'interprétation", et de la présentation, des règles de cet art... Dans la mesure où le contenu particulier et la fin particulière d'une procédure scientifique n'ont rien à voir avec cette procédure en tant que telle, il serait facile de présenter la procédure freudienne d'interprétation comme un cas particulier de l'herméneutique des sciences de l'esprit (philologie, théologie, histoire dans toutes ses branches), et cela dans le sens d'une structuration et d'un approfondissement particuliers, empiriques, de cette herméneutique sous son aspect psychologique ou individuel (Böckh). Et cette proposition est donc également valable... que Freud a, pour la première fois, fondé l'herméneutique sur l'expérience (au sens de la *science* expérimentale). (p. 157)

Dans le même sens du côté expérimental de notre recherche (définie comme primordialement -pas exclusivement- théorique), puisqu'il existe bel et bien tant il est vrai qu'il est matériellement impossible de faire de la pure théorie (tout comme de la pure empirie d'ailleurs, quoi qu'en disent les soi-disants empiristes extrêmes), faisons une récapitulation des principales recherches dans le domaine qui ont été nos points d'appui et d'inspiration scientifiques clés (cf. les deux premiers paragraphes de la présente section méthodologique):

[Pour chaque contribution nous présentons, dans cet ordre: année de publication, auteurs(s), titre, type de recherche (primordialement Expérimentale ou Théorique), et grandeur de l'échantillon]

1921 405	Rorschach	Expériment percepto-diagnostique	E	
1932	Binder	Interprétations clairobscur	E	271
1939	Dworetzki	Evolution de la perception	E	210
1945-1946 271	Rapaport et al.	Evaluation psycho-diagnostique	T-E	
1948-1954	Zulliger	Test-Z	E	8,000

1949?	Kuhn	Leçon Introductive au Rorschach	T	-
1951	Bohm	Manuel du Psychodiagnostic		T-E
>>32				
1954	Ellenberger	La Vie et l'Oeuvre de H. Rorschach	T	
-				
1957	Piotrowski	Perceptanalyse		E
?				
1962	Salomon	Diagnostic du Moi (génético-structural)	T	-
1966	Schachtel	Fondements expérimentiels	T	-
1976	Mélon	Figures du Moi	T-E	462

Bien que celle-ci n'est qu'une sélection étroite des ouvrages plus pertinents qui nous ont permis d'arriver à nos conclusions essentielles, elle suffit à montrer *grosso modo* la proportion équilibrée entre expérimentation-théorisation et combien d'expérience y a-t-il derrière notre propre contribution, indissolublement liée à celles de nos prédécesseurs cités. Personnellement nous n'avons pas utilisé d'échantillon formel propre dans le sens courant de la méthode expérimentale (tel comme ça a été le cas pour les recherches des théoriciens KUHN, SALOMON et SCHACHTEL plus haut), mais par contre nous avons eu le soin de tester nos résultats dans la pratique avec l'analyse de protocoles de quelques cas selon la méthode idiographique (chap. IV; cf. références de SCHACHTEL et BINSWANGER sur ce sujet, citations plus haut); le plus détaillé et le mieux en mesure de démontrer ce qu'on peut scientifiquement atteindre comme profit net à partir de nos nouvelles vues et découvertes est celui du criminel de guerre Nazi Adolf Eichmann, sans égal dans la littérature projective.

Nonobstant le fait que -à l'instar de H. Rorschach lui-même- notre compromis théorique est consciemment et prédominamment psychanalytique, nos résultats suggèrent clairement (et en fait incluent aussi quelques preuves concrètes de) la factibilité d'être intégrés sans difficulté dans d'autres contextes psychologico-profonds, psycho-génétiques, *Gestaltiques* et, *last but not least*, phénoménologiques: la Psychanalyse ne possède certainement pas l'exclusivité pour l'exploitation valide de la théorie Rorschach, mais à l'encontre des chercheurs soi-disants "athéoriques" nous soutenons qu'en science il doit y avoir au moins UNE (quelque) théorie guidant notre pratique. D'un point de vue encore plus étroit nos dettes théoriques fondamentales sont envers Jacques SCHOTTE d'un côté, dont nous nous efforçons d'imiter ce qu'il a accompli pour la théorisation de l'épreuve et, au delà, du système de pensée de son Maître L. SZONDI, et Hans ZULLIGER de l'autre qui sans se rendre compte en contraste mais d'une façon entièrement symétrique avait arrivé à lire structurellement la contribution de son Maître direct H. RORSCHACH apportant pour sa part, comme la 'théorie des circuits' du premier, "une dimension temporelle à une représentation des choses jusqu'ici purement spatiale" (Mélon & Lekeuche, 1982/1989, p. 21) avec son Test-Z, pierre de touche de notre recherche.